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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the effect of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on national 
criminal justice practices for core international crimes. It considers that the 
complementarity system of the ICC is firmly based upon the issues of admissibility 
established under Article 17 of the Rome Statute and that positive complementarity 
practices should remain coherent with and based upon that system. As such, the thesis 
is constructed to systematically analyse the legal requirements of ‘admissibility-proof’ 
criminal justice at the national level according to the law and early practices of the 
ICC. 
 
Through analysis of the applicable sources of law available to the ICC, including its 
emerging jurisprudence on admissibility, the thesis demonstrates that the ICC provides 
much greater latitude to national criminal jurisdictions than has previously been 
accepted and that this profoundly affects the concept of positive complementarity, 
including its legal foundation, its definition as well as its implementation, through 
policy and practice. Through analysis of each of the issues of admissibility the thesis 
proves that the emphasis on legal reform of substantive and procedural criminal law is 
over-emphasised to the negligence of several other factors. These factors include 
quantitative restrictions, shaped by the objects of reference of the ICC’s own 
investigations and the ICC’s case selection criteria. Turning to the indicators of 
willingness and ability, the thesis establishes that the early practice of the ICC has 
demonstrated that the complementarity system functions within a plural legal order that 
does not require States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction as a form of mimicry of 
the ICC, but largely according to the national laws and practices in place at the time. 
Notwithstanding this, the thesis argues that legal reform may be advisable to ensure the 
removal the omissions or procedural bars that could render a case admissible to the 
ICC.  
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Chapter 1. 
In Search of the Goldilocks Zone: The Rome Statute’s Effect on 
National Criminal Justice 
 
 
This thesis examines the effect of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on national criminal 
justice practices for core international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and eventually aggression) arguing that the admissibility regime of the ICC provides 
significant latitude to national criminal law frameworks and practices than has previously 
been accepted and which profoundly affects the concept of positive complementarity.  
 
As the only permanent international court with jurisdiction over core international crimes, the 
ICC is expected to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions in ensuring the 
effective prosecution of individuals who perpetrate these crimes. Its Statute establishes an 
admissibility regime whereby national justice systems are given priority to prosecute, unless 
the ICC considers them to be genuinely unwilling or unable to do so, according to criteria 
that must be assessed from the opening of a preliminary examination by the Office of the 
Prosecutor through to investigation and any eventual admissibility challenge or review. This 
process is supplemented with several information seeking-mechanisms and discretional 
powers to establish partnerships in pursuit of its mandate.  
 
Together, these mechanisms can be referred to as part of a system of complementarity, for the 
pursuit of the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of core international crimes, by the 
ICC and by States. Different organs of the ICC have acknowledged that this system of 
complementarity (also referred to as part of the ICC system of justice) requires measures to 
strengthen national criminal justice practices that were unforeseen in the Rome Statute. This 
led to the development of positive complementarity, a distinct aspect of complementarity, 
which aims to both catalyse and facilitate national compliance with the system of 
complementarity, largely, but not exclusively, through legal reform, capacity development 
and technical assistance activities.  
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However, the complementarity system in general and the text of the admissibility regime in 
particular, has been interpreted as requiring widely diverging national practices. At one 
extreme, it has been advocated that the standards and provisions of the ICC itself must be 
both adopted and evident in order for States to retain jurisdiction, to the other side of the 
spectrum, where it is argued that States simply need to follow their ordinary legal framework 
with good faith. With only a handful of decisions that address these issues, the first decade of 
the ICC has seen considerable uncertainty on what constitutes admissibility-proof criminal 
justice. Consequently, the possibility to develop a coherent policy of positive 
complementarity that is consistent to the Court’s mandate has been restricted. 
 
1. Argument  
This thesis critically examines the marketplace of complementarity models through the lens 
of the ICC’s admissibility regime in order to identify and clarify what ‘admissibility-proof’ 
criminal justice looks like at the national level. It argues that the adoption of substantive and 
procedural laws and the consequential allocation of resources to ensure their effectiveness 
should be clearly connected to complementarity and the requirements that the ICC Statute 
imposes on States. Such an approach acknowledges the centrality of complementarity to the 
effectiveness of the ICC as an international criminal tribunal but also to the system of justice 
that its Statute established, in order to reduce impunity for the perpetration of conduct under 
its Statute.  It considers that any models that claim to support this system of justice should be 
firmly located within the legal framework of the Rome Statute to guarantee legal certainty 
and equality of the Court’s subjects. It also recognises the considerable allocation of 
resources that criminal adjudication for ‘ICC’ crimes imposes on States and considers that 
States must have the capacity to implement the legal frameworks that its legislature 
establishes. For almost all territorial States, the perpetration of ICC-level criminal conduct 
occurs in extraordinary circumstances, where the gravity of the crimes, their scale and the 
contextual circumstances in which they arise, imposes huge costs on society at large. This 
includes the national judicial system, which under the ICC system, is expected to ensure that 
its capacity to do so is sufficient. Within this national context, the importance of a clear 
threshold that national criminal justice practices must obtain in order to retain jurisdiction is 
key, both for national planning and policy but also for the legitimacy and coherence of the 
ICC itself.  
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This examination confirms that the admissibility regime of the ICC establishes a lower 
threshold of national criminal justice practice than has been widely recognised: that is, that 
the national criminal justice practices are obliged to meet far fewer legal requirements and 
standards than the various models of complementarity have suggested. The consequences of 
this are numerous and stimulating, however two fall within the scope of this thesis. The more 
tangential consequence is a comparative one within the sphere of international harmonisation. 
It requires reflection on the differing standards, rules and obligations required of States under 
different international treaties and their enforcing bodies, in light of the ICC’s lower 
threshold requirements of national criminal justice procedures, but also in terms of the 
selection of cases and notions of the right to remedy. The more profound consequence is how 
this ‘copper plated’ system of national practice within the ICC system of complementarity 
affects national capacity to adjudicate core international crimes, and consequently, influences 
concept of positive complementarity, including its legal foundation, its definition as well as 
its implementation, through policy and practice. Despite the fascinating and complex issues 
that are raised by the concept of positive complementarity and its relationship (or otherwise) 
to the admissibility regime of the ICC, the constraints of logic and space have curtailed this 
expedition. First, in order to address the relationship between the practice of the admissibility 
regime and positive complementarity, it was necessary to establish, in depth, the admissibility 
law and practice of the Court. Without this strong foundation, the possibility to address the 
concept of positive complementarity in a detailed and rigorous way would have been limited. 
Therefore these issues are not addressed in the detail they deserve. They are however, 
confronted in section 5 of this Chapter, as an appraisal of the relationship between the ICC 
and positive complementarity, which serves as a summary of avenues for future research.   
  
As such, the thesis is constructed to systematically analyse the legal requirements of 
‘admissibility-proof’ criminal justice at the national level according to the law and early 
practices of the ICC.  
 
1.1. Are the Complementarity Models Applicable to the System of Complementarity 
According to its Admissibility Component? 
Each of the models of complementarity examined in the literature review (Section 3) seek to 
influence the practices of the ICC, but most importantly they impose different expectations 
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upon States Parties of the ICC, most notably territorial States. Each model directly impacts 
the scale and qualities that national criminal justice systems can be expected or required to 
provide as members of the International Criminal Court and its Rome Statute, who operate 
within the system of complementarity and notably can satisfy the admissibility criteria.  
While each of the approaches aim to clarify a compelling and still somewhat ambiguous facet 
of jurisdictional allocation in international law, the diversity of views creates a number of 
problems. As early as 2002, the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law 
noted that: ‘conflicting interpretations create two types of problem. First, they diminish legal 
security, […] Second, it puts legal subjects in an unequal position vis-à-vis each other.1  
 
Through contrasting the models of complementarity against the admissibility regime and the 
decisions on admissibility that have been issued between 2002 and 20132 this thesis shows 
that many models of complementarity have no reasonable basis according to the legal 
requirements of the admissibility regime. Instead, the substantive and procedural 
requirements that States must adhere to in law and in practice are significantly lower than the 
gold-standard justice that is written into the laws of the ICC.  
 
1.2. To What Extent Does ‘Admissibility-Proof’ National Criminal Justice Comply 
With the Rules and Principles of Other International Obligations? 
One of the common errors or claims is that the ICC is required to impose or enforce the 
operational parts of the Rome Statute when assessing the admissibility of State practices, or 
that it is required to enforce external international treaty obligations, norms or standards that 
may form part of States’ general international treaty obligations. In part this has been driven 
by use of Article 21, on the sources of applicable law, where the rules and principles derived 
from international law form part of the sources of law, in addition to a general ‘human rights 
consistency’ filter which requires that the interpretation and application of the ICC Statute 
must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights. However, this thesis finds 
                                                
1 International Law Commission Study Group on Fragmentation and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law: Topic (a): The Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of “Self 
Contained Regimes”: An Outline’ (2003) 55th Session, ILC 2. 
2 From 1 July 2002, when the ICC became operational until the Pre-Trial Chamber’s (PTC) decisions in 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi: the Appeal judgment in Gaddafi, issued on 21 May 2014 is considered in the 
conclusion. 
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that many models inaccurately apply or use Article 21 to justify their model, and that in fact, 
the ICC expects a standard of criminal justice that is markedly different from several core 
international obligations, most notably in due process rights. While many proponents of the 
mirror thesis may have sought to achieve a form of progressive realisation of broader global 
rights3 the reality is that the ICC system, as it stands, does not support this, and in fact leads 
to a further fragmentation, or plurality, of States obligations through their international treaty 
membership.  
 
1.3. Determining the Impact of Admissibility Law and Practice On State Capacity 
and Positive Complementarity 
While the fragmentation of international law has many important consequences on national 
legal practice and policy, its impact on national capacity to investigate, prosecute and 
adjudicate conduct proscribed by the ICC Statute is critical to the efficacy of the ICC’s 
complementarity system. The diversity of international rules and standards that States are 
obliged or required to uphold, including possible contradictions or differences between the 
expectations of international regimes places considerable resource challenges on States: in 
adopting differing rules and standards to its international or regional counterparts, the ICC 
inadvertently adds to this burden. The replication of differing rules and standards has 
received some critical attention in the context of the debate on UN treaty body reform and the 
centralisation or streamlining of States the reporting obligations.4 Arguably, those advocating 
that national practices under the ICC system of justice to adhere to ‘higher’ or broader 
standards than the Court itself will consider, could argue that the adoption of the higher 
standard would reduce duplication and the possibilities of human rights-based complaints for 
                                                
3 See for example M Cherif Bassiouni, Chicago Principles of Post Conflict Justice (International Human Rights 
Law Institute 2007); Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘International Crimes, Local Justice: A Handbook for Rule 
of Law Policymakers, Donors, and Implementers’ (Open Society Foundations 2011); UN Secretary General, 
‘United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice: Guidance Note of the Secretary General’ (2010). 
4 See for example, Christen Broecker and Micheal O’Flaherty, ‘THE OUTCOME OF THE GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY’S TREATY BODY STRENGTHENING PROCESS: An Important Milestone on a Longer 
Journey’ (Universal Rights Group 2014); M O’Flaherty and Claire O’Brien, ‘Reform of UN Human Rights 
Treaty Monitoring Bodies: A Critique of the Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified 
Standing Treaty Body’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 141; Michael O’Flaherty, ‘Reform of the UN 
Human Rights Treaty Body System: Locating the Dublin Statement’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 319; 
John Mojin, ‘REFORMING UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING REFORM’ 58 
Netherlands International Law Review 295. 
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ICC-related cases to international or regional human rights bodies.5 Megret and others have 
argued that this exercise of ‘uplifting’ national practices to mirror international counterparts 
is not strictly part of the ICC’s mandate or its complementarity regime, 6 while the 2011 
World Development Report drew out the broader and longer term costs of conflict on 
national development, including the legal and political measures for accountability and 
restoration.7 Little systematic attention has been dedicated to assessing the implications of 
multiple international standards on the capacity of domestic jurisdictions and the 
consequential qualities of criminal justice, nor of the additional resources that may be 
necessary to enable such practice, most notably in those States emerging from or enduring 
sustained conflict.  
 
Turning to positive complementarity, it is clear that the emergent tensions of fragmentation, 
as well as the expressions of divergent preferences extend into the core of its conceptual 
basis, including its legal foundation, definition and implementation. I assert that the concept 
of positive complementarity as well as its application should be aligned to its judicial 
counterpart. This means that the legal regime of Article 17 should remain at the epicentre of 
its design and implementation, informed by the mandate and objectives of the ICC, where 
any activities go beyond the requirements of the ICC admissibility regime should be clearly 
distinguished as separate or additional to the ICC minimum requirements. Having emerged 
from the ICC in connection to its mechanism to allocate jurisdiction between States and the 
ICC, the concept of positive complementarity is inherently derived from the functions of the 
ICC, and so to divorce it from the ICC or to segregate it from the trajectory of the ICC’s 
powers would be a fundamental repurposing of the concept and hence its form of reference.  
 
                                                
5  See for example, Christopher Keith Hall, ‘Developing and Implementing an Effective Positive 
Complementarity Strategy’, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, vol 48 (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009); Christine Bjork and Juanita Goebertus, ‘Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society 
and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya’ (2011) 14 Yale Human Rights & Development Law 
Journal 205. 
6 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation and the Uses of Complementarity’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
7  World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development’ (2011) 
<http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext>; Jake Sherman, ‘Criminal Justice: Security and Justice Thematic 
Paper’ [2011] Background Paper, World Development Report. See also the background paper contribution by 
Pablo de Greiff to this report, ‘Transitional Justice, Security and Development’ October 29, 2010. 
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2.  Methodology 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis adopts a doctrinal methodology, placing the 
rules of the Statute at its epicentre. It starts from the sources of applicable law available to the 
ICC for the application and interpretation of the statutory provisions on complementarity and 
admissibility and moves through the issues identified by the various models of 
complementarity, analysing the various assumptions of the complementarity models 
according to the sources provided for by the Statute. This of course entails detailed review of 
the emerging practice of the ICC through its admissibility proceedings, where it identifies 
and evaluates the tests and rules that have sprung from the first decade of the Court’s 
decisions on the admissibility of its cases. The conclusion switches to a normative mode, to 
review the outcomes of the doctrinal analysis against the definition and purpose of positive 
complementarity, to propose a framework that adheres to the object and purpose of the ICC. 
 
Following the UN Security Council referral of Libya to the ICC, the admissibility of cases 
finally moved from general considerations of the activity of national justice systems and 
definitions of the parameters of a ‘case,’ into more detailed and contested analysis of the 
meaning of willingness and ability. This unfolded in the final phases of this PhD thesis, 
providing a satisfying verification of many of the conclusions of the thesis, while it finally 
introduced the importance of national capacity to adjudicate, as part of the admissibility 
evaluations. The substantive part of this thesis however, includes only the Pre-Trial 
Chambers jurisprudence in Gaddafi and Al-Senussi. The fascinating and slightly divided 
Appeals Chamber decision in Gaddafi was issued in the final days of this thesis, and is 
analysed in the conclusion. The Appeals Chamber Decision in Al-Senussi was issued 
delivered after the submission of this thesis and has not been reviewed herein. 
3. Literature Review  
Legal research and policy analysis of complementarity, admissibility and positive 
complementarity has largely treated the three issues as distinct and unconnected topics: 
complementarity and admissibility research has largely focused on the formal requirements 
that the ICC or States should apply with some attention to comparative practices of other 
international criminal courts. The literature on positive complementarity has largely sought to 
justify the concept and to propose activities, without questioning its legal or formal basis: put 
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simply it hasn’t inquired into what needs to be catalysed or facilitated in order to satisfy the 
complementarity system and consequently, any admissibility procedure.   
 
The ICC has been relatively slow to establish jurisprudence on issues of complementarity and 
admissibility, and prefers to make case-specific analysis8 rather than providing authoritative 
interpretations on the standards or practice that it requires of States. Combined with certain 
textual ambiguities, and in the shadows of law, publicists, policy makers, development 
agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have established a vibrant marketplace 
of ‘complementarity-proof’ models based on their interpretation of the rules. Early analysis 
of complementarity sought to review its history in international criminal law9 or to consider 
its impact on national criminal jurisdictions10 while collected volumes have addressed 
isolated contemporary and practical challenges,11 as well as niche features of its positive 
dimensions,12 drawing on public international law, but primarily through its sub-disciplines 
of international criminal law and international human rights law as well as international 
relations, transitional justice, and slowly, development studies and legal anthropology.  
 
3.1. The Mirror Thesis Models: National Legal Frameworks and Practices Should 
Be Harmonised With The Rome Statute  
A great deal of literature has focused, erroneously in my view, on the vertical harmonisation 
of national laws and practices with those of the ICC, as well as the horizontal transplantation 
of practice from the two Ad-hoc Tribunals to the ICC. This view has been a dominant and 
persuasive force, during the Rome Conference negotiations and in the years following the 
adoption of the Statute, in academia, in policy and diplomacy, and to an extent, through State 
                                                
8 See Trial Chamber II, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
(Article 19 of the Statute)(The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Situation in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) 2009 [ICC-01/04-01/07-1213] 24., page 28.  
9 Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development 
and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
10 Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The 
Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008); Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the 
Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (First, Oxford University Press 2008). 
11 Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy, The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From 
Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court, vol. 48 (Martinus Nijhoff 2009), Legal Aspects of International 
Organisations 
12 Morten Bergsmo (ed), Active Complementarity: Legal Information Transfer (Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher 2011);  
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legislative practices. Under this view, which Mégret calls the ‘mirror thesis’ and Teitel and 
Howse refer to as ‘ultra-compliance,’ 13  admissibility-proof State practice is frequently 
equated to implementation of the substantive and procedural elements of the Rome Statute, 
reform of institutions and training of the criminal justice sector to ensure that the new legal 
framework will be operative. It is a reform driven, upward trajectory that requires ‘States to 
develop an ability to exercise certain forms of jurisdiction which they may not have had from 
the start’14 by harmonising their legal framework and practice not only with the ICC’s own 
activities, but also often with international human rights law, and partially adopts the 
frameworks of rule of law reform and state building. 15 
 
Many NGOs have argued that States must adapt the legal frameworks to comply with the 
ICC’s own fair trial provisions,16 arguing that the jurisdictional element of complementarity 
‘gives preference to domestic courts if they are capable of conducting fair trials’17 meaning 
that States will be ‘forced to ensure that their domestic judicial systems incorporate and 
adhere to principles of due process recognized by international law.’ Others have insisted 
that States need to include broader procedural protections including witness and victims 
protection although this has received far less attention than it ought to given the wording of 
Article 17(3), which requires proof that the State has the ability to obtain testimony. 18 
Checklists, manuals and model laws have sought to insert broader international and regional 
substantive and procedural rules as pre-requisites of the system of complementarity and have 
                                                
13 Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters’ 
(2010) 1 Global Policy Journal 127. 
14Héctor Olásolo and Enrique Carnero-Rojo, ‘The Application of the Principle of Complementarity to the 
Decision of Where to Open an Investigation: The Admissibility of Situations’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed 
M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2011)., p 374 
15 See for example Bassiouni, Chicago Principles of Post Conflict Justice (n 3); Open Society Justice Initiative 
(n 3). For a critique see Nehal C Bhuta, ‘State Building, Democratization and “Politics as Technology”’ in 
Hilary Charlesworth, Brett Bowden and Jeremy Farrall (eds), Great Expectations: The Role of International 
Law in Restructuring Societies After Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
16 Mark S Ellis, ‘International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity 
Building, The’ (2002) 15 Florida Journal of International Law 215; Federica Gioia, ‘State Sovereignty, 
Jurisdiction, and “Modern” International Law: The Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal 
Court’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 1095; L Yang, ‘On the Principle of Complementarity in 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 121; 
Jonathan O’Donohue and Sophie Rigney, ‘The ICC Must Consider Fair Trial Concerns in Determining Libya’s 
Application to Prosecute Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Nationally’; Amnesty International, ‘International Criminal 
Court: Updated Checklist for Effective Implementation’ (2010) IOR 53/009/2010. 
17 Ellis (n 14) 222. 
18 See Open Society Justice Initiative (n 3) 102; UN Secretary General (n 3) 6; Bassiouni, Chicago Principles of 
Post Conflict Justice (n 3).  
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encouraged donors and policy makers address national criminal justice under the ICC system 
as being consistent with international human rights treaties and rule of law standards.19  
 
As part of its Memorandum of Association with the ICC, the Commonwealth Secretariat 
adopted a revised Model Law To Implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, to provide guidance and technical assistance to the 19 Commonwealth countries yet to 
join to ICC and approximately half of its members who are yet to implement the Rome 
Statute.20 Revised by diplomats with extensive involvement in the adoption of the Rome 
Statute and with observers drawn from the ICC, its Assembly of States Parties Secretariat, the 
ICRC, NGO’s and academics,21 the Model Law offers a clear and influential example of 
Mégret’s Hard Mirror Thesis, arguably promoted by the ICC through the Memorandum, 
whereby the substantive dimensions of the Rome Statute, notably crimes, penalties, liabilities 
and defences are provided with equal weight as the obligations of the Statute.22 The level of 
support behind the adoption of this particular Model Law23 arguably provides an indication of 
the drive towards a more effect-based model of State practice under complementarity, rather 
than the stricter, rule-based version proposed by Mégret. 
 
Despite the absence of an express obligation to implement the substantive parts of the Statute 
into domestic law, almost as many States have done so, as have implemented the explicit 
obligation to cooperate with the ICC. 24  Overwhelmingly, it has been considered an 
imperative action that States capture, define and apply international crime nomenclature as 
completely as possible.25 One of the most prolific publicists on national legal frameworks for 
                                                
19 Amnesty International (n 14); Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Model Law: To Implement the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, Adopted at the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior 
Officials, 14 July 2011’ (2011) LMM(11)17 [Provisional]. 
20 See also Akande (n 20). 
21 Including Parliamentarians for Global Action and the British Red Cross, and comments received from Dapo 
Akande . See Annex A, Commonwealth Expert Group on Review of the Implementing Legislation for the Rome 
Statute, report from the Chair, 23-25 February 2011, paragraphs 1-2. 
22 the incorporation of offences against the administration of justice and the provision of cooperation and 
judicial assistance. Parts II-V, as well as enforcement of ICC sentences and the Agreement of Privileges and 
Immunities, in parts VIII and IX, Model Law. 
23 A handful of Model Laws were issued by regional bodies in the immediate aftermath of the entry into force of 
the Rome Statute, including the Commonwealth Secretariat Model, the Arab League Model, as aids to States 
Parties. 
24 Olympia Bekou, ‘Crimes at Crossroads Incorporating International Crimes at the National Level’ (2012) 10 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 677.  
25 See Commonwealth Secretariat (n 17); Ellis (n 14) 229; Katherine L Doherty and Timothy LH McCormack, 
‘Complementarity" as a Catalyst for Comprehensive Domestic Penal Legislation’ (2009) 5 U.C Davis Journal of 
International Law and Policy 147., Human Rights Watch, Making the International Criminal Court Work: A 
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core international crimes in the ICC era, Olympia Bekou has consistently prioritised the 
adoption of substantive parts of the ICC Statute, as part of the complementarity deal: ‘States 
are given the opportunity to investigate or prosecute nationally. In order to be able to do this, 
they would need to have provisions incorporating the core ICC crimes, the general principles 
of liability as well as the defenses found in the Statute.’26 The assertion of what States need in 
order to conduct effective prosecutions, as opposed to what they are obliged or required to 
do, occurs frequently and is commonly justified as a protection mechanism against the 
Court’s potential interest in their caseload, thereby linking their argument back to the 
admissibility component of complementarity. Some have also used the customary status of 
many of the Rome Statute’s substantive and procedural provisions27  to legitimize the 
incorporation of the operative parts of the ICC Statute into national law28 where the 
customary status of individual rules become equally binding upon States as upon the Court.29 
However, there is a considerable leap between the fact of repetition, whereby the Rome 
Statute repeats rules, rights, duties and obligations already enshrined in international treaties 
or embodied in custom, and the assumption that the repetition itself generates legally binding 
obligations upon States Parties, with the effects of enforceability by the ICC.30 In addition to 
customary international law, the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda was also adopted in early 
normative arguments for broad inclusion of the Rome Statute’s substantive provisions into 
domestic laws. Measures of good faith have also been put forward to establish that States 
must performed to the best of their ability and resources, as well as to the letter and spirit of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Handbook for Implementing the Rome Statute, 2001,13:4, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform,  
International Criminal Court: Manual for the Ratification  and the Implementation of the Rome Statute, 2008, 
3rd edition,  
26 Olympia Bekou, ‘In the Hands of the State: Implementing Legislation and Complementarity’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 839. 
27 In the case of crimes against humanity, and the laws of non-international armed conflict (NIAC), the Rome 
Statute is accepted as a formalization of customary international law, with some small innovations. Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts, ‘Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and 
Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict’ (International Review of the Red Cross, March 2005) 177. 
28 Noora Johanna Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Interpreting the 
Concept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals (European University Institute 2011). 
29  Mark Eugen Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Study of Their Interactions and 
Interrelations, with Special Consideration of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (M Nijhoff; 
Distributors for the US and Canada, Kluwer Academic 1985) 289–306. 
30 Writing in 1992, Cherif Bassiouni cautioned human rights advocates against overlooking the ‘important legal 
distinctions and attempt the de jure condendo extrapolation of legal rights or binding obligations from 
international instruments which do not have legally binding effects.’ M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the 
Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in 
National Constitutions’ (1992) 3 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 235. 
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the ICC Statute,31 which some consider to include complementarity and cooperation32 and 
others as a good faith requirement according to the letter of the Statute. 
 
Finally, many authors promoting the mirror thesis acknowledge the normative nature of their 
enterprise, but seek to ground their claims in broader rule of law tropes, including the 
interests of justice,33 fight against impunity34 the importance of institution or state building, 
of broader coherence with international law, and obligations that may be held or monitored 
by other regimes. 35 This blurring of treaty limits with rule of law tropes seems to conform to 
a ‘tendency towards vagueness’36 where the need to comply with established rules of 
international law is stressed without precisely defining or elaborating on the precise content 
of the legal requirements, or the specific body to which the obligation is ‘enforced’ mostly to 
stress the sovereign discretion of States but also to allow the most pertinent areas of a newly 
established international law to become obvious. 
 
In one of the more authoritative and clinical examinations of the scope of complementarity, 
Jo Stigen has cautioned against simplistic adoption of the Rome Statute, which requires 
resources and thoroughness that will far exceed national qualities: ‘the ICC standard cannot 
reasonably be expected to be matched by national resources.’37  Others have seen the 
pragmatic imperative of adopting the substantive parts of the Statute in order to demonstrate 
that the State has the ability to proceed38 while others have gone further, linking legal reform 
with ‘capacity-orientated assistance’ in order to demonstrate States capability to prevent 
admissibility and provide ‘internationally acceptable criminal justice.’39 This reform-driven 
                                                
31 See Andre de Hoogh, ‘The Relationship between National Law and International Law in the Report of the 
Georgia Fact-Finding Mission’; Libya Article 19 Request (Gadaffi) [2012] Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-
01/11.  
32 International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy,, ‘International Criminal Court: 
Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute’ (2008) ISBN: 978-0-9730432-6-6 11. 
33 Triffterer (n 4). 
34 Bekou, ‘In the Hands of the State: Implementing Legislation and Complementarity’ (n 20) 839. 
35 Jan Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive Criminal Law’ 
(2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86, 78. 
36 Diane F Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ 
(1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 2537, 2551. 
37 Stigen (n 8) Chapter 6. 
38 See for example Edoardo Greppi, ‘Inability to Investigate and Prosecute under Article 17’, The International 
Criminal Court and national jurisdictions (Ashgate 2008) 69. 
39 Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou and Annika Jones, ‘Complementarity After Kampala: Capacity Building 
and the ICC’s Legal Tools’ (2010) 2 Göttingen Journal of International Law 791. 
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and harmonising approach builds on the various Complementarity Resolutions and Reports 
adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.40 
 
3.2. Critiques Of The Mirror Thesis Models 
The harmonising or unifying effect of these approaches has been critiqued by those 
advocating for pluralism, as having largely disregarded the admissibility criteria, as ‘part of a 
universalising drive that overstates the homogenising requirements of the struggle against 
impunity beyond and even in contradiction with complementarity.’41 In developing a critique 
of the mirror thesis proponents, Megret argues that they falsely insist on incorporation of the 
Rome Statute in four ways: (i) by abusively transposing ICC-specific features onto states, by, 
for example, insisting that States abolish immunities of all foreign heads of States for ICC 
crimes, including incumbent figureheads;42 (ii) by mandating what is currently optional, such 
as excluding the death penalty from the sentencing structure for ICC prohibited crimes;43 (iii) 
requiring implementation of issues that are not connected to complementarity, including fair 
trial standards;44 and (iv) requiring too much identity with the Rome Statute, by for example 
faithfully reflecting the ICC regime by adopting ICC crimes, liabilities and general parts of 
international criminal law.45 A fifth enlargement or exaggeration also occurs, he suggests, 
where proponents push beyond the Rome Statute, to ‘correct’ the compromises of the 
negotiation process, in accordance to other international obligations, norms or standards, as a 
form of progressive realisation to broader global rights objectives.46  
 
                                                
40 Bureau of the ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Bureau on Complementarity’ ICC-ASP/9/26, 17 
November 2010; ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Taking Stock of the 
Principle of Complementarity:  Bridging the Impunity Gap’ (International Criminal Court) ICC-ASP/8/51, 18 
March 2010; Informal summary by the focal points, ‘Stocktaking of International Criminal Justice. Taking 
Stock of the Principle of Complementarity: Bridging the Immunity Gap.’ RC-11-Annex V.c (Previously issued 
as RC/ST/CM/1.) June 2010; Review Conference of the Rome Statute, ‘Focal Points’ Compilation of Examples 
of Projects Aimed at Strengthening Domestic Jurisdictions to Deal with Rome Statute Crimes’ 
RC/ST/CM/INF.2, 30 May 2012; Review Conference of the Rome Statute, ‘Resolution RC/Res.1, 
Complementarity’ (International Criminal Court) Adopted at the 9th plenary meeting, 08 June 2010. 
41 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation and the Uses of Complementarity’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 363. 
42 Ibid 368–369. Contrast with Amnesty International (n 14); Commonwealth Secretariat (n 17).  
43 Mégret (n 35) 370–371. Contrast to Amnesty International (n 14).  
44 Mégret (n 35) 371–372. . 
45 Ibid 373–375. 
46 For example, those proposed by Open Society Justice Initiative (n 3); UN Secretary General (n 3); Bassiouni, 
Chicago Principles of Post Conflict Justice (n 3). 
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A second critique occurs in a re-appraisal of the dominance of compliance studies in 
International Law, by Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel. 47  They argue that the process of 
creating new international treaties or norms generates a shift in decision making, from one set 
of elite actors to another (such as from diplomats or military planners, to legal professionals) 
and that the legal professionalization of the new treaty or norm may generate three types of 
compliance: under compliance, increased compliance or ‘ultra-compliance’ where ‘ultra-
compliance’ is an attempt to capture the effects of legal professionalization, which may go 
‘beyond what is desired from the perspective of the objectives of the legal regime.’48 They go 
on to consider examples of compliance and ultra-compliance in the context of the evolution 
of State practices following membership of the ICC and its Statute. In their view, compliance 
includes the symbolic commitment to the norms enshrined within the text through the act of 
signing and ratifying the Statute, through to the incorporation of its norms into domestic law, 
cooperation with the ICC or with other countries to transfer or extradite persons, as well as 
opening prosecutions.49  
 
3.3. Strict Interpretation or Pluralism Models: The Rome Statute Should Have 
Minimal Effect On National Legal Frameworks and Practices 
Instead, Mégret points to the absence of express obligations of States to implement the crimes 
and liabilities of the Rome Statute, to assert that states have only to exercise jurisdiction 
according to whatever laws they have in place at the time, without the need for updated or 
revised legislation but through ‘equivalent’ legal standards.50 In critiquing the surge of 
literature and lobbying to justify the harmonization of domestic law with the ICC, Mégret 
claims that ‘complementarity should be a device to manage diversity and pluralism in 
international criminal law.’51 He captures the tension of the complementarity regime as one 
between the exercise of jurisdiction of States using whatever laws that they have, in a way 
that is willing and able, and undergoing a sophisticated legal re-engineering to exercise 
                                                
47 Howse and Teitel (n 11). 
48 Ibid 132. 
49 Ibid 127. 
50 Frederic Mégret, ‘Too much of a good thing? Implementation and the uses of complementarity’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
51 Ibid 369. 
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certain forms of jurisdiction that are favoured by the ICC.52 In seeking to establish a middle 
ground for legal pluralism53 he points to the difficulties that legal transplants bring to 
domestic practice, particularly international law transplants, where ‘new and alien’ concepts 
prove problematic to implement, or generate ‘international bubbles’ within the domestic legal 
system, where inequity can creep in. 54  
 
Legal pluralism has also been advocated through concepts of polymorphic repression, 55 or 
‘sentencing theory of complementarity’ 56  where Diane Bernard and Kevin Jon Heller 
consider that the text of the Statute enables ‘flexibility regarding the legal basis and forms of 
the fight against impunity’ so long as national measures are concluded with rigid sentencing 
(where the person is convicted). Under this view, the Court’s admissibility determinations 
must be outcome driven and overlook any procedural irregularities or violations that may 
trigger other international treaty bodies, and look only for the possibility of prison sentences, 
ideally long ones.57 Bernard has argued that this outcome model of criminal justice is 
supported by the Statute, where ‘adequate and good faith implementation of the Statute is 
indispensible to the concrete application of complementarity […] States are encouraged […] 
but are not legally bound by a specific form of action or to a particular formalism.’58 Others 
have sought to view the ICC complementarity system through the lens of global governance, 
as a ‘comprehensive, multileveled, polycentric and actor-open enforcement regime of 
international criminal law’59 where global governance principles can rationalise an ‘all-too 
often irrational division of labour, material resources, information and expertise between 
these centres of gravity.’60 
                                                
52 Ibid 378. 
53 Paul Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 Southern Californai Law Review 1155. 
54 Andy Aitchison, Making the Transition: International Intervention, State-Building and Criminal Justice 
Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Intersentia 2011); Eszter Kirs, ‘Limits of the Impact of the International  
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the Domestic Legal System of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2011) 
3 Göttingen Journal of International Law 397. 
55 Diane Bernard, ‘What Does the Rome Statute Require from States? Penal Rigidity and Formal Flexibility in 
the Struggle Against Impunity’, Droit international pénal: précis (2nd edition, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2012) 311. 
56 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law 
Journal 85. 
57 One problem with the approach of Bernard, and also of Heller, both of whom insist that the ICC is entirely 
punitive and requires States to exert heavy sentences is that there is nothing in the Statute that indicates this, and 
nor does it reflect the ICC’s own sentencing limitations. 
58 Bernard (n 49) 311. 
59 Christoph Burchard, ‘Complementarity as Global Governance’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy 
(eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 167. 
60 Ibid 175. 
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In one of the game-changing articles on the scope of the complementarity system, Kevin Jon 
Heller systematically dismantled the claim that the admissibility regime requires States to 
protect all due process rights of suspects.61 Entitled The Shadow Side of Complementarity, 
Heller rejected the possibility that the ICC can seize jurisdiction from States on grounds of 
fair trial abuses, unless the abuse protects the accused from criminal justice, arguing that ICC 
judges are prevented from seizing jurisdiction where abuse of due process by national judicial 
actors has restricted the rights of an accused 62 This approach has been reiterated by others, 
notably Rob Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl Williams and Elizabeth Wilmshurt who argue that 
‘the principle of complementarity addresses the particular aspects of the proceedings which 
are referred to in Article 17, whereas more general human rights considerations about the 
conduct of national prosecutions are more properly addressed by human rights treaty 
bodies.’63 The separation of responsibilities between international tribunals and treaty bodies 
on such clearly connected issues requires attention and cooperation between the different 
international bodies, in reactive circumstances but also within the context of positive 
complementarity. 
 
3.4. Horizontal Mirroring: The Relevance of The Rules, Principles and Practices of 
the Ad-Hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
A further tranche of literature has engaged with what I call horizontal mirroring, where the 
experiences, practices and standards of the adhoc tribunal, notably the International Criminal 
Tribune for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and to a lesser extent, the non-Hague based 
international tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) are proposed as fundamental practices to be 
integrated into the ICC’s own practice. Many have done so through recourse to the sources of 
applicable law under the ICC Statute, where rules and principles of international law can be 
applied or provide interpretive value, but largely, this has been done by an almost hypnotic 
                                                
61 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255; Heller, ‘A Sentence-Based Theory of 
Complementarity’ (n 50); Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions 
(n 8); Olásolo and Carnero-Rojo (n 12). 
62 See Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity’ (n 55). 
63 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd ed, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 151. 
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assumption of the inherent importance of the ICTY/R’s work, most notably connected to its 
completion strategy, and an assumption that the institutions are mirror images of one another, 
despite the significant distinctions of their mandates and powers. A rejection of horizontal 
mirroring has also occurred, as ICC professionals and some academics reappraised the 
relevance of ICTY/R experiences in light of their different mandates, and some ICC 
judgments sought to restrict the applicability of ICTY/R experiences. 
 
From the strict interpretation of national due process requirements made by Heller, or the call 
for pluralism made by Mégret, to expectations of ‘ultra-compliance’ with the substantive 
parts of the Rome Statute, put forward by Bekou, Kleffner and Stigen and critiqued by 
Howse and Teitel, the diversity of views reviewed here, are without exception, rule-based, 
that is, they seek to identify the correct effect of the Rome Statute on national criminal law 
frameworks and practice, has been referred to as source-based ascertainment of rules.64  
 
3.5. ‘Positive’ Complementarity 
The concept of a more positive,65 constructive66 ‘pro-active’67 or active68 style of engagement 
between the ICC and State criminal justice institutions was born in the first operational days 
of the ICC, following the acceptance speech of the first ICC Prosecutor in 200369 and the 
                                                
64 Jean d’ Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
65 William W Burke-White, ‘Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of 
Justice’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 59; Hitomi Takemura, ‘A Critical Analysis of Positive 
Complementarity’ (2007); Bergsmo (n 10); Sylvia Arbia and Giovanni Bassu, ‘Proactive Complementarity’ in 
Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From 
Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); Bergsmo, Bekou and Jones (n 33); William W Burke-
White, ‘Reframing Positive Complementarity: Reflections on the First Decade and Insights from the UC Federal 
Criminal Justice System’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court 
and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); William W Burke-White, 
‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
Justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal; Christopher Keith Hall, ‘Developing and Implementing 
an Effective Positive Complementarity Strategy’, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, 
vol 48 (Martinus Nijhoff 2009); Florian Jessberger, ‘Universality, Complementarity, and the Duty to Prosecute 
Crimes Under International Law in Germany’ in Wolfgang Kaleck and others (eds), International Prosecution 
of Human Rights Crimes (Springer Berlin Heidelberg); Darryl Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of 
Complementarity’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67; Carsten Stahn, ‘Complementarity: A Tale of Two 
Notions’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 87; Bergsmo, Bekou and Jones (n 33); Christopher Keith Hall, 
‘Positive Complementarity in Action’ in Mohamed M El Zeidy and Carsten Stahn (eds) (2011). 
66 Robinson (n 59). 
67 Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity’ (n 59); Arbia and Bassu (n 59). 
68 Bergsmo (n 10). 
69 Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ‘Election of the Prosecutor, Statement 
by Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo’ (International Criminal Court 2003) Press Release ICC-OTP-20030502-10. 
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publishing of an informal expert paper by his Office70 and has become established within the 
ICC through its Review Conference in 2010,71 its judicial and diplomatic language72 as well 
as the statements, reports and activities of its Assembly of States Parties.  Regardless of the 
moniker adopted, there has been little variation in the narrative of the purpose of positive 
complementarity, and little effort to connect it to the admissibility requirements of 
complementarity. Understood as part of the complementarity system, the positive dimension 
was developed to address and develop national criminal justice capacity to investigate, 
prosecute and adjudicate crimes under the Rome Statute.  
 
The OTP has described its use of positive complementarity as a tool to catalyse and enable 
effective criminal justice at the national level, while the concept has entered into as part of 
the Court’s wider mandate. 73  From the outset, certain conditions have been attached, 
attesting to the qualitative standards of national criminal jurisdictions, namely that ‘national 
systems are expected to maintain and enforce adherence to international standards.’ 74 There 
has been no attempt however to connect or locate positive complementarity with the 
admissibility requirements or to the complementarity models introduced above: the capacity 
requirements that the complementarity models impose onto national criminal justice systems 
remains unexplored territory.   
4. Chapter Synopsis 
In the children’s fairy-tale, Goldilocks and the Three Bears, a young golden-haired girl 
walking in a forest comes across an empty house, with three steaming-hot bowls of porridge 
                                                
70 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ 
(International Criminal Court 2003) 
71 ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Taking Stock of the Principle of 
Complementarity:  Bridging the Impunity Gap’ (n 34); ASP Bureau Focal Points on Stocktaking 
Complementarity, ‘Focal Points’ Compilation of Examples of Projects Aimed at Strengthening Domestic 
Jurisdictions to Deal with Rome Statute Crimes’ (Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010) RC-ST-CM-
INF.2-ENG-30052010; ICC Review Conference, ‘Stocktaking of the ICC: Complementarity’ (Plenary session, 
Kampala, Uganda, 3 June 2010); ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘ICC/ASP/8/Res.9 Review Conference’ 
(International Criminal Court 2010) Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.9; Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 
‘Resolution RC/Res.1, Complementarity’ (n 34). 
72 Judge Song ICC President, ‘Eighteenth Diplomatic Briefing’ (International Criminal Court 2010); Judge Song 
ICC President, ‘Remarks at Ceremony on the Occasion of Signing the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the International Criminal Court and the Commonwealth on Cooperation’ (2011). 
73 ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Taking Stock of the Principle of 
Complementarity:  Bridging the Impunity Gap’ (n 34); Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the 
Bureau on Complementarity (9th ASP)’ (International Criminal Court 2010) ICC-ASP/9/26. 
74 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (International 
Criminal Court 2003). page 2 
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made earlier by three bears who live in the house. 75 Whether hungry, greedy, or lacking in 
manners, Goldilocks enters the house to eat the porridge: the first bowl she tries is too hot, so 
she moves to the second bowl, which is too cold. Finally, she tries the third bowl of porridge, 
which she declares to be ‘just right.’ Subsequently, astronomers have adopted Goldilocks’ 
quest for the bowl of porridge that was ‘just right’ in order to define the zone of a star’s orbit 
where conditions enable life to occur.76 This thesis is a voyage to discover that third and final 
bowl of porridge, of national criminal justice practices within the International Criminal 
Court System that are neither too ambitious nor too limited. 
 
Chapter 2 addresses the contention that, while the majority of complementarity models aim 
to establish acceptable thresholds of national criminal justice practices for States who fall 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction, they rarely adopt the process that governs the application and 
interpretation of the sources of law to which the Court is bound to, and rarely do so in a 
coherent or consistent way. The chapter aims to address this methodological shortcoming, in 
order to more coherently interpret the substantive and procedural scope of ICC admissibility-
proof national criminal justice practices, by reviewing the methodology created by the 
sources of applicable law described in Article 21 and identifying the laws, principles and 
rules that are most relevant to determinations of the willingness and ability of States to 
provide effective criminal justice at the national level for those persons responsible for ICC 
crimes.  
 
Chapter 3 then turns to the complementarity system, to assess the models of 
complementarity against the emerging rules and tests that have emerged from judicial 
evaluation of Article 17(1). It seeks to correct or redress the ambiguity of the first paragraph 
of the admissibility regime and confront several models of national criminal justice which 
have sought to expand the effect of the operational parts of the Statute onto the legal 
frameworks and practices of States, through the application of Article 21, including the 
practice of the Court, which has adopted a series of tests that largely shatters these 
aspirations. It confirms the emergence of four core tests of the features of complementarity: 
                                                
75 Joseph Jacobs, ‘The Story of the Three Bears’, English Fairy Tales (David Nutt 1890). 
76 The Goldilocks Zone (or habitable zone) is an astronomical term to define planets that fall within the 
habitable zone of a star, where it is neither too far or too close to the star to eliminate the possibility of liquid 
water being present. NASA: Science News, ‘The Goldilocks Zone’ (2 October 2003); Kim Meeri, ‘Earth-Size 
“Goldilocks-Zone” Planet Found in Distant Solar System’ Washington Post (17 April 2014). 
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(i) that admissibility should be determined in real-time and that the State must be active; (ii) 
admissibility assessments should be restricted to preliminary examination, investigation and 
admissibility challenges; (iii) that the evidence must demonstrate that the States is taking 
concrete and progressive steps and (iv) that the objects of reference should reflect the stage of 
proceedings and be restricted to the situation or cases under scrutiny by the Court. 
 
Chapter 4 considers the impact of the selection of cases by the ICC on national criminal 
justice institutions and policy-making. Defined in the Statute under Article 17(1)(d) as a 
requirement that cases be of a sufficient gravity to be admissible before the ICC, three criteria 
inform the selection of cases by the ICC: (i) the gravity of the crimes; (ii) the most 
responsible groups or persons and (iii) the interests of justice as a countervailing measure. 
Through review of the Prosecution’s Policy on selection criteria, as well as reports and 
jurisprudence from the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers, the chapter argues that the practice 
of case selection can inform the exercise of national criminal justice in post-atrocity 
countries, including national case selection strategies, the adoption of alternative or other 
justice measures as well as the allocation of resources to criminal accountability.  
 
Chapter 5 then turns to Article 17(2), to the first of the two admissibility criteria and returns 
to the hotly-disputed question on whether States Parties are required to uphold international 
due process protections over their domestic criminal investigations or prosecutions, when 
they are under examination or investigation by the ICC. It reviews the due process debate 
through the sources of applicable law as defined by Article 21, drawing on the recent 
jurisprudence from the ICC in the admissibility decisions in the cases of Gaddafi and Al 
Senussi and ICC policies, in order to identify whether any reliable rules concerning national 
due process requirements of ICC-scrutinised investigations or cases have emerged. In 
particular, it finds the overwhelming attention to the scope of the due process standard of 
Article 17(2) to have been misplaced, overlooking the importance of more foreseeable due 
process requirements of the admissibility regime, such as the requirement of witness 
protection schemes to ensure that necessary testimony can be obtained. 
 
Chapter 6 moves sequentially to the ability of States to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate 
conduct listed in the Rome Statute, as it is defined in Article 17(3). The genuine ability of a 
State to prosecute perpetrators of the criminal acts listed in the Rome Statute has beguiled 
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and tantalised the concept of complementarity from the earliest moments of the Court, where 
concerns where raised that the judicial machinery of developing or post-conflict countries 
would be subjected to harsh assessment from the ICC through to expectations that the ICC 
could catalyse national efforts or help develop capacity of national justice mechanisms 
through the development of a positive dimension of complementarity. This Chapter reviews 
the litigation of these features through the two Admissibility Challenges in the cases of 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, and reviews the framework of inability in light of the recent 
admissibility challenges, briefly revisiting the relevance of the due process debate as part of 
the general assessment of ability or as a more qualified part of the specific requirements, 
before reviewing in turn, the emergence of indicators on the ability or status of the national 
justice system and its three specific requirements, of the ability to obtain testimony, to obtain 
testimony and evidence or to otherwise carry out its proceedings. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by reviewing the framework or threshold of ‘admissibility-
proof’ national criminal justice practices as derived from the law and practice of the ICC 
since it became functional until 21 May 2014 when Admissibility Appeal Judgment in 
Gaddafi was released. Due to the proximity of the judgment and the submission of this thesis, 
the Gaddafi Appeal is considered only in the conclusion, to help re-focus or affirm the tests 
and rules that have emerged when considering the admissibility of cases and situations before 
the ICC. This Chapter also considers the emergent tensions and contradictions between these 
tests and principles and international human rights treaties and treaty bodies. 
 
5. The ICC and Positive Complementarity: Limits of Research and Avenues for Future 
Research  
While this thesis addresses the subject matter of its subtitle, it does so in recognition of the 
potential impact that the admissibility law and practices will have on the ICC’s role in the 
implementation of the concept of positive complementarity and consequently on national 
capacities to operate in accordance to the ICC system. This thesis considers that the concept 
of positive complementarity is inherently derived from the legal apparatus of the Rome 
Statute, including the Statute, its rules, procedures and emergent jurisprudence. As an ‘action 
driven concept, the absence of a clear framework of the minimal formal requirements that 
State practice under the ICC needs to adhere to is problematic, as positive complementarity 
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activities can be conducted without any clear understanding of the formal limitations that the 
Rome Statute imposes on its judiciary during admissibility deliberations and of its similitude 
or otherwise, to the requirements imposed on States from other applicable international 
treaties. It considers that efforts to segregate positive complementarity from the trajectory of 
the Court’s powers would remove its connection to, or origins within the legal framework of 
the ICC, and would in effect become detached from the ICC’s system of justice. While I 
assert that the concept should remain grounded within the legal framework of the ICC, it does 
not follow that the ICC should or must retain control over every aspect of its design and 
implementation, and indeed I would tentatively argue against this. However, my interest 
remains largely focused on defining the role of the ICC and its organs with the concept and 
practice of positive complementarity.  
5.1. Applying Managerial Compliance Models to Positive Complementarity 
Having considered that positive complementarity should remain grounded within the 
framework of the Rome Statute, the author considers that managerial forms of compliance 
may provide a suitable framework from which to clarify the concept of positive 
complementarity and its relationship to the ICC, notably to address questions of its legal, 
institutional and policy framework. The objectives as well as methods of implementation that 
positive complementarity appears to establish have been understood as a second, less 
coercive and more managerial form of treaty compliance as far back as 1996, ably elaborated 
by Chayes and Chayes as the notion of managerial compliance.1 While the concept of 
managerial compliance developed rapidly in social sciences, as a method and set of tools to 
enable greater conformity to international law,2 as part of a reconceptualization of States 
performance as members of international treaties3 and as a (critiqued) concept to understand 
the effects and significance of international law.4 
                                                
1 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance’ (1993) 47 International Organization 175; 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘A Theory of Compliance’, The New Sovereignty: Compliance 
with International Regulatory Regimes, vol 47 (Harvard University Press 1995). 
2 Andrew T Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 
1823; Peter M Haas, ‘Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics’ 
in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: the role of non-binding norms in the international legal 
system (Oxford University Press 2000); George W Downs and Andrea Trento, ‘Conceptual Issues Surrounding 
the Compliance Gap’ in Edward C Luck and Michael W Doyle (eds), International Law and organization: 
closing the compliance gap (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2004). 
3 Kai Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and COmpliance’ in 
Larknaes (ed) (2002); Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management and the European 
Union’ (2002) 56 International Organization 609; Celeste Montoya, ‘The European Union, Capacity Building, 
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Compliance models, whether they are managerial or coercive, are methods to ensure that 
member states adhere to the rules, principles and provisions of the treaties that constitute the 
organisation, or which are produced by it. While this thesis is overwhelmingly concerned 
with the impact of the operative part of the ICC Statute on domestic jurisdictions, evidenced 
through its admissibility law and practice, the explicit obligation of States Parties is to 
cooperate with the ICC and to ensure that it has a sufficient legal framework to do so. As 
such, managerial compliance, or positive complementarity models should also respond to 
capacity needs or limitations in the sphere of cooperation and judicial assistance.  
 
As a less coercive and more constructive method to enable compliance, the tools that are 
commonly adopted as part of managerial methods include capacity building, technical 
assistance, networks and partnerships as well as outreach programmes. They have informed 
the provision of such compliance-driven services by specialised units or divisions of many 
international organisations in support of and adherence to the their respective mandates. This 
practice is not so clearly consolidated within international criminal tribunals and little effort 
has been given to locate the praxis of managerial compliance as part of the inherent powers 
of international criminal tribunals, despite their adoption of many tools that form part of its 
repertoire.5  
 
Consideration of managerial compliance mechanisms should not be made to the exclusion of 
more coercive or sanction driven incentives that may be particular to the ICC system, 
including the incentives that OTP preliminary examinations and investigations may have on 
encouraging or catalysing States to engage its domestic jurisdiction, the possibilities of 
                                                                                                                                                  
and Transnational Networks: Combating Violence Against Women Through the Daphne Program’ (2008) 62 
International Organization 359. 
4 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 
The’ (1997) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 345, 346; Eric A Posner (ed), Economies of Public 
International Law, p 1117; Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International 
Law Really Matters’ (2010) 1 Global Policy Journal 127. 
5Previous international criminal tribunals such as the temporary tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR) were compelled to conduct capacity building activities with the States under their jurisdiction, 
as part of their completion strategies, forming responsive programmes, in partnership with other international 
organisations. ICTY and UNICRI, ‘ICTY Manual on Developed Practices’; ICTY, OSCE/ODHIR and UNICRI, 
‘Supporting the Transition Process: Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Knowledge Transfer: Final Report’ 
(OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 2009). ICTY, ‘ICTY Outreach: 
Capacity Building’ (ICTY) <http://www.icty.org/sections/Outreach/CapacityBuilding> accessed 3 November 
2010. Alejandro Chehtman and Ruth Mackenzie, ‘Capacity Development in International Criminal Justice: A 
Mapping Exercise of Existing Practice’ DOMAC/2, September 2009. 
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sequencing cases and the challenges that may be posed by competing requests, as well as the 
monitoring powers that the OTP following decisions of inadmissibility. Research should also 
extend into the core of the cooperation regime, and the significant challenges facing non-
cooperation, particularly in light of the Security Council referred cases of non-States Parties. 
 
5.2. Definitions of Positive Complementarity 
From the outset, there is little agreement on the suitability of the choice of adjective to define 
this component of complementarity. Although the positive6 label emerged first, authors have 
also argued that this form of complementarity may be better defined as a constructive,7 pro-
active8 or active9 style of engagement between the ICC and State criminal justice institutions. 
Regardless of the moniker adopted, there is little variation in the narrative of the purpose of 
positive complementarity, and little effort to connect it to the admissibility requirements of 
complementarity. Largely understood as part of the complementarity system, the common 
features of the different proposals invoke the encouragement and strengthening of States 
capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of crimes that fall under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC as well as to cooperate with the ICC, in the context of the Court’s own 
investigative and judicial activities.  
 
                                                
6 William W Burke-White, ‘Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice’ 
(2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 59; Hitomi Takemura, ‘A Critical Analysis of Positive Complementarity’ 
(2007); Morten Bergsmo (ed), Active Complementarity: Legal Information Transfer (Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher 2011); Sylvia Arbia and Giovanni Bassu, ‘Proactive Complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn and 
Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2011); Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou and Annika Jones, ‘Complementarity 
After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools’ (2010) 2 Göttingen Journal of International Law 
791; William W Burke-White, ‘Reframing Positive Complementarity: Reflections on the First Decade and 
Insights from the UC Federal Criminal Justice System’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The 
International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 
2011); William W Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National 
Courts in the Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal; Hall, ‘Developing and 
Implementing an Effective Positive Complementarity Strategy’ (n 2); Florian Jessberger, ‘Universality, 
Complementarity, and the Duty to Prosecute Crimes Under International Law in Germany’ in Wolfgang Kaleck 
and others (eds), International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes (Springer Berlin Heidelberg); Darryl 
Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67; Carsten 
Stahn, ‘Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 87; Bergsmo, Bekou and 
Jones; Christopher Keith Hall, ‘Positive Complementarity in Action’ in Mohamed M El Zeidy and Carsten 
Stahn (eds) (2011). 
7 Robinson (n 5). 
8 Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity’ (n 5); Arbia and Bassu (n 5). 
9 Bergsmo (n 5). 
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Within the ICC’s organs, four definitions or descriptions of positive complementarity can be 
determined. The first occurred within the Office of the Prosecutor in 2003, where positive 
dimensions of complementarity were explored through informal, expert-led papers, which 
considered that the effective implementation of the principle of complementarity provided ‘a 
mechanism to encourage and facilitate compliance of States with their primary responsibility 
to investigate and prosecute core crimes’10 that could be informed by guiding principles of 
partnership11 and vigilance.12 The second definition also emerged from the OTP, in 2006, 
thereby revising the first, to clarify that it ‘encourages genuine national proceedings where 
possible, relies on national and international networks and participates in a system of 
international cooperation. 13  The third definition by the OTP significantly reduces its direct 
engagement with positive complementarity, clarifying that the OTP would not be involved 
directly in the provision of capacity building or technical assistance but would instead 
encourage genuine national proceedings and rely on its networks of cooperation,14 while 
reference to positive complementarity activities by the OTP has been removed from the 
current prosecutorial strategy.15  
 
Consequently, the fourth definition of positive complementarity, issued by the Bureau of the 
Assembly of States Parties in 2010 remains the only active definition by an organ of the ICC. 
It describes positive complementarity as: 
‘all activities/actions whereby national jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to 
conduct genuine national investigations and trials of crimes included in the Statute.’16 
 
                                                
10 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ (n 28) 3. 
11 The paper proposed two strands of ‘partnership’ that are reminiscent of managerial compliance: (a) 
encouraging national action, with States, through international fora and with judicial institutions and (b) 
providing direct assistance and advice, through the provision of information and evidence under Article 93(10) 
requests (the so-called reverse cooperation), provision of technical advice, training and the brokering of 
assistance. 
12 Their caution on vigilance was however, not connected to critiques of managerial compliance, but of the legal 
interpretation of complementarity, largely contained within Article 17(1), moving from the status of inaction as 
opposed to unwillingness and inability, on the requirement of genuine proceedings and on the implications of 
different phases of ICC proceedings on the application of the admissibility criteria. 
13 Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ‘Seventh Diplomatic Briefing’ 
(International Criminal Court 2006) Statement; ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on the Activities 
Performed during the First Three Years (June 2003 – June 2006)’ (n 35); ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report 
on Prosecutorial Strategy’ (n 33). 
14 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (n 61) 5. 
15 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘OTP Strategic Plan: June 2012-2015’ (International Criminal Court 2013). 
16 Taking stock of the principle of complementarity: bridging the gap, and an annex of example capacity 
building projects. See ASP Bureau Focal Points on Stocktaking Complementarity (n 11). 
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Each of these definitions, or statements of activity, requires an understanding of what is being 
strengthened and logically, to what standard or legal requirement it is being strengthened to. 
To guarantee equality, this requires the existence of a framework of the minimum standards 
or requirements. 
5.3. Legal Framework  
This thesis does not delve deeply into legal analysis of the powers of the ICC to engage in or 
with positive complementarity, nor of the value or benefit of doing so. However, it considers 
that through the ICC Statute, and its powers as in inter-governmental organisation, the legal 
basis as well as a normative rationale for the ICC to be engaged in the design, construction 
and implementation of a positive complementarity framework should be explored. In addition 
to the inherent powers of the ICC as an international judicial organisation, four provisions 
appear to provide the basis for the ICC to establish cooperation agreements or partnerships 
with relevant international intergovernmental organisations as well as non-governmental 
agencies, to enable the ICC to engage with positive complementarity activities. 
Cooperation with the United Nations  
Article 2 of the Rome Statute and the ensuing Negotiated Agreement17 appears to supports 
the possibility for partnership between the ICC and the UN for the purpose of positive 
complementarity programmes. Based on the international legal personality 18  of both 
organisations, the Negotiated Agreement establishes a general provision of cooperation, 
allowing the UN, its programmes, funds or offices to provide other forms of cooperation and 
assistance not included within the Negotiated Agreement, where it is compatible with the 
Charter and the ICC Statute provisions. 19  The UN currently provides legal technical 
assistance through the UN Office of Legal Affairs as well as UN agencies and specialised 
bodies on themes directly applicable to the substantive and procedural dimensions of national 
criminal justice for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. This includes areas covering 
child soldiers, crime prevention and criminal justice reform, human rights, and institutional 
                                                
17 Article 2, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ and UN General Assembly Resolution 58/79, 09 
December 2003 
18 Article 1 and 4, Rome Statute and Article 2 of the Negotiated Agreement. 
19 Article 15(2) ‘Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations’ 
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development, as well as counter-terrorism 20  albeit according to the standards and 
requirements established under UN treaties, standards and principles. 
General Provisions for Cooperation  
Article 87 establishes the general grounds for cooperation requests, and authorises the Court 
to conclude cooperation and assistance agreements with intergovernmental organisations that 
are consistent with its mandate or competence.21 The provision distinguishes between the 
provision of material assistance – documents, materials and information – and ‘other forms of 
cooperation and assistance,’ which gives the Court some leeway to interpret its scope, so long 
as it is in accordance with its competence or mandate.22 In the context of strengthening 
national criminal justice systems and practices, the ICC concluded a ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’23 with the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec)24 in 2011. It is the first 
example where the ICC has entered into an explicit commitment to conduct capacity building 
activities with an intergovernmental organisation for the purpose of strengthening national 
capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction, as well as to strengthen national ability to cooperate 
with the ICC.25 The agreement allows the ICC and Commonwealth Secretariat to cooperate 
in order to develop training and assistance programmes for judges, prosecutors, officials and 
counsel in work related to the Court and to ‘foster the professionalism required of national 
actors’ for the effective functioning of the complementarity regime.  This directly confronts 
the human and legal capacities of Commonwealth member States who are yet to incorporate 
                                                
20 Office for Drug-Control and Crime Prevention: Centre for International Crime Prevention (ODCCP/CICP), 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office of Legal Affairs Codification Division 
(OLA/COD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) while UNDP and national mandated offices of the UN also engage directly in the thematic areas of the 
Rome Statute. See Edward Luck, 'Tackling Terrorism' 96-100 in David Malone, The UN Security Council: from 
the Cold War to the 21st century (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004); Eric Rosand, ‘Resolution 1373 and the 
Counter Terrorism Committee: The Security Council’s Capacity Building’ in Giuseppe Nesi (ed), International 
Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Fight Against 
Terrorism (Ashgate 2006) 
21 Article 87(6) ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’   
22 This requires the Court to assess if the other international organisation would be acting ultra vires by entering 
into the agreement, based on the Court’s own evaluation of the mandate or competence of the other 
organisation’s mandate, even though this decision should be based on the internal law of the partner 
organisation, in keeping with its international legal personality.  
23 The press release of the ICC refers to the signing of a cooperation agreement between the ICC and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. The titles of the remarks given by both the ICC President and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat General Secretary refer to a  Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations, while 
the content of the remarks refer to a cooperation agreement. Without further clarification from the Court or 
ComSec, it will be referred to as a cooperation agreement. ICC Press Office (n 20). 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Article 8 of the ComSec Agreement. 
The International Criminal Court and Positive Complementarity: the Impact of the ICC’s Admissibility Law and 
Practice on Domestic Jurisdictions. 
28  EUI PhD Thesis
    
either their obligations to cooperate with the Court or to introduce definitions of core 
international crimes into their domestic laws, and is understood to include further assistance 
measures including advice and assistance on legislative drafting, which would address legal 
capacity issues, in addition to human capacity.26  
 
Various ‘promotional’ clauses, to promote and disseminate the principles and values 
enshrined in the Statute 27  can be found in this and other agreements, including the 
Framework Cooperation Arrangement with the Organization of American States (OAS)28 the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the International Criminal Court and the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Organisation29 and the Agreement between the International 
Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance.30   
 
The EU Agreement on Cooperation and Assistance includes a direct reference to the EU’s 
support for capacity building activities. In addition to the general commitment to promote the 
values of the Statute, the EU Agreement establishes EU support for the development of 
training and assistance for judges, prosecutors, officials and counsel, in work related to the 
Court.31 However, it does not do so in collaboration with the Court, but separately through a 
range of global or bilateral donor mechanisms, as well as through its current direct 
sponsorship of the ICC’s Legal Tools Project as well as previous sponsorship of the Visiting 
Scholar and Internship programmes of the ICC.    
Other Forms of Cooperation 
Under Article 93(10), States are entitled to request assistance or cooperation from the 
International Criminal Court when they are conducting investigations or trials into crimes 
where the conduct falls under an ICC crime, or a serious crime at the national level.32 Formed 
                                                
26 ‘ICC signs cooperation agreement with Commonwealth to jointly support States implementing international 
criminal law’ (International Criminal Court July 13, 2011) 
27 inserting a special focus of such promotion to the norms of international humanitarian law. 
28 Article 1(i) and (ii) Exchange of Letters Between the International Criminal Court and the General Secretariat 
of the Organization of American State for the Establishment of a Framework Cooperation Agreement 2011 
(ICC-PRES/08-02-11). 
29 Article 2.2, Memorandum of Understanding between the International Criminal Court and the Asian-African 
Legal Consultative Organization 2008 (ICC-PRES/05-01-08). 
30 Article 6, Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and 
Assistance 2006 (ICC-PRES/01-01-06).  
31 Article 16, Ibid. 
32 Article 93(10), 'Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’  
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as part a broad provision that elaborates on the ‘other forms of assistance’ to be provided by 
States to the Court, it is the only statutory provision that reverses the direction of the 
requesting and requested entities. Whereas the ICC’s Cooperation regime focuses primarily 
on the obligation of States towards the Court in the functioning of the Court’s duties Article 
93(10) is the only measure  that requires the Court to consider States’ requests for support or 
assistance towards their own endeavours to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of 
crimes under the ICC statute, albeit ‘discretionary’33 in nature.34  As the provision is ‘in-
exhaustive’35 in its scope, it clearly provides considerable interpretive discretion on behalf of 
the Court in deciding whether to provide assistance, and also to States, in the formulation of 
their request to the Court. While the scope of Article 93(10) can clearly support a request for 
capacity building by a State, the provision entitles them to do so only where they have 
initiated an investigation or trial in respect of conduct that is prohibited under the Statute.  
Powers of the Prosecutor to Form Agreements with Respect to Investigations   
Article 54(3) (c) and (d) on the Duties and Powers of the Prosecutor with Respect of 
Investigations, entitles the Prosecutor to conclude cooperation arrangements and agreements 
with international organisations, in accordance with its respective competence and/or 
mandate36 in order to facilitate the conduct of investigations by the Prosecutor. This could be 
used to respond to any noted capacity inefficiencies or deficiencies of States relevant to any 
ICC investigation, in order to enable the State to better execute its responsibilities, both 
domestically but, significantly, in regard to the Court’s own investigation. This supplements 
the general obligation to cooperate in Part IX of the Statute, by providing the Prosecutor with 
their own independent power to form cooperation or assistance agreements for the execution 
of the function of the OTP.    
 
Taken together, the four provisions would appear to establish ample opportunities for the ICC 
to establish cooperation agreements with relevant organisations in pursuit of positive 
                                                
33  Claus Kress and Kimberly Prost, ‘Article 93: Other Forms of Cooperation’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  : observers’ notes, article by article 
(Nomos 2008) 1586 
34 While the Rules of the Court indicate that the request should be submitted to Registrar, they are required to 
transmit the request to the Office of the Prosecutor, for the parts of the request that relate to the pre-trial stage, 
or to the relevant Chamber, in the circumstances that the request relates to proceedings already underway. Rule 
194(2) Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2002 (ICC-ASP/1/3) 94. 
35 Gioia (n 27); Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article 
by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008). 
36 Article 54(3), ibid. 
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complementarity activities. Whereas the admissibility regime of the Statute establishes a 
range of (indirect) coercive compliance mechanisms, it appears that there may be sufficient 
legal basis for the Court to engage in what can be considered as managerial compliance 
mechanisms. As I have stated previously, I am firmly of the opinion that positive 
complementarity should remain connected to the judicial outputs of the ICC and that through 
collaboration or cooperation, it is within its legal powers to do so. The extent to which the 
ICC should do so, as well as its institutional competences should be interrogated, and as this 
short section has shown, there is considerable difference in the policies and views of the 
differing organs of the ICC. 
 
5.4. Institutional Framework  
Despite the apparent legal basis for the ICC to engage in positive complementarity, the ICC 
may not itself provide an acceptable institutional basis: this remains a worthy area of further 
research. While historically, the OTP and ASP have dominated policy discussions on the 
scope and application of positive complementarity, other organs, such as the Registry and the 
Victims Trust Fund may also have applicable roles to play in the development of positive 
complementarity policies and strategies. While early policy dimensions of the OTP’s 
‘complementarity in practice’ envisaged a form of burden sharing, where the ICC would 
restrict its own adjudicatory work to prosecute ‘the most responsible leaders’37 where the 
OTP could encourage national prosecution of lower ranking perpetrators,38 this model met 
some resistance from States Party donors who commented on the need for budgetary 
constraint as well as practical information on the implementation of the OTP approach.39 
Subsequently, the ASP attempted to curtail the Court’s efforts to provide or facilitate capacity 
building, asserting its view that the Court should limit its activities to what it defines as its 
‘core judicial function.’40 
 
                                                
37 A formula that has been rejected by the Chambers and revised in the policies of the OTP   
38 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ (n 28). 
39 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Annex to the Three Year Report and the Report on the Prosecutorial Strategy’ 
(International Criminal Court 2006) para 7(a) <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9960BBE1-C1E2-4986-
BA8C-F6E20742641A/0/OTP_ProsecutorialStrategyAnnex_En.pdf>. 
40 ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘ICC/ASP/10/Res.5 Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the 
Assembly of States Parties’ (n 45); ibid 59. 
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Within this ‘core judicial function’ the OTP has pursued the development of collaborative 
cooperation networks, which serve a dual function to support the investigations of the OTP 
while also strengthening national capacities. Using the prosecutorial powers to establish 
cooperation programmes with international organisations as well as other entities, the OTP 
has developed a collaborative dimension of positive complementarity, constructing 
professional networks and exchanges. These currently include the ICC’s Legal Tools Project, 
an online legal information platform that emerged from the OTP;41 the Law Enforcement 
Network, an OTP initiated network to involve officials, experts and lawyers from situation 
countries in OTP investigative and prosecutorial activities; and a project with INTERPOL to 
establish cooperation amongst national war crimes units.42  
 
In an unusual move for an international organisation, the ASP has sought to limit the role that 
the Court should play in ensuring that States Parties are able to comply with its treaty, in 
favour of promoting bilateral support between States, such as the Justice Rapid Response43 or 
between other international agencies, notably development agencies. Without due 
consideration of the differing mandates of external agencies, this may be problematic, most 
notably concerning the difference in rules, principles and standards required by other bodies. 
In aiming to limit the role of the Court to an indirect actor, the ASP appear to have 
overlooked the importance of positive complementarity to the core functions of the ICC, as 
well as its essential institution functions, such as outreach. This may be an oversight that fails 
to fully consider the importance of involving the ICC in the design and implementation of 
positive complementarity mechanisms that are consistent with the ‘Goldilocks Zone’ of 
national criminal justice under the ICC, and it can further weaken the legitimacy and 
authority of the Court. By reducing the prominence of positive complementarity to voluntary 
bilateral mechanisms between States rather than as a component of the Court’s 
complementarity regime, the ASP risks reducing the transparency and certainty of the ICC, 
by allowing the complementarity marketplace to set their own standards of ‘necessary law 
and practice.’  
                                                
41 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on the Activities Performed during the First Three Years (June 2003 – 
June 2006)’ (n 35) 32; Bergsmo (n 5). 
42 ICC Prosecutor, ‘Fifteenth Diplomatic Briefing of the International Criminal Court’ (International Criminal 
Court 2009) Statement 9. ICC Office of the Prosecutor and Interpol, ‘Co-Operation Agreement between the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC and INTERPOL, 22 December 2004’. 
43  ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (n 104) 61; ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘ICC/ASP/8/Res.2 
Cooperation’ (n 89). 
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5.5. Policy Framework  
While this thesis argues that the laws and practice of the Court under Article 17 challenges 
should form the epicentre of Positive Complementarity, this is not a commonly held view. 
Several publicists have recognised the ‘managerial’ possibilities of positive 
complementarity,44 some have sought to strip the concept down to essential characteristics of 
domestic capacity building and legal empowerment,45 others have encouraged its expansion 
into components of outreach programmes and systematic domestic capacity building,46 while 
others have considered that positive complementarity should be unchained from the 
jurisdictional constraints of Article 17 and the admissibility criteria to become a broader tool 
to combat impunity.47  
 
From the outset of the ICC, there has been a tendency to attach certain conditions attesting to 
the qualitative standards of national criminal jurisdictions, namely that ‘national systems are 
expected to maintain and enforce adherence to international standards.’48 Equally, through its 
plan of action to achieve universality and full implementation of the Rome Statute annual 
Resolutions on Universality, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) repeat calls for ‘full and 
effective implementation’ of the Rome Statute’ which go beyond calls for compliance with 
the obligation to cooperate, and: 
                                                
44Stahn (n 5); Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity’ (n 5); Burke-White, ‘Implementing a Policy of 
Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice’ (n 5); Christoph Burchard, ‘Complementarity as 
Global Governance’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); Jann K Kleffner, 
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (First, Oxford University Press 2008) 
311–313 and 327–330. 
45 See the preface by Morten Bergsmo in Bergsmo (n 5). This is elaborated further in Bergsmo, Bekou and 
Jones (n 5). 
46 This includes the relevance of ICTY experiences in building capacity, as well as efforts to assert a positive 
complementarity paradox in countries that are under preliminary examination or investigation. Jane Stromseth, 
‘Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict 
Societies?’ (2009) 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 87; David Tolbert and Aleksandar Kontic, ‘The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases to 
National Courts and Lessons for the ICC’, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, vol 48 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2009); Tarik Abdulhak, ‘Building Sustainable Capacities – From an International Tribunal to 
a Domestic War Crimes Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 
333; Bjork and Goebertus (n 2). 
47  Lisa J LaPlante, ‘The Domestication of International Criminal Law: A Proposal for Expanding the 
International Criminal Court’s Sphere of Influence’ (2009) 43 John Marshall Law Review 635. 
48 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (International 
Criminal Court 2003). page 2 
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‘Encourages States, particularly in view of the fundamental principle of 
complementarity, to include the crimes set out in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome 
Statute as punishable offences under their national laws, to establish jurisdiction for 
these crimes, and to ensure effective enforcement of those laws.’49 
However, the capacity requirements that the complementarity models impose onto national 
criminal justice systems also remains unexplored territory.   
 
The Stocktaking Report and Resolution conceded that positive complementarity formed a 
functional element of the complementarity principle, as a tool to aid the reduction of vertical 
and horizontal impunity gaps within the ICC system of justice.50 Unlike the OTP, which had 
sought to establish positive complementarity as a two-way process, that supported both the 
functioning of the OTP and the delivery of criminal justice by national jurisdictions, the 
Bureau affirmed its view that positive complementarity exists for the purpose of 
strengthening national jurisdictions. 
 
The Bureau follows contemporary dimensions of capacity building, identifying the capacity 
needs of national criminal justice institutions as consisting of human capacities, such as the 
skills and knowledge of police, investigators, prosecutors, judges and defence counsel; 
organisational capacities including witness and victim protection schemes, forensic 
programmes, the construction and sustainable operation of courthouses and prison facilities 
and institutional/legal capacities to ensure that legislation is enacted to implement the Rome 
Statute into domestic legislation.51 While this largely reflects the factual and legal indicators 
that consist of the admissibility criteria of ability 52  the Report considered positive 
complementarity to be applicable as a preventative measure, in advance of any future cause 
                                                
49 ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘ICC/ASP/8/Res.3 Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the 
Assembly of States Parties’ (n 43) 4; ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘ICC-ASP/9/Res.3, Strengthening the 
International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties’ ICC-ASP/9/Res.3, 10 December 2010 para 4; 
ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘ICC/ASP/10/Res.5 Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the 
Assembly of States Parties’ Resolution Resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res.5 para 72; ICC Assembly of States Parties, 
‘ICC-ASP/11/Res.6, Complementarity’ ICC-ASP/11/20, 21 November 2012 para 4; ICC Assembly of States 
Parties, ‘ICC-ASP/12/Res.4, Complementarity’ ICC-ASP/12/Res.4, 27 November 2013 para 4. 
50Here it defines horizontal gaps as impunity that may emerge between those situations investigated by the Court 
and those that aren’t, while vertical gap occur within a situation, between those who are brought before the 
Court and those perpetrators who aren’t. para 14. ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Bureau on 
Stocktaking: Taking Stock of the Principle of Complementarity:  Bridging the Impunity Gap’ (n 11). 
51 Ibid 17. 
52 See Chapter 5 
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to apply such laws as well as infrastructural and human capacities53 as well as serving the 
catalytic features recognised by the OTP, to include all jurisdictions where Rome Statute 
crimes may have been committed, regardless of their status before the OTP. Here the ASP 
accept that positive complementarity can serve as a catalyst for domestic proceedings as well 
as readying all relevant States to provide the relevant cooperation required for investigations 
at either the international or national forum.54 The Report also considered that positive 
complementarity could be effective in responsive scenarios, at any stage following the 
triggering of the Court’s jurisdiction, where capacity building could be beneficial both to the 
Court’s own operations, for example to assist in arrest and surrender mechanisms, witness 
and victim participation and other cooperation mechanisms, but also to support national 
systems for their own domestic proceedings.55 Positive complementarity was also envisaged 
at the conclusion of the ICC’s investigations or prosecution, to prevent vertical impunity 
within the State and support any on-going judicial activities in territorial jurisdictions.56  
 
Finally, before returning to the main questions of this thesis, I consider that it is essential to 
the legitimacy of the ICC as well as the legal security and equality of the ICC system, that 
positive complementarity remains coherent to the ICC Statute. While this thesis 
acknowledges the absence of critical engagement on the legal capacity requirements of the 
different models of complementarity it does not address it in the detail that it deserves. 
Instead, it recognises the distinction that exists between notions of ‘best practice’ that the ICC 
Statute is understood to require of its organs, drawn from international and regional treaties 
and practices on the one hand and ‘admissibility proof’ national criminal justice on the other 
hand, while somewhere in between, a ‘good enough’ threshold can balance admissibility-
proof practices, national ownership, legal familiarity and resources while recognising broader 
international obligations. This thesis confronts the common conclusion that domestic legal 
orders should ensure that their legal infrastructure complies with the ICC statute: ‘it is in the 
                                                
53 ICC Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Taking Stock of the Principle of 
Complementarity:  Bridging the Impunity Gap’ (n 11) 20–21. 
54 Ibid 22–23. 
55 Ibid 24–25.  
56 Ibid 26–27. 
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interests of justice and the States, that the latter already have or create … regulations in their 
domestic legal systems, which are in accordance with the law to be applied by the Court.’57 
 
                                                
57 Otto Triffterer, ‘Legal and Political Implications of Domestic Ratification and Implementation Processes’ in 
Claus Kress and Flavia Lattanzi (eds), The Rome Statute and domestic legal orders (Nomos  ; Il Sirente 2000). 
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Chapter 2 
Interpreting Complementarity: The Sources of Applicable 
Law Available to the ICC 
 
 
Almost all of the models summarised in the Chapter 1 are interpretations of the effect of the 
Rome Statute on national practices, and what States must do in order to ‘satisfy 
complementarity’ or remain ‘admissibility proof.’ They establish and respond to propositions 
of acceptable thresholds of national criminal justice practices for States who fall under the 
ICC’s jurisdiction and yet they rarely adopt the process that governs the application and 
interpretation of the sources of law to which the Court is bound to, and rarely do so in a 
coherent or consistent way. Notwithstanding the latitude for permissible interpretive 
variation, a more consistent application of Article 21 to the questions over the scope of 
national criminal justice practices that have been raised by the two divergent approaches may 
help to narrow the spectrum and provide a more balanced representation of the admissibility 
regime.1 
  
This chapter aims to address this methodological shortcoming, in order to more coherently 
interpret the substantive and procedural scope of ICC admissibility-proof national criminal 
justice practices, by reviewing the methodology created by the sources of applicable law 
described in Article 21 and identifying the laws, principles and rules that are most relevant to 
determinations of the willingness and ability of States to provide effective criminal justice at 
the national level for those persons responsible for ICC crimes.  
1. Sources of Applicable Law: A Sequential Methodology With A Human Rights Twist 
Article 21 instructs the ICC Judges to respond to the indeterminacy of the Statute, its gaps 
and ambiguities, as well as unforeseen contingencies, 2 through three sequential groups of 
internal and external laws, rules and principles and a consistency filter that reinforces the 
                                                
1 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 303–320. 
2 Margaret de Guzman, ‘Article 21: Applicable Law’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008); Jan Klabbers, An 
Introduction to International Institutional Law (Second, Cambridge University Press 2009) 58.  
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importance of human rights to the application and interpretation of law by the ICC. Its 
similitude to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (herein ICJ Statute) 
has been noted,3 and yet it has also been described as a ‘tissue of imperfectly defined 
sources.’4 
1.1. In The First Place: Internal Sources of Law, Principles and Rules of ICC 
Decisions 
Described as a ‘beautiful pyramid’ of internal legal sources, the Statute presides over the 
subsidiary sources of the Elements of Crimes (EoC), Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(RoPE) in forming the first set of sources of law that the Court must apply.5 While Article 21 
does not establish this hierarchy, the EoC and RoPE derive their authority from the Statute, 6 
which includes instructions on the use of the Elements of Crimes, which ‘shall assist the 
Court in the interpretation and application’7 of the Statute, while where any conflict arises 
between the application of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Statute 
must prevail.8  Additionally, the preamble offers authoritative and contextual interpretive 
value9 to the object and purpose of the ICC. Finally, the principles and rules derived from 
previous decisions of the Court can also be applied,10 and although this remains discretionary 
Judges have done so with some regularity across the Chambers, particularly in the context of 
admissibility considerations.11  
 
Where the internal legal regime fails to provide sufficient or satisfactory rules to address the 
questions before the Court, where ambiguity remains, or where the application of internal 
                                                
3 George E Edwards, ‘International Human Rights Law Challenges to the New International Criminal Court: 
The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy’ (2001) 26 Yale Journal of International Law 323, 369; Sergey 
Vasiliev, ‘Applicability of International Fair Trial Standards in International Criminal Proceedings: Between 
Universalism and Contextuality’, Toodag Seminar (2008) 210. 
4 Alan Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol II (Oxford University Press 2002)., page 1053. 
5 Article 21(1) ‘The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.’ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (A/CONF183/9). 
6 See Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ (n 75) 1055. 
7 Article 9, Rome Statute (n 76). 
8 See Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Sources of 
Law in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’ in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, vol 48 (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 287–290. 
9 United Nations, ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (United Nations 1969). Article 31(2). 
10 Article 21(2), Rome Statute (n 76). 
11 Bitti, (note 8) 293.  
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rules would, in the circumstances, ‘lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable’12 recourse to external laws is possible.  
 
1.2. In The Second Place: International Principles, Rules and Treaties Including 
Principles of the International Law of Armed Conflict 
 
The second group of legal sources moves horizontally outside of the Court to the applicable 
treaties, principles and rules of the international legal sphere, with specific reference of the 
principles of armed conflict as established under international law.13 With the exception of 
reference to the ‘laws of armed conflict’ the Statute does not elaborate these external sources, 
requiring the Chambers to do so.14 In the absence of a definitive list of applicable sources, 
there has been some debate on the scope of laws and which model of inquiry to adopt, in 
order to determine the applicable sources of an international nature. 
 
During the negotiations, the choice of adjective moved between relevant and applicable, 
causing some initial controversy by those who preferred greater discretion to be afforded to 
the ICC judges to apply the confluence of legal disciplines that makes up its practice. Others 
appeared to accept that the distinction between ‘applicable’ laws and ‘relevant’ laws could be 
measured by whether the ICC Statute directly referred to a treaty, or if it directly replicated 
the text of an external treaty: if it did, then the treaty should be considered applicable, 15 if 
not, it could serve only as an interpretive aid. The adoption of such a strict in concreto model 
of inquiry would have excluded pertinent treaties, including the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties as a valid source16 as well as the UN Convention Against Torture17 by 
                                                
12 VCLT (n 9) Article 32(b). 
13 Article 21(1) The Court shall apply: ‘(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict.’ Rome Statute (n 76). 
14 Ward N Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts (Cambridge 
University Press 2006)., on the tactics of negative reference, see I Brownlie, ‘Some Questions Concerning the 
Applicable Law in International Tribunals.’ [1996] Skubiszewski collection 768. 
15 Per Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: the 
making of the Rome Statute--issues, negotiations, results (Kluwer Law International 1999) 215. 
16 The VCLT was expressly accepted as a source of law in Pre Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58,in Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of 
the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, para 42; Appeals Chamber, Situation, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to 
the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 2006, 
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requiring the exact repetition of external treaty texts, rather than the more accepted in 
concreto requirement for an identical normative formulation or identical legal elements.18 
This method of inquiry may be more appropriate in the consideration of defenses, liabilities 
and the definition of crimes, to respect the principle of legality, specifically the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege and the prohibition against the extension by analogy.19 For other 
purposes the in abstracto method appears to be more compelling, whereby substantial 
similarity of the elements, rules or norms would be required, understood by Edwards, as all 
treaties ‘with provisions that address issues that might also be addressed by the ICC.’20  
 
But the debate over whether the Court should have access to relevant or applicable treaties is 
somewhat neutralized by the granularity of Article 21(1)(b) which extends applicable 
international sources to the ‘rules and principles of international law.’ Reflecting Article 
38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, this allows judges to apply provisions of international treaties as 
well as previous decisions of external tribunals and even customary international law, where 
they confirm a principle or rule of international law.21 
 
The applicability of the rules and the jurisprudence of the preceding adhoc and 
internationalized criminal tribunals has also been challenged by authors affiliated to the ICC, 
while their jurisprudence has not been used as a buttress to the ICC’s newly established 
permanence that it was expected to provide.22 Volker Nerlich, a Legal Officer in the ICC 
Appeals Chamber has argued that it is ‘self evident’ that the statutes as well as the rules of 
procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well 
as other tribunals, cannot be considered as law directly applicable before the ICC, given that 
the limited jurisdiction of the adhoc tribunals, established under the UN through the Security 
Council does not extend to the ICC, an independent international legal entity with separate 
                                                                                                                                                  
ICC-/04-011°6-772, para. 34. See also analysis in Joe Verhoeven, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the 
Ambiguities of Applicable Law’ (2002) 33 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, 294. 
17 Saland (n 86) 215. 
18 Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice’ (n 24) 247–248. 
19 Article 22, Rome Statute (n 76). 
20 Edwards (n 74) 390. 
21 de Guzman (n 73). Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts about the Relationship 
between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute’ (1999) 49 DePaul Law Review 909. 
22 David Tolbert and Aleksandar Kontic, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: 
Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases to National Courts and Lessons for the ICC’, The Emerging Practice 
of the International Criminal Court, vol 48 (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
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legal personality from the UN.23 He forcefully argues that in order for the jurisprudence of 
the preceding international tribunals to be applicable, the legal rules that underpin the 
jurisprudence must be similar or even identical to the ICC:24 where that is so, jurisprudence 
would be acceptable as a ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’, valuable in 
order to determine the existence of a principle or rule of international law.25   
 
1.3. Failing That: General Principles of National Laws of the World Including 
Jurisdictional States 
 
The third and final group of sources of law introduces two equal groupings of national laws:  
cited first are the general principles that are derived from the laws of the legal systems of the 
world, with the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction listed 
second. Notwithstanding the methodological challenges to identify such general principles 
that are posed by this grouping of legal sources, the principles must be consistent both with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.26 The subparagraph 
thus introduces two routes towards identifying general principles of law without specifying 
the value to be accorded to each: a meta-level of principles derived from ‘systems of the 
world’ and a smaller sample drawn from States with jurisdiction over the crimes, although 
both sources must first be vetted for consistency with all international law as well as 
internationally recognized norms and standards. In effect, general principles of national laws 
can only become applicable where they consistent with international law and international 
standards, limiting the efficacy of this source of law to all but a handful of legal systems, 
perhaps with the exception of fair trial rights.27 
 
By drawing the distinction between general principles that may be recognized from this 
subgroup of legal systems, and from general principles derived from a global revision, the 
                                                
23 Volker Nerlich, ‘The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings before the ICC’ in Carsten Stahn 
and Goran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, vol 48 (Martinus Nijhoff 
2009) 316. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid  313. 
26 Article 21(1) The Court shall apply: ‘(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from 
national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.’ Rome Statute (n 76). 
27 Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice’ (n 24). 
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Rome Statute seems to give equal weight to the two sample groups: while this may not alter 
the outcome where both samples ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ on a particular principle, the order of 
preference will need to be resolved where competing or contradictory principles are 
identified. In these circumstances, the Statute seems to have two requirements: first, in the 
context of the definition of crimes and changes to applicable law, the Court is directed to 
interpret the definition that favours the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.28 
Second, seen through the lens of complementarity, the ‘interests of justice’ may prioritize the 
general principles derived from the ordinary jurisdictions. 
 
In addressing the quantitative aspect of Article 21(1)(c), attention is needed in order ensure 
that fair representation of the legal systems of the world is made. Unlike its counterpart 
provision within the ICJ Statute, which refers to general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations,29 the ICC is instead required to consider the legal systems of the world, 
without any reference to their status or grouping. The corollary method of deriving general 
principles from the major legal systems of the world is also not strictly required.30 In 
removing the subjective element of civilized nations from the sources of general principles, or 
reference to major legal systems, the text of the Statute neutralizes and expands the practice 
of determining general principles. But Volker Nerlich considers that it continues to impose a 
subjective methodology over the sources of law, due to what he considers to be an inevitable 
selection process: 
“a survey of all municipal jurisdictions of the world is infeasible and thus the 
decision maker will have to determine which jurisdictions to include in his or her 
                                                
28 Article 22 (1), nullum crimen sine lege. This approach is reinforced by Article 24(2), which requires that, 
where a change of law occurs during trial, the version that is favourable to the accused person will prevail. The 
requirement of Article 21(3) that rules and principles be applied consistently with internationally recognized 
human rights may generally favour the person being prosecuted, but this is also balanced with the right to 
remedy for the victims of offences. See for example, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law 2005 (60/147).  
29 Article 38(1)(c), see Alan Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat and Karin 
Oellers-Frahm (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 
Incorporated 2006).  
30  Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Grotius 
Publications 1987); Fabián Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals (M Nijhoff Pub 2008); H Patrick Glenn, ‘Comparative Legal Families and Comparative 
Legal Traditions’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law (Oxford University Press 2006); Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice’ (n 24).  
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survey and how much weight to afford to each of these jurisdictions for the 
‘distillation’ of the general principle.”31 
Falling back to this methodological dilemma is an obvious reaction to the magnitude of the 
requirement: the act of surveying all municipal jurisdictions of the world is undoubtedly a 
weighty, laborious and time-consuming endeavor, and despite the advent of contemporary 
research tools,32 the distillation of general principles of law from a dataset that includes all 
applicable municipal legislation remains out of reach.33  
 
Lawyers like Bassiouni and Raimondi34 have sought out different methodologies to reduce 
the subjectivity that is woven into the pursuit of general principles of law. Writing in 1992, 
Cherif Bassiouni championed the inductive approach that Nerlich seems to struggle with, 
whereby general principles can be ‘extracted’ from domestic legal principles or norms 
contained within the largest possible sample of national legal systems. In searching for the 
repetition of rights in international instruments as well as their legal recognition in national 
constitutions, the purpose of Bassiouni’s comparative exercise was to gather evidence of 
which procedural protections could be defined as general principles of international law, 
rather than to determine their application or use in society.35 He did this by reviewing the 
Constitutions of 139 countries, identifying eleven clusters of rights defined in international 
law as well as national constitutions and recording how many countries protected such rights-
clusters within their national constitution.36 The troublesome issue of ‘weighting’ is bypassed 
due to the large sample size, and although Bassiouni did aim to identify major legal families, 
in-keeping with the ICJ Statute, greater deference was instead given to those principles that 
appear more frequently within national constitutions. 37  
 
                                                
31 Nerlich (n 94) 314. 
32 E.g. the National Implementing Legislation Database (NILD) of the ICC’s Legal Tools Project, available at 
http://www.legal-tools.org/en/access-to-the-tools/national-implementing-legislation-database/ 
33 Researchers face restricted access to laws, as many States do not publish new legislation in official gazettes, 
either in paper form or electronically. Furthermore, linguistic and semantic obstacles must be given sufficient 
research attention. Despite the advent in digital resources, the investment of time and resources required to 
overcome these limits remains obscure. 
34 Raimondo (n 101). 
35 He goes on to acknowledge that ‘the existence of a right in a national constitution does not necessarily mean 
that it is protected in practice or uniformly and effectively observed’ and that ‘the only way to determine the 
extent to which each of the articulated rights is actually protected is to scrutinse the actual practices of criminal 
law enforcement’ the specificity of which is not required for the purpose of identifying general principles of 
law. Bassiouni (n 18) 252-253 
36 See Annex 2 in Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice’ (n 24). 
37 Ibid, 243–245. 
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1.4. Normative Consistency With Internationally Recognized Human Rights  
The final paragraph of Article 2138 demands that the application and interpretation of all 
formal sources of law be consistent with ‘internationally recognized human rights’ and 
without discrimination, in what Allan Pellet refers to as ‘super-legality,’ a subject-matter 
hierarchy between the norms that must be applied by the Court, that supersedes the formal 
sources determined in Article 21(1).39 By referring to ‘internationally recognized human 
rights’ rather than ‘international human rights law’ the rule gives Judges considerable latitude 
in the choice of human rights-related sources, which can include emerging norms and 
standards that have yet to be formalized into treaty law, vastly expanding the sources to 
which the judges can turn.40 The exact implications of this clause upon the application and 
interpretation of the three groups of legal sources has been understood in contrasting ways, 
which require clarification. 
 
Some have considered that Article 21(3) creates a subject-orientated ‘super-legality,’41 
elevating a wide panoply of human rights to a materially ‘superior status’42 above the 
interpretation and application of all formal sources of law, including the Statute, where the 
Court would be within its competence to strike down an internal source of law where it 
would infringe on an international human right.43 Others, including the chairperson of the 
drafting committee for the Article, have rejected this, instead claiming that it provides 
nothing more than a ‘general consistency test’ to ensure that the ICC develops its 
jurisprudence in conformity with evolving human rights standards while maintaining a 
prohibition on adverse discrimination.44  
                                                
38 Article 21(3) The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this Article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as 
gender as defined in Article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
39Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ (n 75)., page 1079 
40 Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice’ (n 24); International Commission of Jurists and 
International Commission of Jurists, ‘Human Rights Standards: Learning from Experience’ (International 
Council on Human Rights Policy 2006). 
41 Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ (n 75). 
42 Bitti (n 79) 302. 
43 Erika De Wet and Jure Vidmar, Hierarchy in International LawThe Place of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 13–16. 
44 Saland (n 86) 215; Gerhard Hafner and Christina Binder, ‘Interpretation of Article 21 (3) ICC Statute Opinion 
Reviewed, The’ (2004) 9 Austrian Review of International and European Law 163; Mahnoush Arsanjani, ‘The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 22, 29., 
Arsanjani undercuts the plain text of the Statute by ignoring the requirement of Article 21(3) that the application 
of the Statute be consistent with IRHR, and refers only to interpretation.  
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The argument that Article 21(3) provides direct effect to internationally recognized human 
rights would be attractive to those pursuing ultra-compliance, but ultimately it remains 
unconvincing. Rather it requires that the Court ensures that its application and interpretation 
of all rules, principles and norms be in accordance with these material norms, so long as they 
have been recognized at the international domain. It does not require that international human 
rights norms be applied directly but that the interpretation and application of laws must not be 
contrary to them. Whereas the second and third sources of law should only be applied in case 
of gaps or ambiguities in the primary sources, the outcome of every exercise of interpretation 
and application must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, regardless 
of the sources being consulted.45 The Appeals Chamber has reinforced this interpretation of 
Article 21(3), making it clear that applicable law must be ‘interpreted, and more importantly, 
applied in accordance with internationally recognized human rights’46  while Pre Trial 
Chamber I has reiterated its link to the sources of law listed in Article 21(1): ‘prior to 
undertaking the analysis required by article 21(3) of the Statute, the Chamber must find a 
provision, rule or principle that, under article 21(1)(a) to (c) of the Statute, could be 
applicable to the issue at hand’47 
 
In conclusion, where omissions or gaps in the regulatory requirements of the admissibility 
regime occurs, in comparison to other international treaties or accepted obligations, it is 
possible that the consistency test of Article 21(3) would require the ICC to respond 
positively. Where this is not possible, i.e. where the perceived omission can be reconciled as 
being consistent to internationally recognized human rights, any remedy or response to the 
                                                
45 Pre Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, A58,in Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, paras 10-12; Sergey 
Vasiliev, ‘Proofing the Ban on `Witness Proofing’: Did the ICC Get It Right?’ (2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 
193, 212. 
46 Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006 ICC Appeals Chamber 
ICC-01/04- 01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, [37]. 
47 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo,  Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing 
(Witness-Proofing Decision: Lubanga) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06-
679, 08 November 2006. 
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outcome would remain extraneous to the enforceable mechanisms of the ICC, and would 
instead require remedy through other international mechanisms. 
2. A Sequential Order of Invocation 
The first four words of each sub-paragraph of Article 21(1) creates a division between the 
internal laws of the Court, including the discretionary application of principles and norms of 
its previous decisions,48 and those subsidiary external sources. They instruct judges that, in 
the first place they should apply its internal law, in the second place applicable treaties, 
principles and rules of international law, and failing that, the general principles derived from 
national legal systems.  
 
This has been described as an ‘ambiguous’49 hierarchy50 where the Statute and its other 
‘proper’ sources preside over a descending hierarchy of international law and general 
principles of national law as subsidiary sources of law51 although the accuracy of these 
assessments is questionable.52 While the text of Article 21(1) may appear in a hierarchical 
list, it is in fact a sequential order, where ‘[t]he Court is instructed to begin with the first-
listed source and proceed to a lower-ranked source only if the first source proves inadequate, 
until the Court identifies the appropriate law to resolve the issue at hand.’53 Similarly, 
Verhoeven dismisses any notion of a hierarchy of sources in Article 21, rejecting any 
superiority of the internal rules over the external ones, asserting instead that ‘the mention of 
‘second place’ only means that such treaties, principles or rules only apply to issues that are 
not settled by the first category rules, either because the Statute is incomplete in certain 
respects, or because the point at stake is not as such concerned with its provisions.’54 This 
view has been definitively adopted by the Appeals Chamber who has asserted that ‘[If] a 
matter is exhaustively dealt with by its [Statute’s] text or that of the Rules of Procedure and 
                                                
48 Saland (n 86). 
49 Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ (n 75) 1077. 
50 Bitti (n 79) 287–291; Saland (n 86) 213–214; Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ (n 75); de Guzman (n 73); Edwards (n 
74) 5; Hafner and Binder (n 115); Vasiliev, ‘Applicability of International Fair Trial Standards in International 
Criminal Proceedings: Between Universalism and Contextuality’ (n 74); Nerlich (n 94).  
51 Bitti (n 79) 294; Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ (n 75) 1067–1077. 
52 Verhoeven (n 87) 11. 
53 Edwards (n 74); Vasiliev, ‘Applicability of International Fair Trial Standards in International Criminal 
Proceedings: Between Universalism and Contextuality’ (n 74) 212. 
54 Verhoeven (n 87) 11. 
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Evidence, ... no room is left for recourse to the second or third source of law to determine the 
presence or absence of a rule governing a given subject.’55  
 
The use of Article 21 in its entirety can be described by the flow chart in Table 1: the sources 
of law described in Article 21(1) and 21(2) must be used in turn, one after the other until the 
matter at hand has been exhaustively dealt with. Once the matter is resolved, it must then go 
through the human rights consistency filter, to ensure that the application and interpretation 
of the preceding laws or rules is consistent with international human rights. It is only once 
this filter has removed any possible human rights based infractions that the process is 
complete. 
 
 
 
By dismissing the hierarchical presumptions directed towards Article 21, its purpose can 
instead be clarified as an order of invocation. Where internal rules, principles or provisions 
are unclear, ambiguous, contradictory or would lead to a manifestly absurd outcome, resort to 
external sources becomes necessary. Where the internal sources are definitive, recourse to 
external sources as applicable law is excluded. That is not to say that principles and rules of 
international law or general principles of law may not be considered as interpretive aids or as 
                                                
55 Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006 (n 117) [34]; Christophe 
Paulussen, Male Captus Bene Detentus?: Surrendering Suspects to the International Criminal Court (Intersentia 
2010). 
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material evidence of the internal rules, but that they do not have the force of applicable law, 
when considered within the domain of the primary sources.  
3. Addressing Semantic Values in Comparative Research Methodologies 
The identification of applicable treaties, rules and principles, as well as internationally 
recognized human rights requires the Court to address a number of methodological 
challenges inherent in comparative legal research. One common methodological challenge is 
the semantic value that should be afforded to external sources, be they international or 
national, from different legal systems and or languages. 56 Briefly alluded to in Section 1.2, 
the judges may choose to adopt both in concreto and in abstracto models of inquiry in order 
to identify the ‘sameness’ between laws, rules or principles, depending on the issue under 
deliberation. The method of in concreto comparison would require sameness to be defined as 
either an identical normative formulation, or identical legal elements, whereas an in abstracto 
inquiry would require substantial similarity of norms or elements.57 Depending on the 
specific issue, the semantic granularity between the texts would need to be defined and 
followed, in order to be able to identify the whether the external rule or principle is applicable 
or not.58 Similar methods have been adopted by the Legal Tools Project of the International 
Criminal Court,59 through the creation of comprehensive taxonomy of the ICC legal texts, 
which provides an index of keywords covering substantive and procedural keywords 
contained within the ICC Statute and adopted by the Court as operational terms,60 as well as 
an internal ‘codebook’ of comparative keywords, which maps the similitude between ICC 
                                                
56 A second common challenge occurs, once the sources have been identified, in order to determine the order of 
application or the choice of sources. 
57 Bassiouni (n 18) 247–248 . 
58 An in concreto methodology would appear to satisfy the strict principle of legality established in the Statute in 
the context where defenses, liabilities and defenses are under interpretation, given that Article 22(2) requires 
that the definition of a crime must be construed strictly, and must not be extended by analogy. However, the 
second sentence provides its own interpretive solution, namely, that where ambiguity occurs, the definition must 
be interpreted in favour of the suspect / accused / convicted person. This would require that the application and 
interpretation of any external sources would not be used to increase the penalties or punitive consequence of the 
criminal process. In light of this qualification, the in abstracto method will be adopted, as it appears to be a more 
compelling and comprehensive reflection of the interplay between different legal systems, be they international 
or national. 
59International Criminal Court, ‘Legal Tools’ (Legal Tools Project of the International Criminal Court) 
<http://www.legal-tools.org/en/overview-of-the-tools/> accessed 2 March 2010. 
60 Franziska C Ecklemans, ‘Taxonomy by Consensus: The ICC Keywords List of the Legal Tools’ in Morten 
Bergsmo (ed), Active Complementarity: Legal Information Transfer (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 
2011) 143. 
Chapter 2/ Interpreting Complementarity: The Sources of Applicable Law Available to the ICC 
 
Emilie Hunter 49 
keywords, and those found in other major legal systems, including national peculiarities, as 
well as their use and relationship to other similar keywords.61   
 
Notwithstanding the importance of semantic value and comparative research in the general 
application of legal sources before the ICC, the significance of comparative legal research 
skills in the pursuit of admissibility determinations and the assessment of national judicial 
practices will continue to grow. This will become apparent in the following Chapters, where 
early ICC jurisprudence has placed national legal frameworks in the foreground of 
admissibility determinations. Equally, the semantic value of ICC legal classifications will 
continue to influence national criminal justice policies in situation countries, where national 
criminal justice actors seek to balance the admissibility rules and practices of the ICC and its 
case selection practices, with their own national criminal laws and practices as well as justice 
and peace concerns. 
 
Returning to the methodology established in Article 21, this Chapter has established the 
framework of sources of law available to the ICC during admissibility procedures. It has 
confirmed that Article 21 establishes a sequential methodology, moving from the internal 
sources of law to external sources of international law and then external sources of law 
derived from general principles of national laws, where each interpretive act must be assessed 
against a ‘human rights consistency principle’ to ensure that the outcome remains consistent 
with internationally recognised human rights. As a sequence of sources of law, Article 21 
reinforces or elevates the subject matter of international human rights law but fails to 
superimpose such rights, their rules or principles onto the practices of the ICC in the absence 
of a provision, rule or principle of the ICC that would contravene them. As such, the power 
of the human rights consistency principle is significantly weaker than those pursuing the 
mirror-thesis would prefer. The consequences of Article 21 on the development or 
application of positive complementarity would appear to be three-fold: the sequential order of 
invocation will place greater emphasis on the internal sources of the ICC and will restrict the 
relevance of the practices, principles and experiences of external tribunals and treaty bodies; 
this will raise the value of ICC jurisprudence in informing national practices of the legal 
                                                
61 Olympia Bekou, ‘Building Databases for the ICC Legal Tools Project: Data Structures and the National 
Implementing Legislation Database’ in Morten Bergsmo (ed), Active Complementarity: Legal Information 
Transfer (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2011). 
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frameworks and resources that it will require in order to retain jurisdiction (or to cede it);62 
and it appears to reduce the centrality or ‘super-legality’ of internationally recognised human 
rights to the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction over crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. 
                                                
62 Although it may by no means reduce the importance or relevance of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals and their 
relationship with their jurisdictional states in informing the development of policies and practices at the national 
level. 
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Chapter 3 
Complementarity Between National Investigation, Prosecution and 
Adjudication and the ICC 
 
 
The heart of the complementarity regime of the ICC beats within the text of Article 17: 
consisting of three paragraphs it establishes the complementarity of judicial efforts between 
States and the ICC in its first paragraph, as well as the grounds for admissibility of situations 
and cases in its second and third paragraphs.1 The first paragraph, which forms the subject of 
the next two chapters largely defines the judicial activity that States must meet, influencing 
the choice of accountability measures and legal frameworks that may be adopted, as well a 
threshold of cases that the ICC will take a prosecutorial or judicial interest in (see Chapter 
5).2  
 
The first paragraph of Article 17 provides the framework upon which the second paragraph 
on unwillingness (Chapter 4) and third paragraph on ability (Chapter 6) operate. In its 
entirety, Article 17(1) is as follows: 
‘1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the 
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted 
from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of 
the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3; 
                                                
1 The Pre-Trial Chambers have also noted the relevance of Articles 19, 21, 90 and 95 of the Statute and rules 58-
59 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which could be considered as the arteries of complementarity. See 
Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) [2013] 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11, 31 May 2013 [56].  
2 Markus Benzing, ‘International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and 
the Fight against Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 591, 594.  
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(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’3 
 
While several models of national criminal justice under the mirror thesis have sought to 
expand the effect of the operational parts of the Statute onto the legal frameworks and 
practices of States, notably the crimes as defined under Article 5-8 and the general principles 
and liabilities established in Part 3, the practice of the Court has adopted a series of tests that 
largely shatters these aspirations. These tests have established four core features of 
complementarity: admissibility should be determined in real-time (Section 2) Admissibility 
should be restricted to the pre-trial phases of preliminary examination and investigation and 
to admissibility challenges (Section 3) the evidence must demonstrate concrete and 
progressive steps (section 4) States must be active (Section 5) and that the objects of 
reference should reflect the stage of proceedings and be restricted to the situation or cases 
under scrutiny by the Court (section 5-6). 
 
1. Real-time Assessments: Admissibility Is An On-going Process Throughout the Pre-
trial Phase 
In 2009, the Pre-Trial Chambers utilized the proprio motu powers enshrined to it under 
Article 19(1) to review of the admissibility of the case against Joseph Kony et al in light of 
the development of a government policy to adopt a national judicial mechanism to address 
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed within the context of the conflict that 
Uganda had referred to the ICC. 4 The Ugandan Policy included the establishment of a 
Special Division within the High Court, which would have jurisdiction over war crimes 
through its Geneva Conventions Act of 1964, as well as the creation of War Crimes Unit 
within the Director of Public Prosecutions. The policy included the allocation of judges and 
judicial staff, as well as prosecutors and investigators, who, at the time of the proprio-motu 
assessment, all of whom were due to undertake training in different dimensions of 
                                                
3 Article 17(1), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (A/CONF183/9). 
4 Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute (Kony Admissibility Decision) 
[2009] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/04-01/05-379, 10 March 2009 [14–19; 33–43]; Judgement on the 
appeal of the Defence against the ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute’ 
(Kony Admissibility Appeal Judgment) [2009] ICC Appeals Chamber, ICC-02/04-01/05-OA3, 16 September 
2009.  
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adjudication of international crimes.5 The Government of Uganda had, in the eyes of the 
PTC, been ambiguous in confirming whether the ICD would seek to assert jurisdiction over 
the cases before the ICC, or would defer to the ICC6 and indeed when the Court would be 
established and ready to take on cases.  The PTC felt that this process was of heightened 
relevance, as the adoption of a national adjudicatory mechanism could represent a change of 
circumstances, and that ‘the Statute does not rule out the possibility that multiple 
determinations of admissibility may be made in a given case.’7 
 
Using Article 18(7) and 19 which establish the framework for challenging the admissibility 
of a case before the ICC, the PTC established that ‘[b]y its very nature, the determination of 
the admissibility of a case is subject to change as a consequence of a change in 
circumstances. This idea underlies the whole regime of complementarity at the pre-trial 
stage.’8 The Judges went on to consider that:  
‘the corpus of these provisions delineates a system whereby the determination of 
admissibility is meant to be an ongoing process throughout the pre-trial phase, the 
outcome of which is subject to review depending on the evolution of the relevant 
factual scenario.’9 
 
As such, the PTC concluded that the issue of admissibility may be assessed more than once in 
the course of the proceedings, either through challenges brought by the various entitled 
parties, or through the Chamber exercising its proprio motu power under Article 19(1).10 
 
Following on from its legal analysis that admissibility may be challenged or reviewed 
multiples of times, it considered that it would be inappropriate to engage in hypothetical 
judicial decision-making, on the basis that the envisaged Special Division and its legal 
framework had yet to be established, and that: 
                                                
5 This Division was subsequently established, Court facilities were built and judicial and prosecutorial staff have 
been assigned to the Division, which has been renamed as the International Crimes Division. However, only one 
case has gone before the High Court to date, that of Thomas Kwoyelo, which is under appeal at the Supreme 
Court in light of the national amnesty programme, as the accused argues that he is eligible for amnesty. See for 
example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Justice for Serious Crimes before National Courts: Uganda’s International 
Crimes Division’ (2012). 
6 Kony Admissibility Decision, (n 4) [42-48].  
7 Ibid [25] 
8 Ibid [27] 
9 Ibid [28] 
10 Ibid [29] 
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‘Pending the adoption of all relevant legal texts and the implementation of all practical 
steps, the scenario against which the admissibility of the Case has to be determined 
remains therefore the same as at the time of the issuance of the Warrants, that is one of 
total inaction on the part of the relevant national authorities; accordingly, there is no 
reason for the Chamber to review the positive determination of the admissibility of the 
Case made at that stage.’ 11 
 
Although the Admissibility Decision was appealed, this line of argumentation was not 
addressed or over-turned and remains an active guide to admissibility determinations.12 
Timeliness of Preliminary Examinations 
The PTC also inquired into the preliminary examinations being conducted by the ICC 
Prosecutor in the context of the timeliness of its inquiries into the circumstances of the self-
referral made by the Central African Republic. On 22 December 2004 the government of the 
Central African Republic (CAR) referred its conflict to the ICC: on 07 January 2005 the 
Prosecutor announced that he would analyse the information received13 although a period of 
two and a half years elapsed before the Prosecutor opened an investigation, on 22 May 
2007.14 The investigation was opened following intervention from the Registry15 and an 
ensuing Decision from the Chambers, requesting information on the status of the Prosecutor’s 
preliminary examination.16 In its Request for Information, the Pre Trial Chambers challenged 
the Prosecutor on the length of the preliminary examination and the absence of information 
on its status. In doing so, they compared the relatively short timeframes of preliminary 
examination into the situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, which 
took between two to six months, with the 22-month preliminary examination in the situation 
of the CAR, reinforcing their displeasure with the duration and silence of the Preliminary 
                                                
11 Ibid [51-53] 
12 Kony Admissibility Appeal Judgment (n 4) 
13 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic’ [2005] 
Press Release, ICC/OTP/2005.39-EN, 07 January 2005 para 4. 
14 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Background: Situation in the Central African Republic’ (2007) ICC-OTP-BN-
20070522-220-A_EN. 
15  ICC Registry, ‘Transmission Par Le Greffier D’une Requête Aux Kins de Saisine de La Chambre 
Préliminaire de La Cour Pénale Internationale et Annexes Jointes’ [2006] ICC-OI/05-5-Conf, 27 September 
2006.  
16 Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central 
African Republic (30 November 2006 Decision) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III ICC-01/05-6, 30 November 
2006. 
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Examination, with a review of the Rome Statute provisions and rules which embrace a 
standard of ‘reasonable time.’17 
 
In his response, the Prosecutor sharply defended the duration of the examination, which he 
sought to justify due to the gradual manner in which important information became available, 
the declining security in CAR and the limited resources of the parties who had provided 
information, pursuant to Article 15.18 Furthermore, unlike his comparative analysis of gravity 
in his decision not to investigate alleged crimes in Iraq, the Prosecutor sought to establish the 
unique concerns and realities of each situation and therefore to reject the Chambers 
comparisons with the relative speed of the preliminary examinations in Uganda and the DRC.  
2. Other Pre-Trial Measures Where Admissibility Has Been Examined 
Despite the ‘lean’ wording of Article 17, or perhaps because of it, its application to pre-trial 
procedures before the Court as well as within national proceedings has been somewhat 
experimental, where it has been considered that its sole limit ‘appears to be that proceedings 
must have reached the stage of a case’ rather than the preceding stage, where the Prosecutor 
has opened an investigation pursuant to Article 53.19  Yet Article 53 itself refers the 
Prosecutor to considerations of Article 17, when determining whether to pursue an 
investigation. 
 
2.1. Preliminary Examination 
The Office of the Prosecutor also evaluates the conditions of Article 17(1) during the pre-
investigation phase of any referral or communication, which is defined under the Regulations 
of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP Regulations) as a preliminary examination. The OTP 
Regulations require the Prosecutor to open such an examination for all of the referral 
mechanisms, including those from States Parties and non-States Parties,20 the UN Security 
                                                
17 Referencing articles 61(1) and (3), 64 (2), 67 (1) (c) and 82 (1) (d), and rules 24 (2) (b), 49 (1), 101 (1), 106 
(1), 114 (1), 118 (1), 121(1) and (6) and 132 (1). See Ibid 4. 
18  Prosecution’s Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber Ill’s 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting 
Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic 
[2006] Office of the Prosecutor ICC-01/05-7, 15 December 2006 6. 
19 Kony Admissibility Decision (n 4) [14]  
20 States Parties through Article 13(a) and pursuant to Article 14, Non-States Parties through a declaration under 
Article 12(3) commonly referred to as ‘self-referral.’ Antonio Marchesi, ‘Article 14: Referral of a Situation by a 
State Party’ in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
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Council 21  as well as communications 22  of alleged violations received by international 
organisations, NGO’s, affected communities and individuals.23  
 
According to its Draft Policy on Preliminary Examination, the evaluation of referrals and 
communications are conducted to the standard of a reasonable basis (see Section 4.1 below), 
24 according to the criteria established in Article 53, and is pursued in four phases: the first 
two ensure that the communication or referral satisfies the material, 25  temporal 26  and 
geographical/personal jurisdiction requirements. 27 In phase three, admissibility is analysed, 
according to Article 17(1), comprising of the presence of relevance domestic criminal 
investigations or prosecutions,28 willingness,29 ability30 and gravity.31 At the final, fourth 
phase, the admissible alleged violations undergo examination of whether pursuit of the 
situation by the ICC would be in the interests of justice.32 The OTP Regulations also require 
the Prosecutor to produce an internal report which analyses the seriousness of the information 
according to each of the Article 53 criteria pursued in phases one to four and to conclude with 
                                                                                                                                                  
Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008); Payam Akhavan, ‘International 
Criminal Justice in the Era of Failed States: The ICC and the Self-Referral Debate’ in Carsten Stahn and 
Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2011); Andreas Th Müller and Ignaz Stegmiller, ‘Self-Referrals on Trial’ (2010) 8 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1267. 
21 Article 12(b). See Dapo Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and Its Impact 
on Al Bashir’s Immunities’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 333; Luigi Condorelli and 
Annalisa Ciampi, ‘Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC’ (2005) 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 590; Antonio Cassese, ‘Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?’ 
(2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 434; Christopher Gosnell, ‘The Request for an Arrest Warrant 
in Al Bashir’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 841. 
22 Article 13(c) and pursuant to Article 15 on the power of the Prosecutor to initiate proprio motu investigations 
and to receive information. See Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Article 15 Decision) [2010] ICC Pre Trial 
Chamber II ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010; Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Article 15 Decision: Côte 
d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber III ICC-02/11, 03 October 2011; Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejic, 
‘Article 15: Prosecutor’ in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008). 
23 Regulation 25, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor 2009 (ICC-BD/05-01-09) 28; ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (International Criminal Court 2010). 
24 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 23) 86. 
25 Article 5, Rome Statute (n 3). 
26 Article 11, Ibid. 
27 Article 12, Ibid.  
28 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 23) 55. 
29 Ibid [56-57; 60-66] 
30 Ibid [58-59] 
31 Ibid [67-72] 
32 Ibid [73-75] 
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a recommendation on whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation.33 Since 
2010, this has resulted in the publication of an Annual Report on preliminary examination, 
which includes an abbreviated summary of each preliminary examination, and on occasion it 
has published public reports on country specific examinations. Although judicial oversight of 
the preliminary examination phase is not strictly foreseen under the Statute, PTC-I requested 
information on the status of the examination in the situation of the Central African Republic, 
following a 30-month period without any public information released on the Prosecutor’s 
inquiry.34 
 
Once the ICC Prosecutor has decided that there is a reasonable basis to begin an investigation 
into the conduct of ICC crimes, they are required to notify all States Parties and States that 
may ordinarily exercise jurisdiction of their decision. Within one month of this notice, States 
are invited to inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals, or 
others within its jurisdiction, with respect to prohibited conduct relevant to the information 
provided by the Prosecutor, and to request the ICC to defer to their activities.   
 
Following a deferral request, the Prosecutor can apply to the Pre Trial Chambers for a 
preliminary ruling on admissibility, or, should the Court be so inclined, it can initiate its own 
preliminary ruling, sidestepping these two requirements. 35  Here the admissibility 
considerations of the Pre Trial Chamber would be directed to apply Article 17 towards the 
‘investigation’ being conducted by the ICC Prosecutor, based on the scope of the 
investigation described in the information provided to States, and its relevance to the activity 
of the State claiming jurisdiction, even though neither party may have reached the stage of 
defining a specific ‘case’, as referred to in Article 17.36 
2.2. Proprio Motu Article 15 Requests and Decisions 
As a protection against reluctant States or a recalcitrant Security Council, the Prosecutor can 
also initiate investigations on the basis of information of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                
33 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (n 23). 
34 Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central 
African Republic (30 November 2006 Decision) (n 16). 
35 Article 18(1)-(2), Rome Statute (n 3). 
36 Daniel D Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Article 18: Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility’ in Otto Triffterer and 
Kai Ambos (eds), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, 
Article by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008) 632. 
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Court.37 Article 15 requires the Prosecutor to analyse the seriousness of the information 
received, by seeking further information from a wide range of sources, including States, UN 
organs, intergovernmental organisations, non- governmental organisations or other reliable 
sources, before concluding whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed,38 according to the 
conditions established in Article 53(1). Where an affirmative conclusion is reached, the 
Prosecutor must request the Pre-Trial Chambers to authorize an investigation and should 
include any supporting material (Article 15 Request). Consequently, the Pre-Trial Chambers 
must examine the request and supporting material and decide whether to authorize an 
investigation, on the basis that the materials appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court 
(Article 15 Decision).39 If the Prosecutor concludes that there isn’t a reasonable basis to 
proceed, they are required to inform those who provided information, while the negative 
decision does not preclude a subsequent reconsideration, on the basis of new facts or 
evidence.40 This procedure provides an opportunity to review prosecutorial and judicial 
application of Article 17(1) at this early preliminary phase. 
 
2.3. Arrest Warrants or Summonses to Appear 
The Requests for Warrant of Arrest is established in Article 58, which imposes two 
substantive requirements: first, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’41 and second that the arrest of the 
named person(s) must be necessary to either ensure their appearance at trial, or to ensure the 
person doesn’t obstruct or endanger the case, or to prevent continuing commission of 
crimes.42 In submitting requests for the issuance of an arrest warrant, the Prosecutor is 
instructed with a list of five requirements: (a) the name and identifying features, (b) 
references to the alleged crimes, (c) a concise statement of facts, (d) a summary of evidence 
and (e) reasons why the arrest of a person is necessary. In its first decisions ordering the 
warrants of arrest for Kony et al,43 Darfur,44 Lubanga and Ntaganda as well as Katanga and 
                                                
37 Article 15(1), Rome Statute (n 3). 
38 Article 15(2), Ibid. 
39 Article 15(4), Ibid. 
40 Article 15(6), Ibid. 
41 Article 58(1)(a), Ibid. 
42 Article 58(1)(b), Ibid. 
43 Decision on the Prosecutor’s Warrants for Arrest under Article 58, (Arrest Warrant Decision: Kony, Otti 
Lukwiya, Odhiambo, Ongwen) [2005] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-02/04-01/05-1-US-EXP, Unsealed 
pursuant to Decision no. ICC-02-04/01/05-53) dated 13 October 2005.  
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Chui45 various Pre-Trial Chambers adopted its proprio-motu powers, albeit in ‘varying 
degrees in scope and depth’ to assess the admissibility of the alleged criminal conduct. 
However, in Ntaganda the Appeals Chambers took a close textual reading of the 
requirements for the warrant of arrest,46 to inform the lower chambers and the Prosecutor that 
it does not consider the arrest warrant procedure to be an appropriate forum for the 
consideration of Article 17 requirements,47 although the Prosecutor continues to submit 
analysis on these criteria within the Requests for Warrants of Arrest.48  
 
2.4. Confirmation of Charges 
The PTC have described the purpose of the Confirmation of Charges procedure as a 
mechanism to protect the rights of the accused ‘against wrongful and unfounded charges’ by 
ensuring that commits to trial ‘only those persons against whom sufficiently compelling 
charges going beyond mere theory or suspicion have been brought.’49 The Confirmation of 
Charges hearing and the subsequent final written submissions is intended to enable the PTC 
to determine whether there is ‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe 
that the person committed each of the crimes charged.’50 There are three possible outcomes: 
(i) to confirm the charges as established during the procedure; (ii) decline to confirm the 
charges on the basis of insufficient evidence;51 or (iii) adjourn the hearing to request either 
that the Prosecutor provide further evidence or investigation in respect to a particular charge 
                                                                                                                                                  
44 Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun (’Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (’Ali 
Kushayb’), Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute (Article 58 Decision: 
Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushyab) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC- 02/05-01/07-1-Corr, 27 April 2007. 
45 Kony Admissibility Decision, (n 4) [16]  
46 The Article 58 procedure does not refer to gravity, the interests of justice or the level of responsibility of the 
person, but requires the Prosecutor to provide a concise statement of facts that constitute the alleged crime and a 
summary of evidence and other information which establish reasonable grounds to believe that the person(s) 
committed the crimes. 
47 Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’ (Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgment: Lubanga and 
Ntaganda) ICC Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-169-US-Exp, 13 July 2006 [33]. 
48 Article 58 Decision: Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushayb (n 44) [251-267] 
49 Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to  article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome 
Statute (Gbagbo Confirmation of Charges Adjournment Decision) [2013] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-02/11-
01/11, 03 June 2013 [18]; Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation Charges 
(Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC/02/05-02-/09-243-Red, 08 
February 2010 [39].  
50 Article 61(7), Rome Statute (n 3), Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda (n 49) [35]  
51 Article 61(7)(b), Rome Statute (n 3), Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda (n 49) [42] 
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or to amend the charge on the basis that the evidence appears to establish a different crime.52 
To decline charges, the evidence needs to be ‘irrelevant or insufficient to a degree that merits 
declining to confirm the charges’53 whereas the process may be adjourned under Article 
61(7)(c)(i) where ‘the Prosecutor’s evidence, viewed as a whole, although apparently 
insufficient, does not appear to be so lacking in relevance and probative value that it leaves 
the Chamber with no choice but to decline to confirm he charges.’54 
3. Evidence and Sources 
The evidentiary requirements for admissibility challenges operates under a distinct 
framework from the other pre-trial phases before the ICC, including those where the Article 
17 criteria are reviewed as part of the Article 53 procedure to open an investigation.  
3.1. The ‘Reasonable Basis’ Threshold During Preliminary Examination 
The Pre-Trial Chambers have confirmed that the lower evidentiary threshold of ‘a reasonable 
basis’ during the preliminary examination is a logical requirement of the stage of 
investigation, where ‘the information available to the Prosecutor is neither expected to be 
"comprehensive" nor "conclusive," if compared to evidence gathered during the 
investigation.’55 Pre-Trial Chambers have also resorted to Article 21(3) in their interpretation 
of the reasonable basis threshold, to acknowledge to acknowledge that it must be consistent 
with international recognized human rights. Accordingly, the PTC has acknowledged the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ standard of the European Court of Human Rights, where “the 
existence of some facts of information which would satisfy an objective observer that the 
person concerned may have committed the offence” forms the requirement of the standard56 
                                                
52 Article 61(7)(c). For decisions to provide further evidence, see Pre-Trial Chamber I, Gbagbo Confirmation of 
Charges Adjournment Decision (n 49) and for decisions requesting amendment of charges, Prosecutor v Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(cii), (Article 61(7)(c)(ii) 
hearing (Bemba)) [2009] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III ICC-01/05-01/08-388, 03 March 2009. 
53 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Article 61(7)(a) and (b) Decision: Bemba) [2009] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III ICC-
01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009 [16]. 
54 Gbagbo Confirmation of Charges Adjournment Decision (n 49) [15]. 
55 Kenya Article 15 Decision) (n 22) [27] 
56 Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58 (Second Warrant of Arrest: Ntaganda) ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-02/06-36-Red, 13 July 2012 [16]citing Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention 
of Human Rights and ECHR decisions in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom, “Judgment”, 30 
August 1990 [32]; K.-F. v. Germany, Judgment, 27 November 1997, [57]; Labita v. Italy, “Judgment”, 06 April 
2000, [155]; Berktay v. Turkey, “Judgment”, 01 March 2001, [199], O’Hara v. United Kingdom, “Judgment”, 
16 October 2001 [34]; . See also Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al BashirJudgment  on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the ‘Decision on the Prosecution’s  Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar 
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as well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, elaborating the right to 
liberty.57 
 
In addition to the lower threshold of evidence, the OTP has amplified the latitude of its 
preliminary examination materials, by stressing that ‘for the purposes of the investigation and 
the development of the proceedings, it is neither bound by its submissions, with regard to the 
different acts alleged in its Article 15 application, nor by the incidents and persons identified 
therein, and accordingly may, upon investigation, take further procedural steps in respect of 
these or other acts, incidents or persons, subject to the parameters of the authorised 
situation.’58 In short, the breadth and depth of information used to assess preliminary 
examinations, including the Article 17(1) criteria, needn’t be exhaustive or stand to the rigor 
of criminal adjudication, and that any subsequent authorized investigation needn’t be 
restricted to or confined by the acts, incidents or persons identified in the course of the 
preliminary examination. 
 
3.2. Sources to Determine Admissibility During Preliminary Examination  
It is clear that the Prosecutor can rely heavily on public documents for its preliminary 
examinations, not only to analyse the seriousness of the information received59 through the 
seeking of additional information from States, UN organs, intergovernmental or non-
governmental organisations or ‘other reliable sources’ but also as sources of facts and 
information in the determination of jurisdiction, admissibility and gravity.  
 
In the Kenya Request, a list of ten public documents formed the basis of the external 
supporting materials, including the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’ ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-02/05-01/09-OA, 03 February 2010 [31–39]; Decision 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, (Article 61(7)(a) and (b) Decision: Bemba) (n 53) [24].   
57 Second Warrant of Arrest: Ntaganda (n 56) citing Article 7, American Convention of Human Rights, 
elaborated in lACHR, Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala, "Judgment', 25 November 2000, [138-144]; Loayza-
Tamayo v. Peru, "Judgment', 17 September 1997, [49-55]; Gangaram Panday v. Surinam, "Judgment', 21 
January 1994, [46-51]; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest, (Warrant of Arrest Decision: Lubanga) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 February 2006 5 [12]. 
58 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for Authorisation of an Investigation pursuant to Article 15 
(Article 15 Request: Côte d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Office of the Prosecutor ICC-02/11-3, 23 June 2011 [23]. 
59 Article 15(2), Rome Statute (n 3) 
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(CIPEV / Waki Commission), 60  the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNCHR Report)61 several UN agencies (the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights,62 UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM63) UN Special Procedures mandate holders (UN 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution64) and NGO’s (the 
Christian Children’s Fund, Oscar Foundation,65 the Federation of Women Lawyers,66 the 
Centre for Rights Education and Awareness,67 Human Rights Watch68 and the International 
Crisis Group69). The PTC accepted the range of documents cited by the Prosecutor, and used 
them extensively in its own Decision.  
 
Similarly, in the Ivory Coast Request, the Prosecutor submitted a breadth of public 
documents, using them interchangeably to support their analysis of the seriousness of the 
information received and as sources of facts and information. This included UN press 
releases and reports of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI),70 Report of 
the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire established under Resolution 16/25 
of the Security Council, progress reports of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) on 
the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, two reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and reports from Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA)71 as well as NGO reports, drawn primarily from Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
Amnesty International (AI) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and 
finally, press reports and releases, with preference given to BBC, Reuters, AFP and RFI as 
well as specialized outlets such as Jeune Afrique and Africa Confidential. While the sources 
continue to be similar, the Request develops from its Kenyan counterpart, by including 
                                                
60 Final Report, 16 October 2008 
61 “On the Brink of the Precipice: a Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-­‐‑2007 Election Violence.”26 August 
2008 
62 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ʺReport from OHCHR Fact-­‐‑finding Mission 
to Kenyaʺ (6-­‐‑28 February 2008) 
63 UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM and Christian Children’s Fund, ʺA Rapid Assessment of Gender-­‐‑Based 
Violence (GBV) during the post-­‐‑election violence in Kenyaʺ (Jan-­‐‑Feb 08) 
64 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions ʺMission to Kenyaʺ 
(26 May 09) 
65 Oscar Foundation (Oscar), “Ethnicity and a Failed Democracy” (February 2008) 
66 Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-­‐‑K), “Submission to the CIPEV on behalf of the Inter Agency Gender 
Based Violence (GBV)” (11 September 2008) 
67 Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW), “Women Paid the Price” (2008) 
68 Human Rights Watch, “From Ballots to Bullets” (March 2008) 
69 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Kenya in Crisis,” (21 Feb 08) 
70 UNOCI, Compte rendu du point de presse hebdomadaire du 24 mars 2011 : CIV-OTP-0002-0983. 
71 Article 15 Request: Côte d’Ivoire (n 58) [23-30] 
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greater explanation and analysis of the rigor and methodology adopted by the external bodies 
in the construction of their reports. The PTC again accepted the use of sources and itself 
referred frequently to UN and NGO reports.72 
 
The use and acceptance of public sources as analysis and evidence of facts and information 
has been largely accepted by the Pre-Trial Chambers when determining whether to authorise 
an investigation following a proprio motu request from the Prosecutor. However the use or 
reliance upon the anonymous hearsay included in the reports of the UN, NGOs and press 
articles has been heavily criticized during the confirmation of charges decision due to the 
absence of probative value of the materials and the failure of the materials to determine 
whether the perpetrators acted according to chapeau elements of crimes against humanity, 
namely acting pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy to attack a civilian population.73 
3.3. Developing Evidentiary Standards in Admissibility Challenges: a Sufficient 
Degree of Specificity and Probative Value 
The Statute does not establish a standard of proof for the purpose of determining 
admissibility, although it does set out distinct standards of proof for the proceedings, from the 
commencement of an investigation (a reasonable basis),74 to the issuance of warrants of arrest 
(reasonable grounds),75 the confirmation of charges (sufficient evidence)76 and the trial 
(beyond reasonable doubt).77  
 
The PTC has considered that these standards do not apply to the admissibility determination 
however, as admissibility ‘deals inter alia with the question as to whether domestic 
authorities are taking concrete and progressive steps to investigate or prosecute the same 
case that is before the Court.’78 The admissibility challenge submitted by the Government of 
Kenya allowed the ICC Chambers to clarify the specificity and probity of evidence required 
                                                
72  Corrigendum to - Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Article 15 Decision- Corrigendum: Côte 
d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber III ICC-02/11, 15 November 2011 [36–41]. 
73 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Gbagbo Confirmation of Charges Adjournment Decision (n 49) [36]. 
74 Article 53(1)(a), Rome Statute (n 3) 
75 Article 58(1)(b), ibid 
76 Article 61(7), ibid. 
77 Article 66(3), ibid. 
78 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-
01/11-01/11-239, 07 December 2012 [10–11]. Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [54] 
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to demonstrate that whether the case was admissible or not. 79  The Appeal Chamber 
determined that evidence must demonstrate a ‘sufficient degree of specificity and probative 
value’ and that assertions of on going investigations is insufficient in respect of deferring 
cases to the State.  
 
In the third admissibility challenge to be submitted before the ICC, the submission of the 
Government of Libya responded directly to the evidentiary requirements specified in the 
Kenya Admissibility Challenge Appeal, as well as each of the admissibility tests established 
to date. In responding to the requirement that the challenging State bears the burden of proof 
to show that the case is inadmissible, Libya submitted that it has provided ‘substantial 
evidence – all of it having a substantive degree of specificity and probative value – to 
demonstrate that it is actually carrying out relevant investigations with respect to the same 
persons and same conduct.’80 Following the conclusion of the Admissibility hearing, the Pre-
Trial Chambers disagreed, and chose to request further information from Libya, to clarify the 
doubt that had arisen on the genuineness of national investigations or prosecutions, and to 
request further information and evidence of a sufficient probative value.81 
 
Third, the Appeals Chamber has exemplified the types of evidence that may demonstrate that 
an investigation is in progress, including witness interviews, suspect interview, collecting 
documentary evidence and conducting forensic analysis.82 But beyond this, it has defined the 
concept of evidence within admissibility proceedings as ‘all material capable of proving that 
an investigation is ongoing and that appropriate measures are being envisaged to carry out 
the proceedings.’ In the Gaddafi case, the PTC asserted that substantiating evidence could 
include: 
‘directions, orders and decisions issued by authorities in charge of the investigation 
as well as internal reports, updates, notifications or submissions contained in the file 
arising from the Libyan investigation of the case, to the extent that they demonstrate 
                                                
79 Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) 
of the Statute’ (Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Rut, Kosgey, Sang) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/09-01/11-
336, 30 August 2011 [61]. 
80 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute relating to Saif 
Al-Islam Gaddafi (Article 19 Application: Gaddafi) Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red, 01 May 
2012 [90]. 
81 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Request for further submissions, (n 78) 
82 Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [54] 
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that the Libyan authorities are taking concrete and progressive steps to ascertain 
whether Mr Gaddafi is responsible for the conduct underlying the warrant of arrest 
issued by the Court.’83 
In particular, the Appeal Chamber has confirmed the challenging State must submit clear 
evidence that establishes the specific investigative measures that it is or has undertaken, 
including police reports detailing the time and location of visits to crime scenes, or 
documentation that demonstrates that ICC suspects, as well as witnesses have been 
interviewed by the relevant authorities.84 
 
It has become recognised practice that the burden of proof of any admissibility challenge lies 
with the entity that challenges admissibility:85 where the challenging entity is a State, the 
PTC have required that ‘the challenging State is expected to substantiate all aspects of its 
allegations to the extent required by the concrete circumstances of the case.’86 However, the 
Chambers have also acknowledged that the burden of proof that lies with the challenging 
State ‘cannot be interpreted as an obligation to disprove any possible "doubts" raised by the 
opposing participants in the admissibility proceedings.’87 
4. Admissibility Criteria Under Article 17(1): A Genuine National Investigation or 
Prosecution Must Exist 
Article 17(1) requires the ICC to inquire into each stage of national judicial activity before 
turning to the States genuine willingness or ability: from the moment a State initiates an 
investigation or prosecution (‘the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it’88) through to the conclusion of the investigation or prosecution, be 
that the conclusion of the trial (‘the person concerned has already been tried for conduct 
                                                
83 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Request for further submissions, (n 78) [10-11] 
84Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Ruto, Kosgey, Sang) (n 79) [40,68] Prosecutor v Francis Kirimia Muthuara 
and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’ (Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Muthuara 
and Kenyatta) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/09-01/11-274, 30 August 2011 [41,69]. 
85 Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Ruto, Kosgey, Sang) (n 79) [62] Decision requesting further submissions on 
issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further 
submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 78) [9]; Transcript of Hearing (Admissibility Hearing: Gaddafi, 
10/10/13) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-T-3-Red-ENG, 10 October 2012 page 64, line 18 topage 
65 line 1; Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-
Senussi) [2013] Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, 11 October 2013 [208]. 
86 Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [ 52] 
87 Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi (n 85) [239] 
88 Article 17(1)(a), Rome Statute (n 3).  
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which is the subject of the complaint’89) as well as where a discretionary decision has been 
taken not to proceed (‘the case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned’90). To date, the ICC has 
only received admissibility challenged on cases that were under investigation within the 
national system, although several of its Preliminary Examination countries have ongoing 
cases that have reached trial phases as well as also having been concluded, which should be 
under review by the Office of the Prosecutor. 
 
Through its early decisions, the Court has determined that inactive states will automatically 
loose jurisdiction to the ICC, where the inactivity reflects the investigation or case under 
consideration. In its proprio-motu deliberations of the admissibility of the case against Joseph 
Kony, the leader of the Lords Resistance Army, a rebel group fighting in Northern Uganda, 
Pre Trial Chamber II decided that it was a ‘logical prerequisite’ to any evaluation of a State’s 
willingness or ability that investigative, prosecutorial or adjudicative activity existed, from 
the first general phase of investigation, through to the specification of particular cases. 
Without leaving the comfort of the Statute, as the primary source of applicable law, the Pre-
Trial Chamber considered that under the admissibility criteria elaborated in Article 17(1)(a)-
(b) “the paramount criterion for determining the admissibility of a case is the existence of a 
genuine investigation and prosecution at the national level in respect of the case.”91  
 
The Chamber went on to decide that, whilst the Ugandan legal system had undergone 
significant formal reform, creating an International Crimes Division within its High Court to 
prosecute perpetrators of serious crimes committed during the conflict, the domestic 
authorities remained inactive, and important legislation governing the operation of the 
Special Division remained in draft form. Without the adoption of ‘all relevant legal texts and 
the implementation of all practical steps’ the Chambers decided that there had been no 
change in the activity levels of the Ugandan criminal justice system and as such, the case 
remained admissible.92  
 
                                                
89 Article 17(1), Rome Statute (n 3). 
90 Article 17(1), ibid. 
91 Kony Admissibility Decision, (n 4) [36] 
92 Kony Admissibility Decision, (n 4) [52] 
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In subsequent decisions, other Chambers have utilized the discretionary power of Article 
21(2) to apply rules or principles from previous decisions, to adopt the inactivity threshold, 
showing the Courts willingness to develop the admissibility regime where the text is 
insufficient. The consequence of the rule of activity is that States are compelled to employ 
national criminal procedures in relevant situations or cases under consideration by the Court 
in order to render the Courts interest in their caseload inadmissible.  
 
In the Katanga admissibility hearing the Chambers pursued the same rational, requiring the 
State to demonstrate its investigative activity through ‘the existence of identifiable and 
meaningful investigative steps’ in relation to incidents or conduct that clearly constitute the 
scope of the investigation of the ICC Prosecutor.93 The Appeals Chamber confirmed this 
approach in Katanga, developing the activity rule into two initial questions that must be 
answered in the affirmative before considering the questions of willingness and ability: (1) 
are ongoing investigations or prosecutions and (2) have there been investigations in the past, 
and the State having jurisdiction decided not to prosecute the person concerned.94 
5. Objects of Reference: ‘The’ Investigation, ‘The’ Case, ‘The’ Suspect 
One of the most striking aspects of Article 17 is its restriction to the analysis of definitive 
cases or complaints, rather than to general criminal prosecutions of ICC crime conduct 
undertaken by the State under investigation by the Court. In one of the seminal texts on 
Complementarity, Jan Kleffner concluded that the use of definite article ‘the’ rather than the 
indefinite article ‘an’ indicates that admissibility is tied to specific situations or cases, rather 
than to general analysis of all of the criminal investigations or prosecutions of ICC crime 
conduct.95 This is congruent with the purpose of the ICC as a backstop or last resort to 
national criminal jurisdictions, and has been adopted by the ICC in all of its cases.  
 
                                                
93  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Transcript of hearing of the ‘Motion 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Garmain Katanga, pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of 
the Statute’ (Admissibility Hearing: Katanga) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-01/07-T-65-ENG, 01 June 
2009 line 6–7. 
94 Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 
2009 on the Admissibility of the Case” (Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Katanga) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-
01/04- 01/07-1497 OA8, 25 September 2009, [78]; Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 1) [58].  
95Jan Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive Criminal Law’ 
(2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86., page 103. 
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5.1. The Situation Phase: ‘Likely Groups of Persons’ and ‘Likely Crimes’ 
The Court has also clarified the objects of reference for Article 17 assessments: the text refers 
to a ‘case’ and yet interpretation of the investigative and prosecutorial activities of States has 
been understood to encompass earlier phases of inquiry, where the dimensions of a case may 
yet have been defined. This was clarified in the Article 15 Decision in Kenya where the Pre-
Trial Chambers declared that: 
‘admissibility at the situation phase should be assessed against certain criteria 
defining a "potential case" such as: (i) the groups of persons involved that are likely 
to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and 
(ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the 
incidents that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping 
the future case(s).’96 
5.2. The Concept of a Case: the ‘Same Person - Same Conduct’ Test 
Article 17(1) refers to a definitive case but doesn’t explicitly specify its parameters or 
distinguish the ICC case from an ICC investigation. Elsewhere in the ICC Statute however, 
the transformation of an investigation into a case first occurs where a warrant of arrest is 
issued, as it is at this point that persons are named as allegedly bearing individually criminal 
responsibility for the conduct of ICC crimes. The Pre Trial Chamber clarified the concept of 
a case in its decision to issue the arrest warrant for Thomas Lubanga, declaring that a case 
consisted of ‘specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects.’97 It went on to 
clarify the two objects of reference, whereby the identified suspects of a national 
investigation or prosecution should be the same persons as those indicted by the ICC, and the 
conduct should also be the same, in what has become known as the ‘same person - same 
conduct’ test.98 In their decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I considered unanimously that “it is a 
                                                
96 Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 22) [59] 
97 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Warrant of Arrest, (Warrant of Arrest Decision: Lubanga) (n 57) [21]. 
98 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges (public redacted version) (Confirmation of Charges Decision: 
Lubanga) 157 [37–40]; Situation on the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v Bosco 
Ntaganda, Decision on the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest (First Warrant of Arrest Decision: 
Ntaganda) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-02/06-l-US-Exp-tEN; and Redacted version, 6 March 
2007, ICC-01/04-02/06-1-tENG-Red, 22 August 2006 [38–41]; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
in the Case of the Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Decision on the evidence and information provided by the 
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condition sine qua non for a case arising from the investigation of a situation to be 
inadmissible that national proceedings encompass both the person and the conduct which is 
the subject of the case before the Court.”99 The Appeal Chamber confirmed this test, tying 
admissibility challenges to specific cases, even though admissibility can be challenged at any 
point before the confirmation of charges: ‘article 19 of the Statute relates to the admissibility 
of concrete cases. The cases are defined by the warrant of arrest or summons to appear 
issued under article 58, or the charges brought by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the Pre-
Trial Chamber under article 61.’ 100 
5.3. The ‘Same Person’ Component  
The requirement that admissibility challenges relates to named individuals has been relatively 
uncontroversial, particularly in contrast to the notion of the same conduct: Article 17(1)(b)-
(c) refers to persons, where the decision is taken at the domestic level not to prosecute ‘the 
person concerned’ or where the ‘person concerned’ has already been tried for conduct which 
is the subject of the complaint. However, Article 17(1)(a) also refers to the investigative 
phase, where it is possible that the ‘concrete’ features of suspects and conduct may still be 
under investigation.  
 
This has proven slightly more problematic in the context of preliminary examination and 
proprio motu requests, where the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chambers are required to assess 
the criteria of Article 17(1), where national investigations overlap with those pursued by the 
ICC. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in the Kenya case, referred to above illuminates a 
distinction between admissibility at the situation phase and following an admissibility 
challenge, whereby during the situation phase (a synonym for preliminary examination or 
investigation) the activity of any national jurisdiction should be measured against ‘potential’ 
                                                                                                                                                  
Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga [2007] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-
01/04-01/07-4, 06 July 2007 [17–21]; Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for 
the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ICC Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04- 02/07-3 
(transferred to file of Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo as ICC-01/04-01/07-262), 6 July 2007 17–22; 
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (’Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (’Ali 
Kushayb’), Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute (Article 58 Decision: 
Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushyab) (n 44) [14, 18–25]; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Arrest Warrant: Bemba) 
[2008] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG, (translation notified 17 July 2006) 10 June 2008 
[16, 21]. 
99 Warrant of Arrest Decision: Lubanga) (n 57) [31] 
100 Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Muthuara and Kenyatta) (n 84) 
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rather than ‘concrete’ cases, including factors of the likely groups of persons and the likely 
crimes that may provide the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping future 
case(s).101 The distinction between the situation phase and the case phase and its impact on 
investigation and case selection by the ICC is considered in more detail in Chapter 6. 
5.4. The ‘Same Conduct’ Component  
As settled jurisprudence of the ICC,102 the same conduct test ICC has been far more 
provocative and vigorously litigated. Two key objections have been raised: the first 
concerned the scope of its application or its parameters, with allegations that the test imposed 
‘de facto primacy’ into the ICC’s jurisdiction, while the second challenge has confronted the 
epicentre of the mirror thesis, namely whether ICC crimes need to be applied by the State. 
The Scope of Application of the “Same Conduct’ Component 
The defence team of Germain Katanga vigorously litigated the validity of the ‘same conduct.’ 
They argued that the same conduct test construed by the Chambers defeated the object and 
purpose of complementarity, amounting to ‘de-facto primacy.’103 Instead, they argued that 
                                                
101 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 22) [59] 
102 Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun (’Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (’Ali 
Kushayb’), ‘Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58(7)’ (Arrest Warrant Request: Ahmad Harun and Ali 
Kushayb) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC- 02/05-62-US-Exp, 27 February 2007 [24]; Prosecutor v Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (Omar Al Bashir), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Arrest Warrant Decision: Al Bashir) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-02/05-
01/09-3, 04 March 2009 [50]; Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58 (Arrest Warrant Decision: Abu Garda) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I 
ICC/02/05-02-/09-15-AnxA,07 May 2009 [4]; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga (n 98) [20]; Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the evidence and information 
provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga [2007] ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/07-262, 06 July 2007 [21].  
The same approach was taken in Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute 
(Kony Admissibility Decision) (n 4) [17–18]; Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta 
and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (Admissibility Decision: Muthuara, 
Kenyatta, Ali ‘PNU Case’) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-01/11-96, 30 May 2011 [48]; 
Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Application 
by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the 
Statute (Admissibility Decision: Ruto, Kosgey, Sang ‘ODM Case’) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-
01/11-101, 30 May 2011 [54]. Lastly, the same position was adopted in Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) Decision: Bemba) (n 53) [16]; Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 1) [74]. 
103 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision 
on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for 
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‘comparative gravity’ or ‘comprehensive conduct’ would be more appropriate, thereby 
requiring that the national investigation be directed against the person, but allowing greater 
flexibility in terms of the conduct being investigated, and afford greater opportunity for the 
case to be declared inadmissible.  
 
During the Confirmation of Charges hearing for Katanga, the Chambers confirmed that he 
would stand trial for the joint commission of three crimes against humanity (murder, sexual 
slavery and rape) and seven war crimes (conscription of children, deliberate attacks on 
civilian populations, willful killing, destruction of property, pillaging, sexual slavery and 
rape):104 national investigations had been established, under the rubric of crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed by Katanga, in overlapping locations, including Bogoro 
village.105 The overlap of investigations at one location (Bogoro village) with one of the 
charges (Crimes Against Humanity) was, the defence team argued, sufficient to satisfy the 
same conduct test. The Trial Chamber rejected the challenge, on grounds that the inactivity of 
the RDC to pursue the investigations amounted to unwillingness, thereby omitting to proceed 
to examine the ‘same conduct’ argument of the Bogoro attack.106 Upon Appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber maintained the admissibility of the case, relying on the inactivity of DRC to pursue 
the investigations,107 rendering the overlapping investigations of the attack on Bogoro village 
as mute as the national investigation had ceased without sufficient fulfillment of the 
admissibility criteria. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the alternative tests of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Germain Katanga (n 98) [17–22]; Ben Batros, ‘The Judgment on the Katanga Admissibility Appeal: Judicial 
Restraint at the ICC’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 343. 
104 The Confirmation of Charges established that Germain Katanga would stand trial for allegedly committing 
through other persons, within the meaning of article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute, three crimes against 
humanity: Murder under article 7(1) (a) of the Statute; sexual slavery and rape under article 7(1) (g) of the 
Statute. Seven war crimes: Using children under the age of 15 to take active part in hostilities under article 8 
(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute; deliberately directing an attack on a civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities under article 8(2)(b)(i); willful killing 
under article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute; destruction of property under article 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Statute; pillaging 
under article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Statute; sexual slavery and rape under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Statute. 
Decision on the confirmation of charges (public redacted version), Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-
01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008 [574]. 
105 Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, pursuant to Article 19 
(2) (a) of the Statute (The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Situation in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) [2009] 65 [14].  
106 Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui,  Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the 
Statute) [2009] ICC Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-01/07-1213, 16 June 2009 [77]. 
107 Batros (n 103); Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case” (Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Katanga) (n 94) 
[116]. 
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conduct, preferring instead to confirm ‘same conduct’ test as the legitimate threshold for the 
consideration of case-level admissibility. 
 
Interpretation of the scope of conduct or the degree of overlap in the conduct that forms the 
subject matter of the national investigation with the ICC’s investigation was revisited in the 
Libya cases. In Gaddafi, the Government submitted that its national investigation should 
cover ‘substantially the same conduct’ but should not be required to mirror the case before 
the Court, on evidentiary grounds that the State may have access to different evidence to that 
of the Court, but also according to the object and purpose of the ICC, where the mirroring of 
identical charges under national investigations is simply unnecessary for the purpose to 
bringing an end to impunity.108 Furthermore, Libya challenged the scope of the ICC’s own 
investigations and the expectation that Libya should focus its resources on exactly the same 
incidents, which it considered may not be the most serious crimes.109 Instead, Libya proposed 
that the correct interpretation of the same conduct test would allow national investigations of 
‘substantially the same conduct’ where this would involve overlap of incidents and 
underlying facts.110  
 
In its Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber largely accepted Libya’s argument concerning the 
interpretation of ‘substantially the same conduct’ although it qualified this by asserting that 
its determination of this test will ‘vary according to the concrete facts and circumstances of 
the case.’111 The PTC reiterated the Appeals Chambers definition of a case as those specific 
incidents where one or more crimes has been committed by one or more identified suspects, 
as well as its definition of conduct as being substantially the same as alleged in the 
proceedings before the Court.112 With this in mind, the PTC determined that the conduct of 
                                                
108Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-
285-Red2, 23 January 2013 [27]. 
109 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute relating to Saif 
Al-Islam Gaddafi (Article 19 Application: Gaddafi) (n 80) [87]. 
110 Libyan Government’s consolidated reply to the response of the Prosecution, OPCD and OPCV to its further 
submission on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Reply: Gaddafi Admissibility) 
[2013] Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-293-Red2, 04 March 2013 [34]. 
111 Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [77] 
112 Ibid [76], citing Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimia Muthuara and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Judgment on the 
appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision 
on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute’ (Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Muthuara and Kenyatta) (n 84) 39; Prosecutor v. 
William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of 
Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the 
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the national investigation should be compared to the conduct alleged in the ICCs Warrant of 
Arrest against Gaddafi, where broad acts of murder and persecution were alleged in 
Benghazi, Misrata, Tripoli and other cities, between 15 February and at least 28 February 
2011.113 The PTC considered that the Warrant of Arrest referred to more generic acts that 
resulted from the control that Gaddafi exerted over the Libyan Security forces, whereas in 
contrast, the Article 58 Decision included a longer, but still non-exhaustive list of the acts of 
murder and persecution within temporal and geographical parameters.  
 
Despite the specificity of the acts described in the Article 58 Decision, the Chambers decided 
that they did not represent ‘unique manifestations’ of Gaddafi’s alleged criminality, but rather 
that they constituted ‘samples of a course of conduct.’114 As such, the PTC concluded that the 
admissibility or otherwise of Libya’s investigation into Gaddafi should be assessed on the 
basis of similitude between the underlying conduct listed in the Warrant of Arrest and Article 
58 Decision: 
‘it would not be appropriate to expect Libya's investigation to cover exactly the same 
acts of murder and persecution mentioned in the Article 58 Decision as constituting 
instances of Mr Gaddafi's alleged course of conduct. Instead, the Chamber will 
assess, on the basis of the evidence provided by Libya, whether the alleged domestic 
investigation addresses the same conduct underlying the Warrant of Arrest and 
Article 58 Decision’115 
The Legal Characterisation of Conduct: Confronting The Montague – Capulet Complex 
Unlike the international treaties upon which much of the Statute is based, the Rome Statute 
omits express requirements of States Parties concerning their domestic practices to repress its 
crimes and punish those who commit acts amounting to ICC crimes. While the Preamble 
affirms and recalls the duty of States to prosecute serious crime perpetrators, the substantive 
parts of the Statute are instructions to the ICC, and do not include similar instructions to 
States: indeed, as an example, Article 5, establishes the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’ 
(Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Rut, Kosgey, Sang) (n 79) [40]. 
113 The Prosecutor v Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi (Arrest Warrant Decision: Gaddafi, Gaddafi, Al-Senussi) Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-1, 27 June 
2011 6. 
114 Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [80-82] 
115 Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [83] 
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Court, by providing jurisdiction to the Court to enforce the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression, in accordance to the Statute. The absence of 
expressly stated requirements or obligations of States Parties has been used to used to justify 
the strict interpretation thesis proposed by Heller, including the limits of the due process 
requirements of States within the context of ICC investigations116 and the omission of a 
requirement to apply international crimes rather than ordinary crimes within the national 
criminal justice mechanisms of States Parties.117 Kleffner has countered that no rule or 
principle that prohibits these implied obligations can be inferred from a treaty text, not least 
the Rome Statute, given its broader object and purpose.118 
 
In contrast, the four Geneva Conventions establish four distinct requirements of States: the 
treaties must be executed through allocation of responsibilities to the Commanders in Chief to 
oversee the execution of the treaty requirements,119 disseminated widely and incorporated 
into military study programmes,120 applied through the adoption of laws and regulations that 
ensure the application of the treaty, and finally provision must be made for effective penal 
sanction through the adoption of legislation where necessary.121 Similarly, the UN human 
rights treaties contain explicit instructions to States, along with the supervisory and 
monitoring mechanisms described above. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
for example, requires that States ‘undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and 
other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.’122 
In issuing its authoritative interpretation of this obligation, the Committee of the Rights of the 
Child has declared that States are under an obligation to conduct ‘a comprehensive review of 
all domestic legislation and related administrative guidance to ensure full compliance with 
                                                
116 See Articles 55(2), 59(2), Rome Statute (n 3) concerning the rights during investigation, arrest and 
questioning, article 87(4) concerning well-being of victims and witnesses and article 99(1) on protection of 
national laws; and Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute on National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255. 
117 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law 
Journal 85, 86.  
118 Kleffner (n 95) 90. 
119 Geneva Convention I, for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field 1949, article 45; Geneva Convention II, for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 1949, article 46.  
120 Geneva Convention (I) (n 119), article 47; Geneva Convention (II) (n 119), article 48; Geneva Convention 
III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949, article 127. 
121 Geneva Convention (I) (n 119), article 29; Geneva Convention (II) (n 119), article 50; Geneva Convention 
(III) (n 120), article 129; Geneva Convention IV, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
1949, article 146. 
122 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, article 4. 
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the Convention’123 and furthermore, that ‘effective remedies must be available to redress 
violations, a requirement that is implicit in the Convention and consistently referred to in the 
other six major international human rights treaties.’124 
 
Those pursuing the mirror thesis, or advocating the necessity of incorporating ICC crimes 
into national law have suffered a setback following the ease in which the Pre-Trial Chambers 
have accepted that admissibility should be assessed according to the pre-existing applicable 
national legal framework and that the legal characterization of the conduct according to 
international crime labels is ‘not determinative of an admissibility challenge.’125 
 
The admissibility criteria refers to the ‘conduct’ of the suspect or accused person/s who form 
the focus of the national investigation, prosecution or adjudication: Article 17(1)(c) and 
Article 20(3) exclude admissibility where a person has already been tried for ‘conduct’ which 
is the subject of the complaint, where the conduct concerns crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court.126 The key difference in the meanings of conduct and crime is that conduct refers 
to the de facto acts that are committed whereas crime must refer to the de jure appraisal of 
the conduct and its taxonomy within a legal system, either the Rome Statute or the national 
criminal justice system. This Pre-Trial Chambers acknowledged this in Gaddafi, where they 
took the view that ‘assessment of domestic proceedings should focus on the alleged conduct 
and not its legal characterization.’127 In linking the applicability of ordinary crimes to the 
subject matter of the ICC’s investigation or case, the PTC asserted that the application of 
ordinary crime charges would be sufficient ‘to the extent that the case covers the same 
conduct.’128 
 
Notwithstanding the confirmation that there is no requirement for national level 
investigations to apply international crime charges within the same conduct test, the PTC 
raised concerns in the Gaddafi case over the applicability of specific elements of the charges 
that had been ascribed to the accused. Notably, under the Libyan criminal code, several 
                                                
123 General Comment No. 5 (2003) General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 2003 (CRC/GC/2003/5) para 18. 
124 Ibid 24. 
125 Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [85] 
126 Rome Statute (n 3)., article 17(1)(c) and article 20(3)(a) 
127 Pre Trial Chamber I, Gadaffi Admissibility Decision (n 1) [87] 
128 Ibid [88] 
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charges that were potentially applicable to Gaddafi were restricted to those persons who 
served as ‘public officers’: as the accused did not hold a formal position within the Libyan 
state at the time of their alleged commission of the crimes, the possibility that he would be 
excluded from liability if his status could not be recognised as a public official could act as a 
procedural bar from securing conviction. However, Libya asserted that this element could be 
satisfied under domestic law, if sufficient evidence could be produced to demonstrate his de 
facto authority, which proved satisfactory to the PTC.129 Turning to the other offences under 
the Libyan Criminal Code, the Chamber considered that while ordinary crime charges 
available to Libya did not cover all aspects of the offences contained within the ICC Arrest 
Warrant charges, they did nonetheless sufficiently capture the conduct, and as such, they 
satisfied the same conduct test.130 
 
Establishing Limits of the ‘Same Conduct’ Test 
In the Article 15 Request to open an investigation into the situation in Ivory Coast, the 
Prosecutor followed the activity tests, asserting that while national prosecutors from Abidjan, 
and Daloua, as well as the Military, are conducting investigations into crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, only one person under investigation by the Abidjan Prosecutor was 
on the list of most responsible persons developed by the ICC Prosecutor, and the suspect was 
under investigation within the domestic domain for crimes outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Furthermore, the regional prosecutors seem to have adopted a policy of deferral or forum 
sharing, with the each of the Prosecutors declaring that they do not intend to pursue those 
bearing the greatest responsibility, in apparent deference to the ICC investigation.131     
 
Other admissibility challenges have also had to engage with the selection of crimes by 
national prosecutors, although in both cases, the charges adopted the nomenclature of 
international crimes. In deciding to issue the warrant of arrest for Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
(Lubanga), as well as in the confirmation of charges decision, the Court had to address the 
previous detention of Lubanga in the DRC, on domestic charges of genocide, crimes against 
                                                
129 Ibid [107-109] 
130 Ibid [112-113] 
131 Situation in the Ivory Coast, Prosecutor’s provision of additional information in relation to its request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, ICC-02/11-7-Red, 16 August 2011, [11-22].  
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humanity, as well as murder, illegal detention and torture. 132  In the decision of the 
confirmation of charges, the Pre Trial Chamber accepted that the ICC held jurisdiction over 
two counts of the war crime of enlisting or conscripting child soldiers into the FPLC, the first 
as part of an international armed conflict, occurring between early September 2002 and 02 
June 2003 and the second charge of conscription or enlistment as part of a non-international 
armed conflict, occurring between 02 June 2003 and 13 August 2003. 133 They did so on the 
basis that neither the national investigation nor the grounds for the provisional detention of 
Lubanga included the enlistment or conscription of children under the age of fifteen, and 
thereby that the same conduct was not under investigation by the territorial state. For States 
trying to evaluate the importance or need of implementing ICC crimes into national 
legislation, the Lubanga decisions provide no clarity or direction: the arresting State had 
already detained the suspect under a combination of international crime charges and ordinary 
crimes and had made some efforts at investigation, but the combination of its self-referral (an 
admission of unwillingness or inability) along with the narrow selection of charges outside of 
the national investigation rendered the case admissible, in the eyes of the majority of the Pre 
Trial Chambers. Instead, the confirmation of charges reinforced the doctrine of the ‘same 
person same conduct’ test, indicating to States that they will need to ensure that domestic 
investigations cover the same conduct established in the notification issued by the Office of 
the Prosecutor.  
 
Through review of the rules and tests that have emerged from judicial evaluation of Article 
17(1), sections 1 to 5 have largely confirmed that the models of complementarity that 
advocate the mirroring of the ICC’s substantive and procedural parts are largely unfounded 
during assessment of this first stage of admissibility determination. Furthermore, the ICC has 
established admissibility in the majority of admissibility challenges or proprio motu 
determinations at this stage, without proceeding to the more detailed assessment of their 
                                                
132The first arrest warrant of 19 March 2005 detailed charges of genocide and crimes against humanity under 
articles 164, 166-169 of the DRC Military Code, whereas the second arrest warrant of 29 March 2005, covered 
the domestic crimes of murder, illegal detention and torture. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest, (Warrant of Arrest Decision: 
Lubanga) (n 57) [33]. included as Annex 1 in Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 
February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo ICC Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06, 24 February 2006 [65]. 
133 Charged as co-perpetrators within the meaning of article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for the war crime of 
enlisting or conscripting children under the age of fifteen in the context of an internatnal armed conflict, 
proscribed in article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the confirmation of charges (public redacted version) (Confirmation of 
Charges Decision: Lubanga) (n 98) [254, 410]. 
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genuine willingness and or ability. Section 5 seemingly reduced the most popular dimension 
of the mirror thesis, that States must adopt the ICC crimes, by reviewing the ICC’s 
jurisprudence on the ‘same conduct’ test, where it has established that the substantive parts of 
the Rome Statute will not be applicable to States undergoing admissibility determinations, 
and rather that admissibility will be assessed according to the national criminal laws and 
practices in place. In prioritising the conduct that underlies the legal characterisation, as well 
as the national definition ascribed or applied to such conduct, the ICC has elevated the 
significance of comparative legal analysis in its admissibility procedures, in order to fully 
determine if the national legal framework poses procedural bars or omissions in the 
availability of its laws to the acts and individuals that are the object of reference. Despite the 
pre-eminence afforded to existing national laws by the ICC, it may nonetheless remain 
preferential for States to revise its substantive and procedural laws in order to ensure that 
there are no procedural bars or omissions that may render its choices of crimes (and 
liabilities) as admissible to the ICC. But this preference is certainly not obligatory. 
 
The absence of any obligations to revise the relevant national laws places the Rome Statute at 
odds with many of its counterpart treaties in international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law, where legal reform is required in order to bring the national legal 
framework into compliance with the international treaty. The absence of an obligation 
incumbent on States Parties to repress ICC crimes through criminal prosecution has been 
considered by Akhavan to be ‘inconsistent with an effective system of complementarity.’134 
By drawing comparison with other treaties - that have the status of applicable law before the 
ICC – Akhavan points to an absence of an express and enforceable obligation on States to use 
their criminal jurisdiction to repress international crimes, and proposes the adoption of an 
Optional Protocol to remove the discretionary nature of State primacy and make explicit the 
obligation for States to investigate, adjudicate and prosecute ICC crimes. While such a 
proposition has failed to stimulate discussion within the Assembly of States Parties, the gap 
between the obligations imposed by the Rome Statute and its international treaty counterparts 
will need to be addressed and acknowledged in the pursuit of positive complementarity. In 
short, the development of the same conduct test continues to reduce the weight behind those 
who advocate for substantial legal reform, including the ASP Resolutions on 
                                                
134 Payam Akhavan, ‘Whither National Courts? The Rome Statute’s Missing Half’ (2010) 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1245, 1246. 
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complementarity, and requires greater nuance and clarity to ensure that the distinction is 
made between the absolute requirements of the ICC and those that are aspirational or ideal. 
This will require that the cooperative models of positive complementarity proposed in 
Chapter 7 be designed and constructed in such a way as to be clear of the ‘obligation origin’ 
of each proposed legal reform. 
 
The first phase of the admissibility procedure has also established that the dimensions of 
admissibility considerations will be restricted to specific investigations or particular cases 
consisting of the same person and conduct, and will not encompass a broad and sweeping 
review of all national criminal justice activities (although this approach is adopted during the 
preliminary examination of the Office of the Prosecutor, which will be addressed in Chapter 
4). While subsequent Chapters will demonstrate the ICC’s practice in conducting broader 
reviews of national criminal justice laws and practices, for the purpose of establishing the 
contextual circumstances of the case at hand, this remains consistent with the legal 
personality of the ICC as an international criminal tribunal. There would certainly appear to 
be room for improved cooperation between the more general national reviews conducted by 
international human rights treaty bodies and the ICC within the context of admissibility 
considerations, in order to better support the identification of contextual circumstances. 
Finally, moving this issue into the domain of positive complementarity, it would seem 
prudent to observe that the restriction of admissibility assessments to the objects of reference 
of the ICC’s investigation should inform positive complementarity practices, combined with 
the case selection practices of the ICC, to which this thesis will now turn to. 
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of Case Selection by the ICC on National 
Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication 
 
 
The selection of cases by the ICC is intended to ensure the identification and pursuit of ‘the 
most serious crimes committed within [a] situation’1 and to limit the Court from the pursuit 
of ‘peripheral cases’2 that have nonetheless satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the 
Statute. Defined in the Statute under Article 17(1)(d) as a requirement that cases be of a 
sufficient gravity to be admissible before the ICC and established in the Regulations of the 
Prosecutor to encompass Article 53 (1) to (c),3 three criteria inform the selection of cases by 
the ICC: (i) the gravity of the crimes; (ii) the most responsible groups or persons and (iii) the 
interests of justice as a countervailing measure.4 The statutory sources for the application and 
interpretation of each of the selection criteria are rather thin on the ground, but have formed 
the subject of a breadth of literature.5 
                                                
1 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP Regulations) (ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-
09, 23 April 2009) Regulation 33. Under Regulation 29(1) the OTP is also required to produce internal reports 
analyzing the seriousness of the information and considering the factors established in article 53(1). The Report 
must be accompanied by a recommendation on whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation. 
Alternatively, Pre-Trial Chamber I described the gravity threshold as a requirement whereby “particular features 
[…] render it [the conduct] especially grave.” Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 
February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo ICC Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06, 24 February 2006 [45]. 
2 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Article 15 Decision) [2010] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09, 31 March 
2010 [56]; Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Article 15 Decision: Côte d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber III 
ICC-02/11, 03 October 2011 [201]. 
3 OTP Regulations (n 1), Regulation 33 
4 For the purpose of brevity, the interests of justice has been omitted from this thesis. 
5 Article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c). See also Margaret de Guzman, ‘Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2009) 32 Fordham International Law Journal 1400; Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Gravity 
Threshold Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 35; Ray 
Murphy, ‘Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court’ [2006] C 281; William A Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Gravity’, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, vol 48 (Martinus Nijhoff 
2009); Ignaz Stegmiller, ‘The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Back and Forth in Lubanga and 
Ntaganda’ (2009) 9 In 547; Susana Sa Couto and Katherine Cleary, ‘The Gravity Threshold of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2008) 23 American University International Law Review 808; Darryl Robinson, ‘Serving the 
Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 14 Eur J Int 
Law 481; Héctor Olásolo and Enrique Carnero-Rojo, ‘The Application of the Principle of Complementarity to 
the Decision of Where to Open an Investigation: The Admissibility of Situations’ in Carsten Stahn and 
Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice 
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The selection of core international crime cases is an (overlooked) reality within every 
international and national forum.6 Notwithstanding the challenges underpinning the practice 
of selecting cases from those that already reach the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC,7 
the rules and practice of case selection by the ICC is directly relevant to national criminal 
justice actors. It can help to identify the cases that the ICC can be expected to focus on, 
thereby informing the strategies of engagement with the ICC at each stage of its inquiries, as 
well as national adjudication strategies.  Of particular importance, the practice of case 
selection can inform the exercise of national criminal justice in post-atrocity countries, 
including national case selection strategies, the adoption of alternative or other justice 
measures8 as well as the allocation of resources to criminal accountability. This Chapter will 
review the sources, interpretation and application of the three selection criteria by the Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP), the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers (PTC) and Appeals Chambers (AC), in 
order to identify whether sufficiently predictable rules or practice has emerged to inform 
national actors of the selection practices of the ICC.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
(Cambridge University Press 2011); Paul Seils, ‘Making Complementarity Work: Maximising the Limited Role 
of the Prosecutor’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011).; W. A. Schabas, "Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Gravity", in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.). The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal 
Court, (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 
6 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(Cambridge University Press 2005); Jörg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade, Coping with Overloaded Criminal 
Justice Systems  : The Rise of Prosecutorial Power across Europe (Springer 2006); Morten Bergsmo (ed), 
Criteria for Prioritising and Selecting Core International Crimes Cases (Peace Research Institute Oslo 2009). 
7 See Bergsmo (n 5); Morten Bergsmo and others, The Backlog of Core International Crimes Case Files in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Peace Research Institute Oslo 2009). 
8 As addressed elsewhere, States will remain in compliance with the Rome Statute if the cases that fall below the 
ICC’s selection threshold are addressed through other accountability measures.  See Carsten Stahn, 
‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the 
International Criminal Court’ (2005) 3 J Int Criminal Justice 695; Gregory S Gordon, ‘Complementarity and 
Alternative Forms of Justice: A New Test for ICC Admissibility’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy 
(eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2011); Forum for International Criminal and Humanitarian Law, ‘Abbreviated Criminal Procedures for 
Core International Crimes’; Sonja Kotnik and others, ‘The Emergence of a Abbreviated Criminal  Procedure in 
the Field of Criminal Law’, Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Dilemmas of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice (Faculty of Criminal Justice, University of Maribor 2004); CH Brants-Langeraar, ‘Consensual Criminal 
Procedures: Plea and Confession Bargaining and  Abbreviated Procedures to Simplify Criminal Procedure’ 
(2007) 11 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law. 
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1. The Selection of Cases  
The inclusion of the gravity of the cases as a principle to enable the selection of incidents and 
cases for investigation and trial is one of the many innovations of the Rome Statute and as 
with the criteria of willingness and ability, the founding texts have provided ‘little in the way 
of concrete guidance about how to undertake this assessment’9 with little relevant precedent 
from other applicable sources. The starting point for the identification of the selection criteria 
is Article 17(1)(d) which establishes the fourth and final reason that case may be declared 
inadmissible before the Court, where: ‘the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court.’10 
 
The requirement of sufficient gravity is repeated in Article 53(1)(b) and (c) as factors that the 
Prosecutor must consider when deciding whether to initiate an investigation. First they must 
consider if a reasonable basis exists to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
has been committed and then: 
‘(b) The case is or would be admissible under Article 17; and 
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice.’11 (emphasis added) 
The same formula is repeated in Article 53(2) which establishes the conditions upon which 
the Prosecutor can conclude that there is an insufficient basis to proceed, where factors 
concerning the perpetrator are inserted into the conditions of the interests of justice, including 
‘the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role on the alleged crime.’ 
Together, these articles provide the foundation for the selection criteria: the gravity of the 
case and the interests of justice. In order to determine the gravity of the case, the gravity of its 
constitutive parts must be identified – this has emerged as the gravity of the crimes (see 
Section 2) and the level of responsibility of the perpetrator (see Section 3).  
  
Both the Office of the Prosecutor and the Chambers of the Court have sought to interpret the 
scant statutory requirements that instruct the selection of cases for investigation and trial 
                                                
9 Beth Van Schaack, ‘The Concept of Gravity Before International Criminal Courts’ (2008) American Society 
of International Law Accountability: Newsletter of the International Criminal Law Interest Group of the 
American Society of International Law. 
10 Article 17(1)(d), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1998 (A/CONF183/9). 
11 Article 53(1). Ibid Rome Statute (n 9) 
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before the ICC and to elaborate standardized tests. The Pre-Trial Chambers have found 
sufficient guidance from the Statute to clarify three principles of case selection by the ICC.  
 
1.1. Gravity of the Case is an Additional Safeguard for Admissibility 
With the exception of the text of Article 17(1)(d) which requires that a case be of ‘sufficient 
gravity’ the operative part of the Statute is inconclusive in establishing a clear-cut filter to 
cases as part of the admissibility requirements. The Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor have established a rule of case selection, which reinforces the importance of 
gravity as a criteria for the selection of cases within a situation:  
‘The Office shall review the information analysed during preliminary examination 
and evaluation and shall collect the necessary information and evidence in order to 
identify the most serious crimes committed within the situation. In selecting 
potential cases within the situation, the Office shall consider the factors set out in 
article 53, paragraph 1 (a) to (c) in order to assess issues of jurisdiction, 
admissibility (including gravity), as well as the interests of justice.’12 (emphasis 
added) 
 
Turning to the preamble, the sufficiency of the gravity of a case can be put into context with 
memories of ‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’ and 
affirmations that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community’ must be 
punished and effectively prosecuted. The selection of cases from amongst those that bear the 
hallmark of being the most serious might sit awkwardly with the determination ‘to put an end 
to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes’ where the ICC is expected to be the sole 
adjudicator for the crimes contained therein, if it were not for two paragraphs that recall the 
duty of States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction and emphasize the complementary 
relationship between the ICC and States in these matters.13 The preamble has simultaneously 
been interpreted as insulating the ICC against the selection of cases, as well as enabling it. 
The practice of case selection from the crimes within their jurisdiction, however unpopular in 
some quarters, has also been a long-term practice of the ad-hoc international criminal 
                                                
12 Regulation 33, OTP Regulations (n 1) 
13 For matters of resource allocation, if nothing else, the selection of cases has become a reality of the ICC’s 
practice that over-rides any ambiguity established under the preamble. 
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tribunals, either based on statutory criteria or through resolutions largely associated with their 
completion strategies. Their selection practices have primarily been categorized according to 
notions of responsibility and status of the perpetrators which will be reviews in Section 3. 
 
The existence of a case selection practice by the ICC emerged in the Lubanga case, where the 
Pre-Trial Chambers found that a case must consist of something more than the jurisdictional 
requirements of the Statute:  
‘[T]he gravity threshold is in addition to the drafters' careful selection of crimes 
included in articles 6 to 8 of the Statute [...]. Hence, the fact that a case addresses one 
of the most serious crimes for the international community as a whole is not sufficient 
for it to be admissible before the Court.’14 
 
The Pre-Trial Judges returned to the notion of the sufficiency of the selected crimes in the 
situations of Kenya and the Ivory Coast, where it considered that the gravity threshold of 
article 17(1)(d) forms an additional safeguard against the pursuit of peripheral cases that 
nonetheless satisfied the subject matter of the ICC:  
‘the Chamber recalls that all crimes that fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the Court are serious, and thus, the reference to the insufficiency of gravity is actually 
an additional safeguard, which prevents the Court from investigating, prosecuting 
and trying peripheral cases.’15 
 
The repetition of these formulas in the Pre-Trial Chambers decisions, and the absence of 
appeals, indicates that the selection of cases by the ICC has been recognized as a necessary 
practice of the Court, whereby the gravity of the crimes operates as a threshold to reduce the 
flooding of the Court with ‘less grave’ or ‘peripheral’ cases that have nonetheless reached the 
threshold of the ICC crimes.16 
 
                                                
14 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Warrant of Arrest, (Warrant of Arrest Decision: Lubanga) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 
February 2006 5 [41]; Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation Charges 
(Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC/02/05-02-/09-243-Red, 08 
February 2010 [30].  
15 Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 2) [56], Article 15 Decision: Côte d’Ivoire (n 2) [201] Situation in the Republic 
of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for Authorisation of an Investigation pursuant to Article 15 (Article 15 Request: Côte 
d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Office of the Prosecutor ICC-02/11-3, 23 June 2011 [58]. 
16 Sa Couto and Cleary (n 4) 808; El Zeidy (n 4) 36. 
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1.2. The Gravity Threshold at the Preliminary Examination Phase: ‘against the 
backdrop of potential cases’   
The second emerging principle on the selection of cases during admissibility focuses on the 
scope of evaluation. Initially, the pre-trial chambers outlined two different requirements for 
the evaluation of the gravity threshold during the pre-trial phase, described in Lubanga as: 
“(i) at the stage of the initiations of an investigation, the relevant situation must meet 
such a gravity threshold and (ii) once a case arises from the investigation of a 
situation it must also meet the gravity threshold provided for that provision.”17 
This has been understood as requiring the Prosecutor to determine gravity during the 
preliminary examination by applying the gravity threshold to the entire situation (i) and 
applying the gravity threshold to the features of any specific cases that emerge from the 
formal investigation (ii).  
 
However, in the Kenya Article 15 Decision, the Pre-Trial Chambers revised the situation-
level requirement for gravity during preliminary examination, declaring that: 
‘although an examination of the gravity threshold must be conducted, it is not feasible 
that at the stage of the preliminary examination it be done with regard to a concrete 
"case". Instead gravity should be examined against the backdrop of the likely set of 
cases or "potential case(s)" that would arise from investigating the situation.’18 
The requirement or parameter for the gravity threshold identified here, requires that the 
preliminary examination should cease to evaluate the general gravity of the situation and 
should instead be examined against the backdrop of ‘potential cases,’ which the PTC 
described as:  
(i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for 
the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court allegedly committed during the incidents that are likely to be the focus of an 
investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s).’19 
                                                
17 Warrant of Arrest Decision: Lubanga (n 13) [41] 
18 Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 2) [58] 
19 Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 2) [50] 
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Even at the preliminary examination phase, the Judges have reinforced the nature of the court 
as a criminal court, thereby requiring or re-emphasizing the importance of linking the 
selection of crimes to those persons most responsible for them. The use and application of 
factors to determine the most responsible persons or groups will be considered throughout 
Section 4 whilst the application of factors to determine the gravity of the crimes will be 
addressed in Section 3.  
 
1.3. The Gravity Threshold must be evaluated as the second phase of Admissibility  
The third principle to have been affirmed by the Court is a simple affirmation of the 
appropriate sequencing of the determination of the gravity threshold. In almost all pre-trial 
cases where the gravity threshold is assessed, the Chambers have asserted that gravity 
threshold should be determined following assessment of jurisdiction and the first three tests 
of admissibility (activity, willingness or ability) as established in the sequence of Article 
17(1).  
 
In conclusion, the gravity threshold has emerged as an additional safeguard to filter out those 
cases that the ICC has jurisdiction over, to those that would be admissible before the Court. 
To define the threshold, the Court has directed the Prosecutor to consider the most 
responsible persons (see section 4) and the gravity of the crimes, where several factors have 
been established and applied. It is to these factors, and their application in cases before the 
ICC that we now turn to.  
 
2. Factors of the Gravity of the Crime 
While the gravity threshold clearly serves to limit the admissibility of those cases that meet 
the jurisdictional tests of the ICC, the method to measure or define the gravity of the crimes 
or the most responsible groups or persons is more complicated. The concept of the ‘gravity of 
a crime’ must take the criminal conduct as its axis, but there are numerous normative 
approaches that can be taken to construct a framework for measuring it.20  
                                                
20 Unlike the other admissibility criteria willingness, ability and ne bis in idem, which rotate around the qualities 
of the criminal justice system in the context of the specific investigation or case. In a dissenting opinion of 
Judge Pikkis, some effort was made to provide synonyms of gravity, which include weightiness, sufficiency and 
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The Statute does little to guide the Prosecutor or Judges to any particular methodology. Its 
preambular formula, of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, 
which reappears in Article 5 to establish the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC serves 
only to denote that all of the underlying acts of the prescribed crimes are considered to be 
within the most serious category. Furthermore, a comparative gravity is used in Article 
8(1)(g) on war crimes to allow for additional types of sexual violence unforeseen by the 
Statute, where the acts constitute ‘any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.’ 
In a dissenting opinion, some effort was made to provide synonyms of gravity, which include 
weightiness, sufficiency and adequacy, although this remains in such abstract terms as to be 
unhelpful.21 
 
2.1. The Prosecutor’s Factors: Scale, Nature, Manner of Commission, Impact 
Prior to the adoption of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor in 2009, the OTP had 
presented aspects of the gravity of the crimes in a variety of policy papers, including general 
Prosecutorial Policies22 specific issue led papers23 including referrals and communications.24 
The Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor however, establish four factors that govern 
the application of the gravity of the crimes within the context of the initiation of an 
investigation or prosecution: 25 
‘In order to assess the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in the situation the 
Office shall consider various factors including their scale, nature, manner of 
commission, and impact.’26  
                                                                                                                                                  
adequacy, although this remains in such abstract terms as to be unhelpful. See the Separate and Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georghios M Pikkis’ Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
“Judgment of the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre Trial Chamber I entitles ‘Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’ ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/04-169, 13 July 
2006. 
21 Ibid. 
22 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (International Criminal Court 
2010) para 6. 
23 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (International 
Criminal Court 2003).  
24 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the 
Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications’ (International Criminal Court 21 April 2004); 
25 While they are not strictly included in the sources of applicable law under Article 21, they nonetheless 
provide guidelines that instruct the operations of the Office of the Prosecutor, and have been accepted as 
relevant factors in decisions by the Pre-Trial Chambers. 
26 Regulation 29(2) OTP Regulations (n 1) 
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These four factors subsequently formed the basis of a more detailed Draft Policy on 
Preliminary Examinations, 2010 (Draft Policy) and have been used in the delivery of annual 
preliminary examination reports27 as well as the more sporadic country reports. 28 
Scale of the Crimes 
Largely a quantitative factor, the Draft Policy refers to indicators such as the numbers of 
direct and indirect victims, and their geographical or temporal range; the intensity or 
frequency of crimes (for example high intensity or high frequency crimes committed over a 
short timescale or low intensity violence committed over an extended period). The policy 
also emphasizes qualitative dimensions including the extent of the damage caused by the 
crimes, specifically bodily or psychological harm caused to the victims and their families.29  
The Nature of the Crimes 
The nature of the crimes is largely used as a synonym for the specific elements or underlying 
acts of the offences. Additionally, it emphasises certain thematic crimes against the person, 
including killings, rapes and other sexual or gender violence crimes, crimes committed 
against children, or the imposition of conditions of life on a community calculated to bring 
about its destruction.30  
The Manner of the Commission of the Crimes 
The third factor turns to the groups or individual perpetrators, through identifying qualitative 
dimensions of the organization and execution of the crimes, by the individual suspect as well 
as the organizational structure that supported them. The non-exhaustive list draws on several 
common elements of the crimes relevant to the commission of the crimes, covering 
organizational policies as well as individual intent or mens rea, as well as the aggravating 
factors relevant to sentencing. This includes:  
‘the means used to execute the crime, the degree of participation in the intent its 
commission, the systematic nature of the crimes, whether they formed part of a plan 
                                                
27 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012’ (International Criminal 
Court 2012). ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012’ (n 26) 
28 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘OTP Response to Communications Received Concerning Iraq’. Government of 
Mali “referral of the Situation in Mali since January 2012” of 18 July 2012 
29 ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 21), para 70.a 
30 Ibid, para 70(b) 
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or organized policy or otherwise resulted from the abuse of power or official 
capacity, and elements of particular cruelty, including the vulnerability of the victims, 
any motives involving discrimination, or the use of rape and sexual violence as a 
means of destroying communities.’31  
The thematic crime of sexual violence is once again elevated to a specific indicator, perhaps 
in-keeping with the profiling of sexual and gender violence in the Statute.32  
The Impact of the Crimes 
The final indicative factor of gravity moves to the consequences of the crimes, to the local or 
international community, particularly concerning long-term social, economic and 
environmental damage, or those crimes that seek to increase civilian vulnerability or spread 
terror among civilians.33 Many of these factors can be expected to feature within the 
assessments of the interests of the victims, one of the two balancing criteria in the 
determination of the interests of justice (see Section 4), however the concept, as well as the 
indicative features of it, allows for a broader analysis of the crimes. 
 
Throughout the four factors of gravity, one indicator, ‘harm against the person’ is almost 
constant, appearing to give greater prioritsation to conduct that results in physical or 
psychological harm. Yet many preliminary examination reports include acts of pillage and 
destruction of property indicating that the emphasis on bodily or psychological harm has not 
limited the selection of incidents involving physical destruction such as attacks against 
protected property, buildings and monuments, pillage, destruction or seizure of property, or 
the displacement of civilian populations34 particularly where it is large-scale, psychological 
and or violent. 
 
In elaborating these four indicative gravity factors, the OTP has intended to provide clarity 
and transparency to its investigative functions and procedures, to serve to guide to States and 
                                                
31 Ibid, para 70(c), 
32 Article 42(9) instructs the Prosecutor to appoint legal expert advisors on specific issues, including but not 
limited to sexual and gender violence and violence against children, while Article 54(10(b) requires the 
Prosecutor to take appropriate measures during the investigations to respect the interests and personal 
circumstances of victims and witnesses, particularly where the crime involves gender violence, sexual violence 
of violence against children. Rome Statute (n 9) 
33 ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 21), para 70(d). 
34 Including serious violations such as the specific acts of war crimes listed in article 8(2)(b)(ii),(iii), (v), (ix), 
(xiii), (xvi), Article 8(2)(e)(ii)(iii0(iv)(v)(viii). Rome Statute (n 9) 
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all actors seeking to engage in the preliminary examination process, in the ordering or 
structure of their dialogue, but also in shaping national fact-finding and investigative 
strategies. But beyond this, their coherence with the preliminary stage of inquiry has been 
questioned, by some commentators35 and by the Pre Trial Chambers, who have examined the 
coherence, consistency and application of the gravity factors in particular preliminary 
examinations and in general terms have cautioned that: 
‘the gravity of a given case should not be assessed only from a quantitative perspective, 
i.e. by considering the number of victims; rather, the qualitative dimension of the crime 
should also be taken into consideration when assessing the gravity of a given case.’36 
Notably, the Appeals Chamber has cautioned against ‘an overly restrictive legal bar to the 
interpretation of gravity’ on grounds that it would impinge upon the deterrent role of the 
Court, as well as formulistic assessments of gravity against any criteria.37 
  
2.2. Aggravating Circumstances 
The Prosecutor’s factors or indicators of the gravity of the crime are not the only source of 
regulation. Further guidance can be found in Part 7 of the Statute, on Penalties, and Article 78 
in particular, where the gravity of the crime forms a factor in the determination of 
sentencing.38 Here gravity is understood as synonymous with aggravated circumstances, 
which Sa Couto has argued can serve as factors for the identification of the gravity of the 
crimes during pre-trial procedures. 39 Under Rule 145(2)(b) this would allow the gravity of 
the crime to be informed by factors such as abuse of power or capacity, or the commission of 
the crime where it involved discrimination, particular cruelty, multiple victims or 
vulnerability of the targeted group. 40 Under the sentencing rules, more than one aggravating 
circumstance would indicate the ‘extreme gravity’ of the crime, thereby providing the basis 
to impose the sentence of life imprisonment.41  
 
                                                
35 See for example, De Guzman de Guzman (n 4); Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and Gravity’ (n 4). 
36 Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda (n 13) [31] 
37 Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’ (Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgment: Lubanga and 
Ntaganda) ICC Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-169-US-Exp, 13 July 2006 [69–79]. 
38 Article 78(1), Rome Statute (n 9) 
39 Sa Couto and Cleary (n 4) 813. 
40 Rule 145(2)(b), Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2002 (ICC-ASP/1/3) 94. 
41 Rule 145(3), ibid. 
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The Tribunals have applied similar concepts of gravity in their sentencing practices, and 
insofar as the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have encouraged adoption of the ICC’s own 
aggravating circumstances provisions, reflection on the adhoc tribunals practices may also be 
helpful.42 The ICTY Chambers have, for example, established that the gravity of offences is 
determined by, inter alia, the effect on victims or on persons associated with the crime and 
nearest relations,43 or the depravity of the crimes,44 which can be understood as a synonym 
for the manner of commission of the crimes, as adopted by the Office of the Prosecutor (see 
Section 3.1). 
 
The Pre-Trial Chambers have acknowledged the relevance of the sentencing factors in 
determining the gravity of the crimes, but rather than using the aggravating circumstances as 
advocated by Sa Couto, they have instead referred to other sentencing factors listed in Rule 
145(1)(c). The Abu Garda confirmation of charges decision declared that sufficient gravity 
could be determined with the additional factors that regulate the sentencing of perpetrators: 
‘The Chamber finds that certain factors that may be of relevance to the assessment of 
gravity are listed in rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules, relating to the determination of 
sentence. The rule makes reference to "the extent of damage caused, in particular, the 
harm caused to victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behaviour and 
the means employed to execute the crime", which, in the view of the Chamber, can 
serve as useful guidelines for the evaluation of the gravity threshold required by 
article 17(l)(d) of the Statute.’45 
By encouraging the use of sentencing guidelines which closely correspond to the OTP’s own 
factors, the role of the perpetrator in the criminal acts is encouraged at the outset of inquiry, 
thereby inserting a perpetrator lens to the OTP factors.  
 
                                                
42 El-Zeidy encourages the review of ICTY sentencing practices in determining the factors of gravity by the 
ICC. See El Zeidy (n 4). 
43 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-94-1-T, 14 July 1997 [61]; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, 
Sentencing Judgment, IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, 11 November 1999 [25]; Prosecutor v. Mucic et al. ‘Celebici’ Case’, 
Judgment, IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998 [1226]. 
44 Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic ́, a.k.a. Viktor Andric ́, Sentencing Judgment, IT-95-12-S, 8 May 2006; Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolic ́, Sentencing Judgment, IT-94-2-A, 18 December 2003 [186–199] (providing factual 
circumstances on the criterion of the ‘manner of commission of the crimes’ and known as ‘depravity of the 
crimes’) 
45 Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda (n 13) [32]. 
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2.3. Gravity During Preliminary Examinations: New Facts and Evidence  
To date, the only public preliminary examination to be rejected on partial grounds of 
insufficient gravity, concerned the killing and inhumane treatment of Iraqi civilians and 
soldiers by UK armed forces. In its 2006 decision not to open an investigation into alleged 
war crimes committed against Iraqi prisoners by British forces, the OTP found that although 
the ICC had material and personal jurisdiction and there was a reasonable basis to believe 
that these crimes had been committed, the incidents under scrutiny did not appear to form 
‘part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission’ as described in Article 
8(1).46 Furthermore, in recognizing that this may not be an absolute legal requirement, of the 
war crimes chapeau text, the Prosecutor considered that the estimation of between 4 and 12 
victims of willful killing, and approximately 8 victims of inhuman treatment to be of a 
‘different order’ to other situations under investigation by the ICC, where thousands of 
willful killings appear to have been committed, and therefore did not satisfy the gravity 
threshold required under Article 53.47  
 
The decision has garnered considerable consternation for its incomplete approach to 
gravity:48 firstly, for limiting its assessment to the quantitative factors of scale49 and ignoring 
other factors, notably concerning the impact of the crimes having been committed by an 
occupying force operating under UN Security Council Resolution,50 secondly for limiting its 
examination only to the incident contained in the communication and thirdly for its 
comparative assessment, whereby the alleged acts committed by British forces in Iraq where 
compared to the quantitative scales of situations in other countries under investigation by the 
OTP.51 The absence of any reasoned analysis and the subsequent opening of a case in Sudan 
for the killing of a similar number of UN Peacekeepers has led to calls for the preliminary 
examination to be reopened52 while in January 2014, an extensive joint-communication was 
submitted to the OTP by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights and 
                                                
46 OTP, Response to communications received concerning Iraq (Iraq Response Letter), 9 February 2006, page 8. 
47 Ibid, page 9. 
48 The text of the Statute calls for ‘sufficient gravity’ rather than the comparative gravity that the Prosecutor 
made, between the number of victims in the Iraq communications and those in the situations under examination 
in Uganda and DRC. de Guzman (n 4) 1433.   
49 Melanie O’Brien, ‘The Impact of the Iraq Communication of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court on War Crimes Admissibility and the Interests of Victims’ University College Dublin Law Review 8. 
5010 December 2008, William Schabas, ‘Gravity: Are Lives of Civilians Not as Important as Those of 
Peacekeeping Troops?’. 
51 de Guzman (n 4) 1432 
52 Schabas (n 49) 
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Public Interest Lawyers (ECCHR-PIL Communication) which addresses each of the gravity 
criteria in turn, along with a detailed review of the policy element of Article 8(1) which had 
caused discomfort to the previous Prosecutor.53 
 
The ECCHR-PIL Communication assesses each of the selection criteria adopted by the 
Prosecutor in Regulation 29, to conclude that on the basis of public domain information and 
confidential materials that the communicants have access to, the facts and evidence clearly 
passes the necessary threshold to open a preliminary examination.54 The Communication 
contains detailed analysis of alleged torture and ill treatment of 2,193 separate allegations by 
109 victims, with a further 303 victims alleging ill treatment by UK Services Personnel 
between 2003- 2008. In addressing the factor of scale, the Communication clearly seeks to 
revoke the earlier quantitative determination of scale made by the OTP Prosecutor, by 
demonstrating that the number of alleged victims far exceeds the scope of the 2006 
examination, but also that the geographical and temporal scale of alleged crimes was far 
larger than earlier considered.55 
 
The Communication joins the nature of the alleged crimes and the manner of their 
commission, pointing to evidence of widespread commission of the alleged crimes, the 
involvement of sexual abuse and religious humiliation and a systematic practice of brutal 
violence as indicators, along with the collegial ways that the crimes were carried out. The 
Communication asserts that additional aggravating circumstances, such as the use of sexual 
acts and sexually orientated humiliation, or other forms of humiliation, such as forcing 
inmates to dance ‘like Michael Jackson’ or hitting detainees in succession to force them to 
cry in order to recreate to a signing choir establishes a reasonable basis to assert the gravity of 
the alleged acts.56 
 
In turning to the impact of the alleged crimes, the Communication asserts their seriousness on 
the local community, including victims and their families, while claiming that internationally, 
                                                
53 European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights and Public Interest Lawyers, ‘Communication to the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: The Responsibility of Officials of the United 
Kingdom for War Crimes Involving Systematic Detainee Abuse in Iraq from 2003-2008 (ECCHR & PIL: Iraq 
Communication)’ (2014). 
54 Ibid, 209-214 
55 Idid, 210 
56 Ibid, 210-210, citing evidence of surviving detainees and photographs from Camp Breadbasket.  
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the alleged crimes have had a heightened impact, due to the nationality of the perpetrators, 
the means available to the UK and the role of the UK in executing a UN Security Council 
mandate. 57  It includes evidence of physical impacts of victims, including scarring, 
disfiguration, ongoing pain, surgery and even miscarriage, as well as estimations of serious 
psychological damage, based on the Communicants experience in engaging with the victims 
and informed by the Istanbul Protocol and other medical and psychological testimony 
documenting the long lasting physical and psychological impact of torture. 58  The 
Communication goes on to outline the impact of the alleged crimes on the international 
community, linking the nature and manner of the commission of the crimes to the 
international mandate that the UK Services Personnel operated under, notably the obligations 
of the Multi National Forces to respect and adhere to international law obligations, including 
the Geneva Conventions. 59  The Communication also points to the additional (and 
considerable) international impact on the respect of national and international law obligations 
where violations occur with impunity by personnel of a country with considerable means60 
and international status61 such as the UK. This is undoubtedly a compelling dimension of the 
factor of impact, and it is entirely applicable to the evaluation of gravity. 
 
While the OTP has yet to publicly respond to the Communication, its structure, which 
follows the criteria established by OTP Policy and jurisprudence of the ICC, depth of sources 
and quality of analysis establishes a robust response to the earlier rejection of the OTP which, 
according to the established selection criteria, establishes a strong justification for reviewing 
its earlier decision. 
 
                                                
57 Ibid, 211 - 214 
58 The ECCHR & PIL: Iraq Communication cites testimony given by Doctor Abigail Selzer, a Consultant 
Psychiatrist in Camden and Islington Trust, who has worked with Freedom from Torture since 2001 and with 
the Helen Bamber Foundation since 2010 to the the Al Sweady Inquiry, on 17 April 2012, along with witness 
statements of psychological harm, Psychological Medico-Legal Reports of victims interviewed by PIL and the 
“Istanbul Protocol” Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
59  UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1483 (2003)’ (United Nations 2003) S/RES/1483 (2003) ss 4–5; 
‘Resolution 1511 (2003)’ (United Nations 2003) S/RES/1511 (2003); ‘Resolution 1546 (2004)’ (United Nations 
2004) S/RES/1546 (2004). 
60 The Communication lists this as foresight, planning, training, discipline and resources. See ECCHR & PIL: 
Iraq Communication (n 52) 213. 
61 Which the Communication establishes as the UK’s permanent member status at the UN Security Council as 
well its membership of the European Union. 
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2.4. The Gravity Factor of ‘Scale’ Should Not Be Mixed With the Legal 
Requirements of the Crimes 
The Arrest Warrant Decision in the Ntaganda case, and its subsequent over-turning on appeal 
has helped to define the scope of the factors of scale, impact and the most responsible 
persons.62 In 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC-I) rejected the warrant of arrest request for 
Bosco Ntaganda on three grounds of insufficient gravity. The Chambers had attempted to 
develop three factors to determine the gravity threshold, each of which were subsequently 
over-ruled by the Appeals Chamber:63 that (i) the scale of conduct should be systematic or 
large-scale; (ii) the impact should trigger social alarm amongst the international community 
(see section 3.5) and (iii) accused persons must fall within the category of most senior 
leaders suspected of being most responsible (see section 4.2). The PTC adopted a laborious 
and contorted reasoning to reach its conclusion, adopting literal, contextual and teleological 
interpretations of gravity in order to reach its conclusion. In over-turning the PTC Decision, 
the Appeals Chamber found the ‘three-pronged test’ to be flawed and incorrect.64 
 
The Appeals Chamber robustly rejected the PTC interpretation of the scale of conduct, 
finding that the requirement for conduct to be either systematic or large scale to be 
inconsistent with the definitions of the common contextual elements of war crimes (Article 
8(1)) and crimes against humanity (Article 7). The definition of war crimes requires that the 
crimes were committed as “part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of 
such crimes” whereas the PTC interpretation of scale selected only one of the three 
alternative legal requirements, that of its large scale. Similarly, the Statute requires that 
crimes against humanity must be “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack” 
whereas the PTC-I focused only on the systematic dimension.65 The Appeals Chamber went 
further, establishing that PTC-I had blurred the distinction between the jurisdictional 
requirements contained in the chapeau elements for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
and the admissibility procedure: 
“in requiring conduct that is either systematic or large-scale, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
introduces at the admissibility stage of proceedings criteria that effectively blur the 
                                                
62 Stegmiller (n 4). 
63 Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgment: Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 36) [56-58] 
64 Ibid [82]. 
65 Ibid [69]. 
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distinction between the jurisdictional requirements for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity that were adopted when defining the crimes that fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. [...] Indeed, it would be inconsistent with article 8 (1) of the Statute if a 
war crime that was not part of a plan or policy of a large-scale commission could not, 
under any circumstances, be brought before the International Criminal Court because 
of the gravity requirement of article 17 (1) (d) of the Statute.”66 
 
2.5. The Gravity Factor of ‘Impact’ Should Not Include ‘Social Alarm Caused to the 
International Community’ 
The second (erroneous) factor of gravity that led to PTC-I dismissing the first Ntaganda 
arrest-warrant was based in the Chambers interpretation of the impact of the alleged conduct, 
which they described as the ‘social alarm caused to the international community.’67 Adopting 
a contextual interpretation, the PTC considered that due consideration should be given to the 
notion of social alarm due to the current thematic vogue within the international community 
against the practice of enlisting and conscripting children into armed groups.68 Despite its 
self-confessed ‘contextual interpretation’ the decision gave no reason for the applicability of 
‘social alarm’ and failed to identify legal sources that supported its conclusion that the 
offence caused to the international community should influence the decision to arrest a 
person.69 The Appeals Chamber rejected the criterion of ‘social alarm’ as a subjective factor 
that distorts the careful selection of crimes listed in the Statute, opening the Court to 
influence of subjective and contingent reactions to crimes.70 
 
While the Appeals Chamber rejected each of the tests put forward by the PTC, describing 
them as inconsistent with the Statute and a distortion of the requirements of jurisdiction and 
                                                
66 Ibid [70-71]. 
67 Situation on the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on 
the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest (First Warrant of Arrest Decision: Ntaganda) [2006] ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-02/06-l-US-Exp-tEN; and Redacted version, 6 March 2007, ICC-01/04-02/06-
1-tENG-Red, 22 August 2006 [64].  
68 Ibid [46]. 
69 The Prosecutor argued that social alarm is absent from the Statute and depends heavily on subjective and 
contingent reactions to crimes. See Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgment: Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 36) [72] 
quoting the Prosecutor’s Supporting Document [49]. This reasoning was also criticized as being inconsistent 
with the purpose of the Court to end impunity, as social alarm does not engage with the objective features such 
as mens rea and actus rea of the conduct. See Sa Couto and Cleary (n 4) 814. 
70 Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgment: Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 36) [72] 
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admissibility,  it did not grant the Prosecutor’s request for relief, to identify the correct legal 
principle in the interpretation of Article 17(1)(d). Instead it simply found that the application 
of the admissibility criterion was an error of law. 71 
 
2.6. Balancing The Gravity Factors of ‘Scale’ and ‘Impact’  
The Prosecutor’s case against Bahar Idris Abu Garda (Abu Garda) focused on an intentional 
attack against African Union Mission Peacekeepers (AMISS Peacekeepers), where 12 
peacekeepers where killed, charging the accused with three counts of war crimes of violence 
to life,72 intentionally attacking a peacekeeping mission73 and pillaging74 and where Abu 
Garda bore individual criminal responsibility as a co-perpetrator or an indirect perpetrator 
through his position as the Vice President and General Secretary of the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM). Unlike the 2006 preliminary examination in Iraq where the killing of eight 
to twelve persons was considered of insufficient gravity, the Prosecutor considered that the 
intentional killing of twelve peacekeepers, and the attempted killing of eight peacekeepers to 
be of sufficient gravity.75  
 
In an unfortunate choice of words, the Prosecutor sought to establish the gravity of the case 
through qualitative factors, such as the impact of the attack on the communities reliant on the 
peacekeepers for humanitarian aid and security: ‘The gravity of the crimes is not in the 
instant case related to the number of casualties but to the quality, as peacekeepers, of the 
personnel attacked.’ 76  He then continued to establish the impact on the international 
community, drawing on the International Law Commission Commentary on the Draft Code 
of Crimes, the Prosecutor continued that intentional attacks against peacekeeping operations 
‘constitute exceptional serious offences which “strike at the very heart of the international 
legal system established for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”’ 
whereby ‘such attacks “constitute violent crimes of exceptionally serious gravity which have 
                                                
71 Ibid [68, 89]. 
72 Article 8(2)(c)(i) and Article 25(3)(a) and (f), Rome Statute (n 9) 
73 Article 8(2)(e)(iii) and Article 25(3)(a), Ibid 
74 Article 8(2)(e)(v) and Article 25(3)(a), Ibid 
75 Notwithstanding the heavily contested status of the AMIS Peacekeeping base and whether it had in fact 
retained its status as a protected civilian object or had become a legitimate military target, by taking an active 
part in the hostilities. See Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda (n 13) [60-62]  
76 Request for Warrant of Arrest (Abu Garda) [2008]. para 174 
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serious consequences not only for the victims, but also for the international community.”’77 
Foreseeing the future factor the manner of commission, the Prosecutor also used the size of 
the attacking forces to establish gravity, whereby he asserted that more than 1,000 members 
of the armed groups attacked the AMIS Peacekeeping compound, as well as the frequency of 
attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian organisations. 78  The PTC accepted the 
Prosecutor’s submission, finding that the case met the gravity threshold, upon consideration 
of the range of relevant factors, including the impact that the attack had. 
 
In assessing the gravity threshold, the PTC reinforced its earlier interpretation of the 
‘sufficient gravity’ threshold as an additional threshold test to the jurisdictional barrier 
created by the classification of the crimes of the Statute, concluding that “the fact that a case 
addresses one of the most serious crimes for the international community as a whole is not 
sufficient for it to be admissible before the Court.”79 
 
Turning to the relevant factors in the determination of gravity, the PTC returned to Rule 
145(1)(c) which relates to the determination of sentencing, to establish what it considered to 
be useful guidelines for the evaluation of gravity, namely (i) the extent of damage caused, (ii) 
the harm caused to victims and their families, (iii) the nature of the unlawful behavior and 
(iv) the means employed to execute the crime.80 Only one of these factors neatly corresponds 
to the prosecutor’s adopted factors of gravity – that of the nature of the unlawful behavior, 
while there is some overlap between the other factors of scale, manner of commission and 
impact. Notwithstanding the Chamber’s preferred factors of gravity outlined above, they 
agreed with the Prosecution‘s submission that factors of the nature, manner and impact of the 
[alleged] attack are critical, and noted that factors other than the quantitative scale of victims 
are relevant to an assessment of gravity, to include qualitative factors.81 
                                                
77 Ibid [6], quoting International Law Commission Commentary to Art. 19, Draft Code of Crimes. 
78 Ibid [76]. 
79 Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda (n 13) [30]. 
80 Confirmation of Charges Decision: Abu Garda (n 13) [32]. 
81 Ibid [31]. 
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2.7. Gravity Factors Should Demonstrate Potential Cases not the General Gravity of 
a Situation 
The Prosecutor’s Request (Request) to open an investigation into the post-election violence 
in Kenya was the first proprio motu action in the history of the ICC: it was submitted on 26 
November 200982 and accepted by Pre-Trial Chamber on 31 March 2010 (Decision).83 While 
the PTC accepted the request, they did so after considerable review of the necessary 
requirements of the gravity of the crimes analysis at the transitory phase of the Article 15 
Request (see section 1.2 above) to reinforce that even at the early phase of inquiry, gravity 
analysis should distinguish between the gravity of the potential cases that are likely to be the 
focus of investigation, from the general situation: 
‘In this regard, there is interplay between the crimes and the context in which they 
were committed (the incidents). Thus, the gravity of the crimes will be assessed in the 
context of their modus operandi.’84 
 
While the PTC Decision pursued this approach, reviewing the materials submitted and 
subsequently identifying particular incidents according to factors of gravity, the OTP Request 
provided a very broad, three paragraph description of the general gravity of the post-election 
violence, before setting out description of four underlying acts of crimes against humanity, 
while the facts of the acts as well as their legal character often repeated information provided 
within the generic gravity assessment without identifying specific incidents. This sub-section 
will review the OTP submission first, followed by the PTC- analysis. 
 
Searching For Gravity: The Preliminary Examination in Kenya  
The four paragraph summary of the gravity threshold lists quantitative and geographical 
dimensions of the factors of scale of the entire situation, listing between 1,133 to 1,220 
civilian murders, the rape or committal of sexual violence against at least 900 women, men 
and children, more than 350,000 displaced persons and 3,561 acts of causing serious injury, 
                                                
82 Office of the Prosecutor, Request Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Article 15 Request) [2009] Pre Trial Chamber 
II ICC-01/09, 26 November 2009. 
83 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Article 15 Decision) (n 2). 
84 Ibid [61]. 
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which took place in six of Kenya’s eight regions, including the country’s most populated 
areas. In addressing the manner of commission, the Request claims that the acts were 
organized and planned to attack sections of the civilian population, based on ‘distinctive 
ethnic features and/or presumed political affiliation’ where perpetrators targeted members of 
other ethnicities that were minorities within the area85 and that acts were committed with 
particular cruelty, instilling check points in order to select victims based on ethnicity, and 
then attacking them brutally, cutting off body parts, hacking or burning civilians to death, 
using gang rape, genital mutilation, forced circumcision and penile amputation.86  
 
Finally, in seeking to establish impact, the Request includes factors ranging from the 
psychological, medical and physical consequences of the victims and their relatives, to 
matters of personal, communal and political security and national economic wellbeing, where 
Kenyan Gross Domestic Product growth rate fell from 7% before the election violence, to 
1.7% in the year of the violence. 87  But whilst its analysis is broad, it is largely drawn on 
generalised expectations, rather than documented impacts. For example, the extreme physical 
and psychological trauma of the victims of sexual violence committed during the post-
election violence is assessed according to standard psychological and physical impacts, rather 
than effects that have been catalogued or assessed in the context of the post-election violence: 
“Victims of sexual violence, who often suffered grave physical injury, suffer from enormous 
psychological trauma, may have been infected with HIV/AIDS and/or other types of sexually 
transmissible diseases, are often abandoned by their husbands and/or families and suffer from social 
stigma.”88 
 
Similarly, while the vulnerability of displaced persons, particularly women and children, is 
raised, as well as the impact of displacement on the each facet of the livelihood of the 
displaced individuals, families and communities, no specific examples were provided. 
Turning to the analysis of the Crimes, the Request largely repeats the same facts of the 
gravity analysis. 
 
Murder 
                                                
85 Kenya Article 15 Request (n 81). [57]. 
86 Ibid [58]. 
87 Ibid [59] see also Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (n 21), 14-21. 
Kenya Article 15 Request (n 81) [59] 
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The Request cites the estimated scale of murders across the country, breaking down the total 
estimated range of 1,113 to 1,220 to six of Kenya’s provinces: the Rift Valley (744), Nyanza 
province (134), Nairobi (125), Western province (98) Coast (27) Central Province (5). While 
the Report notes that the most violent attacks within the Rift Valley occurred in the districts 
of Uasin Gishu, Nauru and Trans Nzoia89, it provides no further analysis of factors of gravity 
in these locations, without giving any direction on the future potential cases that the 
investigation may pursue. Instead it returns to a generic description of the manner of the 
commission of the crimes, including diverse and often brutal causes of death ‘by burns, arrow 
shots, blunt object, severe wounds, sharp pointed object, assault, drowning, suffocation 
injury, stoning, shock, and hanging.’90 
 
Rape and Sexual Violence 
The statement of facts and analysis of the acts of rape and sexual violence continues in the 
same generic narrative, describing the patterns of approximately 900 acts of rape or other 
forms of sexual violence, the request cites the reports of registered rapes from hospitals in 
Nairobi to indicate an increase in sexual assault during the violence, while noting heir 
expectation of significant under-reporting occurred based on a report into sexual violence of 
the post election period.91 Within the description of criminal acts, the report continues to 
include general practices that while indicating brutality, are not linked to specific locations or 
attacks. For example the report notes ‘numerous incidents of rape and sexual violence’ which 
it supports with descriptions of brutality in their commission, including sexual mutilation by 
the cutting of vaginas and labia, of penis amputation and circumcision, and gang-rapes or 
public rapes but it fails to identify locations (even redacted locations). One potential incident 
indicates that women who had sought refuge in temporary shelters were told to move or 
expect to be raped, while reports of sexual violence being used as a tool to terrorise 
communities into leaving their villages with the purpose of ‘land-grabbing’ from rival ethnic 
or political groups.92 
 
Deportation and forcible transfer 
                                                
89 Ibid [65] 
90 Kenya Article 15 Request (n 81) [94]. 
91 Ibid [66]. 
92 Ibid [96-98]. 
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Turning to deportation or forcible transfer the Prosecutor recounted the number of forcibly 
transferred persons to be approximately 350,000, asserting the existence of nearly 200 
Internally Displaced Camps in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, Coastal and Central 
provinces, with around 12,000 Kenyans having crossed the border to seek refuge in 
Uganda.93 But apart from characterizing the displacement as part of ethnic and political 
targeting, organized through the mobilization of organized groups associated to main political 
parties,94 the review omits any analysis of the geographical, ethnic or political distribution of 
individual acts of displacement or to indicate potential incidents against the background of 
the general patterns of violations.95 
 
Other inhumane acts 
In summarizing the final category of crimes, ‘other inhumane acts’ the statement of facts 
recounts the Waki Commission findings, including the estimated number of victims (3,561 
people) and the character of the violations committed against them, whereby the majority 
‘suffered injuries from sharp pointed objects, blunt objects, soft tissue injury gunshots, arrow 
shorts, burns, and other assaults.’96 The choice of objects used to inflict injury, the brutal 
manner of the commission of the acts and the intention to cause injury to the physical or 
mental well being of the victims was also noted in a general sense.97 
Notwithstanding the PTC’s review of the necessary features of the gravity threshold test, the 
Chambers nonetheless accepted that the Prosecutor had substantiated the gravity test, for each 
of the alleged criminal acts of murder98 rape and sexual violence,99 forcible displacement,100 
and other inhumane acts.101 Furthermore the PTC asserted that the factor of scale was 
‘justified on the basis of the alleged number of deaths, documented rapes, displaced persons, 
and acts of injury, as well as the geographical location of these crimes, which appears 
widespread.’102 Turning to consider the manner of the commission of the Crimes, it also 
accepted the Prosecutor’s submission of the brutality of the commission of the crimes as 
                                                
93 Ibid [69]. 
94 Kenya Article 15 Request (n 81) [100]. 
95 The estimated figure represents approximately 1% of the population, which at 2008, stood at 37.4 million 
persons, International Monetary Fund - 2011 World Economic Outlook. 
96 Kenya Article 15 Request (n 81) [100]. 
97 Ibid [101]. 
98  Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 2) [143] 
99 Ibid. [152] 
100 Ibid. [158] 
101 Ibid. [168] 
102 Ibid. [190-191] 
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pertinent, but it did so through its preferred medium of the ‘means used to execute the 
violence.’103 Particular examples that the Chambers highlighted included the manner of the 
commission of acts of rape, notably forced circumcision and genital amputation, gang rapes, 
including by a group of over 20 men, cutting of victims and the insertion of crude weapon 
and other objects in the vagina.104 The PTC decision also emphasized the importance of 
corroborating evidence submitted by victim’s representatives, in addition to the materials 
presented by the Prosecutor.105 
 
Finally, the Decision acknowledged the individual and social impact of rape and forced 
displacement, noting that the direct victims of rape and sexual violence had reported the 
contraction of HIV/AIDS, abandonment by their husbands or families due to the social 
stigma of rape, pregnancy and ‘inevitable psychological burdens of helplessness and 
isolation.’106 Turning to the impact of forced displacement and the further vulnerability to 
attack experienced in IDP camps, the Pre Trial Chambers noted the loss of property, homes, 
legal documents and possessions, coupled with the lack of security in ad hoc camps for IDPs, 
which ‘scarcely provided better security against attacks’ where displaced persons could be 
further victimized through attacks of rapes and sexual violence, but including transactional 
sex and sexual exploitation. In addition to poor security conditions, the PTC accepted that the 
act of forced displacement, coupled with the conditions of the IDP camps exacerbated the 
individual impact of the violence on the victims social and economic situation, notably the 
absence of access to education for displaced children, poor living conditions and health 
concerns in IDP camps, including contraction of sexually transmitted diseases following rape 
within the IDP camps, psychological trauma, stress and depression, abandonment, separation 
of families, loss of income and businesses.107  
 
The second proprio motu investigation request108 into post-election violence in Ivory Coast 
adopted the Kenya formula of assessing gravity against the backdrop of a potential case 
                                                
103 Ibid [193] 
104 Ibid [193] 
105 Ibid [196] 
106 Ibid [195] 
107 Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 2) [196] 
108 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Article 15 Decision: Côte d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber III 
ICC-02/11, 03 October 2011.  
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within the context of a situation.109 However, its analysis of the persons or groups of persons 
and the gravity of the crimes was assessed in two confidential annexes, limiting the 
possibility of identifying emerging practices of the Kenya formula.110  
 
2.8. The Mali Report: Gravity Against the Backdrop of Potential Cases  
Both the 2012 Preliminary Examination Report, and the country specific report on Mali 
(Mali: Article 53 Report), publicized once the investigation was opened, have provided a 
more comprehensive and analystical approach to the application of the gravity threshold 
during preliminary examination, where PTC requests for the potential cases to be shown in 
relief against the general patterns of crimes commited within the situation. 
 
The 2012 Report identified six alleged crimes committed in a number of different or 
overlapping incidents that the Prosecutor considers to fall under the jurisdictional parameters 
of the Court, including three incidents of killings, both of captured armed forces and unarmed 
civilians, torture and ill-treatment, attacks against religious and historical monuments 
including of World Cultural Heritage in Timbuktu, pillaging, rape and child recruitment.111 
Three months later, the Mali: Article 53 Report (Mali Report) introduced one further 
underlying act, that of sentencing and the carrying out of executions,112 relating to incidents 
that had previously been listed under killings, and considered that with the exception of the 
recruitment of child soldiers, which required additional information, the Mali Report found 
that there was a reasonable basis to believe that each of the acts had been committed.  
 
In considering whether national proceedings exist in Mali for any of the alleged crimes 
referenced, the Report notes that a special administrative commission of inquiry was 
established in relation to the alleged crimes committed in Anguelhok did not result in judicial 
proceedings,113 although other incidents, such as the allegations of torture and enforced 
disappearances of the Presidential Guard (Regiment of Paratrooper-Commandos or Red 
Berets) and the killings of Muslim preachers appear to be the subjects of national 
                                                
109 Ibid [55].  
110 Ibid [56] 
111 ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012’ (n 26), paras 171-178 
112 Pursuant to Article 8(2)(c)(iv), Rome Statute (n 9) 
113 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report’ (International Criminal Court, 16 
January 2013) 144–148. 
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investigations.114 It then moves on to consider the gravity of the incidents, grouping them by 
underlying acts, with the exception of killings, which it restricts to one incident, the summary 
executions of Malian Armed Forces (MAF) in Aguelhok on 24 January 2012. 
 
Killings in Anguelhok 
Referred to as the Aguelhok Incident, the report notes that reports of the scale of summary 
executions of MAF range between 70 and 153, with the manner of the killings being 
particularly alarming, with alleged mutilations, disemboweling, torture, throat slitting and 
shots to the head. In addressing the nature of the crime, the Mali Report points that there can 
be no distinction between the gravity of combatants killed hors de combat and the killing of 
civilians, while the impact of the killings has been recorded as one of the worse single crimes 
committed due to the manner of the killings.115 
 
Punishment 
The second crime, punishment imposed by armed groups in the North, refers to a policy by 
three armed groups, to impose sentences on civilians and members of the armed forces hors 
de combat, including executions, amputations, stoning and flogging, without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court. The Mali Report noted a lack of 
information on the factors that could help to determine the scale of the alleged crimes, 
although it noted that the acts appeared to operate according to a policy. Under with nature of 
the crimes, the report includes both the underlying act of passing of sentences and carrying 
out of executions,116 as well as violence to life and person to encompass the amputations, 
stoning and flogging.117 The manner of punishments listed are reported to have taken place in 
public, or at a police station, military camp of informal detention site, impacting upon victims 
and their families who are traumatized and stigmatized in their communities, while also 
instilling fear within local communities, exacerbated by having often been forced to watch 
the execution of the punishments.118  
                                                
114 Ibid, 138-139 
115 Ibid, 144-148. 
116 Article 8(2)(c)(iv), Rome Statute (n 9) 
117 Article 8(2)(c)(i), Ibid 
118 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report’ (n 112) 149–153.  
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Destruction of Religious and Historical Sites 
The destruction of religious and historical sites in Timbuktu is one of the most reported 
violations in the conflict. In addressing the scale of the attacks, the Mali Report notes the 
targeting of significant numbers of the buildings listed as UNESCO World Heritage sites, 
including at least nine of 16 mausoleums, two out of three great mosques and two historical 
monuments. The report turns to the ICRC Commentary on attacks against cultural or spiritual 
heritage as being intimately associated with the history and culture of the people, to illustrate 
the grave nature of the attacks, while the manner of the attack, through the use of axes, 
hatches and picks to destroy parts of the buildings and burning of wooden parts indicate 
intentional damage, in keeping with the ideology of the perpetrators.119   
 
The destruction of cultural heritage in Timbuktu is described as having an impact upon the 
conscience of humanity, based on the declarations from the African Union and UN Security 
Council condemning the attacks. Notwithstanding the significance of the international 
condemnation of the attacks, the Ntaganda Appeals Chamber decision has spoken against the 
use of subjective factors such as the alarm caused to the international community as a 
permissible factor to evaluate impact.   
 
Pillaging in Gao and Timbuktu 
Despite apprehension that the Prosecutor’s indicative gravity criteria would prioritise crimes 
against the person, the fourth crime considered to be of sufficient gravity to warrant 
investigation is pillaging. The scale and manner of pillaging in the cities of Gao and 
Timbuktu, indicate that systematic looting and destruction of banks, shops, food reserves, 
places of worship, public buildings, hospitals, schools, offices of humanitarian organisations 
including the ICRC, and the residences of high level civil servants, Malian security services 
and economic personalities indicate that the attacks imposed a ‘severe’ impact on the looted 
cities and villages. While these incident appear to have passed the OTP’s gravity threshold, 
                                                
119 Ibid, 154-160 
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caution on the linkage between the individual acts of pillage and the common elements of 
war crimes, namely that they were large scale or committed as part of a plan or policy. 
 
Rape and Sexual Violence in and around Gao and Timbuktu 
Finally, the Mali Report cites between 50 and 100 rapes, following the seizure of northern 
cities by armed groups, especially in Gao and Timbuktu,120 is included, qualified in part by 
the need for further information, given the lack of clarity on the scale of the crimes as well as 
whether they formed part of a plan or policy or where large scale. In addressing the nature of 
the crime, the Report cites the Akayesu judgement of the ICTR, to emphasise the bodily and 
psychological harm that rape causes, while the manner of the commission of the crimes 
reveals patterns of abduction and sexual assault over a period of 24 hours, usually in 
abandoned homes, hotels or other buildings, with occasional gang-rapes and frequent racial 
insults meted out to the victims. The Mali Report foresees that these acts would have a ‘grave 
impact on victims, their family members and the local population’121although it does not refer 
to information verifying this.   
 
2.9. Limited Review of the Factors of Gravity: Uganda and Libya 
In contrast to the situations reviewed thus far, the judicial and diplomatic submissions 
concerning Uganda, Sudan and Libya contain little or no review or contestation of the gravity 
threshold, by the Prosecutor, by the Pre-Trial Chambers or by the various parties. 
 
The situation in Uganda has targeted six leading members of the Lords Resistance Army 
(LRA), retaining focus on rebel leaders and not on government forces, the Uganda People’s 
Defence Forces (UPDF) on the bases that the LRA crimes have a higher gravity relative to 
the alleged criminal acts committed by the UPDF.122 Yet the investigation phase submissions 
make little to no reference of scales of gravity between the two groups, leading to some 
concerns of selectivity bias by the ICC. In his letter notifying the Ugandan authorities that he 
had decided to open an investigation into crimes committed in northern Uganda, the 
                                                
120 ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012’ (n 26), para 177 
121 ICC Office of the Prosecutor (n 112), 166-170 
122 Sa Couto and Cleary (n 4) 810. 
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Prosecutor based his analysis on general factors of scale, frequency and brutality of offences 
committed against the civilian population in the ongoing conflict with involving the LRA. 
While briefly listing the underlying acts, including murder, torture, mutilation, rape, sexual 
slavery, child conscription and referring to the devastating impact that the crimes have had on 
the region, the Prosecutor omitted any analysis of gravity as part of the investigation and 
admissibility criteria (pursuant to article 53(1) and article 17(1)). Similarly, while Uganda has 
adopted a specialized division within its High Court, to prosecute lower level perpetrators, 
the Ugandan Attorney General has invoked the gravity of the alleged crimes of the LRA six 
as one of three reasons why the ICC remains the more appropriate forum to undertake the 
trial of the most responsible persons.123 The factors of gravity were also largely absent from 
the proprio motu review of the admissibility of the situation by the Pre-Trial Chambers, 
following the establishment of a national criminal mechanism, the International Crimes 
Division of the High Court.124 
 
Following the Security Council referral of the situation of Libya to the ICC in February 2011, 
the only public review of the OTP’s gravity threshold factors occurred in the Prosecutor’s 
first report to the UN, in May 2011.125 Subsequently, despite the extensive litigation on the 
admissibility of the two cases, issues of gravity have not been debated. The Prosecutor’s UN 
Report provided similar generic description of the gravity factors to the Kenya Article 15 
Request: beginning with the manner and nature of the crimes, the report highlights the 
systematic shooting of protestors in multiple locations, which followed the same modus 
operandi by the Security Forces. In acknowledging acts of persecution and (unspecified) war 
crimes the Prosecutor appeared satisfied by the appearance or apparent commission of attacks 
in a number of cities. Turing to scale, the report recounts general efforts to cover up crimes, 
including the deployment of Security Forces to hospitals had obstructed the ability to 
determine the precise number of victims, by preventing Doctors from gathering 
documentation of the dead and injured who had been admitted to hospital. Despite these 
                                                
123 The other two factors being national reconciliation and social rehabilitation and the inability of Uganda to 
arrest the persons bearing the greatest responsibility. Letter of the Solicitor General of Uganda to the ICC 
Government of Uganda ICC-02/04-01/05-329-Conf-AnxD, 28 May 2004. 
124 The mandate of the ICD restricts the High Court to hearing cases of mid to high-level leaders, due to an 
amnesty package that excludes lower level perpetrators from criminal prosecution. The first case before the 
ICD, of Thomas Kwoyelo, was repealed by the Constitutional Court on grounds that the accused was protected 
by the Amnesty Law. See Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni vs. Uganda, Judgment, HCT-00-1ICD-Case No.02/10, 
Constitutional Court of Uganda, 22 September 2011 
125 ICC-OTP, ‘(First) Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)’. Paragraphs 15-20. 
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difficulties, the Report refers to credible reports that between 500 and 700 people died as a 
result of Security Forces shootings against protesters in February 2011, before quoting 
estimations of the Libyan Interim National Council (INC) that up to 10,000 people were 
killed during February and March, with more than 50,000 wounded. Turning to impact, the 
Prosecutor lists figures compiled by the UN, of the displacement of approximately 535,000 
migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers, and 327,342 Libyan. On this basis, the 
Prosecutor concluded that a sufficient gravity threshold had been reached to justify the 
opening of an investigation and no subsequent report to the UN Security Council has referred 
to gravity.126 
 
Within the judicial fora, the factors of gravity have not formed a substantial dimension of any 
of the pre-trial proceedings before the ICC, including the admissibility challenge, where all 
parties agreed that the cases at hand were sufficiently grave.127 
 
3. Factors of the Most Responsible Persons or Groups 
The second part of the gravity threshold invokes the degree of criminal responsibility of 
suspects or perpetrators, by directing investigative and prosecutorial resources towards those 
who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes that the Court is scrutinizing. This 
functions as a form of selection criteria, ensuring that cases are not submitted for crimes that 
                                                
126 Prosecutor, (Second) Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to 
UNSCR 1970 (2011), New York, 02 November 2011; Prosecutor, (Third) Statement to the United Nations 
Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), New York, 16 May 2012; 
Prosecutor, (Fourth) Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to 
UNSCR 1970 (2011), New York, 07 November 2012; Prosecutor, (Fifth) Statement to the United Nations 
Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), New York, 08 May 2013; 
Prosecutor, (Sixth) Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to 
UNSCR 1970 (2011), New York, 
127 The Prosecutor’s arrest warrant request made a brief assertion that the case was of sufficient gravity, 
pursuant to its factors of gravity, to warrant the intervention of the Court, based on a general assessment of the 
general facts and circumstances of the situation as well as the particular incidents included in redacted Section 
E(5) of the Request. Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar 
Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi [2011] [51–55]. The Government of Libya robustly 
asserted that they were actively investigating additional incidents and violations to those selected by the 
prosecutor, including the notorious Abu Selim prison massacre where Al Senussi is suspected of being a direct 
perpetrator in the killings of more than 1,270 prisoners. While this incident would remain outside the temporal 
jurisdiction of the ICC, the Government continued to assert that investigative duties were underway for other 
incidents connected to the UN Security Council referral, including killings or rebels hors de combat. 
Application on behalf of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute relating to Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Article 19 Application: Gaddafi) Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red, 01 May 
2012. 
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may well have passed the gravity threshold, but where liability is nonetheless attributed to 
persons that the Court does not consider to be the most responsible. But the identification of 
‘the most responsible persons’ contains subjective factors that will often be contested: the 
debate can often oscillate around the combining of concepts of seniority and notoriety, where 
the position of the person within any formal or semi-formal hierarchy and any particularly 
brutal, reprehensible or callous behaviour can be combined to identify different types of most 
responsible persons.128 This has resulted in formulas where ‘notorious low-level perpetrators’ 
can be prosecuted alongside ‘high level organizers, planners and funders’ and both bear the 
status of ‘most responsible.’129 
 
Despite the status of the ICC as a criminal court, this criterion is not an explicit or statutory 
requirement but one that has emerged from practice. An indirect reference to the degree of 
responsibility of the perpetrator can be inferred from the text of Article 53(2) on the interests 
of justice consideration during investigation, where the Prosecutor is directed to ‘consider the 
role of the alleged perpetrator in the alleged crime’ as one of the balancing factors of the 
interests of justice equation. The preamble and Article 1 remains relatively silent on the types 
or level of perpetrators that the ICC should prioritize: the preamble simply reinforces the 
determination of the States Parties to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community. Similarly, Article 1 reinforces the 
power of the Court to ‘exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern.’ Neither the preamble nor Article 1 indicate that the Court should or 
must prioritise the perpetrators that it exercises jurisdiction over and nor do they indicate the 
types of perpetrator that should form the focus of the judicial powers of the ICC.  
 
The modes of liability and the permissible defenses contained in Part 3 on General Principles 
of Law ensure that both direct and indirect perpetrators can be held criminally responsible, as 
individuals, regardless of their status or hierarchy. The responsibility of commanders and 
                                                
128 See for example, the analysis by Nancy Armory Combs and Mark Drumbl, concerning the categorization of 
perpetrators by the ICTR through its completion strategy and the Rwandan Gacaca Courts, according to the 
ranking or status of the individual as well as their role in the crimes perpetrated. Nancy Armoury Combs, Guilty 
Pleas in International Criminal Law: Constructing a Restorative Justice Approach (Stanford University Press 
2007); Mark A Drumbl, ‘Lessons for International Criminal Justice from Rwanda’ [2002] SSRN eLibrary 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=355300> accessed 21 April 2010. 
129 For example the Foča cases before the ICTY, where notorious low level perpetrators such as Kunarac were 
prosecuted for the rape of Muslim women. Xabier Agirre Aranburu, ‘Prosecuting the Most Responsible for 
International Crimes: Dilemmas of Definition and Prosecutorial Discretion’ in J Gonzalez (ed), Protección 
Internacional de Derechos Humanos y Estado de Derecho (Grupo Editorial Ibañez 2009). 
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other superiors over the actions of subordinates under their effective command is clearly 
codified130  as are the conditions that establish the irrelevance of superior orders and 
prescription of law131 demonstrating that the Court should have no preference for the status of 
the perpetrator or their position within an organization that falls under the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. This is further reinforced by the irrelevance of official capacity, where Article 27 
clearly establishes that:  
‘The Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member 
of government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility.’ 
As a categorical removal of official immunities, Article 27 does not give additional weight or 
emphasis to persons who hold an official capacity, it merely rejects any immunity that they 
may try to claim.132 
 
The Statute is also quite categorical in its inclusion of multiple forms of liability, covering 
principal perpetrators through committing or attempting, as well as indirect modes of 
liability, including ordering, soliciting or inducing, aiding or abetting, providing the means 
for the commission of the crime as well as the more contentious modes of common purpose, 
or the specific incitement to others to commit genocide. The codification of multiple varieties 
of indirect liabilities helps to reinforce the plurality of perpetrators that the Court is 
empowered to prosecute and does not provide any weighting or preference to any level of 
liability or position of the perpetrator.   
 
                                                
130 Article 28, Rome Statute (n 9). For example, Alberta Arnold and Otto Triffterer, ‘Article 28: Responsibility 
of Commanders and Other Superiors’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008); Kai Ambos, 
‘Command Responsibility and Organisationsherrschaft: Ways of Attributing International Crimes to the “most 
Responsible”’ in Andre Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt (eds), System criminality in international law 
(Cambridge University Press 2009). 
131 Article 33, Rome Statute (n 9) 
132 See Kenya challenges over immunity and the routes adopted to circumvent the irrelevance of the official 
capacity of the President and Prime Minister. While the amendment to Rule 134 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence at the 12th Assembly of States Parties, to allow both video testimony from outside the seat of the Court 
and the excusal from presence at trial for extraordinary public duties of accused persons does weaken the 
authority of the Court, it does not alter the force of Article 27. See Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, Adopted at the 12th plenary meeting, on 27 November 2013, by 
consensus. 
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Some indicators of the role of the perpetrator may be discernable from Article 78 on the 
determination of sentence, where the Court is directed to take into consideration factors such 
as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. These 
factors are supplemented by Rule 145, which includes factors of aggravation that may be 
relevant to the determination of the level or degree of culpability of the person, for the 
purpose of selection. While introduced in Section 2.3 above, the aggravating circumstances 
provide factors governing the status and behaviour of the perpetrator, including the abuse of 
power or official capacity, particular defencelessness of the victim, particular cruelty, 
discrimination or multiple victims can be evidenced during the commission of the crime.133 
 
The Statutes, amendments and practices of the recent ad-hoc tribunals offer mixed guidance 
in defining the type of perpetrator that should be the subject of international criminal 
prosecution, but in general they lean towards the prioritization of those persons who occupy 
positions of authority and power. The model more comparable to the ICC is that of the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) whose Statute was enacted after the Rome Statute was 
concluded. The SCSL Statute gave it power to: 
‘prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility […] including those leaders 
who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.’134 
Notwithstanding the adjudicatory record of the SCSL or its selection practices, its Statute 
clearly expressed direction towards those perpetrators who are central to the criminal acts 
(‘greatest responsibility’) with a preference towards persons in positions of authority (‘those 
leaders’) on the basis that their actions provided the greatest threats to the establishment of 
peace. As will be seen in Section 3.3 below, the ICC has refrained from any connections to 
positions of seniority or leadership, as well as to any peace processes or settlements to 
conflicts. 
 
The Statute of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) establishes 
similar competences over categories of persons who were senior leaders and categories of 
persons that are most responsible:  
                                                
133 Rule 145(2)(b), Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2002 (ICC-ASP/1/3) 94. 
134 Article 1(1), Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 2000 (UN Security Council Resolution 1315). 
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‘The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea 
and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of 
Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international 
conventions recognized by Cambodia’135  
The phrasing of the provision appears to affirm that the ECCC has jurisdiction over two 
categories of persons, rather than ‘those senior leaders who are most responsible’ although 
the Chambers has chosen to prioritise the most senior who were also the most responsible, 
thus adopting a conjunctive application of their competences.136 
 
The Statutes of the two adhoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda did not 
specify the level or category of suspects to be subject to their jurisdiction. The various 
practices that emerged - the big fish v. little fish strategies of the Prosecutor (also known as 
‘pyramidal structure),137 the ICTY Rules of the Road criteria to regulate the selection of cases 
between the international and national fora, as well as their completion strategies have served 
all informed a distinct methodology or criteria for the selection of cases which has been 
heavily influenced by the status of the perpetrator.138 
 
The Completion Strategies of the ICTY and ICTR demanded the transfer of cases and 
indictments from the international tribunals to the territories of the conflicts, based on 
categorizations of the level of the crimes and the level of the perpetrators. Resolution 1534 
which established the Completion strategy required both Tribunals to review and confirm 
new indictments, ensuring that they: 
‘concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal’139 
                                                
135 Article 1, Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Coirts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 2004. 
136 See also Aranburu (n 130) 386. 
137 Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. Int. Criminal Justice, 2004, 586-88; Nicola 
Piacente, Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 J. Int J. Int. 
Criminal Justice, 2004, 447-48; José E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 Michigan 
Law Review, 1998, 2093. 
138 See for example Olympia Bekou, ‘Rule 11 BIS: An Examination of the Process of Referrals to National 
Courts in ICTY Jurisprudence’ (2009) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 723; Mohamed M El Zeidy, 
‘From Primacy to Complementarity and Backwards: (re)-Visiting Rule 11 Bis of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ (2008) 
57 International and Comparative Law Quarterley 403; OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Domestic 
War Crimes Prosecution: Monitoring and Reporting on Rule 11bis Cases’. 
139 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1534’ para 5. 
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In implementing the resolution, the amended Rule 11 bis of the ICTY specified its referral 
criteria, which have largely been reflected in the ICC practice, whereby: 
‘In determining whether to refer the case […] the Referral Bench shall […] consider the 
gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the accused.’140  
 
The level of responsibility of the accused did not follow the same criteria when assessed by 
the Referral Bench. The Referral Bench requested briefings on whether the responsibility of 
the accused should be determined conjunctively, by the role that the defendant played in the 
commission of the offenses and their position in the civil or military hierarchy, or as 
alternates.  
 
In several cases, the stricter, conjunctive approach was adopted141 leading to praise for 
allowing ‘a clearer determination of the role and position of the accused, providing a more 
accurate picture on gravity.’142 As a consequence of these decisions, low-ranking but more 
notorious perpetrators such as Radovan Stancović was referred back to jurisdictional States, 
whereas two second in command leaders, Rašević and Todović were referred back, despite 
the case of their first in command being retained by the ICTY. In her analysis of the ICTY 
Referral Bench decisions, Bekou considered that the Bench differentiated ‘between planners 
and actors that execute the will of the planners’ on the basis that the planners are expected to 
hold a political role that elevates them above the other perpetrators: the combination of an 
assumed political role and ‘increased planning capacity constitutes greater gravity’ than the 
other actors.143 
 
                                                
140 ICTY, Rule 11 bis (c), Revised 30 Sept 2002, amended 28 July 2004, amended 11 Feb 2005 
141 The Prosecutor v Janković, Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis ICTY Referral Bench IT-96-23/2 ‘Foča’, 
22 July 2005; Prosecutor v Ljubičić, Decision for Further Information in the Context of the Prosecutor’s 
Motion Under Rule 11 bis ICTY Referral Bench IT-00-41-PT, ‘Lašva Valley’, 05 September 2005; Prosecutor 
v Todović & Rašević, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes 1 and II ICTY 
Referral Bench IT-97-25/1 ‘Foča’, 08 July 2005; Prosecutor v Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under 
Rule 11 bis ICTY Referral Bench IT-96-23/2-PT, ‘Foča’, 17 May 2005; Prosecutor v Lukić & Lukić, Decision 
on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex and Annex B, ICTY Referral Bench IT-98-32/1-
ARIlbis.1, ‘Višegrad’ , 05 April 2007; Prosecutor v Lukić, Decision of Milan Lukić’s Appeal Regarding 
Referral [2007] ICTY Referral Bench IT-96-23/2 ‘Foča’, 22 July 2005; Prosecutor v Ademi & Norac, Decision 
for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ICTY Referral Bench IT-04-
78-PT, ‘Medak Pocket’, 14 September 2005. 
142 Bekou (n 137) 746. 
143 Ibid, 747 
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The ICTR referral criteria is less helpful for the purposes of identifying factors of the most 
responsible persons. Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR omits the referral criteria of gravity and the 
level of responsibility, instead requiring only that referral be determined by fair trial and 
sentencing features of Rwandan national law rather than by the features of the indictment: 
‘In determining whether to refer the case […] the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that 
the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that the 
death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.’144 
Despite the absence of gravity criteria in the referral process, the national system in Rwanda, 
established a procedure for forum allocation of core international crimes cases, based on the 
seniority of the perpetrator as well as the gravity of the alleged crimes. The High Court 
retained jurisdiction over the most senior perpetrators of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, which includes planners, organisers, instigators and supervisors of the genocide, 
leaders of political parties, armies, religious denominations or militias, well known or zealous 
perpetrators, and persons accused of committing rape or sexual torture.145 The Gacaca Courts 
would adjudicate over all remaining alleged perpetrators of genocide and crimes against 
humanity,146 where its Sector Courts prosecute cases of murder, torture and dehumanising 
behaviour through direct perpetration, attempt, aiding and acting as an accomplice and its 
Cell Courts prosecute those responsible for property related offences.147  
 
The most obvious difference between the ICTY/R Completion Strategies is that the Rule 
11bis referral process was designed to disperse cases from the international tribunals to their 
national counterparts, where selection according to the seniority or role of the perpetrator (or 
indeed the gravity of the crimes) is used simply to identify and then allocate jurisdiction, 
rather than to distinguish between those that will be criminally prosecuted and those that will 
not. It has been alleged that the Rule 11 bis formula and practice has found its equivalent in 
the principle of complementarity before the ICC, notably in the sharing of jurisdiction148 and 
                                                
144 Rule 11 bis, (c) ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
145 Rwanda, Law on the Organisation and Pursuits of Crimes against Humanity, 1996. 
146 Where the defendant confesses to the conduct of criminal acts with the intent to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity .Article 1 and 2, Gacaca Law, revised 2008. 
147 Category 2, Article 51 Gacaca Law. 
148 Bekou (n 137) 731. 
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yet the criteria for selection that has emerged from the ICTY Referral bench practice, as well 
as the rules that established it have been rejected by the ICC Chambers.149 
 
3.1. OTP Policy: Shifting Sands  
Before turning to the ICC jurisprudence governing the selection of cases according to the 
most responsible persons, it is instructive to consider the approaches taken by the Office of 
the Prosecutor, not least as the ICTY Rule 11bis practice appears to have heavily informed its 
early policy. During the first decade of its operation, the targeting of ‘those who bear the 
greatest responsibility’150 was primarily defined as ‘leaders who bear most responsibility for 
the crimes.’151 The hierarchical status of the alleged perpetrators152 was a paramount factor in 
determining who bore the greatest responsibility, whereby the Prosecutor would focus 
investigations on the ‘highest echelons of responsibility, including those who ordered, 
financed, or otherwise organized the alleged crimes.’153 The early OTP policy did not 
exclude those lower down the chain of command from consideration, but included them 
primarily where they had a strategic value for the whole case.154 In 2010, the relevance of 
lower level perpetrators as amongst those most responsible, was acknowledged, where they 
bore liability for particularly serious or notorious acts. 155 Justified in terms of the limited 
resources of the Court, the OTP sought to balance this selection criterion with the 
development of positive complementarity, where it would continue to encourage national 
prosecutions for ‘lower ranking’ perpetrators, in order to reduce the impunity gap of any 
given conflict or atrocity.156 
 
                                                
149 See 4.2 below, First Warrant of Arrest Decision: Ntaganda (n 66) [80] 
150 Regulation 49(2)(c) requires the Prosecutor to describe the persons or groups of persons involved when 
issuing a request to open a proprio motu investigation, where those persons identified should not be peripheral 
perpetrators, but those who bear the greatest responsibility. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper: Issues, 
2003’ (n 22) 7; ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in 
Practice’ (International Criminal Court 2003) Informal Expert Paper; ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on 
Prosecutorial Strategy’ (International Criminal Court 2006) para 2b; ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 
‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (International Criminal Court 2010) para 19. 
151 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper: Issues, 2003’ (n 22) 3. 
152 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice’ (International Criminal Court 2007). 
153 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (n 153) 19. 
154 Ibid. 
155 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice’ (n 151). 
156 ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (n 22), 3, 7; Fourth Report of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, to the Security Council pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005) (14 
December 2006); ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (n 153) 19. 
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Following review of the effectiveness of this ‘leader focused’ approach and coupled with 
significant evidentiary failures in several cases pursued by the Prosecutor,157 the subsequent 
Strategic Plan of the OTP revised the emphasis on top-level leaders.158 Instead of targeting 
only those in positions of leadership, the OTP has expanded its attention to ‘encompass mid 
or high-level perpetrators, or even particularly notorious lower level perpetrators’ as part of 
a strategy to ‘gradually build upwards’ in order to reach those most responsible for the most 
serious crimes.159 In doing so, the OTP has recognised that the increasing evidentiary 
standards that occur in the transition from investigation to a case, requires a diversification of 
evidence categories, in order to demonstrate the often complex structures that are necessary 
to prove direct or indirect liability of those in leadership positions.160 Implicitly, it has also 
broadened the conceptual or normative understanding of those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, by expanding its investigative attention to include notorious low-level 
perpetrators as well as mid to high level perpetrators.  
 
3.2. Rejection of the Ad-Hoc Tribunal’s Conjunctive Formula Of Seniority And 
Responsibility   
In one of the early rulings of the Court, the Appeals Chamber ruled strongly against the 
conjunctive formula of the level or position of the perpetrator and their role in the 
commission of the crimes that gained popularity in the ICTY Rule 11bis cases and within the 
OTP. 161 Their judgment emerged following the Pre-Trial decision not to issue the warrant of 
arrest of Ntaganda on the basis that he could not be considered amongst the most senior 
leaders of the UPC/FPLC as he did not bear a sufficient role on the decision making policies 
and practices, nor did he have autonomy to change or prevent such policies or practices.162 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber had rejected the arrest warrant request for Ntaganda on three 
erroneous grounds of scale (see section 3.4 above), impact (see section 3.5 above) that the 
accused persons must ‘fall within the category of most senior leaders suspected of being most 
                                                
157 Kenya cases- footnotes to confirmation of charges rejections and withdrawal of charges. 
158 Although it had earlier argued that the ‘institutional design’ of the ICC generated the ‘prospect of 
accountability for those suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes’ through 
recourse to the Preamble. See ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 21), para 22. 
159 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (n 149) 4, 9, 22. 
160 Ibid, 19 
161 Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgment: Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 36) [72-81]. 
162 First Warrant of Arrest Decision: Ntaganda (n 66) [87]  
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responsible’ whereby two factors must be affirmatively answered, in a manner reminiscent of 
the ICTY Referral Bench: 
“(1) the role played by the relevant persons through acts or omissions when the State 
entities, organisations or armed groups to which he belongs commit systematic or 
large scale crimes […] and 
(2) the role played by such State entities, organisations or armed groups in the 
overall commission of crimes.’163 
 
Within this framework, three additional factors would need to be met: the suspect must be 
one of the most senior leaders, the role that the suspect played when the organization to 
which they belonged committed the crimes and the role of the suspect’s organization in the 
commission of the crimes.164  
 
In doing so, the PTC sought to maximize the Court’s deterrent effect by focusing only on the 
most senior leaders, arguing that it is only the most senior leaders ‘who can most effectively 
prevent or stop the commission of those crimes.’165 Relying heavily on the rules of the adhoc 
Tribunals which govern the selection of the most senior persons bearing the greatest 
responsibility, the PTC adoption of a teleological interpretation was squarely rejected166 and 
the reliance on the adhoc tribunals was declared to be flawed due to the particular 
circumstances whereby the Ad hoc tribunal adopted narrow selection criteria for suspects.167 
The Appeals Chamber correctly established that the teleological conclusion conflicted with a 
contextual interpretation of the Statute, by contradicting provisions of the Statute that 
establish the irrelevance of superior orders and the irrelevance of official capacity168 (see 
section 4 above). The Appeals Chamber continued by referencing the Rome Statute 
Preamble, which uses the prefix of seriousness only in the context of crimes (‘the most 
serious crimes’) and not perpetrators (‘perpetrators’ and ‘those responsible’) to assert that a 
                                                
163 Ibid [64]. 
164 Ibid [52-53]. 
165 Ibid [54].  
166 Ibid [78]. 
167 Due to the context in which the ICTY and ICTR Rules on the most senior leaders bearing the greatest 
responsibility’ was adopted (i.e. the Completion Strategy). Ibid [80].  
168 Articles 33 and 27(1), Rome Statute (n 9). 
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cumulative construction of responsibility of the perpetrator would generate an intolerable 
impunity gap.169 
 
More significantly, the Judgment questioned the deterrent effect that would be generated by 
focusing exclusively on high-ranking leaders by actively excluding all those below this 
threshold. Rallying against what the Appeals Judges considered to be an excessively 
formalistic criteria, they argued that a more logical assumption that the deterrent effect will 
be at its highest where no category of perpetrator is excluded from being brought before the 
Court. When transcribed to the national sphere, this will require considerably more nuance 
than the model adopted by the Ad hoc Tribunals and that sought by the PTC.170 
 
3.3. All Modes of Liability Can Satisfy the Gravity Factor of the Most Responsible 
Person  
The choice of liability has also been disputed before the Court in the context of the gravity 
threshold and determinations of the most responsible person. This unfolded in the second 
case of the Kenya situation, following the decision of PTC-II to accept the alternative mode 
of liability for the Ali, of having ‘contributed to a crime committed by a group of persons’171 
in its Decision to Request Surrender of Muthuara, Kenyatta and Ali.  
 
The defence team of Ali challenged the gravity threshold of the charges during the 
confirmation of charges hearing, arguing that ‘there is substantial doubt as to whether 
inaction can, as a matter of law, result in liability and rise to the sufficient level of 
gravity.’172 To substantiate their argument, the Defence relied on the discredited framework 
for gravity articulated in Ntaganda (see 3.2 above), in order to establish that Ali was not one 
of the most senior leaders and that the deliberate failure to act by the Kenyan Police (of 
                                                
169 Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgment: Lubanga and Ntaganda (n 36) [78-80]. 
170 Ibid, [73-79] 
171 In the Request to Surrender, the Prosecutor alleged that Ali, along with Muthuara and Kenyatta had acted 
either as indirect co-perpetrators or as contributors in the alternative, for each of the five charges. In the 
Decision, the PTC judges considered that the Prosecutor had included insufficient material to hold Ali 
responsible for acting as an indirect co-perpetrator. See Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for 
Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali Pre 
Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-02/11-01, 08 March 2011 [46–48]. 
172 Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the case of the Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthuara, Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the  Rome Statute’ [2012] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012 [63]. 
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whom Ali was in charge) was not ‘systematic or large-scale.’173 Furthermore, they sought to 
declare that the charges against Ali were of insufficient gravity because he had not been 
accused of being a principal or direct perpetrator, clearly ignoring the liabilities that allow for 
indirect perpetration. While the PTC rejected the Defence’s choice of gravity test, they 
nonetheless considered the substance of the arguments, which it identified as (i) that an 
alleged omission should fail to reach the gravity threshold and (ii) that only principal or direct 
perpetration fulfills the gravity test. 
 
The PTC rejected the argument of alleged omission as untenable on two bases, first that the 
Statute provides for the liability of omission and to restrict the Statute for the purpose of 
gravity would contradict the object and purpose of the Court, and second, that the Prosecutor 
had clearly alleged that Ali had contributed towards the five acts by taking positive steps to 
ensure that the Kenyan Police remained inactive, during and for the purpose of the 
commission of the crimes, rather than having omitted to act.174 The PTC also found the 
argument that only principal or direct perpetrators are of sufficient gravity to be legally 
unfounded, as it would ‘deprive article 25(3)(d) of the Statute of any meaning.’175 
 
Having rejected the Defence arguments on the peramaters of the most responsible persons, as 
untenable and legally unfounded, the PTC considered the gravity of the five charges that Ali 
was charged with, considering that the ‘numerous deaths and brutal injuries, massive 
displacement and sexual violence’ that was ‘allegedly committed in two locations over the 
course of a number of days’ were committed in a manner that ‘featured particular brutality, 
such as beheading victims and also burning victims alive’ and thereby clearly satsifed the 
gravity threshold of Article 17(1)(d).176 The PTC ultimately declined to confirm the charges 
against Ali, on the basis of insufficient evidence, but its evaluation of the factor of the most 
responsible persons in the context of the gravity threshold has helped to confirm the 
applicability of indirect forms of perpetration and provide distance from the faulted PTC 
decision in Lubanga. 
 
                                                
173 Ibid [65] 
174 Ibid [46] 
175 Ibid [47] 
176 Ibid [49-50] 
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3.4. Identification of the Groups of Persons Likely to be the Object of Investigations 
During Preliminary Examination 
The Prosecutor has not always explicitly analysed the potential perpetrators or perpetrator 
groups in the context of gravity during preliminary examination. This has led to various 
reprimands by the Pre-Trial Chambers, who, notably in the Kenya cases, sought to insist that 
the form of preliminary examinations must also be shaped by the likely perpetrators or 
perpetrator groups, rather than the Prosecutor’s earlier prioritization of the crimes alone.  
 
In the Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation into the post-election violence in Kenya, 
the submission considered that the likely persons or groups to form the basis of an 
investigation could be ‘gangs of young men armed with traditional weapons’ as the main 
groups of direct perpetrators, while referring to the list of suspects compiled by the Waki 
Commission to infer that ‘persons in positions of power appear to have been involved in the 
organization, enticement and/or financing of violence targeting specific groups.’ 177   In 
authorizing the investigation, Pre Trial Chamber II referred to reports by the UNHCHR and 
Human Rights Watch,178 to characterize those most responsible for the organization or 
funding of the attacks as leaders, businessmen and politicians.179 The PTC went on to express 
its opinion that admissibility assessments of actual or potential cases cannot be conducted in 
the abstract, but require the parameters of potential crimes and suspects: 
In this respect, the Chamber fails to comprehend how the Prosecutor can determine 
whether a case "would be admissible", without preliminarily knowing the type of 
groups of persons or incidents (involving the commission of crimes falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court), or both, likely to shape his future case(s).180 
 
While the Chambers went on to confirm the Request, it expressed its view that Article 15 
Requests must include:  
‘(i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the object of an investigation 
for the purpose of shaping the future case(s);’ 181 
                                                
177 Request Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Article 15 Request) (n 81) [74-75] 
178 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “From Ballots to Bullets”, March 2008 
179 Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 2) [123] 
180 Ibid [49] 
181 Ibid [59] 
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but that the identification of groups or persons likely to form the object of the investigation 
should consist of a generic assessment, that is ‘general in nature and compatible with the 
pre-investigative stage into a situation.’182 In assessing the alleged crimes, an ‘interplay’ 
between the crimes and the context of their commission exists which the Chambers have 
decided to assess in the context of their modus operandi.183 
 
The views of the PTC were largely incorporated into the subsequent Article 15 Request, into 
the post election violence in the Ivory Coast. In contrast to the Kenya Request, the Ivory 
Coast Request identified various entities and command structures within the state and 
military as potential perpetrators, including defence and security forces, battalions of the elite 
Service Personnel of the then national army, marines in the navy and the overall command by 
the Minister of Defence.184 The OTP also identified the Minister of Interior (as a superior 
with respect to the police) and the Presidential Security Group. The Request refers to 
Confidential Annex 1B, which the Request and Decision describe as containing a list of 
potential suspects, including assignations of those bearing greatest responsibility. In its 
analysis of the confidential materials, the PTC referred to the Prosecutor’s submission that 
the individuals likely to be the focus of future investigations would be ‘high-ranking political 
and military figures.’185 These details, combined with the crimes including murder, rape and 
enforced disappearance that were alleged to have been committed, satisfied the PTC that the 
‘criterion of gravity in relation to these potential cases is thus met.’186 
 
Finally, the recent communication to the prosecutor concerning allegations of war crimes 
committed by British forces in Iraq (see Section 3.3 above) demonstrates the influence and 
absorption of the PTC requirements by those seeking to trigger the Prosecutor into action. 
The ECCHR-PIL communication identifies two groups of responsible persons,187 namely 
groups, bodies and commanders of the British military and representatives of the civil service 
as well as government ministers.188 From its analysis of the forms of liability under the Rome 
Statute, the Communication draws on public information sources to establish the command 
                                                
182 Kenya Article 15 Decision (n 2) [60] 
183 Ibid. [61] 
184 Kenya Article 15 Request  (n 81) [70]. 
185 Article 15 Decision: Côte d’Ivoire (n 2) [205] 
186 Ibid. 
187 Referring to Regulation 49(2)(c) which comes into effect during the investigative phase. 
188 PIL Communication, page 158 
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structures of the British military and civilian supervisors, from which it attempts to 
demonstrate that individual criminal responsibility as established under the Statute, can 
reasonably be traced to named civilian superiors189 and heads of various military units that 
they consider as persons bearing the greatest responsibility. Furthermore, the Communication 
asserts that the status of the most responsible persons places them under ‘positions of moral 
leadership and authority, which carry with them the responsibility of ensuring respect for 
domestic and international laws.’190 
 
4. The Effects of ICC Case Selection on Admissibility Procedures and Positive 
Complementarity  
While the selection of cases by the ICC is intended to limit the Court from the pursuit of 
‘peripheral cases’ its effect on complementarity models, including its positive component is 
significant. As the two core criteria of ICC case selection, the concepts of gravity and the 
most responsible persons will dominate the scope of the cases that appear before the Court to 
undergo admissibility determinations and will influence the national prosecutorial policies of 
any States that seek to retain jurisdiction over ICC crimes. This has been overlooked in all of 
the complementarity models, and yet the practice of case selection by the ICC will dominate 
admissibility, creating a threshold of the specific incidents and alleged perpetrators that are 
most likely to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction. Those above the threshold will need to be 
prosecuted by the State, or alternatively by the ICC, while many incidents and suspects will 
fall below the threshold and are therefore unlikely to form the object of ICC investigation or 
prosecution.  
 
Despite the mixed record of case selection by the ICC, during preliminary examination and in 
the transition to investigation and case, it is clear that the ICC system of justice will be 
heavily shaped by case selection and the resource constraints of the ICC. This is an 
operational reality of the ICC that requires a choice to be made over which of the crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction should form the object of any ICC procedure. The Chambers 
have made it clear that peripheral cases, crimes or perpetrators should not take up the 
                                                
189 including the serving Secretaries of State for Defence during the period (Geoffrey Hoon, John Reid, Des 
Browne and John Hutton) and Ministers of State for Service Personnel (Adam Ingram and Bob Ainsworth). See 
ECCHR & PIL: Iraq Communication, 186 
190 ECCHR & PIL: Iraq Communication, 209 
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resources of the ICC and furthermore, that the exclusion of minor cases, or cases that are not 
central or emblematic should begin within the preliminary examination, where gravity should 
be assessed against the backdrop of potential cases. One plausible outcome of case selection 
by the ICC is to incubate a threshold for criminal prosecution, where cases above the 
threshold are fast-tracked towards criminal sanction, while those below the threshold can be 
subjected to the panoply of alternative or transitional justice mechanisms.  
 
The early decisions of the ICC have gone some way in helping to establish this threshold: 
first the Court has been able to dispel some of the widely repeated criticisms of case 
selection, the most common of which is that every violation of the Rome Statute should 
undergo criminal investigation, prosecution and adjudication, and that the de-selection of 
cases or incidents from the punitive process amounts to a denial of justice to victims and the 
gift of impunity to their perpetrators. In these narratives, case selection has been portrayed as 
an antagonism to justice and a companion of impunity, driven by a tacit assumption that 
criminal justice is the superlative, or only option to provide accountability for all violations. 
By focusing on the ‘de-selected’ crimes and perpetrators, the purpose of case selection is 
obscured, which is the punishment of selected perpetrators of gross violations by a particular 
mechanism. This clarification opens up a breadth of possibilities familiar to transitional 
justice mechanisms, many of which are supported by international human rights bodies and 
which form the corpus of the rapid internationalisation of transitional justice. Instead of being 
seen as the only remedy available to victims, criminal justice, either at the national or 
international realm can be seen as one component of an inclusive, rather than exclusive 
justice and accountability process. Case selection, by the ICC and correspondingly, by States, 
can be better understood as a necessary method for the allocation of accountability 
mechanisms, particularly so in situations where very high incidences of crime have occurred. 
 
Of course, the criteria upon which case selection occurs – the gravity of the crime (or 
conduct) and the most responsible persons – are grounded in concepts that reinforce the 
values of the international community and may contrast to emerging norms or concepts of 
seriousness or gravity and responsibility. This is often the case when considering victim-led 
definitions of seriousness and responsibility, where the definitions of both concepts may be 
underpinned on an entirely opposite rationale, and will continue to raise challenges that must 
be responded to sensitively and diligently. 
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Finally, turning to the impact of case selection upon positive complementarity, it is clear that 
the prevailing conceptualisation of the gravity threshold – of the gravity of the crimes and the 
responsibility of the perpetrators – will shape the support that States require, in determining 
an appropriate policy, identifying the quantitative elements of such a policy, allocating 
resources, identifying the necessary skills required to fulfil such a policy. Several situation 
States or States under preliminary examination have adopted selection or prioritization 
strategies, which demonstrate varying models of engagement with the country-focused 
selection practices of the ICC and other criminal, alternative or transitional mechanisms, 
while those bodies submitting communications to the ICC have also responded to the 
emerging practice of the Court. Ensuring that this process is conducted with methodological 
rigor, with fairness and transparency will continue to challenge and trouble even the most 
genuine criminal justice institutions and broader criminal justice actors, while it is of utmost 
relevance to national capacity to operate within the Rome system of justice.  
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Chapter 5 
Willingness of the National Judicial System: Models of 
Complementarity and Emerging Indicators 
 
 
The extent to which States Parties are required to uphold international due process 
protections over their domestic criminal investigations or prosecutions of ICC crimes, by the 
International Criminal Court, was widely disputed following the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute.1 More recently, expectations or aspirations of an internationally harmonized global 
system of gold-plated criminal justice have been combusted through methodical doctrinal 
analysis and legal realism. 2  Instead, the emerging ICC System of Justice limits the 
jurisdictional authority that the ICC will hold over the fair trial practices of States under its 
scrutiny, placing it at odds somewhat with regional and international human rights 
mechanisms and retreating from the expectations of some that the ICC could become a 
further arbiter of international fair trial obligations. This chapter reviews the due process 
debate through the sources of applicable law as defined by Article 21, drawing on the recent 
jurisprudence from the ICC in the admissibility decisions in the cases of Gaddafi and Al 
Senussi and ICC policies, in order to identify whether any reliable rules concerning national 
due process requirements of ICC-scrutinised investigations or cases have emerged. In 
particular, it finds the overwhelming attention to the scope of the due process standard of 
Article 17(2) to have been misplaced, overlooking the importance of more foreseeable due 
process requirements of the admissibility regime, such as the requirement of witness 
protection schemes to ensure that necessary testimony can be obtained. 
 
                                                
1 See Introduction, Section 3.1 
2  Enrique Carnero Rojo, ‘The Role of Fair Trial Considerations in the Complementarity Regime 
of the International  Criminal Court: From “No Peace without Justice” to “No Peace with Victor’s  Justice”?’ 
(2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 829; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: 
The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255; 
Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd ed, Cambridge 
University Press 2010); Darryl Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’ (2010) 21 
Criminal Law Forum 67. 
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1. The Principles of Due Process Recognised by International Law and Consistency 
with Internationally Recognised Human Rights 
The textual basis for ICC scrutiny over the protections of participants under national 
accountability mechanisms find their origins in the issues of admissibility of article 17(2) 
which instructs the judges to have regard to due process, and in the sources of applicable law 
and in the human rights consistency principle of article 21(3). In addition, discreet due 
process rights can be read into the specific criteria of inability, established in Article 17(3) as 
will be analysed in Chapter 6. In full the two provisions read as follows: 
Article 17(2): ‘In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international 
law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable’ (emphasis added) 
 
Article 21(3): ‘The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must 
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, […]’3 
 
These two provisions have encouraged the development of a seductive ‘due process thesis’ 
whereby the Court will have the power to wrest jurisdiction from countries where the rights 
of the defendant have not been guaranteed or protected. Early writings on the fair trial 
requirements of States Parties tended to assume that these provisions would require that their 
national practices adhere to international human rights standards. Mark S. Ellis argued that 
this mean that ‘at a minimum, States will have to adhere to standards of due process found in 
international human rights instruments, particularly as they relate to the right of defendants’4 
while others asserted that full adherence to due process rights are essential for legality and 
legitimacy,5 that they would be applicable to alternative forms of justice,6 that the ICC would 
defer to national criminal justice procedures where they are found to be ‘effective and respect 
basic human rights standards’ 7  or that States may be considered unwilling if their 
                                                
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1998 (A/CONF183/9). 
4 Mark S Ellis, ‘International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity 
Building, The’ (2002) 15 Florida Journal of International Law 215, 241. 
5 Jan Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive Criminal Law’ 
(2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86, 112. 
6 Carsten Stahn, ‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines 
for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 3 J Int Criminal Justice 695, 713. 
7 Darryl Robinson, ‘The Rome Statute and its Impact on National Law’ in Antonio Cassesse et. al (Eds.) The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002). 1866 
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proceedings ‘failed to accord with international due process norms.’8 These interpretations 
are largely based on some sort of direct effect or ultra-compliance, whereby the operative 
parts of the Statute become binding upon States, or through conceptual expansion through 
their broadly recognized status as codified customary international law.  
 
The hypnotic attraction of the ICC as a criminal court with a strong human rights core was 
clinically exposed by Kevin Jon Heller, in the game-changing article, The Shadow Side of 
Complementarity. Writing in 2006, Kevin Jon Heller challenged what he described as the 
‘prevailing scholarly consensus that […] a State’s failure to guarantee a defendant due 
process makes a case admissible under article 17.’9 Instead, Heller argued that the ICC could 
intervene only when ‘its legal proceedings are designed to make a defendant more difficult to 
convict,’10 basing his argument on a largely persuasive textual analysis of Article 17. Further 
critiques of the Due Process Theory have been loudly publicized by Frederic Megret, who 
has successfully attached arguments of legal pluralism to discussions on the effect of the ICC 
on national due process,11 while Rob Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elizabeth 
Wilmshurt have asserted the preservation of institutional mandates whereby ‘general human 
rights considerations about the conduct of national proceedings are more properly addressed 
by human rights bodies.’12 
 
Notwithstanding the seductive qualities of the due process thesis, it is clear that even where 
Article 17 is filtered by the human rights consistency principle of Article 21(3), the Court 
does not have unrestricted powers to assert jurisdiction whenever the human rights of 
suspects, accused persons or victims and witnesses are violated by the State in question, and 
instead, due process protections must be ‘read-in’ to the specific requirements of the 
admissibility test.  This section shall review the general due process requirement, while the 
subsequent sections will consider the effect of the human rights consistency principle on due 
process considerations (section 1.2 below) before turning to the interpretation by the ICC 
                                                
8 Dawn Yamane Hewett, ‘Sudan’s Courts and Complementarity in the Face of Darfur’ (2006) 31 Yale J. Int’l 
Law276, 278.  
9 Heller (n 2) 277. 
10 Ibid. 278. 
11 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation and the Uses of Complementarity’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); Frédéric Mégret and Marika Giles Samson, ‘Holding the Line 
on Complementarity in Libya The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials’ (2013) 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 571. 
12 Cryer and others (n 2) 151. 
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Pre-Trial Chambers (1.3 below) and the specific factors of the willingness (section 2-4 
below). 
 
1.1. The Due Process Requirement is Part of the Willingness Criteria  
The most convincing dimension of Heller’s Shadow Side argument is made in his analysis of 
the limited authority that the principles of international due process can command over 
admissibility. Through textual and grammatical interpretation, Heller persuasively delineates 
the influence of due process as a separate criterion or as a dominant factor in the 
determination of admissibility. Located in the chapeau part of the text, the due process 
requirement is intended as a subordinate part of the framework through which the exhaustive 
factors of the willingness criteria should be determined. Heller describes it thus:   
‘According to traditional rules of grammar, subordinate clauses depend on 
independent clauses for their meaning – which means that the chapeau is not separate 
from the three subparagraphs, but simply explains how the Court should determine 
whether one or more of the paragraphs are satisfied (namely, with regard to the 
principles of international due process).’13 
As such, the due process requirement forms part of the instructive framework to determine 
willingness: it is not a disjunctive, or free-standing rule, that exists in addition to the factors 
of unwillingness or inability, to enable admissibility to be determined through independent 
assessment of the States adherence to due process principles recognized by international law, 
but a subordinate clause. 14 Instead, each of the three factors of unwillingness must be 
assessed in regard of principles of due process recognized by international law: shielding 
should be determined with regard to international due process, as should unreasonable delays 
as well as the loss of independence and impartiality. 
 
Although the plain text reading of the value of the due process requirement is unambiguous, 
the restriction of due process analysis to just three factors of State criminal justice practices – 
of shielding, undue delay and loss of independence and impartiality – is not in accordance to 
the due process protections expected of the ICC or of other international criminal tribunals. 
                                                
13 Heller (n 2) 260. 
14 On the conjunctive requirement of ‘due process’ in determining unwillingness see Prosecution Response to 
‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the 
ICC Statute’ [2013] Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-321/Red, 24 April 2013 [32]. 
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But a contextual reading of the Statute is unconvincing in the quest to find a legal basis for 
the ICC to enforce due process rights on its States Parties.  
 
The ICC Statute explicitly guarantees its suspects, accused persons and convicted persons the 
procedural protections that are comparable with international and regional human rights 
treaties and courts.  This includes eight pre-trial rights afforded to suspects, covering: (i) the 
rights of non incrimination, (ii) the prohibition of coercion, duress or threat or torture or any 
other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as arbitrary arrest 
or detention (iii), (iv) access to an interpreter and to translation into a language that they fully 
understand, without cost, (v) to be informed about the alleged criminal conduct before 
questioning, (vi) access to legal assistance of their choice, including the right to be 
questioned with counsel (vii), and of course the right to remain silent must have been fulfilled 
(viii). 15 At the trial phase, the ICC protects the rights of the accused, including the rights to 
be present at trial (i), to conduct the defence in person or through legal assistance of the 
accused's choosing (ii), to be informed of this right (iii) to have legal assistance assigned by 
the Court without payment (iv),16 to be informed about the charge (v), be given sufficient 
time to prepare the defence (vi), to be tried without undue delay (one of the admissibility 
factors of unwillingness) (vii), to examine witnesses (viii) and raise defences (ix), to have a 
competent interpreter (x), to be protected against self-incrimination (xi) and the imposition of 
a reverse onus (xii) and to make an unsworn statement (xiii). 17 Furthermore, Article 68 
establishes the protections of victims and witnesses and their participation in proceedings, 
establishing the responsibility of the Court to tale appropriate measures to protect their safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy. 
 
It is clear that the full panoply of due process rights enumerated in the Rome Statute are not 
intended to be enforced by the ICC when determining the genuine willingness and ability of 
States, given their location in parts five and six of the Statute, which govern the work of the 
Court, and the absence of any reference to the applicability of the provisions to national 
proceedings. They may however, serve to contribute towards the interpretation of the specific 
factors of unwillingness and ability, through the status of the rights under external sources of 
                                                
15 Article 55(1), Rome Statute (n 3). 
16 Article 67(1)(d), Ibid. 
17 Article 67(1), Ibid. 
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international law,18 through Article 21, as rules and principles of international law and the 
human rights consistency principle, although as shall be seen below, this has also been 
heavily qualified.  
 
1.1. Applicable International Treaties, Rules and Principles of Due Process  
The parity between the due process protections provided to participants in ICC proceedings 
are comparable to those established by international and regional human rights treaties and 
through the rules and principles that have emerged from their case law. This has been 
championed by human rights NGO’s and advocates such as Mark Ellis19 or Jonathan 
O’Donahue,20 to imply or infer that States are therefore required to fulfill the same procedural 
obligations of the ICC, while early complementarity scholars such as Jan Kleffner21 and Jo 
Stigen 22  have used the jurisprudence of international and regional courts to establish 
applicable rules of due process for the admissibility criteria. There is little to fault with the 
second approach, where their meticulous review of case law has helped to identify rules and 
principles of each of the indicators of unwillingness and inability as defined in the Statute.  
 
The interpretive challenges of the first approach are somewhat more problematic.23 Those 
advocating for fair trial parity in the ICC’s assessment of national proceedings obscure the 
object and purpose of the due process protections under Parts 5 and 6 of the Statute, which 
govern the ICC’s actions, and the equivalent rules established under international and 
regional treaties, which govern and provide remedy for States Parties behavior by distinct 
                                                
18 Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press 2005); UN OHCHR, 
‘Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and 
Lawyers’; ‘Article 67: Rights of the Accused’, , Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008); Ximena Medellín Urquiaga, Digest of Latin 
American Jurisprudence on International Crimes, vol II (María Galvis Patiño ed, Due Process of Law 
Foundation 2013); Dovydas Vitkauskas and Grigoriy Dikov, ‘Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) Council of Europe Human Rights Handbook. 
19 Ellis, ‘International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 
The’ (n 4); Mark S Ellis, ‘International Justice and the Rule of Law: Strengthening the ICC through Domestic 
Prosecutions’ 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law ( 79. 
20 Jonathan O’Donohue and Sophie Rigney, ‘The ICC Must Consider Fair Trial Concerns in Determining 
Libya’s Application to Prosecute Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Nationally’. EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal 
of International Law, 11 June 2013 
21 Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (First, Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
22 Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The 
Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
23 Mégret (n 11). 
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legal regimes. In effect, the ICC is assumed to become an external enforcer of States treaty 
obligations to external bodies, such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court 
of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, imposing or ‘encouraging’ 
state adherence to rules that while shared, are clearly not intended to be imposed by the ICC. 
 
However attractive the dream of a harmonized or homogenous criminal procedure for 
international crimes may be, the ICC is not a legitimate forum to impose or apply the fair trial 
rules or jurisprudence of external bodies ad infinitum, except where it is directly mandated to 
do so. As Cryer et al have said, human rights bodies rather than the ICC are the legitimate 
forums to address and redress fair trial violations, while the ICC ‘s interventions based on 
fair-trial violations (of undue delay etc) are not to redress the harm done, but to attempt to 
remove the violated accused person for trial before the ICC. Instead, the institutional 
responsibility of the ICC over persons it has accused of crimes may be a more appropriate 
avenue for human rights advocates to pursue, which may in turn effect the legal reasoning of 
the ICC.24 
 
Turning to the Adhoc Tribunals, it has oft been considered that the rules and jurisprudence 
from their trials, as well as their transfer panels could instruct the practice of the ICC. As late 
as 2009, the former ICTY Prosecutor and Director of the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice, David Tolbert asserted that the transfer proceedings of the ICTY could provide 
valuable lessons to the ICC.25 Yet it is also clear that the formal scrutiny that the ICC is given 
over the national enforcement of human rights in criminal proceedings of international 
criminal conduct is markedly weaker. The referral rules under Rule 11 bis of the ICTY and 
ICTR, as well as the ICTY’s Rules of the Road practice had led many Hague-orientated 
commentators to advocate for similar standards before the ICC. 26 Instigated through the 
                                                
24 The defence team of Al Senussi unsuccessfully raised the principle of non-refoulement as grounds for 
declaring the case admissible before the ICC, Defence Response to ‘Application on behalf of the Government of 
Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’ Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
International Criminal Court ICC01/011-01/011-356, 14 June 2013. 
25 David Tolbert and Aleksandar Kontic, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: 
Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases to National Courts and Lessons for the ICC’, The Emerging Practice 
of the International Criminal Court, vol 48 (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
26 Article 9(2) ICTY Statute governing the primacy of the ICTY required national jurisdictions to defer cases to 
the tribunal where it decided this was necessary. The introduction of the ‘Rules of the Road’ in BiH required 
that national prosecutors submitted their case files to the ICTY Prosecutor to review the charges and evidence 
before domestic prosecution could proceed, in order to ensure that international standards were met. On the 
Rules of the Road procedure, see Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, Judicial Capacity Building in Bosnia and 
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Completion Strategies, Rule 11 bis provided the Transfer Panels of the ICTY and the ICTR 
with the framework to transfer indicted persons from the jurisdiction of the ICTY to 
applicable national jurisdictions. Subparagraph (B) established the requirement to reject the 
transfer of cases to national jurisdictions where fair trial practices could not be guaranteed 
and where the death penalty could be imposed:27 
‘The Referral Bench may order such referral […] after being satisfied that the accused 
will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.’28  
 The transfer process, as well as the content of the rule is markedly distinct from the 
admissibility procedure before the ICC. As part of the strategy to close the two adhoc 
tribunals, the transfer process establishes conditions under which indicted persons would 
move from the jurisdiction and due process protections of the adhoc tribunals to national 
jurisdictions. As such, Rule 11 bis (B) functions in a similar way to the non-refoulement 
principle, as a process to ensure that the tribunals did not act in a way that would violate the 
fundamental rights of its indictees. The ICC’s admissibility procedure originates from a 
distinct principle to the transfer process and functions in a markedly different way: 
is intended to regulate the movement of cases into the orbit of the ICC, it does not require an 
indictment in order to be triggered and nor does it require that the indicted person be under 
the control of the ICC. 
 
1.2. The Scope of Internationally Recognised Human Rights and the Interpretation 
of Due Process 
The human rights consistency principle of Article 21(3), which acts as a final filter to the 
argumentation of the Court, has commonly been considered by those in favour of ultra-
compliance, as a fallback rule that would allow broader due process requirements to inform 
and influence the admissibility and complementarity practices of the ICC. Given the broad 
range of sources that the sub-paragraph allows (see Chapter 2, section 1.4 and 4.4) as well 
as the richly populated jurisprudence of international and regional human rights mechanisms 
concerning due process rules and principles, resort to Article 21(3) offers a great temptation. 
As with many immediate attractions, the prima facie appeal of article 21(3) should be 
                                                                                                                                                  
Herzegovina: Understanding Legal Reform Beyond the Completion Strategy of the ICTY, Human Rights 
Review 2007. 
27 Rule 11 bis (B), ICTY Rules of Procedure, IT/32/Rev.44 2009 (IT/32/Rev 44). 
28 Rule 11 bis, ibid.  
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somewhat tempered: it is unconvincing to interpret Article 21(3) as a never-ending supply of 
jus cogens rules or emerging human rights standards that can simply over-ride the 
cautious wording of the Statute. As the PTC-I has reiterated, Article 21(3) does not overwrite 
the Statute, but rather that ‘prior to undertaking the analysis required by article 21(3) of the 
Statute, the Chamber must a provision, rule or principle that, under article 21(1)(a) to (c) of 
the Statute, could be applicable to the issue at hand’29  
 
Within the confines of Admissibility, and the particular strictures of the due process 
requirement, the issue at hand needs to be clearly identified. While Article 21(3) may 
introduce well-established international rules and principles governing due process as sources 
that regulate the consistency of the Court’s practices with internationally recognised human 
rights, it does not place them in a higher position of authority over the Statute. In short, 
international human rights do not trump the somewhat conservative structure of the Statute 
provisions on admissibility, but it requires that they be applied consistently with international 
human rights. Jonathan O’Donohue and Sophie Rigney have tried to assert this, arguing that 
Article 21(3) over-rides the wording of Article 17(2) to require that the ICC assert 
jurisdiction over States that are, or can be expected to violate or fail to fulfill due process 
rights, without any connection to the explicit grounds for declaring admissibility.30 Megret 
has also considered this use of article 21(3) as an unconvincing leap of logic: 
‘[…] the injunction not to violate human rights (nor to read the applicable law as 
permitting any such violation) is entirely appropriate as it applies to the operation of 
the Court itself, to apply this provision as a basis for the Court to insist upon 
admissibility is a considerable stretch. It suggests that the Court’s failure to find a 
case admissible despite the existence of fair trial violations would be, in itself, a 
violation of human rights, a leap of logic.’31 
 
The expectation that the Court would apply its own rules or standards of practice over States 
within its jurisdiction is not unrealistic: in terms of the explicit conditions of admissibility, in 
particular of undue delay, the ICC has accepted arguments that ‘the ICC should not impose 
                                                
29 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,  
Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing (Witness-Proofing Decision: 
Lubanga) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06-679, 08 November 2006. 
30 O’Donohue and Rigney (n 20). 
31 Mégret and Samson (n 11). 
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standards beyond its own practices’ even where, in the context of undue delay, it sails 
perilously close to time periods that its compatriot human rights courts have considered as 
lengthy or excessive.32 However, to reinterpret Megret, the issue at hand is not whether the 
applicable sources of law (including article 21(3)) permit the ICC to impose its own due 
process standards on States, but whether the applicable law permits the ICC to defer 
jurisdiction in cases where the human rights of suspects of interest to the ICC can reasonably 
be expected to be violated. The defence team in Gaddafi tried unsuccessfully to establish that 
this was the not the case, through the principle of non-refoulement, arguing that the ICC may 
violate principles of international law including non-refoulement where the declaration of 
admissibility would expose the accused to a violation of fundamental fair trial rights. They 
argued that, as Gadaffi was the subject of an ICC arrest warrant, the ICC would ‘violate the 
right of Mr Gaddafi to benefit from the protections enshrined in article 67(1) of the Statute in 
full equality with other defendants tried before the Court’ if they were to transfer jurisdiction 
to Libya and furthermore that the act of transferring jurisdiction triggered extradition 
protections, including the principle of non-refoulement. 33 The Pre-Trial Chambers did not 
assess this argument in their decision to declare the case admissible, but it can be inferred 
from the decision to defer the case of Al Senussi to national proceedings, that the Chambers 
were not convinced of its rigor or applicability.  
 
Another, potentially persuasive method to ‘read-in’ broader fair trial requirements of States 
under admissibility consideration could be through interpretation of the ‘genuineness’ 
standard of national criminal justice activity,34 although this too has been interpreted as 
invoking a separate and distinct standard that is independent to that of fairness. In the rough 
eloquence that typified the statements of the first prosecutor, this distinction was made clear 
in the context of the Libyan situation, where on a visit to Tripoli, he declared that: 
                                                
32 See the arguments of the Prosecutor in the Gaddafi case and the ensuing analysis in the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decision Prosecution response to Libya’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the admissibility of the case 
against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Prosecutor’s Additional Response to Libya’s Further Submissions on 
Admissibility: Gaddafi) Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-276/Red2, 11 February 2013; Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) [2013] ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11, 31 May 2013. 
33 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 
32) [157]; Defence Response to the ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of 
the ICC Statute’ (Defence Observations: Gaddafi Admissibility) Office of Public Defence Counsel ICC-Ol/ll-
Ol/ll-190-Corr-Red, 31 July 2012 [51–52].  
34 Heller (n 2). 
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 ‘We are not a human rights court. We are not checking the fairness of the proceedings. 
We are checking the genuineness of the proceedings’35 
 
In their pursuit of fair-trial compliance, Donohue and Rigney, sought to incorporate fair trial 
rights into the meaning of the adverb ‘genuine’ thereby elevating the qualities of genuineness 
above the legal standard of fairness, in opposition to the preferred interpretation of the ICC: 
‘Respect and protection of fair trial rights are key objective factors that must be 
considered in determining whether proceedings are of such a quality that they may be 
considered “genuine”.’36 
Rooting the Rome system of justice as one of process, rather than outcome is an eminently 
attractive proposal for those who believe in the importance of rule of law: Heller himself has 
explained the ‘shadow side’ of Article 17 as one which aims to reduce impunity for core 
international crimes, but which must overlook or remain unmoved by ‘impunity of another 
kind’ namely of the violation of defendents rights by States Parties in order to make them 
easier to convict. It becomes emblematic of the clash of objectives and expectations of the 
ICC as contained within its preamble and in the minds of those who strive to make it 
effective, as well as between different international legal bodies, and the absence of coherent 
and articulate theories that juxtapose the various assumptions of the purpose of the ICC 
enables the various proponents to continue talking past one another. 
 
1.3. National Fair Trail Irregularities Must Constitute an Indicator of Unwillingness 
or Inability  
The limited case law before the ICC has led to fruitful clarification of the scope of the due 
process principle. In the Al Senussi Admissibility Challenge, the Government of Libya 
argued that the list of criteria in article 17(2) was exhaustive, with the due process clause 
being inserted as a further objectivity requirement of the ICC judges scrutiny of the 
exhaustive criteria, and ‘not to ensure that the domestic proceedings accord with a particular 
                                                
35 Press statement made by the then ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo in Libya following the UN Security 
Council Referral, 16 May 2011. 
36 O’Donohue and Rigney (n 20). 
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ideal as determined by the ICC.’37 The Prosecutor argued for a broader interpretation, 
invoking the object and purpose of the Statute and the human rights consistency principle of 
Article 21(3) to argue that: 
[o]nly where the national investigation or proceedings lack fundamental procedural 
rights and guarantees to such a degree that the national efforts can no longer be held 
to be consistent with the object and purpose of the Statute and Article 21(3) should the 
Court consider matters of fairness as a corollary to its admissibility determination.’38 
The defense argued that the national proceedings involved violations of the fundamental 
rights of Al Senussi, including undue delays, loss of independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary, bias which can form part of the Article 17(2) factors but also of due process 
violations that may not form part of the explicit criteria for unwillingness determinations, 
such as that the State had failed to provide defence counsel to the accused, that the custody 
and safety of the accused could not be guaranteed and that the investigations continued to be 
plagued with procedural irregularities, due to the general incapacity of the national criminal 
justice system. Thee defence concluded that the application of article 21(3) must include due 
process rights in determinations of unwillingness.39  
 
In its review of the various submissions, the PTC reiterated that the assessment of 
admissibility must be conducted with reference to Libyan national laws, but emphasized that 
such reference will not be made for any or all alleged departures or violations from the 
national legal framework, but that it will: 
‘take into account only those irregularities that may constitute relevant indicators of 
one or more of the scenarios described in article 17(2) or (3) of the Statute, and that 
are sufficiently substantiated by the evidence and information placed before the 
Chamber.’40 
Although the PTC decision is consistent with the textual analysis that underpins Heller’s 
Shadow Side thesis, the Chambers have made clear that it will consider all due process or fair 
trial issues that directly contribute towards the analysis of the indicators of unwillingness or 
                                                
37 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of 
the ICC Statute (Article 19 Application: Al-Senussi) [2013] Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-307(Red2), 
02 April 2013 [111].  
38 Prosecution Response to ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi 
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’ (n 14) [180]. 
39 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) 
[2013] Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, 11 October 2013 [180]. 
40 Ibid, 221. 
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inability. In acknowledgment of this clarification, which offers something of a middle ground 
between the restrictive interpretation conducted by Heller or Megret, and the expansive, 
ultra-compliant methodology adopted by Ellis, O-Donohue and others, this Chapter will now 
consider each of the indicators of article 17(2) to (3) for actual and predictable irregularities 
that can support determinations of admissibility. It should of course be recalled that, 
according to the established ‘same person same conduct’ test that has emerged from Article 
17(1), the genuine willingness and ability of States is addressed only once the Court has 
determined that the State is actively engaged in an investigation or case that overlaps with its 
own international investigation or case (see Chapter 3). 
 
2. Shielding a Person From Criminal Responsibility 
As the first of three factors upon which a State can be considered as unwilling, Jo Stigen has 
described shielding as its core, whereby the remaining criteria of undue delay and loss of 
independence or impartiality simply offer different mechanisms of measurement, a sentiment 
that is widely shared.41 Operationally, the national proceedings or decision must purposefully 
shield suspects or perpetrators,42 through an action or series of actions that intend to make it 
more difficult to try certain persons or to prevent those persons from being held criminally 
responsible.43 The dimension of intent requires a qualitative assessment of the criminal 
justice measures taken by a State, whereby the judicial activities of a State may appear to be 
‘fulfilling the letter of the Statute by engaging in an investigation or prosecution, but not the 
spirit, by in fact having a sham proceeding to shield the person from criminal 
responsibility.’44 In full, it requires that: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made 
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;45  
 
The shielding of a person from criminal responsibility within the judicial process clearly 
violates established principles of fairness, although, largely due to its inclusion as part of the 
                                                
41 STIGEN (N 22) 8. 
42 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (n 21) 135. 
43 Stahn, ‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice’ (n 6) 701. 
44 ‘Article 17: Issues of Admissibility’, , Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed, Beck 2008). 
45 Article 17(2)(a), Rome Statute (n 3). 
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criteria of unwillingness, it has not been the subject of much debate by those advocating for 
the due process or mirror thesis. However, the internal rules of the ICC remain silent in the 
elaboration of possible factors that may constitute shielding and the Court has yet to 
determine admissibility of a case on the basis of shielding.46 In this absence, some policy 
initiatives and doctrinal efforts have been made.47 Within the Office of the Prosecutor, its 
Draft Policy on Preliminary Examinations (2010) offers the most up-to-date assertion of 
eight indicative factors that inform the OTP’s assessment of shielding and thereby can be of 
interest to national criminal justice actors.48   
 
Indicators of Shielding from the Office of the Prosecutor 
The indicative criterion of the OTP Draft Policy largely overlaps with the list of potential 
indicators of shielding proposed by Jo Stigen in 2008,49 where he includes over 25 markers of 
shielding, derived from review of international case law and standards of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination as well 
as the UN Declarations of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of 
Power. It is not my intention to repeat or update the scholarly review conducted of these 
external sources, rules and principles, or to conduct an extensive review of the possible 
interpretive boundaries of the criteria of shielding. Rather, it is to establish whether the policy 
indicators of the Office in the Prosecutor and the various pre-trial judicial submissions and 
decisions of the Court have generated a consistent framework of the minimum required 
practice of States, which can serve as a guide to national criminal justice actors. In the 
context of shielding this is a somewhat limited due to the absence of judicial decisions and 
relative lack of submissions asserting or rebutting the shielding of perpetrators. 
 
                                                
46 Rule 51 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows the Court to considerd information referred to it by 
the State undergoing admissibility review, detailing its adherence to international recognised norms and 
procedures for the independent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct, which can ensure that the ICC is 
furnished with the States legal framework and practices, although Kleffner considers this to offer no more than a 
rebuttable presumption. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2002 (ICC-ASP/1/3) 94; Kleffner, 
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (n 21) 136. 
47 Julio Bacio Terracino, ‘National Implementation of ICC Crimes Impact on National Jurisdictions and the 
ICC’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 421; Stigen (n 22) 8. 
48 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (International Criminal 
Court 2010) para 60. 
49 Stigen (n 22) Chapter 8 
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Degrees of Responsibility and Seriousness: From the Most Responsible, the Most Serious 
Crimes to Marginal Perpetrators or Minor Offences 
The first indicator establishes the selection of perpetrators and offences by the State to 
require comparative assessment of the choice of cases that are active within the national 
courts. It is a counterpart to the selection of suspects and conduct that underpin the gravity 
threshold of Article 17(1)(d) whereby the genuineness of the States judicial activity can begin 
to be determined through its choice of suspects and offences. It also mirrors or forecasts the 
emerging jurisprudence of the Court, where the PTC have directed the OTP to focus its own 
investigations on cases that are central and not peripheral to the situation that is under 
scrutiny.50  
 
Its formulation indicates that a positive response would be afforded to States that 
investigating or prosecuting the most responsible perpetrators for their conduct in the 
perpetration of the most serious crimes, according to the command theory that underpins the 
ICC’s framework of the most responsible persons. This is in part undermined by the latest 
Prosecutorial Strategy of the Office of the Prosecutor, whereby a strategic ‘pyramid’ model 
of prosecutions could be followed, whereby the ICC Prosecutor may target mid-level or 
notorious lower level perpetrators in order to build up evidence and established facts that 
would then enable stronger cases against those that are considered to be most responsible.51  
 
The formulation of the indicator also appears to include ‘partial shielding’ where specific 
perpetrators, including those most responsible, are investigated or prosecuted for clearly 
minor offences.52 The gravity threshold test established in article 17(1)(d) is likely to be of 
importance here following the adoption of the ‘same person same conduct’ test by the Court. 
The gravity threshold largely functions to focus the ICC Prosecutor’s selection of situations 
and cases to the most emblematic or grave violations (see Chapter 5), which the Pre-Trial 
Chambers have interpreted as a direction to exclude ‘peripheral cases.’ The Court thus is 
                                                
50 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Article 15 Decision) [2010] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09, 31 March 
2010 56; Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Article 15 Decision: Côte d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber III 
ICC-02/11, 03 October 2011 150. 
51 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘OTP Strategic Plan: June 2012-2015’ (International Criminal Court 2013). 
52 Stigen (n 22), although this has also been criticized for being a non-essential use of ICC resources which 
should be directed towards those cases of total impunity. 
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expected to target the more major or serious offences, rather than minor offences. This 
becomes relevant at the earlier ‘activity’ phase of admissibility assessment, whereby the 
adoption of the ‘same person same conduct’ test requires that the States selection of offences 
or conduct largely overlaps with the conduct under scrutiny by the ICC (see Chapter 3). A 
States’ pursuit of ‘minor offences’ in its national proceedings is therefore likely to fail at this 
first stage of admissibility and be declared ‘inactive’ thereby precluding the more sensitive 
analysis of its shielding of perpetrators.  
 
The inclusion of marginal perpetrators, whereby neither the hierarchical position of the 
perpetrator nor their notoriety is identified, enables a more dynamic or fluctuating 
interpretation of they types of perpetrators that can be considered as most responsible. The 
OTP has commonly referred to the most responsible perpetrators through status and 
hierarchy, to indicate those who command power and influence on high level – the most 
senior persons – as well as those in mid to high level positions and those who have acted with 
particular brutality albeit not occupying a hierarchical position of power – the notorious 
lower-level perpetrators. Trusting that the choice of noun was purposeful, those who may be 
considered as ‘marginal’ perpetrators could be understood as having played a peripheral or 
minor role in the criminal conduct, despite the possibility that they incur one or more of the 
liabilities in the Statute. Where States target marginal perpetrators, or even lower-level 
perpetrators, the other factors of shielding will need to be scrutinized, notably to identify and 
evaluate the measures that have been taken to investigate those bearing ‘greater’ 
responsibility.  
  
Manifestly Insufficient Steps in the Investigation or Prosecution  
Evidence of manifestly insufficient steps in the investigation or prosecution by a State can be 
both indicators of shielding, as recognized by the OTP Draft Policy, and inability, notably to 
obtain the accused, as well as evidence and testimony. In the context of inability, the PTC 
recently assessed the sufficiency of investigatory measures by the Libyan authorities in the 
admissibility challenge in the Al-Senussi case (see Section 7 below). The core distinction 
between inability and unwillingness in this context is that for unwillingness to be proven, the 
lack of activity or its low quality will need to be attributed to an intent to shield the person 
from justice.  
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Evidence of shielding through insufficient steps could reasonably include failure to obtain the 
accused by not issuing arrest warrants or request extradition, particularly where few or no 
measures where taken to prevent the absconding or movement of the suspect. This could also 
include the failure to obtain evidence, including forensic or ballistic tests, as well as 
testimony of witnesses, or a failure to do so in accordance with rules of evidence, leading to 
the contamination of evidence, breakages in the chain of custody etc. Such failures may also 
be compared to other relevant cases, to the qualities and timeliness of other investigations 
(see 2.1.3 below).  
 
While incompetence on the behalf of the investigating or prosecuting authorities may 
contribute towards inability it is unlikely to be persuasive in the context of shielding. 
Notwithstanding the legal and evidentiary complexities of gross human rights violations 
(which amount to international crimes), particularly within a post-conflict setting, 
jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has consistently 
insisted that efforts to investigate violations ‘must be undertaken in a serious manner and not 
as a mere formality’53 that is ‘preordained to be ineffective.’54 The IACHR has also ruled 
against ‘mechanical implementation of certain procedural formalities’ where there is an 
absence of genuinely seeking the truth to require the State to show ‘that it carried out an 
immediate, exhaustive, serious and impartial investigation.’55 The European Court of Human 
Rights imposes a ‘reasonable steps’ threshold on national efforts to secure sufficient evidence 
of the incidents under investigation, where ‘any deficiency which undermines its ability to 
establish [the crime or the responsible person or persons] will risk falling foul of this 
                                                
53 Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v Colombia, Judgement (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
31 January 2006 143; Case of Ximenes Lopes v Brazil, Judgement (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 04 July 2006 148; Case of the ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v Colombia, Judgement (Merits) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 15 September 2005 219, 223; Case of Manoel Leal de Oliveira v Brazil, Merits 
(Publication) Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Report No. 37/10, Case 12.308, 17 March 2010 
114. 
54 Case of Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Judgement (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights 29 
July 1988 177. 
55 Case of Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina, Merits (Publication) Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, 18 November 1997; Case of Arges Sequeira Mangas v Nicaragua, Merits 
(Publication) Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Report No. 52/97, Case 11.218, 18 February 1998; 
Case of Manoel Leal de Oliveira v. Brazil, Merits (Publication) (n 53). 
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standard.’ 56  Decisions of insufficient evidence should also be scrutinized in order to 
determine if the investigation itself was insufficient.57  
 
Deviations from Established Practices and Procedures  
The deviation from established laws and procedures in order to shield a person from criminal 
responsibility may be identified or measured in many ways. It is an inherently comparative 
exercise, requiring identification of the procedural laws and rules and their adherence in other 
similar cases. It may be that the acts of deviation constitute a breach of the principle of 
equality or fairness through decisions to hold the case in an inappropriate or partisan location 
that favours the suspect, and likely intimidate or threaten victims and witnesses, or providing 
partisan investigators with unrestricted access to unsecured evidence, forensics and ballistics, 
or even the allocation of partisan judges and prosecutors to the case. Or deviation from 
established practices may be to reduce the level or standard of investigative or prosecutorial 
activity, such as making mistakes in the collection and storage of evidence,58 issuing 
decisions or orders concerning the case from authorities that are outside the jurisdiction of the 
prosecution,59 systematically transferring the jurisdiction of the case,60 establishing special 
tribunals where the intergrity or impartiality of the personnel can reasonably be questioned or 
considered as institutionalizing impunity,61 failing to respond or to provide resources to 
respond to complaints or irregularities.62   
 
Ignoring Evidence or Giving it Insufficient Weight  
Unlike the factor of insufficient steps to gather evidence, this factor allows for circumstances 
where evidence has been gathered or presented, either by diligent investigators or possibly 
                                                
56 ECtHR, Jordan v. UK, para 107 
57 Case of Manoel Leal de Oliveira v. Brazil, Merits (Publication) (n 53) 124–127. 
58 Ibid, 127-130. 
59 Ibid, 130. 
60 Case of James Zapata Valencia and José Heriberto Ramírez Llanos v  Merits (Publication) Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights Report No. 100/99, Case 10.916, 27 September 1999 179–183. 
61  Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Colombia UN Human Rights Committee 
CCPR/CO/80/COL, 26 May 2004 8, 11. 
62 Case of Dextor Lendore v Trinidad and Tobago, Merits (Publication) Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights Report No. 28/09, Case 12.269, 20 March 2009 41; Case of Alfonso Martín del Campo Dodd v Mexico, 
Merits (Publication) Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Report No. 117/09, Case 12.228, 19 
November 2009. 
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even by victims groups or other private actors, and is ignored or overlooked by investigators 
prosecutors, judges or jury members. Together with the preceding factors, it allows or 
predicts that shielding may occur by small, or discreet segments of criminal justice 
institutions, where of course, it forms part of an intentional exercise to shield the perpetrator 
from criminal responsibility. 
 
Irreconcilability of Findings with Evidence Rendered  
As an extension of the previous factor, findings that are irreconcilable with the evidence 
tendered can be an indicator of shielding and will be identified through the oral and written 
deliberations of the judicial panel or jury responsible for the investigation or prosecution. 
This requires that the facts and evidence submitted are not adequately analysed, or that the 
findings are at odds or contradictory to the evidence delivered. 
 
Intimidation of Victims, Witnesses or Judicial Personnel 
The intimidation of victims, witnesses and judicial personnel (extending to include 
investigative and prosecutorial personnel) is one of the most fundamental challenges to the 
pursuit of justice and accountability for the crimes prescribed by the Rome Statute. It was 
raised as a matter of concern by the UN Committee of Racial Discrimination in its review of 
Rwanda, as ‘intimidation of judicial authorities seeking to investigate and address human 
rights violations committed since 1994 against ethnic Hutus’ 63  reaffirmed in the UN 
Declarations of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power,64 
establishes that the intimidation of actors can amount to shielding perpetrators from justice, 
and incorporated into the decision making of the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights.65  
 
The use of anonymous judges has also been suggested as a potential form of shielding by 
Stigen, where he used the example of anonymous ‘hooded judges’ in early Colombian drug-
                                                
63 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Rwanda UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination CERD/C/304/Add.97, 24 March 2000 18. 
64 UN General Assembly, ‘UN Declarations of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of 
Power’ A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985. 
65  Report on the Situation of Human RIghts in Ecuador Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, Doc. 10 rev.1, 24 April 1997 Chapter 3. 
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trafficking cases. The purpose of providing the judges with anonymity was itself to protect 
the judges from intimidation and threats, and yet it a clear consequence of this form of 
‘protection’ can be to allow a partisan judge to shield the person, as they cannot be identified.  
Intimidation of judicial personnel may include circumstances where the intimidation does not 
amount to loss of independence, such as the attempts to intimidate the judges in the recent 
trial of former Guatemalan President Efrain Rios Mont for crimes of genocide and crimes 
against humanity.  
 
However, while both the States concerned and the ICC have an objective duty to protect all 
participants in the proceedings from harassment and intimidation, in the context of shielding, 
it can be expected that the intimidation must be to favour the accused and be attributable to a 
state policy, due to the intent requirement of Article 17(2)(a). Similar failures to protect or 
prevent intimidation may lead to determinations of inability, where there is an absence of 
state involvement (see Section 7). 
 
The current factors however exclude bribery or other form of impermissible interventions 
with victims, witnesses and judicial intervention, as an indicator of shielding. As the ICC is 
itself experiencing in two separate cases, the bribery or attempted bribery of persons 
participating in criminal cases is a frequently utilized mechanism,66 used to derail trials and 
undermine the quest for individual criminal responsibility. While it is proscribed in cases 
before the ICC as an offence against the administration of justice, through corruptly 
influencing a witness67 or a Court official,68 where there is evidence of it occurring in 
national investigations and cases, it may also provide credible evidence of efforts to shield a 
person. As such, evidence of corruptly influencing witnesses, judicial personnel or other 
participants in the criminal justice process should be accepted as an indicator of shielding, to 
be subjected to the same tests as the other factors, of connection to State practice or intent to 
protect the suspect or accused person from individual criminal responsibility. 
                                                
66 The Prosecutor v. Walter Osapiri Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, ICC-
01/05-01/13 (the so-called Bemba 2 case). See also, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Article 15 Decision) [2010] 
ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010 56; Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute 
on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Article 15 Decision: 
Côte d’Ivoire) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber III ICC-02/11, 03 October 2011 201. 
67 Article 70(1)(c), Rome Statute (n 3). 
68 Article 70(1)(d), Ibid. 
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The Lack of Resources Allocated to the Proceedings at Hand as Compared with Overall 
Capacities 
The resources available for national criminal justice proceedings continues to be of central 
importance in the complementarity landscape, providing many of the contours that make up 
the panorama of willingness and ability. But as a factor that may indicate shielding, it should 
be measured comparatively, through assessment of the allocation of resources to the specific 
investigations or prosecutions (including trials) in contrast to its overall capacity. Within the 
international human rights framework, the lack of resources or under-funding of the criminal 
justice system can be considered as an impediment to the expeditiousness of a trial and 
consequently lead to findings of an undue delay,69 as well as contributing towards corrupt 
practices and the loss of independence or impartiality of judges,70 particularly where the 
magnitude and social repercussions of the case are high.71 
 
In practice, the allocation of resources would need to encompass both economical resources, 
but also personnel with sufficient skills and knowledge to pursue the case at hand, as well as 
the facilities necessary to conduct the criminal proceedings.72 The training of criminal justice 
practitioners, as well as the receipt of technical assistance and international funding has also 
been encouraged and used as evidence of a commitment to be sufficiently resourced.73 But 
again, within the context of shielding the allocation of resources to the specific case in 
question will be assessed in comparison to its general resources: Stigen describes this as the 
                                                
69 Case of Jorge, José and Dante Peirano Basso v Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Merits (Publication) Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights Report No. 86/09, Case 12.553, 06 August 2009 133, 167. 
70 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32, paragraph 27. UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General 
Comment No. 32. Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial’ (United Nations 
2007) CCPR/C/GC/32 27; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Democratic Republic of 
Congo UN Human Rights Committee CCPR//C/CAF/CO/2, 2006.16. 
71 Case of Jorge, José and Dante Peirano Basso v. Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Merits (Publication) (n 69) 
167. 
72 Issues of resources in each of these categories formed a significant component of proceedings in the 
admissibility procedure in the two Libya cases before the ICC. See Chapter 5, section 5.4 
73 See references to the importance of education and training of criminal justice actors in various UN Guiding 
Principles and soft instruments, such as UN General Assembly (n 64); Libyan Government’s Further 
Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further 
Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-285-Red2, 23 January 2013; The 
Government of Libya’s Appeal against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’ (Admissibility Appeal: Gaddafi) [2013] Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-350, 07 
June 2013. 
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requirement of ‘sufficient coherence between the national system’s general capabilities and 
its actual performance.’74 Where a sufficient level of resources for the general practice could 
be determined, a gap, or incoherence between capability and performance could indicate 
shielding, whereas a lack of capability would need to be assessed as part of the inability 
criteria, even where there was coherence between capability and performance. 
 
Refusal to Provide Information or to Cooperate 
The refusal or reluctance of States to cooperate with the ICC has become an operational 
reality of the Court, notably in the UN Security Council-referred Darfur situation75 and the 
Kenya cases. State cooperation or willingness to provide information has also become the 
“800lb gorilla” of admissibility proceedings, as the ICC learns exactly how vulnerable it is to 
State cooperation in all phases of its work, but particularly in UN Security Council Referrals 
of non-State parties.76 Jurisdictional states are informed of the Prosecutor’s interest in crimes 
and possible perpetrators within their jurisdiction at an early stage of the Prosecutor’s 
                                                
74 Stigen (n 22), Chapter 8 
75 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding 
Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, issued 09 April 2014; Decision on 
the Non-compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the 
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, 26 March 2013; Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of 
the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by 
the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-139, 
12 December 2011; Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of 
Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140, 13 December 2011. Statement of the ICC Assembly of 
States Parties President on the Visit of the Sudanese President to Chad, 20 February 2013, The EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton, Statement On The Visit Of Sudanese President Al-Bashir To Chad, 16 May 
2013. 
76 As of October 2013, the arrest warrants or surrender requests of 14 persons remained outstanding. See also 
Franco Palmisiano, ‘Cooperation By Non-States Parties’ in Flavia Lattanzi (ed), The International Criminal 
Court: Comments on the Draft Statute (Editoriale Scientifica 1998); States’ Responses to Issues Arising from 
the ICC Statute: Constitutional, Sovereignty, Judicial Cooperation and Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers 
2005); Jackson N Maogoto, ‘A Giant without Limbs: The International Criminal Court’s State-Centric 
Cooperation Regime’ [2006] Bepress Legal Series 53; Göran Sluiter, ‘Obtaining Cooperation from Sudan — 
Where Is the Law?’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 871; Han-Ru Zhou, ‘The Enforcement of 
Arrest Warrants by International Forces: From the ICTY to the ICC’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 202; René Blattmann and Kïrsten Bowman, ‘Achievements and Problems of the International Criminal 
Court: A View From Within’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 711; Göran Sluiter, ‘Using the 
Genocide Convention to Strengthen Cooperation with the ICC in the Al Bashir Case’ (2010) 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 365; Dapo Akande, ‘The Effect of Security Council Resolutions and Domestic 
Proceedings on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
299; Carsten Stahn, ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for “Shared 
Responsibility”’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 325; Dire Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on 
Chad and Malawi: On Cooperation, Immunities, and Article 98’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 199. 
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examinations (see Chapter 3) ensuring that they have adequate notice of the Court’s interest 
in their domestic proceedings and through the so-called ‘reverse cooperation’ provision in 
Article 93(10) they may also request assistance and cooperation from the Court.77  Equally, a 
cooperation framework exists to regulate cooperation and judicial assistance matters: State 
Parties have a general obligation to cooperate with the ICC,78 they must ensure that there are 
national proceedings to enable all forms of cooperation specified under Part 9 of the Statute79 
while the Rules of Procedure establish channels and languages of communication for these 
purposes80 and several administrative units exist within the ICC organs and Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP) to facilitate cooperation practices.81  
 
In light of the legal framework and infrastructure supporting cooperation with the ICC, the 
absence of cooperation from a State is likely to indicate either unwillingness or inability: in 
the context of unwillingness through shielding, the absence of communication must 
reasonably be intentional, although the noun adopted by the OTP – refusal – indicates that 
the non-cooperation must be active rather than passive. A failure to cooperate through lack of 
resources is more likely to indicate inability, unless for example, the lack or resources, 
including the designation of inappropriate or incompetent communication channels is also 
indicative of intentional practice by the State to make it harder to pursue criminal 
responsibility for the individuals concerned.82 The scope of non-cooperation in the context of 
shielding should extend to all of the cooperation obligations, where the non-cooperation 
                                                
77 Request for Assistance on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 93(10) and 
Rule 194 [2011] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-58 21-04-2011, 21 April 2011; Application on behalf of 
the Government of Kenya for leave to reply to the Prosecutor’s Response of 10 May 2011 and Corrigendum of 
11 May 2011 to ‘Request for Assistance on behalf of the Government of Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 
93(10) and Rule 194’ ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-61, 18 May 2011; Government of the Republic of 
Kenya, ‘Request on Behalf of the Goverment of Kenya in Respect of Its Application for Leave to Reply to the 
Prosecutor’s Response of 10 May 2011 and Corrigendum of 11 May 2011 to “Request for Assistance on Behalf 
of the Government of Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 93(10) and Rule 194”’ (2011) ICC-01/9-62; 
Decision on the Request for Assistance Submitted on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya 
Pursuant to Article 93(10) of the Statute and Rule 194 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence [2011].  
78 Article 86, Rome Statute (n 3). 
79 Article 88, Ibid. 
80 Rule 177, 178, 180 
81 Within the Office of the Prosecutor this function is executed by the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division (JCCD) the ASP President pursues bilateral engagements with States on matters of 
cooperation pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Assembly Procedures, while the ASP working group on 
cooperation also ensures a State-level discussion of the issues and challenges of cooperation and the ASP 
Bureau compiles an annual report of the actions undertaken both by the President and the Bureau. See  ‘Report 
of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation (11th ASP)’ (Assembly of States Parties 2012) ICC-ASP/11/29. 
82 Although of course, this can be mitigated through Article 93(10) by requesting the court to assist (in good 
faith) in the execution of the cooperation request. Rome Statute (n 3). 
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emerges from a refusal rather than say, competing requests83 for the arrest and surrender of 
persons.84 This would include the refusal to arrest or surrender persons, which should be 
distinguished from the inability to do so, as well as where genuine efforts are ongoing to 
identify and locate of suspects and execute their arrest/surrender and subsequent transferal to 
the ICC. It should also include the other forms of cooperation, including the taking of 
evidence and testimony, the production of evidence, questioning of persons, service of 
documents, facilitation of voluntary appearances of witnesses or experts as well as temporary 
transfer of persons in custody of the State, the examination of places and sites, execution of 
searches and seizure, provision of records, protection of victims and witnesses and the 
preservation of evidence, the identification, tracing and freezing of assets and other types of 
assistance.85  
 
Several of the other indicative factors of shielding may also be symptomatic of the refusal to 
cooperate, or they may surface through the cooperation process. The intimidation of 
witnesses and victims may clearly contravene the obligation to protect them, following a 
request from the ICC, while insufficient steps in the investigation or prosecution evidence 
and testimony may become more apparent following requests to provide evidence or records 
to the Court. The overlap between cooperation and the preceding seven factors of shielding 
adopted by the OTP demonstrates the inter-related nature of the willingness of States to 
ensure criminal responsibility for the most responsible persons. Herein lies the obvious 
paradox facing the ICC’s system of justice: States who choose to shield a person from 
criminal accountability will be considered unwilling and therefore jurisdiction will pass from 
them to the ICC, and yet the ICC will often require their subsequent cooperation for the case 
to proceed, notably through the arrest and surrender of those that the State has chosen to 
protect.  
 
In the context of shielding, the qualities of specific national investigations and prosecutions 
can be scrutinized comparatively and in some detail, but largely according to the established 
domestic procedures and standards rather than to international ones, while the scope of 
                                                
83 Article 90 establishes the procedure to reconcile competing requests for the surrender of persons. Ibid. 
84 Article 89, 92, Ibid. Currently 14 suspects subject to a warrant of request or request to surrender remain at 
large: several due to States clear refusal to cooperate, whilst others such as those indicted in Uganda continue to 
evade efforts to secure their location and consequently their arrest and detention. 
85 Article 93(1), Rome Statute (n 3). 
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shielding extends only to include those persons whom the State wishes to protect, by making 
it harder to convict. 
 
3. Unjustified Delays  
The second criterion of unwillingness, unjustified delay, is recognized as an integral part of 
the right to a fair trial, protected as part of the rights of the accused during trials before the 
ICC86 but is also incumbent upon States through numerous international and regional treaties. 
However, in the context of admissibility, an unjustified delay does not incur a determination 
of the violation of the accused persons right to a fair trial, but could render the unduly 
delayed case admissible before the Court. In full, the unjustified delay formula reads as 
follows:  
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances 
is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;  
 
This can be broken down into three tests: first whether a delay can objectively be observed, 
second whether it can be considered as justified. Whereas the first two tests are sufficient 
under international human rights law to determine that an undue or unjustified delay has 
occurred, the third composite test requires the prohibited delay to be inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person to justice, a test which should be conducted in light of unspecified 
‘circumstances.’87  
 
A review of the subsidiary internal sources of law of the ICC reveals no further criteria or 
indicators for the determination of each of the tests of unjustified delay, while the various 
policy papers and strategies of the Office of the Prosecutor do little more than rephrase 
Article 17(2)(b). For example, the informal expert paper on complementarity, from 2003 
provides an annex of indicia for unwillingness and inability, listing three sequential stages of 
inquiry, to determine in which stage of the proceedings the delay occurs, including the 
investigative and prosecutorial phases, and comparing it with normal delays for cases of 
                                                
86 Article 67(1), Ibid. 
87 The repetition of the formula of intent, led Kleffner to consider that unjustified delay is a synonym or 
marginal elaboration on the criteria of shielding. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National 
Criminal Jurisdictions (n 21) 139. 
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similar complexity within the national system (assumes that there are other cases); 88 where 
delay is identified is it justified (again without any indicators for measuring justified delay); 
and is the unjustified delay inconsistent with an intent to bring the person  concerned to 
justice.89 More recently, in its 2010 Draft Policy on Preliminary Examinations, the OTP 
further reduced the 2003 indicia to an indicative assessment of whether the delay can be 
objectively justified in the circumstances and whether there is ‘evidence in the circumstances 
of a lack of intent to bring the person(s) concerned to justice.’90 This approach places a great 
deal of importance onto the circumstances of the proceedings, which may well indicate that 
margin of appreciation will be afforded to States in the midst of conflict or emerging from it: 
the effects of such an approach is likely to be contrary to or on the upper threshold of human 
rights practice concerning undue delay and it can be expected to be unpopular with human 
rights advocates.  
 
3.1. International Rules and Principles on Unjustified Delay 
Protected in the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)91  the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)92 the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHP)93 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)94 as well 
as the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions95 and the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC 
and STL, as a part of the right to a fair trial without undue delay or within a reasonable 
timeframe. While the thresholds of undue versus unjustified delay were debated during the 
drafting of the Statute, with some States considering undue delay to be too strict, they can 
reasonably be considered to be the same,96 providing a significant repository of jurisprudence 
                                                
88 Stigen (n 22), Chapter 8; John T Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results (Kluwer Law 
International) 676. 
89 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ 
(International Criminal Court 2003) Informal Expert Paper 28; Markus Benzing, ‘International Criminal Court: 
International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 591, 611. 
90 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 48) 64. 
91 Article 14(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
92 Article 6(1) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 
93 Article 26, African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 
94 Article 8 (1), American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 
95 Article 103(1) Third Geneva Convention and Article 71 Fourth Geneva Convention 
96 See Stigen (n 22), 8.3.5.2 
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and authoritative interpretation to which the Court can look to for guidance. 97 In his review 
of fair trial standards in criminal proceedings, Stefan Trechsel has reiterated the importance 
of the four key criteria established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to 
assess the period of alleged undue delay: the conduct of the accused and their appointed 
counsel; the subjective importance of the proceedings for the accused; the complexity of the 
case, with greater tolerance being given to cases with an international dimension; and the 
conduct of the domestic authorities. 98  But as the Statute also requires that any such 
unjustified delay to be put first into a context of the circumstances of the proceedings and 
then to be found as inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to justice, two additional 
criterion should be added: the circumstances of the proceedings and the intent to bring the 
person to justice.  
Conduct of the Accused 
The conduct of the high-level leaders accused of international crimes has consistently 
reached the headlines, where elaborate performances and utilization of due process rights of 
the accused have sought to discredit and disrupt proceedings, often with the inevitable 
consequence of delays. Before the ICTY, the trial of the former President of Yugoslavia 
Slobodan Milosevic, was dogged by delays, adjournments on the grounds of ill-health, and 
use of the right to self-representation to stage political maneuvers and aggressive cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses.99 While at the national level, the recent trial of the 
former Guatemalan President Rios Montt for genocide committed against the Ixil people was 
also emblematic of conduct to delay and disrupt proceedings, through an arguably abusive 
use of legal procedures, as well as interruptions to the proceedings, staged walkouts and 
boycotts.100 
 
                                                
97 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13: Equality before the courts and the right to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent court established by law (Art. 14), 13 April 1984, General Comment No. 
29: States of Emergency (article 4) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, which reinforces that the fair 
trial protections of the Geneva Conventions apply during conflict as well as other emergency situations.  
98 Trechsel (n 18). Chapter 5. The European Court of Human Rights has adopted similar factors in determining a 
reasonable timeframe, in Zimmerman and Steiner v. Switzerland (1984) 6 ECHR 17, 24 
99 Timothy William Waters, The Milosevic Trial: An Autopsy (Oxford University Press 2013). 
100 See inter alia, International Crisis Group, ‘Justice on Trial in Guatemala: The Rios Montt Case’ (2013) Latin 
America Report 50; Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Ríos Montt’ 
(2013). 
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The use of legal procedures by the accused to delay, disrupt or stop investigations and trials 
from proceeding is a well litigated phenomena before human rights bodies, and while the 
abusive action is directly attributable to the accused person, it is also frequently understood as 
part of a broader effort to prevent the pursuit of justice often attributable to state institutions. 
For example, in the Rios Montt case, the lawyers of the former president used legal 
procedures, notably amparo, an action that enables an accused person to challenge an alleged 
infringement of constitutional or legal rights, more than 120 times in the duration of the 
investigation and trial.101 The use of legal protections such as amparo in Guatemala has 
frequently formed the subject matter of complaints to the Inter American Court of Human 
Rights. In “Las Dos Erres” Massacre, the IACHR found that ‘the appeal for legal protection 
has been transformed into a means to delay and hinder the judicial process, and into a factor 
for impunity’102 which the Court found to have been ‘used maliciously, but with the justice 
system as an accomplice.’103 A number of other human rights decisions reinforce the 
connection between delays caused by the conduct of the accused, through the repeated or 
excessive use of legal protections and an intent to shield or protect the accused persons that 
can be attributable to judicial institutions as well as institutions of government. 
 
Other indicators of abusive or tactical conduct by the accused such as staged walkouts or 
boycotts are also consistent indicators of the intent of the accused to delay or terminate 
proceedings. Where adequate measures exist to compel or sanction behavior that breaches 
rules of procedure as well as the code of conduct for lawyers, and such actions are not 
followed, the delays that follow may be considered to be unjustified, again with the 
possibility of collusion between the accused and judicial organs. During the Rios Montt case 
however, the staged protests, walkouts and boycotts of the trial were met with resistance from 
the Judges, but who nonetheless remained unable to compel the defense team to return to 
Court and participate in the proceedings, largely due to the absence of effective punishments 
and enforcement mechanisms. Where situations such as this unfold in the course of 
admissibility, the consequence may rather be that the State will be considered otherwise 
unable to carry out proceedings rather than unwilling through an unjustified delay. 
 
                                                
101 Open Society Justice Initiative (n 100) 9. 
102 Case of the ‘Las Dos Erres’ Massacre v Guatemala, Judgement (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 24 November 2009 120. 
103 Ibid, 106 
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Complexity of the Case 
Determining a suitable yardstick of what constitutes an unjustified delay in national 
proceedings of core international crime conduct is made more problematic by the complexity 
of these cases.104 The complexity of international crime cases should be realistically assessed, 
although the rhetoric commonly used to describe their level of difficulty has swung off the 
barometer, without careful reflection of what is necessary and permissible under the ICC 
system and what is required under different international mechanisms. In addition to the 
specific features of any case, its legal complexity can be partially assigned to the choice of 
legal framework that is adopted and consequentially, the necessary gathering of facts and 
evidence and their analysis and organization into a clear and compelling case file that can 
articulately meet the evidentiary burden for each element of the crime and liability under the 
adopted framework. There are of course many challenges that influence this process at each 
step of the journey, many of which also influence the ICC admissibility analysis: including 
the quantity of data, the maintenance of evidentiary and custodial standards, access to 
important sites (which is often contested, raising security and political obstacles), resources, 
utilization of international requests for assistance, secure and adequate facilities for trial and 
detention, as well as witness and victim protection.  
 
In the context of delays, the choice of legal framework can significantly alter the complexity 
and therefore quite legitimately, the length of time taken to pursue investigative and 
adjudicative activities. Notwithstanding issues of retroactivity, States with applicable 
Criminal Codes that include ICC crimes can reasonably be expected to apply the 
nomenclature established within them, requiring that evidence demonstrate each of the 
common elements of the crime (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) as well as 
the specific elements that establish the underlying act or violation.105 While on the contrary, 
those without these crimes under national laws, may often struggle to adapt ordinary crimes 
and liabilities to the factual reality of the violations under scrutiny. While there is no ideal 
solution or ‘one golden size fits all’ approach, caution should be adopted when exhorting 
States to adopt or apply international crime nomenclature, particularly where they are 
                                                
104 Diane Orentlicher, ‘Owning Justice and Reckoning with Its Complexity’ (2013) 11 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 517. 
105 See for example Uganda, which will apply its ICC Act to those perpetrators it pursues for crimes committed 
after 2010, when it entered into force, and a combination of its Geneva Convention laws and ordinary laws for 
all those preceding it. 
The International Criminal Court and Positive Complementarity: the Impact of the ICC’s Admissibility Law and 
Practice on Domestic Jurisdictions. 
156  EUI PhD Thesis
    
chronically under-resourced and or emerging from conflict:106 not only may it lead to delay 
but under the terms of the Statute it is unlikely to constitute unjustified delay, thereby 
exacerbating the reality of impunity. 
 
Conduct of Domestic Authorities 
In evaluating the conduct of domestic authorities, international and regional human rights 
bodies have considered justified delays to include delays due to lawyers strikes, awaiting 
letters rogatory and public unrest, while inaction in the face of delays by domestic authorities 
has been considered as unjustified, thereby compelling state representatives to actively follow 
their caseload.107 In the context of admissibility decisions, the conduct of domestic authorities 
is also implicit in the intent to bring the person to justice and requires good faith behavior by 
each of the domestic authorities engaged in the investigation and prosecution: the good faith 
efforts of one institution to pursue its mandate to bring the person to justice may be 
undermined through the conduct of another, which could lead to admissibility due to the 
unjustified delay of the other authority  
 
Of greater interest to the ICC system of justice as well as to admissibility, the lack of 
adequate funding for trials has also been rejected as a legitimate cause for delay in criminal 
cases, with the UN Human Rights Committee finding that ‘the lack of adequate budgetary 
appropriation for the administration of criminal justice does not justify unreasonable delay 
in the adjudication of criminal cases’108 Where a State has not been able to pursue an specific 
prosecution due to inadequate budgetary means for example, but it has made efforts to 
reallocate funds or request international aid, it is entirely plausible that the Court consider 
deferring its case back to the impoverished State, having subsequently considered whether its 
fiscal restraints rendered it unable under the conditions established in article 17(3).  
 
                                                
106 Payam Akhavan, ‘Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial 
Romanticism with Political Realism’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 624, 630–634. 
107 Trechsel (n 18). Chapter 5. 
108 André Fillastre and Pierre Bizouarn v Bolivia UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 336/1988, 
CCPR/C/D/336/1988, 06 November 1996 65. 
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Circumstances that are Inconsistent with the Intent to Bring the Person to Justice 
The circumstance of proceedings shares several features with the complexity of the case as 
well as the conduct of the accused and the judicial authorities, but is also sufficiently distinct, 
as countervailing factor to unjustified delay. International humanitarian law establishes 
certain limitations or qualifications to the right to be tried without undue delay, reflecting the 
particular circumstances of armed conflict: Article 103(1) of the Third Geneva Convention 
provides that investigations of prisoners of war ‘shall be conducted as rapidly as 
circumstances permit and so that his trial shall take place as soon as possible’ while Article 
71 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that accused persons who are under the 
authority of an Occupying Power should be brought to trial as rapidly as possible.  
 
Through General Comment 29 on States Of Emergency, the UN Human Rights Committee 
has affirmed that during periods of international or non-international armed conflict, rules of 
international humanitarian law are applicable109 and therefore that derogations from the 
ICCPR are allowed ‘only to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the 
nation.’110 Where IHL rules on the timeliness of trials apply, a permissible derogation must 
be justified and required by the exigencies of the situation, and ultimately that ‘the right to 
take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness 
of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate.’111 
 
To date, the ICC has not claimed any cases on grounds of unjustified delay, although delays 
have been assessed in preliminary examinations including Guinea, and in the admissibility 
challenges of the two Libyan cases, Gaddafi and Al Senussi the criteria was extensively 
litigated.112 
 
3.2. Determining Unjustified Delays in National Proceedings during Preliminary 
Examinations 
 
                                                
109 General Comment No. 29 (n 97) 3 
110 Ibid, 3, based on Article 4, UN ICCPR (n 91). 
111 General Comment No. 29 (n 97), 16 
112 See Section 3.4 onwards 
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Article 17(2)(b) refers to an unjustified delay in proceedings that are inconsistent with an 
intent to bring a person to justice. This seems to indicate that unjustified delay requires that at 
its minimum threshold there must be proceedings directed against a named person, similar to 
the fair trial dimension of unjustified delay, which commences at the date of arrest.113 Yet 
Article 17 is also applied at the transition from a preliminary examination to an investigation, 
before suspects may have been clearly established, and certainly before the issuing of 
warrants of arrest.  
 
The preliminary examination into the opposition rally violence in Guinea provides a useful 
example of the types of delays or timescales that will be tolerated by the OTP for national 
investigations into a contained episode of violence. The OTP announced its preliminary 
examination into the situation in Guinea two weeks after a government-led crackdown on an 
opposition rally at the Conakry Stadium on 28 September 2009, which led to reported 
killings, disappearances, arbitrary detention and torture, sexual violence and persecution.114 
Shortly after the incident, an Independent Commission of Inquiry (ICOI) was established by 
the UN Secretary General, reporting to the UN Security Council on 18 December that: 
‘it is reasonable to conclude that the crimes perpetrated on 28 September 2009 and in 
the immediate aftermath can be described as crimes against humanity. These crimes 
are part of a widespread and systematic attack launched by the Presidential Guard, 
the police responsible for combating drug trafficking and organized crime and the 
militia, among others, against the civilian population.’115 
In accordance with its terms of reference, the ICOI Report identified the different parties to 
the incident as well as a list of 56 individuals that it considered to bear individual 
                                                
113 Under the Rome Statute, protection against undue delay also begins following the arrest of the person, where 
according to Article 59(2)(c) the arrested person should be brought promptly before the competent judicial 
authorities, which should determine that the person’s rights have been respected. Following their transfer to the 
ICC custody, the Pre Trial Chambers are required to ensure that the person is not detained for an ‘unreasonable 
period’ prior to trial due to ‘inexcusable delay’ by the Prosecutor. Following the commencement of the trial, 
which begins after the Confirmation of Chagres decision is issued. The right to be tried without undue delay 
begins, under Article 67. Rome Statute (n 3). 
114 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘ICC Prosecutor Confirms Situation in Guinea under Examination’ ICC 
Website (The Hague, 14 October 2009) <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20st
atements/statement/Pages/icc%20prosecutor%20confirms%20situation%20in%20guinea%20under%20examina
tion.aspx>. 
115 International Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry: Events of 28 
September 2009 in Guinea’ (2009) S/2009/693 3. 
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responsibility for the acts.116  
 
A national criminal investigation was opened on 08 February 2010, following the publication 
of the ICOI Report, as well as a national equivalent, the Guinean Commission of Inquiry, 
where the General Prosecutor appointed three investigative judges to pursue the findings of 
the two Inquiries. The ICC Deputy Prosecutor acknowledged the national investigation in 
November 2010, informing national press that the OTP was taking stock of the investigation 
being undertaken with the Guinean investigative judges, into the events of 28 September 
2009.117 But it wasn’t until November 2011, some 20 months after than opening of the 
national investigation, that the OTP issued a review of its preliminary examination into 
Guinea. The OTP’s analysis drew heavily on the ICOI Report, to conclude that although 
there was reasonable basis to establish that these acts amounted to crimes against humanity, 
the Guinean State was slowly conducting investigations and would therefore remain under 
preliminary examination.118 The OTP evaluated the investigation as ‘fairly slow but steady’ 
impinged by lack of suitable security and logistical conditions.119 In its 2012 Report, around 
32 months after the initiation of the national investigation, the OTP noted that the 
investigation was on-going, and that despite identified challenges facing the judges, including 
limited financial and logistical resources, security concerns and occasionally tense political 
climate, it concluded that notable progress was achieved over the 12-month period of 
review120 without any reasons presented to doubt the integrity of the judges.121  
 
Notably, in the face of such constraints, the OTP accepted Guinean submissions that it had 
indicted six individuals, including two listed by the UN International Commission of Inquiry 
as among the alleged most responsible perpetrator,122 it had interviewed more than 200 
                                                
116 ‘[T]he Commission shall (a) establish the facts; (b) qualify the crimes; (c) determine responsibilities and, 
where possible, identify those responsible; and (d) make recommendations, including, in particular, on 
accountability measures.’ Ibid, annex, 2. 
117 Two previous statements by the OTP were silent on the national investigations. See ICC Deputy Prosecutor, 
‘Statement to the Press by Ms Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor. Conakry’ (International Criminal Court 
2010). 
118 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011’ (International Criminal 
Court 2011) 113. 
119 Ibid, 120. 
120 Ibid, 155. 
121 Ibid, 156. 
122 Lt. Col. Moussa Tiegeboro Camara, head of the national agency for the fight against drug-trafficking, 
organized crime and terrorism (with the rank of minister) was charged on 1 February 2012 for murders, injuries 
and participation in a crime; Col. Abdoulaye Cherif Diaby, former Health Minister at the time of the events was 
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victims,123 collected evidence which has led to the indictment of the suspects, of which five 
have appeared before the judges, while the sixth is a fugitive.124 On this basis the Prosecutor 
determined that ‘the national authorities appear to be investigating the same persons and the 
same conduct that would form the basis of the potential case that the Office would seek to 
bring before the ICC’125 but that Guinea would remain under preliminary examination as the 
investigation is yet to be completed, in order to continue to ‘support the efforts of the 
Guinean authorities to ensure that justice is rendered.’ 
 
One year later, in the 2013 Report on Preliminary Examinations, the OTP provided an update 
on the conduct of the national investigations, noting that the panel of investigating judges had 
taken further investigative steps: interviewing approximately 150 victims126 as well as 
political leaders and military officers, including the Chief of Staff of the gendarmerie, 
General Balde and the Head of Presidential Security, Claude Pivi who was also indicted 
during the period, while efforts where made to locate alleged mass graves. 127   
 
Nonetheless, the OTP considered that the circumstances in which they were operating was 
problematic, with their work hampered by weekly demonstrations, a tense political climate 
connected to parliamentary elections, security concerns relating to the profile of potential 
suspects and administrative hurdles causing delays in the transmission of national and 
international requests for judicial assistance.128 The Report also noted that two of the indicted 
persons continued to hold their government posts following the indictment, but concluded 
that there was no basis to consider that the proceedings were inconsistent with the intent to 
                                                                                                                                                  
indicted on 13 September 2012. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 
2012’ (International Criminal Court 2012) 154. 
123 Many of whom Human Rights Watch contend are represented by private lawyers who are funded through 
national and international NGO’s in order to represent the victims and pursue national justice. See Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Waiting for Justice: Accountability before Guinea’s Courts for the  September 28, 2009 Stadium 
Massacre, Rapes, and Other Abuses’ (2012) ISBN: 1-56432-954-2 2 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/guinea1012forUpload_0_0.pdf>. 
124 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012 (n 122) 157. 
125 Ibid, 151 
126 The 2013 Report lists the total activities of the national investigation since it began its investigation, rather 
than assessing the progress in previous 12 months, which can be a misleading representation of the investigative 
measures undertaken. The figures included here are disaggregated. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities 2013’ (International Criminal Court 2013) paras 191–195. 
127 Ibid, 192. 
128 At least one of the international requests for assistance concerns a request to interview the former President, 
Dadis Camara, who lives in Exile in Burkina Faso. According to Human Rights Watch, neither the Foreign 
Ministries or Justice Ministries of either country could explain why it was outstanding or if they were aware of 
the requests. See ‘Waiting for Justice: Accountability before Guinea’s Courts for the September 28, 2009 
Stadium Massacre, Rapes, and Other Abuses’ (n 123) 5. 
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bring persons to justice and therefore that it expects that a trial will take place without 
delay.129  
 
Despite its collation of facts and data concerning the activity of the national investigation and 
the circumstances in which it operates, the OTP’s reports do not analyze the justifiability of 
the delays against any standards and give little in the way of guidance or authoritative 
interpretation of the steps necessary to undertake in order to remain outside of the ICC. 
 
 
3.3. Unjustified Delays as interpreted in Admissibility Challenges 
Admissibility proceedings before the ICC Chambers have tended to limit their analysis of 
unjustified delay.  
 
Use of Admissibility Challenge to Raise Violations of the Rights of the Accused Connected 
to Delays is Inappropriate 
During the admissibility appeal in Katanga the defense submitted that the absence of any 
inquiry into the reasons why the DRC was unwilling to prosecute him would ‘have the effect 
of encouraging the current practice of the DRC to simply keep detainees in detention 
indefinitely until the ICC decides whether or not it wants to prosecute them.’ 130  The 
permissibility of the length of detention by Congolese forces, as well as the process of the 
transfer of Katanga to the authority of the ICC was central to the admissibility challenge yet 
the line of argument here focused on the effect of ICC actions on national due process 
protections, notably indefinite detention without the pursuit of domestic or international 
trials.   
 
The Appeals Chamber was unconvinced, both of the potential effect on national due process 
rights alleged above, but also on the choice of mechanism that the appellant had chosen to 
                                                
129 ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013’ (n 126) paras 194-195 
130 Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, pursuant to Article 19 
(2) (a) of the Statute (The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Situation in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) [2009] 65, 100. 
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raise concerns over the possible violation of any of his pre-trial rights in the course of his 
transfer to the ICC, remarking that: 
‘A challenge to admissibility […] is not the mechanism under which to raise alleged 
violations of the rights of the accused in the course of the prosecutorial process. It is 
a limited procedure that triggers the relevant Chamber's powers to determine the 
admissibility of the case under article 17 of the Statute. Unless alleged prejudices and 
violations are relevant to the criteria of article 17 of the Statute, they cannot render a 
case inadmissible.’131 
 
Use of Admissibility Challenges to Delay National Proceedings  
In the Kenya admissibility challenge, the Government of Kenya submitted that its 
investigation of the crimes of the 2007-2008 post election violence was continuing, having 
described a breadth of ‘far-reaching constitutional and judicial reforms’132 that aimed to 
strengthen its criminal justice system and its respect for international standards and 
efficiencies. It continued by requesting to provide a series of progress reports on the status of 
investigations, which it expected would advance once a Director of Public Prosecutions was 
appointed.133 In response, the Prosecutor alluded to the potential delay tactics adopted by the 
Government of Kenya, through its submission request to submit further reports, arguing that 
‘allowing "a lengthy timetable for submissions" for the sake of assessing the development of 
the local judicial institutions has no basis in the Statute, and would lead to unnecessary delay 
of proceedings.’134  
 
The Pre-Trial Chambers decision did not directly tackle the thorny issue of whether the 
Government of Kenya was seeking to delay the admissibility proceedings through it actions, 
but rather expressed its surprise at the statements of the Government of Kenya, whereby it 
                                                
131 Ibid, 112-113. 
132 Application on Behalf of the  Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011 14–15. 
133 Ibid, 13, 69, 72, 79; Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (Admissibility Decision: Muthuara, Kenyatta, Ali ‘PNU Case’) 
[2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-01/11-96, 30 May 2011 14–15; Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (Admissibility Decision: 
Ruto, Kosgey, Sang ‘ODM Case’) [2011] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-01/11-101, 30 May 2011.  
134 Admissibility Decision: Muthuara, Kenyatta, Ali ‘PNU Case’ ibid, 18. 
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appeared to contradict its assertion that its ongoing investigations reached to the highest 
level, whereas in fact, they had not proceeded beyond lower-level perpetrators.135  It also 
considered that none of the reports promised by the Government of Kenya proposed to 
address the national proceedings underway against the three suspects, which would be in-
keeping with the same-person test and would therefore be directly applicable to the 
proceedings.136 It further found that of the 29 additional annexes that were submitted, albeit 
without leave to do so, only 3 appeared of direct relevance to the investigative process.137 
While the decision of the Chamber did not directly discuss issues of delays, it nonetheless 
responded to the practices that are symptomatic of delay tactics. 
 
Finding of Inability Removes the Need to Address Unwillingness  
The submissions of the parties to the admissibility proceedings of Saif al Islam al Gaddafi 
addressed both directly and circuitously, the distinct requirement of unjustified delay as 
prescribed in the Statute. However, in finding that Libya was instead genuinely unable to 
carry out its investigation or prosecution against Gaddafi, the Chamber decided that it would 
not address the alternative requirement of ‘willingness’138 and in particular, that it would not 
address the issues raised by the defence about the impossibility of a fair trial for Gaddafi.139 
While this is judicially prudent, it leaves an interpretive blank in the Court’s approach to fair 
trial rights, both in the context of unwillingness and to a certain extent inability, and indicates 
a certain reluctance to engage with such matters that confront the boundaries of its powers.   
 
Notwithstanding the judge’s caution, it can be pertinent to briefly outline the questions raised 
by the Defence Counsel, which focused on the conduct of the authorities as well as broader 
due process issues,140 and the robust responses provided by the Government of Libya, as well 
                                                
135 Ibid, 60-61 
136 Ibid, 62-63 
137 Ibid, 63. Paragraphs 65-69 describes the aspects of the 3 annexes that contained directly relevant material 
which provides an informative guide to subsequent State submissions. 
138 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 32) 138, 216, 218 
139 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 
32)., 216, 218 
140 None of the parties raised challenges concerning the conduct of the accused, who remained under the control 
of the Zintan Brigade, a militia group with allegiance to the Government but not under its direct or total control, 
and much of the Defence’s challenges focused on demonstrating the absence of due process rights of the 
accused. OPCD, Defence Request and Response to the ‘Libyan Government Application for leave to reply to any 
Response/s to article 19 admissibility challenge’ Office of Public Counsel for Defence ICC‐01/11‐01/11, 21 
May 2012; Public Redacted Version of the ‘Response to the Libyan Government’s further submissions on issues 
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as its analysis of the application of the scope of unjustified delay.141 
 
The Defence Counsel claimed that the timeliness of national proceedings and the measures 
adopted inferred the possibility of unreasonable delay, arguing that ‘after 15 months, the ICC 
can no longer wait in the wings’142 To substantiate its claim it highlighted four factors of 
unjustified delay concerning the failure or inadequacy of measures, in its Response to the 
Admissibility Application, namely to: actively investigate the subject matter of the ICC case; 
to notify Gaddafi of the legal basis for his detention and the nature of the charges against 
him; to bring him before a judge; and to facilitate the pre-trial rights provided to detained 
persons in accordance to national law.143 
 
In its subsequent Response to Libya’s Further Submissions it focused on two issues that the 
Defence considered to affect the timeliness of the proceedings in such a way that ‘the Pre 
Trial Chambers can not but draw inferences concerning the possibility of unreasonable 
delay.’144 The first issue concerned the possibility of a delay in the pursuit of the ICC-related 
case due to the scheduling of a separate case concerning security offences and its status 
before a Trial Chamber, whereas the case over which admissibility was being contested, 
remained at an investigation phase, with considerable uncertainty over the likely charges, 
defendents and location of the possible trial.145 The Defence alleged that the security case 
would take priority over the investigation concerning the case of the admissibility challenge, 
and furthermore that several of the charges of the separate security offences had some 
overlap with the subject matter of the admissibility proceedings, creating ‘inevitably delay’ 
that could ‘potentially frustrate’ the commencement of the ICC-related case and would 
                                                                                                                                                  
related to the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’"(Defence Response to Libya’s Further 
Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) Office of Public Counsel for Defence ICC‐01/11‐01/11-281-Red2, 18 
February 2012. 
141 Libyan Government Response to Defence Request [2012] Government ofLibya ICC 01/11‑01/11, 20 May 
2012; Libyan Government’s consolidated reply to the response of the Prosecution, OPCD and OPCV to its 
further submission on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Reply: Gaddafi 
Admissibility) [2013] Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-293-Red2, 04 March 2013. 
142 OPCD, 18 Feb 2013, para 15. Public Redacted Version of the ‘Response to the Libyan Government’s further 
submissions on issues related to the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’"(Defence Response 
to Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 140). para 15. 
143 Defence Request and Response to the ‘Libyan Government Application for leave to reply to any Response/s 
to article 19 admissibility challenge’ (n 140) [164–188]. 
144 Public Redacted Version of the ‘Response to the Libyan Government’s further submissions on issues related 
to the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’"(Defence Response to Libya’s Further 
Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 140) [146]. 
145 Ibid, 141. 
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therefore generate ‘unreasonable’ delay for the purpose of Article 17.146  
 
The second cause of delay that the Defence Counsel sought to ascribe to the conduct of 
authorities concerned the possibility of a joinder of Gaddafi’s case with nine or more other 
co-defendents, whose investigations and trials were at different stages of proceedings and 
dispersed in different jurisdiction, an action which the Counsel described as ‘extremely 
dilatory and prejudicial’ to the defendant.147 The defence cited the adjournment of one of the 
co-accused in the joinder on the grounds that the authorities could not obtain the transfer of 
his co-defendents to the courtroom as an example of the likely adjournments and delays to 
the proceedings that such a case could expect, which would in their view constitute an 
unjustified delay.148 
 
Through its application to submit an admissibility challenge, its Response and its 
Consolidated Reply, the Government of Libya (GoL) made a robust effort to establish its 
good faith pursuit of national proceedings and cooperation with the ICC in circumstances that 
it described as ‘extremely difficult.’149 In addressing the timeliness of the investigation, the 
GoL sought to compare the duration of the national investigation with those of the 
international criminal tribunals, including the ICC,150 persuasively arguing that ‘Libya should 
not be held to a higher standard that that encountered by international criminal tribunals 
dealing with post-conflict investigations in other parts of the world.’151 In further rebuffing 
allegations of unjustified delay in the timeframe of the investigation, the GoL asserted that 
the complexity of the factual and legal issues of the case to be both justifiable and intended to 
achieve justice, thereby satisfying both prongs of unjustified delay test, and furthermore that 
it had made ‘considerable and adequate progress within this time frame in transforming this 
environment into a functioning democratic state and conducting effective investigations.’152 
 
                                                
146 Ibid, 142.  
147 Ibid, 143. 
148 Ibid, 144. 
149 Libyan Government’s consolidated reply to the response of the Prosecution, OPCD and OPCV to its further 
submission on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Reply: Gaddafi Admissibility) 
(n 141) [3]. 
150 Ibid, 70-71. 
151 Libyan Government’s consolidated reply to the response of the Prosecution, OPCD and OPCV to its further 
submission on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Reply: Gaddafi Admissibility) 
(n 141) [3]. 
152 Ibid, 77–78. 
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Turning to the possible joinder and its likely effect on the delivery of timely justice, the GoL 
Response contested its relevance to an unjustified delay under Article 17(2)(b), first, as the 
Defence claim failed to consider the complexity of the case in light of other similar cases, 
which typically span several years,153 and second as the Defence had failed to consider the 
second ‘good faith’ prong of the unjustified delay test, namely that the unjustified delay must 
be inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to justice.154 The GoL Response correctly 
challenged the Defence Counsel attempt to portray Article 17(2)(b) to be satisfied upon the 
determination of an unjustified delay. Rather, where an unjustified delay is determined, it 
must then be examined against the subjective intention of the State to determine if the delay 
is intentional, either to shield the person (in which case the correct determination would be 
shielding) or is contrary to bring the person to justice.155 
 
Although the Pre-Trial Chambers did not address the submissions on unwillingness, the 
arguments submitted by the Defence and the GoL broadly represent the dilemma of the due 
process thesis in the context of unjustified delay. Exemplified through the dimensions of an 
actual admissibility challenge it is clear that any delay that can be considered as unjustified 
must then be found to be contrary to a good faith intention to bring the person to justice, as 
the same Chamber found shortly afterwards in the admissibility challenge concerning the 
case of Abdullah Al Senussi. What remains untested is the extent to which the intention to 
bring a person to justice is intrinsically built upon adherence to due process protections, 
where justice is a process as well as an outcome.  
 
‘Concrete’ Circumstances: the Inadmissibility of the Al-Senussi Case 
In its Admissibility Decision that the ICC case against Abdullah Al-Senussi was 
inadmissible, the same Pre-Trial Chamber bench briefly concluded that Libya was willing 
under the terms of Article 17(2) to investigate and prosecute Al Senussi156 reserving the 
greater part of its conclusion to the determination of Libya’s ability to do so (see section 5 
                                                
153 Ibid, 72. The Response omitted to consider the impact that a possible joinder may have on the timeliness of 
the Gaddafi case. 
154 Ibid 73. It also seeks to establish that unjustified delay establishes a higher threshold that unjustified delay, 
although the argumentation is unpersuasive 
155 Ibid, 75. 
156 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 
39) 290–293.  
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below).157 In the context of unjustified delay, the Chambers decided that ‘the national 
proceedings against Mr Al-Senussi cannot be considered as tainted by an unjustified delay 
that in the concrete circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring Mr Al-Senussi to 
justice.’158 
 
In its submissions for the Al-Senussi admissibility challenge, the Government of Libya 
developed its arguments from its admissibility challenge in Gaddafi that unjustified delay 
under article 17(2)(b) consists of two prongs, where the second prong requires proof of the 
‘subjective intention of the State and determine that there is […] an absence of intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice.’159 It went on to argue that the evidence available (both to 
the national prosecutors and the excerpts that were submitted to the PTC) clearly 
demonstrated that Libya was genuinely investigating Al-Senussi as well as its intent to bring 
him to justice, claiming that there could be no motive could be deduced from the submissions 
that Libya wished to ensure impunity for the accused.160 Addressing the complexity of the 
case, the GoL referred to the broader temporal jurisdiction of the national case as evidence of 
its increased complexity.161 In addition to its investigation into the conduct that formed the 
subject matter of the ICC’s investigation, the national authorities had expanded the 
investigation into the criminal actions of Al-Senussi to include violations since the 1980’s,162 
while it updated the expected charges that where expected to be made against the accused in 
its final submission, presumably to demonstrate the evolving nature of the investigations.163 
 
In seeking to assert the genuine conduct of the authorities in the national investigation of Al-
Senussi, the submissions noted that more than 100 witnesses had been interviewed since his 
                                                
157 Ibid, 294-310 
158 Ibid, 291. 
159 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of 
the ICC Statute (Article 19 Application: Al-Senussi) (n 37) [102]. 
160 Ibid 105. 
161 Ibid 157 
162 Ibid, 157. 
163 In its Admissibility Challenge, the envisaged charges included: ‘devastation, rapine and carnage; civil war; 
conspiracy; attacks upon the political rights of a Libyan subject; concealment of a corpse; indiscriminate or 
'random' killings; arson; stirring up hatred between the classes; aiding members of a criminal association; 
intentional murder; use of force to compel another; misuse of authority against individuals; search of persons; 
unlawful arrest; unjustified deprivation of personal liberty; torture; and, possibly, incitement to rape, drug 
trafficking and serious damage to public funds.’ Libya’s Article 19 Request [154] to ‘unlawful killing, the 
distribution of narcotics, incitement to commit rape, kidnapping, and other crimes associated with fomenting 
sedition and civil war.’ Government’s Submissions and Response to Defence ’Filing on behalf of Mr Abdullah 
Al- Senussi pursuant to ‘Decision on additional submissions in the proceedings related to Libya’s challenge to 
the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi [2013] Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-455 [8]. 
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transfer of custody to Libya,164 and that in connection to the 37 other co-defendants, more 
than 200 witnesses had been interviewed and tens of thousands of documents had been 
gathered as evidence:165 such evidence, it suggested was concrete, tangible and pertinent to 
the crimes that form the subject matter of the investigation into Al-Senussi.166  
 
Turning to the circumstances in which the investigation was conducted, the Submissions 
provide a breadth of information on the complex post-conflict, transitional reality in which 
the Libyan investigators and prosecutors operate.167 This narrative, coupled with analysis on 
the role of complementarity in such circumstances is likely to be significant in shaping the 
contours of admissibility challenges in the future, and despite their relevance to the 
circumstances in which delays may occur, they will be considered in detail in Section 5 on 
ability, as it is largely under this scenario of admissibility that they have been assessed by the 
Court. 
 
The Prosecutor’s submissions largely supported the Government of Libya’s request, and 
indeed reiterated many aspects of the Government’s narrative, most notably that States 
should not be held to a higher standard than the ICC, rephrasing it thus:  
‘it is essential that States not be held to a higher standard with regard to the speed 
and progress of their proceedings than has been met by the ICC itself or other 
international tribunals, particularly given the history of Libya, its very recent 
emergence from four decades of autocratic rule, and the serious security challenges 
facing the country.’168 
While the Prosecutor noted that some delays in the investigation of Al Senussi had occurred, 
she asserted that they were attributable to the ‘obstacles arising from the challenges of 
establishing a fully functional government in a transitional post-conflict stage’ but that at no 
                                                
164 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of 
the ICC Statute (Article 19 Application: Al-Senussi) (n 37) [156]. 
165 Government’s Submissions and Response to Defence ’Filing on behalf of Mr. Abdullah Al- Senussi pursuant 
to ‘Decision on additional submissions in the proceedings related to Libya’s challenge to the admissibility of 
the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi (n 163) [5]. 
166 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of 
the ICC Statute (Article 19 Application: Al-Senussi) (n 37) [124]. 
167 Ibid, 176–182. 
168 Prosecution Response to ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi 
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’ (n 14) [71]. 
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point did the investigation appear to be inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to 
justice.169 
 
The submissions of the Defence sought to establish that the duration of the investigation – a 
period of approximately 24 months – to be a ‘significant lapse of time’ where ‘preliminary 
logistical and legal steps remain outstanding’170 that warranted a finding of unjustified delay 
and admission of the case to the ICC. 
 
In reviewing the submissions against the legal requirement of unwillingness, the chamber 
considered that the development of the national investigation, from the opening of the first 
investigation by the Military Prosecutor on 09 April 2012, to its reclassification under 
civilian jurisdiction, the transfer of Al-Senussi from Mauritania to Tripoli and the pursuit of 
interviews with the accused, to the eventual transfer of the case to the Accusation Chamber 
demonstrated that ‘Libya has continued progressively to conduct its investigation, as 
demonstrated by the dates of witness interviews, which appear in the evidence submitted as 
part of the Admissibility Challenge.’171  Turning to the complexity of the case and the 
conduct of the authorities, the Chambers observed that the factual allegations of the 
proceedings against Al Senussi covered broad temporal, geographic and material parameters 
beyond the subject matter of the ICC’s own investigation, which it considered ‘on its own to 
be sufficiently broad in scope to be understandably challenging.’172 It concluded that in the 
‘specific circumstances’ the duration of the investigation and transfer of the file to the 
Accusation Chamber did not constitute unjustified delay according Article 17(2)(b).173 
 
4. Loss of Independence and Impartiality of the Proceedings 
 
                                                
169 Ibid, 79. 
170 Defence Response to ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi 
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’ (n 24) [172]. 
171 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 
39) [227]. 
172 Ibid, 228. 
173 Ibid, 229 
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The third and final criteria of unwillingness, that of independence and impartiality are 
recognised as ‘a necessary and sufficient condition to the process of justice.’174 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.’  
Long accepted as an jus cogens right, bearing customary international law status175 the 
principle of independence and impartiality of a tribunal is protected in the ICCPR, ECHR, 
ACHR, ACHPR, the four Geneva Conventions and each of the international criminal 
tribunals, including the ICC Statute.176  The principle applies equally to acts that are 
detrimental to the accused and to acts which aim to protect, shield persons from justice or 
accountability.177 It is this second dimension of the loss of independence or impartiality that 
Article 17(2)(c) aims to address, through the second part of its text, which requires that any 
established loss of independence or impartiality be inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person(s) to justice. Finally, as with the shielding and unjustified delays, the violation needs 
to be found only in the specific case or investigations that forms the subject matter of the ICC 
investigation or case, through the use of ‘the proceedings:’ the Court’s intrusion into the 
national criminal justice practices of the State is limited to the specific case at hand.  
 
In supporting the Courts inquiry into a State’s willingness, States are given the opportunity to 
provide information to the Court that shows that ‘its courts meet internationally recognized 
norms and standards for the independent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct’ 
which the Court may consider in the context of the circumstances of the case.178 The Office 
of the Prosecutor has issued two papers that indicate its own practices concerning its 
                                                
174 Stigen (n 22), Unwillingness 
175 General Comment No. 29 (n 97), See also the ICRC compilation of customary international law rules, ICRC, 
Rule 100: Fair Trial Guarantees, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule100 (accessed 06 
August 2012), Judge Patrick Robertson, The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with specific reference 
to the work of the ICTY, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Publicist, January 2010, Andrew Hudson, Not a 
Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Regime, Boalt Journal of International Law, 25:2, 
2007; Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law, 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court. 
176 Article 14(1)International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1966; Article 6(1)European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950; Article 8(1)American Convention of 
Human Rights 1969; Article 26African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981. Article 3 (1)(d) common 
to the Four Geneva Conventions 1949; ICTY; ICTR; ECCC; Article 40, 42 Rome Statute (n 3);  
177 See Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (n 21) 145; Ximena 
Medellín Urquiaga (n 18) Chapter 2 and 5.  
178 Rule 51, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (n 46). 
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assessment of independence and impartiality, during preliminary examination,179 and more 
broadly in the context of complementarity.180 Its Draft Policy on Preliminary Examinations 
identifies five indicative indicators of institutional and behavioral attributes181 that attempt to 
wed the due process element of independence of article 17(2)(c) with its element of intent: 
‘[i] the alleged involvement of the apparatus of the State, including those responsible for 
law and order, in the commission of the alleged crimes; [ii] the extent to which 
appointment and dismissal of investigators, prosecutors and judges affect due process in 
the case; [iii] the application of a regime of immunity and jurisdictional privileges for 
alleged perpetrators; [iv] political interference in the investigation, prosecution and 
trial; and [v] corruption of investigators, prosecutors and judges.’182  
 
Similarly, its approach to impartiality includes two indicative criteria to identify impartiality 
of the proceedings, which largely reflect those of the 2003 Expert Paper: 
‘[i] linkages between the suspected perpetrators and competent authorities responsible 
for investigation, prosecution and/or adjudication of the crimes; [ii] public statements, 
awards, sanctions, promotions or demotions, deployments, dismissals or reprisals in 
relation to investigative, prosecutorial or judicial personnel concerned.’183 
 
The OTP’s choice of indicative criteria of independence and impartiality differ somewhat 
from the internationally recognised standards and norms that States are invited to consider 
through Rule 51, when submitting information to the Court. For States undergoing the 
admissibility procedure before the Court, it is more feasible to follow the structure that has 
been developed by international and regional human rights bodies in organizing its 
submissions, while for analysis of admissibility, the Court is directed to consider the fair trial 
component of independence and impartiality within the restraints established by the rule of 
intent. In light of this, a brief review of international can serve as a refreshment of the scope 
of the right.  
 
                                                
179 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 48) 64–65. 
180 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ (n 89) 
27–31.The report provides 3 core indicia of independence, 4 for impartiality and 20 ancillary indicia that may be 
relevant when considered in context along with other indicators, that were drawn from international and regional 
human rights jurisprudence, that support determinations of independence and impartiality.  
181 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (n 21) 145. 
182 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 48) 64. 
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In its General Comment on the Right to a Fair Trial, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
emphasized the importance or pre-eminence of the formal and procedural mechanisms that 
establish an independent judiciary, which refers to ‘the procedure and qualifications for the 
appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory 
retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist, the conditions governing 
promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions, and the actual independence 
of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature.’184 In 
addition to conditions that protect judges against conflicts of interest and intimidation being 
adequately secured by law, which established: ‘the status of judges, including their term of 
office, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions 
and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.’185 
 
It also addresses the limitations for dismissal of judges, on grounds of serious misconduct or 
incompetence, as well as the dismissal process which must ensure fair, objective and 
impartial procedures, as defined by law. Dismissals by the executive should be provided with 
specific reasons, and there should be effective judicial protection to ensure that recourse to 
contest the dismissal can occur.186 The dismissal of judges – as well as their appointment – is 
likely to be of importance to the Court in establishing the general context of the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary, while the appointment procedure and its impact on the case, 
as specified by the OTP Draft Policy will undoubtedly assist in determining the loss of 
independence in the case under scrutiny by the Court. 
 
Similarly, the independence of the judiciary has also been found to require that the authority 
of the judiciary is respected and carried out by other organs of State:187 for example, the 
prison authorities must respect acquittals188 and enforce sentences, while the State must 
ensure that adequate resources are provided in order that court decisions can be complied 
with.189 The use of threats, including death threats and intimidation of the judiciary or 
prosecution, and the limited protections afforded to criminal justice professions (judges, 
prosecutors and investigators) has also been criticized as a method of compromising the 
                                                
184 UN Human Rights Committee (n 70) 19. 
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independence of criminal justice institutions, often directly related to atrocity prosecutions.190 
However, incidences where intimidation has led to the loss of independence or impartiality 
are infrequently found before international bodies.191   
 
The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that, under the ICCPR, the requirement of 
impartiality consists of two aspects, one objective, the second subjective:192 
‘First, judges must not allow their judgement to be influenced by personal bias or 
prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act 
in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of 
the other. Second, the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer to be 
impartial. For instance, a trial substantially affected by the participation of a judge 
who, under domestic statutes, should have been disqualified cannot normally be 
considered to be impartial.193 
National submissions through Rule 51 will want to address both of these aspects, and in the 
course of admissibility they are likely to be examined as contextual information unless it 
directly addresses the specific case, where the Court will likely consider that the 
investigators, prosecutors and judges ‘act objectively basing their decision on relevant facts 
and applicable law, without personal bias, preconceived ideas or personal involvement.’194 
Whereas objective impartiality indicators, such as the prior involvement in the same case,195 
or statements against the accused or affiliated groups, may be definitively established, 
subjective indicators are more complex to prove. Human rights bodies have typically inferred 
the loss of impartiality, as there is rarely direct evidence of partial behavior:196 the ethnicity 
of judges, their religious or political orientation, where it differs to the accused person is not 
                                                
190 Human Rights Committee: Argentina (1995) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.46; UN Doc A/50/40, at 144-165, 
also IACHR Annual Report on Colombia 2002, [47-50], available at <http://www. 
cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/chap.4.htm#COLOMBIA 
191 See also ECtHR, Al-Sadoon and Mufdhi v. the UK, 61498/08, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 02 
March 2010 
192 UN Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and 
endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985 
193 UN Human Rights Committee (n 70) 21. 
194  Human Rights Committee, Karttunen v Finland, Communication No. 387/1989 (1992) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989, 7.2. 
195 Findlay v UK, Judgment European Court of Human Rights Application no. 22107/93, 22 February 1997; 
Piersack v Belgium, Judgment European Court of Human Rights Application no. 8692/79, 01 October 1982; 
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196 Stigen (n 22), chapter 8 
The International Criminal Court and Positive Complementarity: the Impact of the ICC’s Admissibility Law and 
Practice on Domestic Jurisdictions. 
174  EUI PhD Thesis
    
of itself sufficient to indicate impartial behavior, unless it is accompanied by other 
circumstantial evidence. 
 
Scrutiny of Independence and Impartiality within Admissibility Challenges 
Evaluation of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary in the context of Article 
17(2)(c) has not occurred during preliminary examination. Before the Pre-Trial Chambers, it 
was analysed in the Al-Senussi case and although it was asserted by the Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims (OPCV) and the Office of Public Counsel for Defence (OPCD) in 
Gaddafi, the PTC did not respond, having found instead that Libya was unable genuinely, to 
prosecute him (see 3.3.3. above).197 
 
Al -Senussi 
In the admissibility challenge for the case of Al-Senussi, the OPCV and Al Senussi’s Defence 
Counsel submitted five separate indicators that they alleged to render a negative finding of 
independence and impartiality in the case of Al-Senussi, while the Government submissions 
sought to demonstrate its adherence to internationally recognised norms and standards 
concerning the independence and impartiality of the case in question, supplemented by 
details of the capacity development and technical assistance that the judiciary had received in 
this area.198  
 
Notwithstanding the Rule 51 information provided by the Government of Libya to the Court 
on its adherence to international norms and standards governing due process, its 
Admissibility Challenge in Al-Senussi briefly described the legal framework that established 
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, including its Constitutional guarantee 
                                                
197 The OPCV sought to assert that Libya had failed to show that its courts met internationally recognised norms 
and standards concerning independent and inpartial prosecution of similar conduct, and that this contributed to 
its unwillingness. Observations on behalf of victims on the Government of Libya’s Application pursuant to 
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against Gaddafi to be demonstrative of its absence of independence and impartiality under Article 17(2)(c). See 
PTC summary of its submission, Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 
(Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 32) [163]. 
198 Libyan Government’s consolidated reply to the response of the Prosecution, OPCD and OPCV to its further 
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under Article 32 of the 2011 Constitution and subsequent enactment into domestic law, 
including the Judicial System Law and the Freedoms Act.199 As further evidence of the 
formal independence of the judiciary and its exclusive authority over criminal adjudication, 
the admissibility challenge pointed to the Constitutional prohibition of Exceptional Courts, 
which had operated by a distinct Security apparatus during the Gaddafi regime to ‘try’ people 
considered enemies of the regime, and which have widely been understood as bearing 
responsibility for systematic human rights abuses, and the return of all adjudicatory activities 
to the justice system.200 As evidence of the active independence of the judiciary, the 
Challenge referred to a ruling of the Supreme Court in December 2012, which rejected the 
use of the People’s Court system to adjudicate criminal trials of the former regime officials, 
as unconstitutional, despite the ‘very high public importance and political sensitivity of the 
cases.’ Under the People’s Court system, criminal trials did not need to be submitted to the 
Accusation Chamber, where the sufficiency of evidence and its lawful collection are 
scrutinised and the decision taken to remit to the Criminal Trial or to dismiss the case would 
be made.201 The Supreme Court ruled that the absence of this vital phase constituted  
‘discrimination among persons in submission to law, violates the principle of equality, 
undermines the personal freedom, breaches the regulations of fair trial which renders it in 
violation of the well-established constitutional rules in this regard.’202 It finally referred to a 
report prepared by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office in April 2011, where it 
asserted its experience of and confidence in the ministry of justice, which it described as 
‘positive and constructive.’203 
 
Maintenance of the former regime judicial system 
In contrast, while recognising the improvements that the interim authorities had made in 
guaranteeing the independence of judiciary, the OPCV considered that the measures had 
                                                
199 Article 52, Judicial Systems Law, Article 31, Freedoms Act. See Application on behalf of the Government of 
Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Article 19 Application: Al-
Senussi) (n 37) [141]. 
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Al-Islam Gaddafi (Article 19 Application: Gaddafi) Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red, 01 May 
2012 147; Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility 
Decision) (n 32) 204. 
202 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 73) 74–75. 
203 British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Conference Report, “Libya and Human Rights: the way forward” 
11 April 2011, 2, quoted in Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi 
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failed to address the core problems faced by the judiciary in Libya, notably that sought to 
assert that a systematic lack of independence and impartiality was in effect in Libya, most 
notably evident through the decision of the transitional authorities to ‘keep in place the 
existing judicial system which survived the fall of the former regime.’204 Following positive 
reform to ensure that the Supreme Judicial Council was composed only of members of the 
judiciary, the OPCV considered that the interim governments’ decision not to enact a draft 
law on the vetting of judges, prepared by the newly constituted Supreme Judicial Council, 
that would establish an independent committee for readmitting only those judges and 
prosecutors that met the proposed qualifications.205 Instead, the OPCV submitted that a 
flawed vetting procedure had enabled former regime judges who had sat on the Extraordinary 
Courts to remain within the judiciary, despite having dismantled the infrastructure in which 
they had operated, and that this process has enabled a lack of independent judges across the 
phases of domestic proceedings.206 
 
Public Statements by Government Officials Assuming the Guilt of the Accused 
The Defence Counsel submitted four indicia that it considered established that the judiciary 
was unable to provide an independent or impartial trial for the accused, including the 
reappointment of Extraordinary Court judges.207 First, it sought to establish that several 
public statements, which assumed the guilt of Al-Senussi and Gaddafi, had undermined his 
presumption of innocence and more importantly demonstrated the loss of independence in the 
judicial proceedings against him. This included statements from the Minister of Finance, the 
former Deputy Minister of Finance, a former Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the former Libyan Prime Minister and other Libyan officials, which assume the guilt 
of the accused, but the Response omitted to demonstrate the consequence or impact of the 
Statements on judicial independence or impartiality, in-keeping with established human 
rights jurisprudence.208 Turning to the Political Isolation Law,209 a form of lustration to 
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exclude officials who had abused their positions under the former regime from holding public 
office, the Response submitted that it’s widely criticised wording was discriminatory against 
Gaddafi-era officials and could be used to remove judges who ‘attempt to issue independent 
decisions which uphold the rights of highly unpopular defendants’210 although it did not 
venture to explain how this could happen. Turning to its allegations of biased criminal 
proceedings against Al-Senussi’s family members, the Defence argued that evidential and 
serious procedural shortcomings in the sentencing of Al-Senussi’s daughter was evidence of 
biased criminal proceedings within the judiciary.211 
 
Pre-Trial Chambers reasoning on the allegations of loss of independence and 
impartiality 
In its reasoning of the allegations by the OPCV and Defence Counsel, the Pre-Trial 
Chambers correctly categorised the submissions by both parties concerning official 
statements that assume Al-Senussi’s guilt, as well as the allegations of biased proceedings 
against family members of Al-Senussi to be allegations of violations of other fundamental 
rights of the accused, rather than as tangible evidence of the loss of independence or 
impartiality of the judiciary. The PTC judges questioned whether such statements by public 
officials is relevant to admissibility under the wording of Article 17, and while choosing not 
to address this issue, it found the argument that the official statements could be attributed to 
the actual or perceived conduct of the Libyan judicial authorities to be unpersuasive, given 
the manner of proceedings in the case to date, and furthermore that such statements, of 
themselves or in combination with other factors, could not indicate the loss of independence 
or impartiality according to its intent requirement: 
‘Given the manner in which Libya's proceedings are developing to date, the Chamber 
is not persuaded, in any event, that the statements referenced by the Defence can be 
attributed to the actual or perceived conduct of the Libyan judicial authorities that 
are involved in the proceedings against Mr Al Senussi. Therefore, the Chamber is not 
persuaded that these statements, in themselves or in combination with other factors, 
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would indicate that these proceedings can be regarded as not being conducted 
independently or impartially and as being carried out in a manner which is 
inconsistent with the intent to bring Mr Al Senussi to justice in accordance with 
article 17(2)(c) of the Statute.’212 
 
The PTC was similarly dismissive of the allegations of biased family proceedings, asserting 
that it was unable to draw any inferences from the conviction that assisted in the case at hand, 
and had they allegations of shortcomings and irregularities occurred or not, they would not 
indicate Libya's unwillingness or inability to carry out the proceedings against Al-Senussi.213 
 
Turning to the inclusion of judges from the Gaddafi-era Extraordinary Courts and the 
Political Isolation Law, the PTC categorised the submissions as general in nature, bearing 
relevance as contextual information only, which could be considered ‘only to the extent that 
such systemic difficulties have a bearing on the domestic proceedings against Mr Al-Senussi, 
such that it would warrant a finding of one of the scenarios envisaged under article 17(2) or 
(3) of the Statute.’214 Instead, the PTC was satisfied by the submission by Libya of details of 
its legal framework establishing judicial independence, as well as the examples provided by 
the Government, of the judiciary exercising these powers in areas directly relevant to the 
proceedings under consideration, finding the Supreme Court decision overturning the 
People’s Courts Procedure, which occurred in the context of a trial against Abu Zaid Omar 
Darda, the former prime minister and former head of the External Security Agency, to be a 
significant factor.215 Having dismissed each of the rather flimsy efforts to establish the loss of 
independence and impartiality in the proceedings against Al-Senussi and found them to fall 
far short of the fair-trial component as well as the requirement of intent, the PTC found Libya 
to be willing to investigate and prosecute Al Senussi, according to the legal requirements of 
Article 17(2). 
5. Intent to Bring the Person to Justice 
Whereas article 17(2)(a) on the shielding of persons unequivocally requires that the abusive 
practice occurs for the benefit of the accused person, the undue delay of proceedings and loss 
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of independence and article impartiality does not cut such a clear cloth. Shielding a person 
from justice most clearly indicates a desire to benefit the person, but can undue delays and 
interference with the independence and impartiality of proceedings occur to prejudice a 
person and remain inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to justice?216  
 
Reverting to the purpose of complementarity, where the primary obligation to prosecute rests 
with States, Markus Benzing disagrees: ‘the normal situation envisaged by article 17(2)(c) 
would not prejudice the accused, but, on the contrary, would be to his or her benefit.’217 The 
Court he says, is not a forum to redress human rights abuses by the State against the accused. 
Similarly, Heller claims that the conjunctive requirements that the national proceedings lack 
independence and impartiality and that it is being conducted in a manner inconsistent with 
the intent to bring the person to justice provides an insuperable barrier.218 The intent to bring 
a person to justice, is he claims, an expression synonymous with the intent to obtain a 
conviction, both within the ICC system, and in international law more generally. A trial that 
violates prejudices the accused, is he says, consistent with the ‘intent to bring a person to 
justice’219 despite the jus cogens status of the rights that such a process may violate.  
 
The Ne Bis In Idem requirements of article 17(1)(3) and article 20(3) supports the same 
requirement of intent. The Court is barred from exercising jurisdiction over individuals that 
have already been tried for conduct that is the subject of the complaint, unless it was for the 
purpose of shielding the person, or it was ‘not otherwise conducted independently in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were 
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice.’220 In their analysis of this requirement of article 20(3)(b) 
Immi Tallgren and Astrid Reisinger Coracini record the disagreement over the text during the 
Rome Conference, noting however that the final view was that, if criminal justice is to be 
done, then it must be done properly, according to international due process requirements.221 
One question that remains unanswered is whether the intent to bring the person to justice 
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contains a qualitative assessment of the required standards of justice, which distinguishes it 
sufficiently from the intent to secure conviction. An assumption also emerges in each of their 
accounts, where any finding of admissibility based on an applicable due process violation 
that prejudices the accused is considered to be a transition point from an international 
criminal court into a body for the protection of individuals. 222 The admissibility decision does 
not contain a remedy to the accused person and it is not the purpose of the exercise, rather it 
is a procedural stage towards rendering criminal justice ‘properly.’   
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Chapter 6 
Ability of the National Judicial System: Models of Complementarity 
and Emerging Indicators 
 
The genuine ability of a State to prosecute perpetrators of the criminal acts listed in the Rome 
Statute has beguiled and tantalised the concept of complementarity from the earliest moments 
of the Court, where concerns where raised that the judicial machinery of developing or post-
conflict countries would be subjected to harsh assessment from the ICC 1  through to 
expectations that the ICC could catalyse national efforts or help develop capacity of national 
justice mechanisms through the development of a positive dimension of complementarity.2 
Within the ordinary realm of complementarity, discourse has looked at the ability of States 
through the lens of compliance with international regimes,3 starting with the Rome Statute 
and extending to include international human rights obligations and standards.4 The scope 
and form of the active dimension of complementarity has also been popularly explored,5 with 
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M El Zeidy and Carsten Stahn (eds) (2011); Sylvia Arbia and Giovanni Bassu, ‘Proactive Complementarity’ in 
Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From 
Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou and Annika Jones, 
‘Complementarity After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools’ (2010) 2 Göttingen Journal of 
International Law 791; Katherine L Doherty and Timothy LH McCormack, ‘Complementarity" as a Catalyst for 
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less attention to what actually needs to be catalysed or developed within the ICC system, to 
‘immunise’ or enable States to retain jurisdiction.6 Both features of complementarity have 
been invigorated following the two Admissibility Challenges in the cases of Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi, most notably in Gaddafi, where, where both aspects of complementarity were 
thoroughly litigated: while the admissibility of the Gadaffi case has been confirmed by the 
Appeals Chamber, it has not been without controversy or dissent, which will continue to fuel 
further inquiry into the interpretation and application of article 17(3) by the Court.7  
 
This chapter will review the framework of inability in light of the recent admissibility 
challenges, briefly revisiting the relevance of the due process debate as part of the general 
assessment of ability or as a more qualified part of the specific requirements, before 
reviewing in turn, the emergence of indicators on the ability or status of the national justice 
system and its three specific requirements. 
1. The Definition of Ability in Article 17(3) 
Similar to determinations of unwillingness, the test for inability identifies a general or 
preliminary requirement followed by one or more specific requirements, in the context of a 
particular case or investigation. Unlike unwillingness, the condition of inability is almost 
universally acknowledged as a more objective criteria,8 which in its entirety, declares that: 
                                                                                                                                                  
Comprehensive Domestic Penal Legislation’ (2009) 5 U.C Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 147; 
Mark A Drumbl, ‘Policy through Complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The 
International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 
2011); Federica Gioia, ‘Complementarity and “Reverse Cooperation”’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El 
Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge 
University Press 2011); Michael A Newton, ‘The Quest for Constructive Complementarity’, The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2010); Moreno 
Ocampo (n 2). 
6  Morten Bergsmo (ed), Active Complementarity: Legal Information Transfer (Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher 2011); Payam Akhavan, ‘Whither National Courts? The Rome Statute’s Missing Half’ (2010) 8 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1245; Frédéric Mégret, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation 
and the Uses of Complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); Frédéric 
Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice: Systems of Horizontal Cooperation v. Systems of Vertical Integration’, 
Droit international pénal: précis (2nd edition, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2012); Hitomi Takemura, ‘A Critical 
Analysis of Positive Complementarity’ (2007). 
7 Notably through the PTC’s request for further information following the Admissibility Hearing Decision 
requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 
(PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-239, 
07 December 2012 [41–47].  
8 ‘Article 17: Issues of Admissibility’ (n 1); Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and 
National Criminal Jurisdictions (First, Oxford University Press 2008) chapter 9. 
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‘In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, 
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, 
the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.’ 
As the text shows, there is a general requirement, which consists of three distinct conditions 
of the national judicial system: (i) a state of total or substantial collapse; or (ii) otherwise 
unavailable. Satisfaction of one of the general requirements should be causally relevant to 
one or more of the three specific requirements of inability, through the use of the adjective 
‘due’ which functions as a connector to the specific requirements:9 (i) to obtain the accused; 
or (ii) to obtain the necessary evidence and testimony; or (iii) to otherwise carry out its 
proceedings.  
 
In seeking to define the ability of national justice systems to investigate and prosecute the 
crimes of the Statute, publicists have drawn a wide spectrum of national standards of practice 
(see Chapter 1): at the upper threshold, States are presented with a comprehensive package 
of safeguards that encompass international minimum standards on the protection of all 
participants in the proceedings, including suspects, accused persons, witnesses and victims,10 
as well as the availability of substantive law that includes the crimes, liabilities, defences and 
general principles of the Rome Statute11 while at the lower threshold, the text of the Statute 
has been carefully reiterated, to clarify first that the standard of national justice required by 
the ICC is that of genuineness rather than fairness (see Chapter 3) and second that the due 
process requirement is limited to the criteria of willingness (see Chapter 4). 
 
Revisiting the Due Process Thesis in the Context of Inability  
The absence of any reference to the qualities or standards of practice that must be attained by 
the national judicial system in its proceedings and its implications for the practice of national 
                                                
9 The Government of Libya’s Appeal against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case 
against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’ (Admissibility Appeal: Gaddafi) [2013] Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-
350, 07 June 2013. 
10 Open Society Justice Initiative (n 4); Bassiouni (n 4); Doherty and McCormack (n 5); International Centre for 
Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy,, ‘International Criminal Court: Manual for the Ratification 
and Implementation of the Rome Statute’ (2008) ISBN: 978-0-9730432-6-6; Commonwealth Secretariat, 
‘Model Law: To Implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted at the Meeting of 
Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials, 14 July 2011’ (2011) LMM(11)17 [Provisional]. 
11  Bekou (n 4); Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National 
Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
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accountability for crimes under the Statute has been somewhat difficult to digest. Whilst the 
ICC may be held to a ‘scrupulous’ standard of fair trial guarantees it is problematic to 
interpret a requirement for systematic respect of due process protections or fair trial 
guarantees within the terms of Article 17(3).12 It seems somewhat counter-intuitive for an 
international judicial body to require standards of practice from those under its jurisdiction 
that vary so markedly from the standards of practice required by other international 
adjudicatory mechanisms. This reality becomes all the more muddled in the context of States 
Parties obligation to cooperate with and provide assistance to the ICC, where, under part nine 
of the Statute, it is presupposed that States have the ability to arrest, surrender and interrogate 
suspects and accused persons, as well as other forms of assistance, and to do so according to 
minimum standards of the Statute.13 
 
Despite these peculiarities, the location of the due process requirement in the chapeau of 
article 17(2) restricts its automatic application to the inability criteria of article 17(3) as 
articulately demonstrated by Kevin Jon Heller (see Chapter 4, section 1.1). Similarly, Jan 
Kleffner has considered that there is an insurmountable disconnect between an absence of 
due process guarantees and any of the three specific requirements of inability14 whereas 
Heller has considered it may be possible only through a distorted interpretation of the term 
‘proceedings’ where they would instead become a reference to ‘fair proceedings.’15 A more 
balanced approach, and indeed the one that has thus far been adopted by the Court, is to 
‘read-in’ certain rights and protections, or more correctly, accept that the absence of specific 
due process rights or broader protections can remove the ability of the state to fulfil the 
specific requirements of Article 17(3) (see section 3-5 below). This approach is coherent 
with the text of the Statute and ensures that the application of the Statute remains within the 
human rights consistency vector of Article 21(3). 
 
The Court is unlikely to avoid litigation concerning the violation of the due process rights of 
its suspects or accused persons, where potential, alleged or proven violations occur in the 
context of the ICC’s own requests. Where due process rights are not respected, it should be 
                                                
12 Kleffner (n 8) 155. 
13  Article 96(2)(d) and (f) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1998 
(A/CONF183/9). 
14 Kleffner (n 8) 157. 
15 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255, 260–263. 
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expected that harmful or prejudicial treatment of the suspect will be raised by defence 
counsel as grounds for annulling the case, should the suspects’ case proceed to trial, as 
occurred in the Katanga confirmation of charges hearing. 16  Similarly, the ICC’s own 
practices, most notably the length of its own investigations and trials form the subject of 
some international human rights procedures.17  
 
2. National Justice System Requirement: Total or Partial Collapse or Otherwise 
Unavailable  
According to a textual analysis of the general requirement, the use of the conjunction “or” 
between the conditions (‘due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system’) could indicate that three permissible conditions exist: however, the two 
adjectives “total” and “substantial” are conditional to the subject verb “collapse” indicating 
that the national judicial system must either be in a condition of (i) total or substantial 
collapse or (ii) be otherwise unavailable. Beyond the text of Article 17(3) the Statute provides 
scant additional interpretive assistance, in a three-way split between the gold-plated standards 
that it places upon the ICC’s own judicial organs and the consequential expectation of 
minimum standards of States who are executing ICC requests, the preambular emphasis on 
ending impunity of perpetrators through criminal prosecution (which has contributed to the 
understanding that the ICC system justice is outcome or sentence driven rather than process 
driven) and the human rights consistency principle of Article 21(3). 
 
The rules and principles of the Adhoc international criminal tribunals are also of little 
assistance in determining the characteristics of total or substantial collapse or unavailability 
despite their powers of referral through Rule 11 bis. As a framework for transferring cases of 
a lower gravity threshold from the ICTY and ICTR to the jurisdictional states, the scope of 
Rule 11 bis has been considered in Chapter 4, however in the context of determining the 
                                                
16 See the defence counsel request for Katanga to be released due to the prolonged detention period that the 
accused experienced.  
17 For example, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judiciary and Prosecutors has reported on 
the judicial practices of the ICC. See Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, ‘Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Leandro Despouy’ (UN Human Rights 
Council 2008) A/HRC/8/4; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 
Leandro Despouy’ (UN Human Rights Council 2009) A/HRC/11/41; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque E Silva’ (UN Human Rights 
Council 2010) A/HRC/14/26. 
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condition of the national judicial system to which cases were being transferred some 
additional remarks can be made. The text of the Rule includes an explicit requirement that the 
standard of national proceedings against the accused must accord to a fair trial, as well as 
powers to order on-going protective measures for victims and witnesses and ultimately to 
revoke the transfer and defer the case back to the adhoc Tribunal.18 It thus places an explicit 
expectation on the Transfer Panels to consider the fair trial provisions and practices of the 
receiving State, which cannot be found in Article 17, where the standard is one of 
genuineness, rather than fairness (See Chapter 3). Equally the context of the Rule is not 
comparable to the ICC, first as it formed part of the Tribunals Completion Strategy and 
eventual closure which was integrated into extensive legal and institutional reforms in the 
countries under the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, and second relates to cases where the 
accused had already been indicted before the adhoc Tribunals and with the exception of very 
few persons, were in the custody of the Tribunal. 
 
Turning to the rules and principles of international human rights bodies and treaties, some 
guidance may be sought from the rule of effective remedy, particularly where local remedies 
are found to be unavailable or ineffective,19 as well as legal and factual circumstances that 
amount to a failure to ensure adequate resources.20 In elaborating the nature of States general 
legal obligations to the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee has considered that States 
must provide accessible and effective remedies 21  through appropriate judicial and 
administrative mechanisms,22 which has been adopted in several cases of the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights23 and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. Equally, the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that States are to be 
afforded some discretion in the manner and choice of form of the remedy24 so long as they 
                                                
18 ICTY Rules of Procedure, IT/32/Rev.44 2009 (IT/32/Rev 44) Rule 11 bis (B) and (C). 
19 Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2004); 
Henry M Onoria, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies under the African Charter’ (2003) 3 African Human Rights Journal. 
20 Case of Jorge, José and Dante Peirano Basso v Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Merits (Publication) Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights Report No. 86/09, Case 12.553, 06 August 2009 133, 167. 
21 Contrast to the Article 2(c) Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law 2005 (60/147) which requires that remedies are available, adequate, effective and prompt.  
22 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31. The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (United Nations 2004) CCPR/C/21?Rev.1/Add.13 15. 
23For a review of Commission findings on the subject see Onoria (n 19). 
24 Kaya v Turkey,  Judgment European Court of Human Rights Application no. 158/1996/777/978, 19 February 
1998 106. 
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reach a standard that makes them effective in practice as well as in law.25 Early policy efforts 
by the ICC as well as publicists sought to build upon these rules when identifying indicators 
of the two general conditions of inability of the national judicial system, along with 
submissions from the various parties to admissibility proceedings. 
 
2.1. Total or Substantial Collapse 
The 2003 Informal Expert Report on Complementarity considered that, as a separate part of 
the inability test, the condition of the national justice system could be assessed through 
objective factual and evidential indicators, where for conditions of total or substantial 
collapse, there was a: [i] lack of necessary personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor; [ii] 
lack of judicial infrastructure. Other publicists have variously described total collapse as a 
dramatic situation of over-arching problems facing than entire national justice system and 
quite probably the entire country,26 a situation where State authorities may exercise control 
over a territory but the administration of justice does not occur, 27  or a sociological 
phenomenon of collapse where the bodies that maintain law and order are no longer 
operable.28 Equally, a substantial collapse has been considered to be a collapse of essential 
criminal justice services in a geographic region that is affected by the subject matter, for 
example a region where the offences took place or where jurisdiction would ordinarily be 
held, or a country-wide collapse of one or more essential criminal justice services, such as the 
judiciary, police or penitentiary services.29  
 
The submissions before the Court have been more precise. In Gadaffi, the OPCV largely 
adopted the Informal Expert Paper criteria, distinguishing between two dimensions of 
‘collapse’ – infrastructure and personnel – that should be demonstrable through a ‘lack of 
judicial infrastructure as well as of trained and equipped personnel responsible for carrying 
out the different phases of domestic proceedings.’ Responding to the choice of adjective, they 
chose to define the condition of Libya’s justice system as in a state of substantial collapse, 
                                                
25 Ilhan v Turkey,  Judgment European Court of Human Rights Application no. 22277/93, 27 June 2000 97; 
Kudła v Poland,  Judgment European Court of Human Rights Application no. 30210/96, 26 October 2000 157.  
26 Citing the experience in Rwanda, where the atrocities were noted by the UN Human Rights Field Officers to 
have substantially destroyed the judicial system and infrastructure. Stigen (n 11). 
27 Markus Benzing, ‘International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and 
the Fight against Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 591, 614. 
28 Kleffner (n 8) 154. 
29 Stigen (n 11). 
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which could be measured or demonstrated by the collapse of infrastructure and personnel to 
be ‘of such intensity that it affects a significant or considerable part of the domestic justice 
system […] sufficient to paralyse the system in fulfilling its functions in relation to 
investigation, prosecution, trial and execution of sentences.’30 Meanwhile the Defence in 
Gadaffi sought to establish that a States’ violation of its obligations under international 
human rights treaties would be ‘symptomatic of a collapsed justice system or may render a 
justice system unavailable to an accused person.’31 
 
2.2. Unavailable 
The OTP Informal Expert paper listed five factors that could support the determination that 
the national judicial system was ‘otherwise unavailable’ where it could be established that 
there was [i] a lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation rendering system 
“unavailable”; [ii] lack of access rendering system “unavailable”; [iv] obstruction by 
uncontrolled elements rendering system “unavailable”; [v] amnesties, immunities rendering 
system “unavailable”.32 In considering otherwise unavailable Kleffner has considered that the 
two categories of collapse necessarily amount to being otherwise unavailable, but that a 
national justice system may otherwise unavailable but not in a state of total or partial 
collapse. He emphasises this with two examples, first of system weakness, where the criminal 
justice system remains too weak to ‘carry out proceedings in a safe environment for the 
judiciary, victims, witnesses and/or perpetrator’ and second through the withholding of 
external cooperation, where a second State refusing to cooperate or assist the State under 
admissibility review to the extent that it prevents any of the three specific criteria of ability.33  
 
In contrast to the descriptive examples provided by Kleffner, Stigen identified four categories 
of unavailability, three of which can apply without distinction to the condition type: [i] 
adequacy of national legal provisions; [ii] legal obstacles to the use of the system; [iii] factual 
obstacles to the use of the system, while the fourth category - system incapability draws 
                                                
30 Observations on behalf of victims on the Government of Libya’s Application pursuant to Article 19 of the 
Rome Statute Office of Public Counsel for Victims ICC‐01/11‐01/11, 04 June 2012 [40]. 
31 Summary of Defence Response in Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 
(Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) [2013] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11, 31 May 2013. 
32 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ 
(International Criminal Court 2003) Informal Expert Paper 31. 
33 Kleffner (n 8) 157–158. 
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heavily on the futility test of the right, and arguably introduces a third general condition of 
inability, as an alternative term to ‘otherwise unavailable’.34 
 
3. General criteria without distinction to the type of inability 
With the exception of the Informal Expert Paper, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has 
preferred to develop broad indicative indicators of inability that are absent of any distinction, 
first between the general conditions of the national judicial system, and second between the 
general conditions and the three specific requirements. The indicative criteria share many of 
the indicators proposed by Stigen as part of the ‘otherwise unavailable’ condition: 
‘[i] the absence of conditions of security for witnesses, investigators, prosecutors and 
judges or lack of adequate protection systems; [ii] the existence of laws that serve as 
a bar to domestic proceedings in the case at hand, such as amnesties, immunities or 
statutes of limitation; [iii] or the lack of adequate means for effective investigations 
and prosecutions.’35 
 
In its submissions to the two Libya cases, the Prosecutor proposed five addition limitations 
and conditions that should be govern assessment of the general requirement of inability, 
again without distinction to the category of the condition, including [i] that inability should 
be considered according to the national legal framework only and not other external as well 
as international legal systems; [ii] the existence of a political situation where the holding of 
trials becomes impossible, [iii] a debilitating lack of judges, prosecutors and other court 
personnel; [iv] obstruction by uncontrolled elements that render the system unavailable; [v] 
public disorder, natural disasters or chaos resulting from a civil war.36 
 
The challenges of determining the whether a national judicial system is in a state of collapse 
or is unavailable to conduct proceedings as well as to obtain the accused, evidence, testimony 
or otherwise conduct proceedings were explored throughout the admissibility challenge in 
Gaddafi, but most notably, following the Admissibility hearing, where the Pre-Trial 
                                                
34 Stigen (n 11) Chapter 9. 
35 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (International Criminal Court 
2010) 59. 
36 Summarising the OTP in Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi 
Admissibility Decision) (n 31) [143]. 
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Chambers requested additional information on five issues from the Government of Libya in 
order to demonstrate ‘concrete, tangible and pertinent evidence’ of the national investigation 
into Gadaffi.37  While the first three issues have been examined in Chapter 3, the remaining 
two issues have a direct bearing on the general and specific elements of inability, concerning 
issues on the exercise on the rights of Gaddafi, which will be addressed in Section 4 below 
insofar as it pertains to the ability to obtain the accused, and issues on the capacity to 
investigate and prosecute. Here, the PTC requested information on the investigation 
resources, on witness protection and security, on the defence of the accused, the custody of 
the accused and capacity building activities undertaken within the national judicial system. 
Clearly these issues are relevant to establishing both the general ability of the judicial system 
and the specific requirements and can be used interchangeably: the PTC has confirmed the 
shared importance that factual and contextual circumstances may have upon multiple aspects 
of the admissibility criteria.38 
 
As such, it can be helpful to organise the various indicators and issues that can contribute 
towards evaluation of ability, without a strict delineation between the general and specific 
requirements of inability. Having reviewed the various indicative indicators of the ability of 
national judicial systems (section 2) the vast majority of the proposed or litigated indicators 
and issues can be organised into legal and factual indicators, which contribute to the 
substantiation or repudiation of either the general requirement of ability, or the specific 
requirements or both. The use of factual and legal indicators is largely reflective of 
international human rights doctrine of effective remedy, where access to the law is required 
to be effective in practice as well as in law or to be accessible and effective. 
 
3.1. Legal Indicators in Determining the Ability of the Case 
Underpinning any review of the ability of a national judicial system to execute its criminal 
justice functions is the existence of sufficient law to enable it to do so. The qualities of any 
such legal framework, notably is adherence to international due process standards has been 
                                                
37 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7) 9. 
38 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) 
[2013] Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, 11 October 2013 [169].‘while either of the two 
scenarios (unwillingness of inability) is sufficient to render a case admissible, the Chamber observes that, in 
practice, the same factual circumstances may often have a bearing on both aspects.’ 
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the source of much of the debate on the scope of article 17(3) while the existence of laws that 
prohibit or restrict criminal investigation or prosecution will also alter the ability of the 
national judicial system. These two dimensions of the legal framework can be organised into 
separate categories or indicators of the national legal infrastructure: [i] the adequacy of 
national legal provisions and [ii] legal obstacles to the use of the system.39  
Adequacy of National Legal Provisions 
Jo Stigen has established quite extensive sub-indicators to argue that the adequacy of national 
legal provisions should inform assessments of the ‘otherwise unavailability’ of the national 
justice system, adopting an ultra-compliant stance that now seems out of fashion. Referring to 
international human rights decisions, which establish that local remedies need not be 
exhausted where legislation is insufficient and that the existence of legal remedy must be 
certain in theory and practice, Stigen asserts that necessary legislation requires applicable 
law, limited excessive defences and that the conduct should of course be criminalised, but 
need not be defined through international crime categories, for all but a handful of specific 
crimes that do not have a close equivalent under ordinary crime nomenclature, such as the 
element of genocide of imposing measures intended to prevent births (see Chapter 3 on the 
relevance of the choice of crimes under admissibility). 40 In its arguments in the Gaddafi 
admissibility challenge, the OPCV went further than Stigen, seeking to persuade the judges 
that Libya was genuinely unable to investigate and prosecute the accused in part because of 
the lack of substantive criminal legislation proscribing war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.41 Both arguments sought to weigh the assessment of the national legal framework 
according to external, international sources of law and the ability of the State to adhere to its 
international obligations. This argument has not been pursued by the Prosecutor in her Libya 
litigation and nor was it persuasive to the PTC, who have sought to restrict its assessment to 
the applicable substantive and procedural law in force within the State. 
 
                                                
39 These are the category description used by Jo Stigen, which largely corresponds to the Prosecutors criteria of 
‘the existence of laws that serve as a bar to domestic proceedings in the case at hand, such as amnesties, 
immunities or statutes of limitation.’ Stigen (n 11) Chapter 9. 
40 Stigen (n 11). Chapter 9 
41 Response on behalf of victims on the Government of Libya’s Application pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome 
Statute (OPCV Response to the Admissibility Challenge: Gaddafi) Office of Public Counsel for Victims ICC‐
01/11‐01/11-166-Red-Corr, 04 June 2012 30–49; Transcript of Hearing (Admissibility Hearing: Gaddafi), 
09/10/13 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-T-2-Red-ENG, 09 October 2012 p.64–66. 
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Assessment in accordance to the applicable substantive and procedural law 
While the Informal Expert Paper had included the lack of substantive or procedural penal 
legislation as one of its factual indicators, where it rendered a national justice system as 
‘unavailable,’ the subsequent materials of the OTP have not adopted the same approach, and 
indeed before the Gaddafi admissibility procedure, the Prosecutor forcefully argued that 
Article 17(3) must be restricted to assessment of the substantive and procedural law of the 
State.42 In its assessment of the general requirement on the condition of the national justice 
system, the PTC considered that ability must be assessed in the context of its relevant 
national laws:  
‘the ability of a State genuinely to carry out an investigation or prosecution must be 
assessed in the context of the relevant national system and procedures. In other 
words, the Chamber must assess whether the Libyan authorities are capable of 
investigating or prosecuting Mr Gaddafi in accordance with the substantive and 
procedural law applicable in Libya.’43 
The decision then proceeded to review the relevant laws that establish the criminal 
proceedings for the accused, noting the fair trial rights accorded to the defendant under 
Libyan law were specific and established by law, and that the State had ratified relevant 
human rights instruments.44 The existence of such laws, which also included rudimentary 
protections for witnesses and victims, provided the framework upon which to assess the 
anility to obtain the accused and to obtain witness testimony, where it found that despite the 
existence of such laws, they were not available to the accused or to certain witnesses and 
therefore that the national judicial system was unable to fulfil its legal duties (see Section 5 
and 6 below). The decision of the PTC to limit its assessment to the current applicable laws 
of Libya, without comparison to its international obligations further reinforces the Court’s 
relative indifference to national due process practices, albeit that the Chamber ‘noted’ that 
Libya had ratified relevant human rights instruments.45 
 
While the PTC acknowledged the formal existence of a national legal framework that enable 
                                                
42 Prosecutor v Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Prosecution response to Application on behalf 
of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Prosecution Response: Gaddafi 
Admissibility Challenge) ICC Office of the Prosecutor ICC-01/011-01/11, 05 June 2012 [20–32]. 
43 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 
31) [200]. 
44 Ibid, 201–202. 
45 Ibid, 200. 
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the investigation and prosecution of persons according to the specific criteria of Article 17(3) 
in Libya, it should be understood that the absence of substantive and procedural laws 
applicable to the requirements of Article 17(3) would limit the capacity of the national 
authorities to investigate and prosecute and may therefore lead to determinations of inability.  
 
Laws that bar proceedings or restrict fulfilment of the specific requirements of inability 
The existence of substantive and procedural laws as discussed above is however, distinct 
from laws that bar proceedings. Both Stigen and the Office of the Prosecutor have included 
this category of legal indicators:46 according to Stigen and the Informal Expert Paper, such 
obstacles could include amnesties and immunities as well as statutes of limitations. In many 
instances, it is probable that the use of amnesties by a State will be filtered out during Article 
17(1) through the ‘activity test’ (see Chapter 3). Through selected State submissions within 
the preparatory works and interpretation of Article 17(1), Darryl Robinson has argued that 
States are provided with a ‘doorway’ under the first paragraph of Article 17 to be declared as 
‘active’, where they have adopted alternative mechanisms, including restricted or partial 
amnesties, where it could be demonstrated that an investigation had been pursued.47 Equally, 
the application of blanket amnesties, where no investigation or truth-seeking investigation 
has occurred is overwhelmingly likely to trigger a reading of inactivity and could therefore 
proceed to the willingness or ability tests.  
 
It is more probable that the Prosecutor will pursue this factor where national laws prohibit or 
prevent the three specific requirements of inability - obtaining the accused, obtaining 
testimony or evidence or otherwise conduct its proceedings. This would also include legal 
obstacles imposed by second or third States, where their laws prevent them from executing 
any request pertinent to the specific requirements.48 
 
                                                
46 Stigen (n 11) Chapter 9; ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 
35) 56. 
47 Darryl Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International 
Criminal Court’ (2003) 14 Eur J Int Law 481, 500. 
48 Kleffner (n 8) 157–158. 
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Analysis of legal framework in Gaddafi 
Having considered that ability must be assessed in the context of relevant national system and 
procedures the Pre-Trial Chambers reviewed the Libyan Procedural Code, to note aspects of 
the Code that it considered to be important to its ability assessment, moving first from 
identifying the phases of Libyan criminal proceedings – investigation, accusation, trial, and 
appeal – to specific features of interest to it. This included unique legal provisions that posed 
challenges to the admissibility proceedings, such as the requirement that investigations 
remain confidential, which in the absence of sufficient legal framework on cooperation and 
judicial assistance had restricted the Libyan authorities in providing the concrete, tangible 
and tangible evidence of the steps taken to investigate Gaddafi that the PTC had requested.49 
 
The bulk of analysis however, prioritized the rights of the defendant under domestic law, 
despite the absence of a due process requirement. The PTC considered that, under Libyan 
law, accused persons were provided with a minimum standard of protection, from the right to 
a lawyer during the investigation phase,50 to review evidence presented against him,51 to be 
informed of their rights and duties when in custody,52 for evidence obtained through forced 
confessions to be inadmissible, and also, importantly for the outcome of the specific ability 
outcome of obtaining the accused, that a presumption exists for defendants to be held in a 
prison that has been prepared for that purpose, albeit that the Public Prosecutor has the 
discretion to decide otherwise.53 Turning to fair trial rights, the PTC listed the protections 
provided to the accused, which include the rights to a public hearing, to have proceedings 
recorded, to be presented with the indictment and all evidence of the prosecution, to remain 
silent, to present defence evidence and the right to a written judgment.54 The PTC also 
evaluated the framework for the imposition of the death penalty; despite Article 80, which 
clearly separates the ICC’s own sentencing practices from those of States.55 
                                                
49 Established in Article 59 of the Libyan Criminal Procedural Code, provided in Decision requesting further 
submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for 
further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7). 
50 Article 106, Libyan Criminal Procedural Code, in Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 31) 202. 
51 Article 435, Libyan Criminal Procedural Code, ibid. 
52 Article 9, Libyan Prisons Act, ibid. 
53 Article 4, Libyan Prisons Act, ibid. 
54 Articles 241, 247, 251, 266, 276 of the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure, in ibid.  
55 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 
31) 202. ‘Where the death penalty has been imposed, the sentence cannot be carried out until the case has been 
considered by the Supreme Court. Commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment is possible where the 
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3.2. Factual Indicators of the Ability of the National Judicial System 
The wide range of proposed or indicative factual indicators of ability that were summarised 
in Section 2 can be expected to drive determinations of ability, both of the availability of 
national justice system, as well as the availability of the substantive and procedural legal 
framework applicable to the specific requirements of Article 17(3). 
 
Although Stigen included factual obstacles as part of the indicators to determine the condition 
of being ‘otherwise unavailable’ the requirement for factual evidence on the availability of 
the national judicial system forms an essential component to the determination of its 
condition: the system must be available for the case in hand both in law and in fact.  Stigen 
chose to assert this through the doctrine of effective remedy, but to limit is relevance to 
factual obstacles that are external to the judiciary.56 However, the inclusion by the Prosecutor 
of broader indicative factors such as the lack of adequate means for effective investigations 
and prosecutions57 or a debilitating lack of judges, prosecutors and court personnel58 clearly 
direct the focus of factual circumstances inward, to the national justice system, as much as it 
considers external factual circumstances such as the absence of security conditions59 or 
obstruction by uncontrolled elements or other external factors such as natural disaster. 60 This 
is also coherent with the questions submitted by the PTC to Libya, where it requested 
information on the capacity of the national judiciary to investigate and prosecute Gadaffi, on 
the resources allocated to the investigation, on the capacity to provide witness protection and 
security, the capacity to secure the custody of the accused and general capacity building 
activities that it had undertaken to strengthen the judicial system.61 
                                                                                                                                                  
family members of victims forgive the convicted person. Once the Trial Court hears the evidence of family 
members, they may impose a new sentence. Additional guarantees are provided under articles 31 and 33 of 
Libya's Constitutional Declaration.’ 
56 Stigen (n 11) chapter 9. 
57 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 35). 
58 Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Prosecution response to Application on behalf 
of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Prosecution Response: Gaddafi 
Admissibility Challenge) (n 42) 43. 
59 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (n 35) 56. 
60 Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Prosecution response to Application on behalf 
of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Prosecution Response: Gaddafi 
Admissibility Challenge) (n 42) 43. 
61 Decision of 07 December 2012 (n 7) 
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Availability of Resources 
The PTC Request for Further Information (PTC Request) on the resources that were allocated 
to the national investigation team in the Gaddafi case included material and personnel 
resources.62 In addition, reference has been made to infrastructural resources, such as the 
availability of court facilities, detention facilities and prisons.63 
Material resources 
The PTC Request asked for further information on the resources allocated, which could be 
understood as consisting of the general financial resources made available to the investigation 
and to necessary victim and witness protection, the equipment provided to conduct the 
investigation and gather evidence and testimony, and their expertise, as well as the measures 
that had been taken to conduct on-site investigations and to preserve evidence: this clearly 
moves from general personnel capacity issues to the specific requirement of ability to obtain 
and preserve evidence. In its response, the Government of Libya clarified that the 
Investigation Committee that was tasked with the investigation of Gaddafi ‘benefits from all 
of the financial and other resources available to the Prosecutor-General’s Office on a 
priority basis.’ 64 While the Libyan Response in Gaddafi and its Admissibility Challenge in 
Al-Senussi does not detail the material resources used to conduct investigations, both 
confirmed that the Investigation Committee had conducted on-site investigations of prisons 
and other locations of criminal acts under investigation, including exhumations of mass 
graves, and that ‘regular criminal investigative procedures’ had enabled the preservation of 
evidence, including the retention of documents, electronic materials, photographs and DNA 
samples.65 
 
                                                
62 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7) 41. 
63 Ibid, 27-32; Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case 
against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) Government of Libya ICC-
01/11-01/11-285-Red2, 23 January 2013; Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 31). 
64 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 94(i). 
65 Ibid, 94(iv-v); Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: 
Al-Senussi) (n 38) 213.  
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Personnel resources 
The absence or lack of personnel within a judicial system can clearly indicate that the system 
is unavailable, or in a state of substantial or total collapse, notwithstanding the existence of a 
legal framework establishing their powers and procedures. The Informal Expert report listed 
such personnel to include judges, prosecutors and investigators, but in light of the specific 
requirements to obtain the accused, this should also include personnel responsible for 
detention facilities as well as security personnel to enable all proceedings to continue 
unhampered. 
 
Almost all of the participants in the admissibility proceedings in Gaddafi and Al-Senussi have 
considered different elements of personnel resources as well as what constitutes proof of 
adequacy. The PTC Request in Gaddafi inquired into the quantity and skills of the personnel 
resources, as well as the powers available to the individuals responsible for the case.66 In its 
response Libya sought to establish that the allocation of four senior investigators and eight 
junior staff67 assigned to the Investigation Committee on a full-time basis was sufficient in 
quantitative terms, although it did not elaborate whether they were allocated exclusively to 
the investigation of Gaddafi or the size of their general case load.68 However, in the course of 
the admissibility challenge in Al-Senussi it became clear that the Investigation Committee 
also bore oversight responsibility for the Al-Senussi investigation, where a number of 
investigators (including some based in Benghazi) were conducting the investigation of Al-
Senussi and were reporting to the Investigative Committee, which was in turn supervised by 
the Prosecutor-General.69  
 
In addressing the expertise of the Investigation Committee, Libya simply asserted that its 
members provided ‘considerable expertise’ as they were drawn from senior positions within 
the Prosecution Services and that they had benefited from strategic advice on the planning of 
trials for former regime officials, by UN experts.70 Despite these assertions, the OPCD sought 
to discredit the skills of the Investigation Committee, alleging that deficiencies in the 
                                                
66 Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 94(i). 
67 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 41. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 
38). 212 
70 Ibid. 
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investigative steps indicated an inability to conduct criminal proceedings, and that the general 
dependence on international assistance within the judicial system indicated that there was 
insufficient personnel resources.71 Despite acknowledging the personnel resources and efforts 
to strengthen their skills, the PTC Decision did not elaborate on its sufficiency, instead 
finding that multiple challenges remained, with substantial difficulties in the exercise of its 
judicial powers.72 
Infrastructure resources 
In determining available infrastructural resources, the PTC requested Libya to provide 
information on the construction of courtrooms and prison facilities for the trial and detention 
of Gaddafi.73 In its Response, Libya confirmed that it was in the process of renovating a 
courtroom complex and prison facility in Tripoli, known as Hadba, which would be ‘capable 
of ensuring proper administration of justice in accordance with minimum international 
standards’ for the trial of Gaddafi, as well as Al-Senussi, in addition to an alternative prison 
and Courtroom, the South Tripoli Criminal Court. They asserted that the Hadba prison 
facility had been refurbished to accommodate over 200 prisoners, that it provided high 
quality recreation and cafeteria facilities, and that its inmate rooms met international 
standards, including televisions74 while both Court complexes were fully equipped for a high 
security trial.75 Turning to available infrastructural resources for the Gaddafi investigation, 
Libya established that the Investigation Committee was allocated its own building (in the 
Serraj district of Tripoli)76and provided general information of its effort to rebuild judicial 
institutions, which the PTC took note of in its Admissibility Decision.  
 
While Libya had described the government detention facilities in which Gaddafi would be 
subjected to upon his transfer from the custody of the Zintan militia as adhering to 
international standards, the Decision recognised that Gaddafi remained in the custody of the 
Zintan militia, where he was unable to benefit from such facilities and went on to consider 
                                                
71 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 
31) [170–172]. 
72 Ibid, 204. 
73 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7) 45(iii). 
74 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 100. 
75 Ibid, 102. 
76 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 94(i). 
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the challenges to adhere to due process protections of inmates within the detention facilities, 
noting reports of torture (see section 3.2.5 below).   
 
Capacity to Provide Witness Protection and Security  
The availability of witness protection and security has formed an essential component of the 
determination of the specific requirement of the ability to obtain testimony (see Section 5 
below). In its Request for Further Information in Gaddafi, the PTC inquired into the 
availability of protective measures for witnesses, including whether protective measures was 
envisaged in the case at hand and if the capacity existed to provide it, and finally whether the 
general security situation inhibited the progress of the investigation in certain areas.77 While 
Libya’s response referred to the existence of laws providing some protective measures, 
including non-disclosure, in camera witness testimony, witness anonymity and police 
protection, and that it envisaged implementing such measures for some witnesses, the PTC 
considered that the Government had failed to substantiate its claims and did not have the 
capacity to ensure protective measures. It found this on the bases that witness protection 
measures were a discretionary practice of the judges at the trial stage, and that the 
Government had failed to show any evidence that specific protection programs existed or 
how witnesses may benefit from them.78 Furthermore, in its decision that Libya was unable to 
provide adequate witness protection, the PTC noted reports that ‘conflict-related detainees, 
including senior former regime members had not been protected from torture and 
mistreatment in detention facilities’79 and that the Government did not have control over the 
detention facilities of two witnesses had prevented the taking of testimony.80 
Capacity to Give Effect to National Laws on Defence Rights 
In Gaddafi, the PTC acknowledged the existence of national laws that protect the interests of 
the accused at the pre-trial and trial phases including the prohibition of the transition from 
pre-trial to trial phase, where a defence lawyer has not been appointed and requested 
information on the measures taken to identify and secure independent legal representation for 
                                                
77 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7) 42. 
78 PTC Decision, Gaddafi, para 211Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 
(Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 31) 211. 
79 Ibid, 209. 
80 Ibid, 210 
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Gaddafi, before the national proceedings, including the protection of counsel from reprisal 
and intimidation.81 In its response, Libya confirmed that, where Gaddafi decided not to 
appoint his own counsel upon the transfer to the trial phase, the Chambre d’Accusation would 
do so, according to the relevant legal provision. The Government further declared that 
Gaddafi has not appointed Counsel, leading the Ministry of Justice officials to be in 
‘continuous high level contact with the Libyan Law Society and the Popular Lawyers Office’ 
to secure a suitably qualified and committed counsel or team of counsels.82 However, it failed 
to inform the PTC of the actual measures that had been taken to ensure independent legal 
representation, simply asserting that it had taken ‘considerable steps’ to do so, and omitted to 
provide details on how it would protect such counsel from reprisals or intimidation.83 The 
PTC considered that ‘Libya has not shown whether and how it will overcome the existing 
difficulties in securing a lawyer for the suspect’ which served as a ‘practical impediment to 
the progress of domestic proceedings against Mr Gaddafi’ which contributed to the 
unavailability of the national judicial system.84 
Capacity Building to address factual issues 
In the Admissibility Challenge and Hearing, the Government of Libya introduced a breadth 
of capacity building programmes that it was seeking to undertake from a number of UN 
agencies and national governments, in order to strengthen the prosecutors and judiciary 
ability to adhere to appropriate international standards, to adjudicate over crimes against 
humanity and armed groups, with the purpose of achieving stability and providing fair 
trials.85 The PTC did not consider this to be specific enough, and requested additional 
information concerned the outcomes of the capacity building proposals, asking whether 
                                                
81 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7) 43–44. 
82 Citing Annex 12, Public- Ministry of Justice letter regarding appointment of defence counsel, 17 January, in 
Libyan Government’s consolidated reply to the response of the Prosecution, OPCD and OPCV to its further 
submission on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Reply: Gaddafi Admissibility) 
[2013] Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-293-Red2, 04 March 2013 97. 
83 Ibid, 97. 
84 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 
31) 215. 
85 Offers of assistance were received from the governments of Argentina, South Africa and Colombia, while 
discussion with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes and the UN 
Support Mission in Libya represented interests from the UN. Application on behalf of the Government of Libya  
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute relating to Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Article 19 Application: Gaddafi) 
Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red, 01 May 2012 46–47. 
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‘Libya has effectively secured such international assistance in judicial capacity building, to 
the extent that such assistance will have an impact of the specific case against Mr Gaddafi.’86 
 
The five-page long response submitted by Libya includes a number of technical assistance 
and capacity building programs targeting the skills and competences of personnel within the 
national judicial system (including the judiciary, prosecution services, police and 
penitentiary) as well as with the militia groups controlling several detention facilities; 
programs also addressed the adequacy of national laws through legal reform and 
harmonisation with international law; and the development of strategic policy for conflict-
related prosecutions, with the prosecution services and the judiciary.  
 
The Government claimed that these activities amounted to ‘substantial measures of 
assistance’ indicating that the credibility of the providers, which were drawn from UN 
agencies and Governments, and the themes of assistance had ‘both direct and indirect impact 
on the specific case against Mr. Gaddafi.’87 Yet the examples provided are at best, of indirect 
relevance to the specific case against Gaddafi, as requested by the Pre-Trial Chambers. 
Instead, the examples provided show that a number of general technical assistance measures 
and capacity building programs were implemented or planned, in support of the national 
judicial system as whole: none of them appeared to directly target the Investigation 
Committee tasked with the investigation of Gaddafi or Al-Senussi, nor any of the institutions 
or individuals that bear responsibility for investigation, prosecution or defence of the ICC 
indictees.  
 
Several assistance programs sought to address the adequacy of national laws, within a general 
rule of law framework, with a specific focus on transitional justice. This included general 
capacity building on judicial reform, led by UNSMIL,88 as well as legal review of a number 
of Libyan laws to advise on how they could be harmonised with international instruments in 
                                                
86 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 49. 
87 UN agencies included: UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the UN Development 
Program (UNDP). Coordinated through the UN Focal Point, which is the Human Rights, Transitional Justice 
and Rule of Law Division of UNSMIL in 2011, where its Division Director is also UNHCHR Representative in 
Libya, responsible for transitional justice, prison reform, human rights and judicial capacity building. 
Governments included Denmark, Finland, Korea, The Netherlands, Morocco, Peru, South Africa, Switzerland, 
Tunisia, Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States as well as the European Union.  Ibid, 103-105 
88 Ibid, 109. 
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order to resume and restart the court system.89  Other multi-party activities, including 
technical assistance, a conference and follow-up review had taken place on the draft 
transitional justice law and international best practices of transitional justice including visits 
to Benghazi, Misrata and Zintan.90 While these activities may indeed demonstrate the effort 
of the Government to ‘integrate judicial capacity building as an essential component of 
Libya’s democratic transition’91 they do not clearly target the challenges raised in the PTC’s 
request for further information: they do not provide information on activities that target the 
subject matter of the investigations into Gaddafi, nor the procedural obstacles, such as the 
discretionary allocation of protective measures at the trial stage, that the PTC had expressed 
concern with and nor did they target the specific personnel that are responsible for the 
investigations or detention of Gaddafi. 
 
Similarly, the description of capacity building efforts that sought to address personnel 
resources - including the skills and knowledge – have limited indirect or contextual relevance 
to the cases under consideration by the Court. This would include the weekly visits by 
UNSMIL to detention centres, including in Zintan (the city where Gaddafi remains in the 
custody of militia) where they advise on international standards for the security and safety of 
detainees, assist in facilitating transfer of detention facilities to the control of the Government 
authorities in Tripoli and inform the Government of the treatment of detainees.92 While this 
practice can undoubtedly strengthen and develop the standards of treatment and may indeed 
contribute towards the ultimate transfer of custody of Gaddafi, the Government summary of 
these activities does not refer specify that the UNSMIL missions engaged with the militia 
responsible for the ongoing detention of Gaddafi. Equally, efforts by UNSMIL and the 
Jordanian Prison Service, to increase the capacity of the Libyan prison administration, 
including judicial police, appears to have been generic and not targeted to those responsible 
for the detention of those under investigation for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.93 
This adequately demonstrates the tension that exists between satisfying the admissibility 
requirements of the ICC, which pertained to a restricted number of individuals, and the wider 
security and institutional challenges facing governments in transition. 
                                                
89 Ibid, 107. 
90 Led by UNSMIL, UNDP and UNODC experts. Ibid, 106. 
91 Ibid, 112. 
92 Ibid, 107. 
93 Ibid, 108. 
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One tranche of capacity building activities referenced by Libya appeared to have a more 
direct bearing on the ICC situation cases, by addressing the subject matter of the UN Security 
Council referral, notably to provide advice on how to advance conflict-related criminal 
proceedings before the Libyan judicial system. Led by UNSMIL, the activities aimed to 
support the development of national strategies for the investigation and prosecution of 
officials of the Gaddafi regime for serious conflict related crimes, through trainings of judges 
and prosecutors. Part of this activity appears to have targeted 40 investigating judges and 
public prosecutors in Tripoli and focused on two main issues: i) to start the screening process 
of conflict related detainees; and ii) to prepare for the investigation and trial of those accused 
of serious crimes as members of the former regime or during the conflict.94 However, while 
these training addressed the general subject matter of the Referral and of the two ICC cases, 
no information was provided to indicate that they directly addressed the subject matter of the 
ICC’s two cases, and furthermore, the trainings targeted the planning or preparation for 
investigations of the conflict crimes or ore historic regime crimes, indicating that the 
investigative judges and prosecutors were not yet actively engaged in systematic 
investigations. 
 
In responding to the information provided, the PTC Decision acknowledged that Libya had 
provided ‘detailed submissions’ on the measures of assistance that it has received with 
respect to human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law95 in what it noted as 
‘extremely difficult circumstances.96 Of the various international assistance measures the 
Libya had received, the Chamber noted those that targeted the formulation of a prosecutorial 
strategy, training for public prosecutors on screening and criminal investigations, training of 
judges and prosecutors on how to advance conflict-related criminal proceedings, national 
strategies for the investigation and prosecution of officials of the Gaddafi regime for serious 
conflict-related crimes with the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor-General's office, as 
well as aiming to enhance the investigative and forensic capability of the Libyan police 
                                                
94 Ibid, 110. 
95 Including a ‘proposed strategy towards developing an effective, accountable and affordable national police 
service, improving security for courts and participants in proceedings, bolstering the independence of the 
judiciary, increasing the capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes and reforming detention centres, in 
particular, by taking urgent steps to bring an end to the practice of torture.’ Decision on the admissibility of the 
case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 31) 183–184. 
96 Ibid, 204. 
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force.97 Yet ultimately, the PTC felt that while these activities may have contributed towards 
the establishment of an administration of justice, ‘a number of legal and factual issues result 
in the unavailability of the national judicial system for the purpose of the case against Mr 
Gaddafi.’98   
 
In conclusion, the breadth of capacity building activities that Libya described had failed to 
demonstrate that a nexus existed between the activities and the perceived deficiencies 
associated to the fulfilment of the specific requirements of the case at hand.  
3.3. Limited elaboration on the general condition of the national judicial system by 
PTC  
The two Libya admissibility challenges broke a substantial amount of new territory for the 
scope of the ability test: the quantity of submissions, responses and replies from the parties 
provided a great deal of information and interpretation and yet in its Decisions, the Pre-Trial 
Chambers provided a minimal analysis of the condition of the national judicial system, 
preferring instead to elaborate upon the specific requirements. In the only decision that 
asserted the inability of a national judicial system to carry out its proceedings, the Pre-Trial 
Chambers did not dwell on the condition of the national judicial system: in Gadaffi they 
instead preferred to assess the specific requirements before determining simply that ‘a 
number of legal and factual issues result in the unavailability of the national system for the 
purpose of the case against Mr Gaddafi.’ 99  Equally, in the Al-Senussi case the PTC 
considered each of the specific criteria of inability in detail, finding that, as the national 
judicial system was able to satisfy each of these requirements it could not therefore be found 
to meet any of the general requirements.100 
 
4. Specific Requirements: Obtaining the accused, obtain evidence or testimony, 
otherwise carry out proceedings 
The general condition of the national judicial system – i.e its state of collapse or 
unavailability – forms the contextual part of the ability test and is relevant only insofar as the 
                                                
97 Ibid, 218. 
98 Ibid, 215. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid, 288, 309.  
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three specific requirements are met. These criteria of ability – obtaining the accused, 
obtaining testimony and evidence and ‘otherwise carry out its proceedings’ – listed in Article 
17(3) have the effect of creating the framework upon which States will be assessed as 
genuinely able, forming the ‘steps that are crucial to a successful investigation and 
prosecution.’101 Within academic literature, these criteria are generally considered to be 
unproblematic and straightforward to implement, where the general condition of the national 
judicial system serves as a filter to distinguish between States who cannot satisfy the three 
criteria, and those who may be able to but choose not to.  
 
As elaborated on above, the PTC has preferred to assess the specific criteria in detail, where 
in Gaddafi, it found that two of the criteria had been met, whereby the State was (i) ‘unable 
to secure the transfer of Mr Gaddafi's custody from his place of detention under the Zintan 
militia into State authority and there is no concrete evidence that this problem may be 
resolved in the near future’ and (ii) that ‘the Chamber is not persuaded that the Libyan 
authorities have the capacity to obtain the necessary testimony.’102 This section will review 
the submissions that led to this conclusion, comparing it to the different outcome in Al-
Senussi, where the PTC found that the State was in fact able to satisfy each of the three 
criteria. This review will seek to identify the elements of ability and the levels of proof that 
the PTC required, in order that this may serve as a guide or framework to national justice 
actors. 
 
5. Obtaining the accused 
The ability to obtain an accused person is a vital pre-requisite of successful criminal 
adjudication and its inclusion in the admissibility criteria is a clear rejection of in-absentia 
trials. While the text refers only to accused persons, the logic of article 17(1) enables the 
Court to seize jurisdiction over national investigations, meaning that article 17(3) can also 
include the inability to obtain suspects.103 This of course would include obtaining suspects or 
accused persons through voluntary or involuntary means, i.e. through arrest or surrender. The 
relevant state authority should be able to gain custody of the person involved, through the 
                                                
101 Stigen (n 11) Chapter 9, section2.6. 
102 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 215. 
103 Stigen (n 11) 313. 
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successful execution of arrest warrants, and where the person may be outside of the 
jurisdiction of those authorities, their extradition,104 or they must be able to guarantee the 
voluntary surrender of the suspect or accused person. 
 
Under the Rome Statute, the rules controlling the arrest, surrender or transfer of suspect are 
largely reflective of international and regional human rights treaties protections: it should be 
based on an arrest warrant that clearly identifies the accused person, that specifies the crimes 
that the person is alleged to have committed and provides a summary of the facts that 
allegedly constitute the crime.105 
 
5.1. Adequacy of the legal framework for obtaining the accused/suspect 
The PTC has ruled that admissibility will be determined against the backdrop of the national 
legal framework (see 3.1.1 above). However, the cooperation framework of the ICC Statute 
injects certain curiosities in the assessment of national laws, in the context of obtaining the 
accused, as it places States Parties under an obligation to ensure that its national legislation 
provides all necessary procedures for the execution of arrest warrants issued by the ICC,106 as 
well as the resources necessary to execute it. While the national legislation enabling the 
execution of arrests for external parties is generally considered to be administrative in nature, 
the Statute also allows for the Court to specify the standards that the executing State should 
follow, which will include the pre-trial guarantees in article 55. States therefore have a 
double requirement to be capable of executing arrest warrants as part of their express treaty 
obligations and to preclude a negative admissibility decision.107 The paradox that a State may 
loose jurisdiction due to their inability to obtain the person and then be required to arrest, 
surrender or transfer the person to the ICC upon request has not been lost on many 
                                                
104 At the time of the first Libyan admissibility challenge, the Government of Libya excluded Al-Senussi from 
the challenge, as he remained in the custody of the Mauritanian Authorities, and therefore the State accepted 
that they were at that point unable to obtain him, as he remained outside of Libya’s jurisdiction. Application on 
behalf of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute relating to Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 
(Article 19 Application: Gaddafi) (n 85) 2–14. 
105 Article 55(1)Rome Statute (n 13); Article 9(1)International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; 
Article 5(1)European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950; Article 
6African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981; Article 5(3)American Convention of Human Rights 
1969. 
106 Article 88 and Article 89(1), Rome Statute (n 13) 
107 The reality is less obvious and straightforward however, as fewer than 40% of States Parties have 
implemented the obligation to cooperate into national law and communicated the legislation to the ICC. 
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practitioners, and has contributed towards some efforts to address limited abilities or 
capacities of States under investigation.  
 
However, following the PTC decision to assess ability according to the national legal 
framework, the ability to obtain the accused should be considered in terms of domestic laws, 
including the protection of the pre-trial and trial rights of the accused, rather than to any 
international obligations that the State may be under but not putting into effect. In its review 
of Libya’s applicable procedural law, the PTC did not discuss to the applicable laws of arrest 
and surrender, but referred to the pre-trial and trial protections of the accused, noting that 
under Article 4 of the Prisons Act, that defendants should only be held in prisons that were 
prepared for that purpose, ‘unless the Public Prosecutor decides otherwise.’108 Within the 
admissibility challenge of Al-Senussi, the defence challenged the procedure of his surrender 
to Libya and to the conditions of his detention in Libya, arguing that the actions of the 
authorities in pursuing his surrender from Mauritania was illegal, where he was denied legal 
assistance and then held in solitary confinement.109 The PTC neither assessed this claim 
against the applicable national framework, as a test of its adequacy, nor considered the 
State’s ability to give effect to any legal protections that may exist under national law, 
although it dedicated several paragraphs to the disputed arrest or abduction of the deputy 
prosecutor assigned to Al-Senussi’s case (see section 5.1 ability to obtain evidence). 
 
5.2. The suspect must be in the custody of the national authorities 
Although Article 17(3) does not clarify whether its assessment of the ability to obtain the 
accused is satisfied at the moment of arrest, it is commonly accepted that the national 
authorities should have control over the accused throughout the proceedings.110 In contrast, 
the lone voice of dissent, Kevin Jon Heller considers that the ability criteria requires only that 
the state be unable to obtain the accused, not that they might be able to escape. In support of 
his argument, he adopts the Court preference for ‘real time’ assessments of admissibility (see 
Chapter 3, Section 1) where the conditions are assessed at the time of the challenge, and not 
                                                
108 (emphasis added) Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 202.  
109 Defence Response to the ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute’ (Defence Observations: Gaddafi Admissibility) Office of Public Defence Counsel ICC-Ol/ll-Ol/ll-190-
Corr-Red, 31 July 2012 70. 
110 If the accused were to abscond during the domestic trial, the case could cease to be inadmissible on the 
grounds that it cannot proceed, although the ICC would also likely face challenges in re-obtaining the accused. 
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for some unspecified possible point of time in the future. If the same logic is applied to the 
possibility of flight risk, then the Court could not consider a state unable otherwise to carry 
out its proceedings, until the point in time that the person absconded. 
 
The first grounds of admissibility in Gaddafi, that the accused remained outside of the 
custody of the state authorities, was in part, due to the loss of authority or unavailability of 
the national judicial system over the area where Gaddafi was detained.111 Subsequent to the 
issuing of warrants of arrest for Saif al Islam al Gaddafi112 he was captured near the Oman 
border, and detained in Zintan, by what the government initially referred to as local 
authorities113 but who have subsequently been recognised as government-affiliated militia 
who do not operate under the sole authority of the central government. In its admissibility 
challenge, Libya sought to downplay both the status or affiliations of the Zintan militia, as 
well as the availability or frequency of access to the accused, asserting that ‘since the transfer 
from Zintan to Tripoli has not yet taken place, […] access is not as readily available as it 
would otherwise be.’114  This was challenged by the OPCV, who claimed that the failure to 
secure Gaddafi’s transfer from the Zintan Brigade to the State authorities demonstrated its 
inability to investigate and prosecute the suspect.115  
 
Following the Admissibility hearing, the PTC requested Libya to confirm who had custody of 
Gaddafi, at present, whether any agreement for transfer had been made, and if so when it 
would occur.116 The Government confirmed that Gaddafi remained in Zintan and had not yet 
been transferred to either of the two prison facilitates in Tripoli that were being renovated for 
this purpose, although efforts remaining on-going to secure his transfer to Tripoli.117 As part 
of its effort to expedite the transfer process, Libya had implemented a policy to integrate 
                                                
111 See also Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Libya Challenges the Admissibility of the Cases Against Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi’ <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/02/libya-challenges-the-admissibility-of-the-cases-against-gaddafi-and-
al-senussi/> accessed 9 July 2012. 
112 The Prosecutor v Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi (Arrest Warrant Decision: Gaddafi, Gaddafi, Al-Senussi) Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-1, 27 June 
2011. 
113 GoL, Admissibility Challenge, Para 17 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 
19 of the ICC Statute relating to Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Article 19 Application: Gaddafi) (n 85) 17. 
114 Ibid, 18 
115 OPCV in Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31) 155. 
116 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7) 45. 
117  Libya Reponse, para 98-102 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the 
Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 
63) 98–102. 
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members of the Zintan Milita into the judicial police, who would bear responsibility for the 
security of Gaddafi upon his transfer to Tripoli, and that this could be completed by early 
June 2013.118 By the time of the PTC Decision, on 31 May 2013, the integration policy had 
failed to secure the transfer, leading the Chamber to note that Libya had not been able to 
secure the transfer of Gaddafi ‘from his place of detention under the custody of the Zintan 
militia into State authority.’119 The PTC recognised the efforts of what it called the ‘central 
Government’ to obtain the transfer of Gaddafi, but that ‘no concrete progress to this effect 
has been shown since the date of his apprehension on 19 November 2011’ leading the 
Chamber to conclude that the ‘problem may be resolved in the near future and no evidence 
has been produced in support of that contention’120 and that Libya remained unable to obtain 
the accused.  
 
5.3. Government authorities must have sufficient control of detention facilities of the 
suspect/accused. 
In the successful admissibility challenge in Al-Senussi, the factual circumstances concerning 
the custodial authority of the accused was not contested. While Al-Senussi had been under 
arrest in Mauritania for several months, and subject to the ICC warrant of arrest, Mauritania 
failed to transfer him to the custody of the ICC121 instead transferring him to the custody of 
the Libyan authorities, where the OTP and Government of Libya maintained that he remained 
under the custody of the States central authorities. The Defence argued that the prison 
facility, including the guards and police of Al-Hadba Prison, where Al-Senussi was held was 
not in fact under control of the government and was ‘in effect being run by militia groups 
outside of the requisite Government control.’122 The defence relied on statements by the 
International Crisis Group which reported that armed groups or revolutionary brigades 
frequently prevented the police investigators from investigating cases by refusing them 
access to detainees, including one statement by the head of a prison who refused to allow a 
                                                
118 Ibid, 99. 
119 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31) 206. 
120 Ibid, 207. 
121 As the situation of Libya had been referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council, the warrants of arrest 
remained binding on non-States Parties, which include Mauritania. However, the State did not perform its 
obligation and transferred Gaddafi back to Libya in March 2012. 
122 Defence Response to ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi 
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’ Pre-Trial Chamber I, International Criminal Court ICC01/011-01/011-
356, 14 June 2013 93. 
The International Criminal Court and Positive Complementarity: the Impact of the ICC’s Admissibility Law and 
Practice on Domestic Jurisdictions. 
210  EUI PhD Thesis
    
prosecutor to interview a detainee.123 However, they did not prove the direct relevance of this 
circumstantial evidence to the specific case of Al-Senussi and the control of the detention 
facilities at Al-Hadba, while several Libyan Annexes provided evidence of the effective 
control over Al-Hadba, through an official letter from the Prosecutor General confirming his 
detention, statements that Al-Senussi had been interviewed on a number of occasions and 
NGO reports that documented the control of Al-Hadba prison by persons recognised as 
government officials.124  
 
The PTC acknowledged that the existence of an ‘unspecified number of detention centres yet 
to be transferred under the control of the central government’ may be relevant contextual 
fact in determining the availability of the judicial system for the case against Al-Senussi. As 
such, the PTC considered that the ‘issue of whether Al-Habda prison is under the control of 
Libya is relevant to the Chamber’s consideration of Libya’s ability to obtain Mr Al-Senussi’ 
but nonetheless on the basis of the evidence presented to it from all parties, it considered that 
the government had adequately demonstrated that it ‘exercised sufficient control of the 
detention facilities’ in which Al-Senussi was being held. 125  
 
5.4. Resources to obtain and maintain the custody of the accused: courtroom and 
prison facilities 
Correlated to the requirement that the State maintains sufficient control over the detention 
facilities and courtroom facilities is the expectation that investigative, custodial and judicial 
facilities must be adequate resourced. This will require the necessary material resources, of 
the physical building and equipment, which must be secure enough to retain the accused, 
both during the trial and while in custody, as well as personnel resources, of state 
representatives who are mandated and have sufficient resources to prepare a satisfactory 
warrant of arrest, to scrutinize it and take a decision on its lawfulness, as well as to execute 
the arrest and maintain the detention.  
 
                                                
123 Ibid, 102 
124 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 
38) 264. 
125 Ibid.  
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In order to better appreciate this, the PTC requested further information of the resources 
available to obtain and maintain custody over the accused although it has not yet ruled 
authoritatively on the standard and scale of such resources. In its Request for Further 
Information in Gaddafi, they asked Libya for more details on the arrangements that had been 
made for building the courtroom complex and prison facility (see section 3.2.4 above).126 
The adequacy of resources for the fulfilment of the specific criteria, in this instance, the 
ability to obtain the accused, will also be of relevance to the general, contextual requirement 
of the condition of the national judicial system. The Libyan response, describing the prison 
facilities of Al-Hadba provides a minimal description of its material and personnel resources, 
providing information of the availability of televisions to inmates rather than the security 
resources of the prison, the number of personnel or the specific training that they may have 
received.127 Similarly, the Government response provides little to no information on the 
facilities of the South Tripoli Criminal Court, where the trial was scheduled to take place.128 
In its response to the Libyan Submission, the OPCD asserted that the lack of adequate 
resources or facilities under the control of the State was causally linked to the refusal of the 
Zintan brigade to transfer custody of the accused and the brigade was fearful that the central 
authorities could not prevent supporters of Gaddafi from attempting to free him from 
detention. Secondly, OPCD claimed that reports of torture within state prisons would put 
Gaddafi at a high risk or being tortured and killed in detention.129 
 
The PTC Decision to declare the Gaddafi case admissible to the ICC noted several factors of 
available resources relevant to obtaining the accused, noting the progress made to rebuild 
institutions and improve security conditions, notably the strategy to improve the effectiveness 
and accountability of the police service, security for the courts and participants and to reform 
detention centres to end practices of torture. Notwithstanding these reflections, the PTC did 
not assess the sufficiency of these resources, but instead referred to ‘multiple challenges’ and 
                                                
126 Decision requesting further submissions on issues related to the  admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (PTC request for further submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 7) 45. 
127 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 100. 
128 At the time of submission, the national trial against Gaddafi was proceeding before the South Tripoli 
Criminal Court, with the accused participating through video-link from a Benghazi court facility. See Euronews, 
‘Gaddafi Appears before Court in Tripoli via Videolink on War Crime Charges’ (euronews) 
<http://www.euronews.com/2014/05/11/gaddafi-appears-before-court-in-tripoli-via-videolink-on-war-crime-
charges/> accessed 3 June 2014; CNN, ‘Trial of Gadhafi’s Son in Libya Continues despite International Court 
Objection’ (CNN) <http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/25/world/africa/libya-gadhafi-son-trial/index.html> accessed 
3 June 2014. 
129 OPCD in Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 165 
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‘substantial difficulties’ to exercise its judicial powers across the territory and therefore that 
‘the national system cannot yet be applied in full in areas or aspects relevant to the case 
being thus “unavailable” within the terms of Article 17(3).’130 
 
5.5. Ability to give effect to the rights of accused when obtaining or maintaining 
custody 
The previous sections have considered the adequacy of the laws concerning arrest and 
detention of suspects or accused persons (section 5.1), the requirement of State custody over 
the accused  (section 5.2), as well as sufficient Sate control over judicial facilities  (section 
5.3), and the availability of sufficient resources to do so (section 5.4), However, the existence 
of laws as well as the physical ability to deprive a person of their liberty, should not be the 
only criteria of evaluation of obtaining the accused or maintaining the custody. In addition to 
these factors, the Court should take into consideration the qualitative ability of the State to do 
so, arguably including assessment of minimum international human rights standards that 
form the States obligations under the international treaties to which it is a member of. The 
ability of the judicial system to give effect to the rights of those persons affected by its ability 
to obtain the accused (i.e. the suspect or the accused) as well as those victims and witnesses 
who are vital for the gathering of evidence and testimony (see Section 6 below) should also 
be considered during admissibility. Some have considered this to include assessments of the 
extent to which the national justice system is able to protect the accused person from 
incrimination, coercion and torture, to provide information on the alleged criminal conduct, 
as well as access to an interpreter.131  
 
The OPCD raised similar issues in Gaddafi, where it suggested that the Libyan authorities 
lacked the capacity to implement judicial orders, such as the transfer of custody and the 
appointment of defence counsel, and that this demonstrated conclusively that the criminal 
justice system was ineffective.132 They sought to assert that the State could did not have the 
capacity to enable the accused to exercise his rights under Libyan law, as Libya had not 
produced records of his interrogation, or information on the dates or subject-matter of 
                                                
130 Ibid, 205. 
131 Anja Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford University Press 2009) 561. 
132 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 172. 
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questioning, and that the remand orders for Gaddafi did not include references to his 
interrogations.133 Its second tranche of concerns arose around the inability to find counsel 
willing to act for Gaddafi, with the consequence that he would be questioned in the absence 
of legal representation, and third that Libya had not demonstrated that Gaddafi had in fact 
waived his right to view investigative materials or confront the witnesses against him.134 
Finally, in relation to the standards of custody, the OPCD challenged Libya’s contention that 
it had demonstrated it had capacity to detain Gaddafi in a secure and humane environment in 
Tripoli.135  
 
The Government of Libya rejected the OPCD claims, asserting that Gaddafi's detention has 
been judicially approved by Tripoli based judges, that he had been visited in detention by 
representatives of human rights organisations on several occasions with the full cooperation 
of the local Zintan authorities,136 that he had been questioned on several occasions, in 
addition to having been informed of the accusations and evidence against him and that he had 
chosen not to exercise his right to view the investigative materials.137 Finally, Libya argued 
for the limitation of the scope of admissibility, claiming that: 
‘admissibility enquiry requires only a consideration of whether the specific domestic 
proceedings are being carried out genuinely with an intent to bring the person to 
justice and does not extend to an exacting scrutiny of proceedings from the 
perspective of a human rights court.’138 
 
The PTC omitted to determine the relevance of these claims, or to elaborate on the extent to 
which national proceedings should give effect to due process protections of the accused, 
within the context of the State’s ability to obtain them, as it preferred to simply determine 
who had control over Gaddafi. Instead, the Chambers chose to assess aspects of the effect of 
                                                
133 Public Redacted Version of the ‘Response to the Libyan Government’s further submissions on issues related 
to the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’"(Defence Response to Libya’s Further 
Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) Office of Public Counsel for Defence ICC‐01/11‐01/11-281-Red2, 18 
February 2012 196–199. 
134 Ibid, 207-212, 258-268. 
135 Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility, (n 63), 48-49. 
136 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 86. 
137 Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63), 88-93. 
138 Ibid, 84. 
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domestic laws to protect the accused, within the third specific criteria, or otherwise unable to 
carry out proceedings (see section 7 below).139 
 
6. Obtaining Necessary Evidence and Testimony 
The second specific element of article 17(3) requires that the relevant national justice 
authorities are unable to obtain necessary evidence and testimony. While article 17(1) 
provides latitude over national adjudication from investigation through to the final decision 
of a case, this criteria forms part of the investigative activities of the State, as an essential 
component in building a case file that is capable of proving that one or more crimes have 
been committed by named individuals, according to the legal requirements of the criminal 
conduct and attributable liability.140 Article 93(1) on other forms of cooperation, lists the 
types of evidentiary activities that it may request of States, which could inter-alia serve as a 
guide to the ICC in assessing the State’s ability to obtain necessary evidence and 
testimony:141   
‘(a) The identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items; 
(b) The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of 
evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;  
(c) The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;  
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of 
grave sites;  
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;  
(i) The provision of records and documents, including official records and 
documents; 
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets 
and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without 
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.’142  
 
                                                
139 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 212- 214. 
140 Morten Bergsmo and William H Wiley, ‘Human Rights Professionals and the Criminal Investigation and 
Prosecution of Core International Crimes’, Manual on Human Rights Monitoring An Introduction for Human 
Rights Field Officers (third revised, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2000). 
141 Claus Kress and Kimberly Prost, ‘Article 93: Other Forms of Cooperation’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  : observers’ notes, article by article 
(Nomos). 
142 Article 93(1) Rome Statute (n 13). 
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The six activities outlined above are indicative of the breadth of methods and categories of 
evidence necessary for adjudication of core international crimes. While these practices of 
evidence gathering may be more or less familiar in ordinary as well as organized crime 
investigations, their magnitude as well as complexity escalates exponentially when applied to 
international crime conduct, due to the need to gather evidence of sufficient quality and 
probity to satisfy the criminal charges against an individual.  
 
While the ability to obtain evidence and testimony will be tested according to the case or 
investigation-specific rationale of the admissibility regime, it requires that the national justice 
system have in place a legal framework that sufficiently governs and empowers the relevant 
authorities to gather evidence, as well as the resources to do so. As with the other 
admissibility criteria, the PTC have so far preferred to assess the State according to its 
domestic legal framework, thereby limiting any arguments of direct effect of either the ICC’s 
own protections or standards governing the gathering of evidence and testimony or of 
external international obligations or standards.  
 
6.1. Necessary evidence and testimony should be specific and sufficiently probative 
The text of Article 17(3) establishes a threshold of ‘necessary evidence and testimony’ which 
has been understood as a synonym for sufficiency, for the purpose of securing criminal 
conviction only, rather than deeper purposes such as to create ‘a correct and complete 
historical record’ which, while Stigen accepts may be a broad aim of criminal proceedings, 
he argues that is not the aim of the admissibility procedure, which is to check that impunity is 
not being protected.143 A logical consequence of this is that the admissibility procedure 
should concentrate on the evidence that the State obtains, rather than expectations or rumour 
of what else may exist, and this evidence should be examined for its qualitative and 
quantitative sufficiency only.144  Correlated to this, the admissibility assessment of the 
evidence and testimony should not determine if the evidence submitted satisfies the charges 
and liabilities under the national case file, but rather it assesses the sufficiency and probity of 
the evidence. 
                                                
143 Stigen (n 11). Chapter 9. 
144 In Al-Senussi, the Prosecutor argued that ‘the threshold under Article 17(3) is not that any evidence cannot 
be gathered, but that the necessary evidence and testimony cannot be obtained as a result of a total or substantial 
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system.’ See Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi (n 38) 191. 
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In its admissibility challenge for the Gaddafi case, Libya submitted summaries of witness 
statements three witness categories that had been collected by competent authorities (those 
authorised under its CPC): close friends of Gaddafi, high ranking military commanders, 
civilian volunteers who accompanied Gaddafi and victims family members and largely 
contained information about the role played by Gaddafi. In its assessment of these 
summaries, the PTC considered that they provided ‘some detail of the alleged evidence given 
by the witnesses and hence they have some inferential value about the existence and content 
off evidence.’145 In its review of these submissions in Al-Senussi, the PTC concluded that 
such summaries where nonetheless ‘fragmented and decontextualized short summaries of 
isolated information’ which provided ‘scant level of detail’ and ‘a lack of specificity’ which 
did not give ‘an intelligible overview of the factual allegations investigated by the competent 
authorities.’146 In general, the PTC has considered that the provision of summaries of 
evidence or testimony, as well as letters or specially prepared materials, to be inadequate, and 
with little or no actual significance to the purpose of the admissibility procedures.147  
 
In furtherance of its submission of evidence collected as part of its domestic investigation, 
Libya submitted three categories of testimony: witness statements drawn by local observers, 
military personnel or persons associated to the former regime and civilian demonstrators, 
several of which the PTC acknowledges as providing details of discrete aspects of incidents; 
documentary evidence including flight documents, medical documents and written orders 
several of which the Chambers considered to be relevant to the case against Al-Senussi, 
demonstrating concrete steps of inquiry and intercepts which they accepted in support the 
planning and coordination of the use of force. 148  
 
In reviewing the ability to obtain evidence and testimony, the Chamber chose to recall its 
findings from the first limb of the admissibility test (that the national investigative activity 
covered the same person and same conduct) to conclude that Libya had demonstrated that it 
had the ability to obtain the necessary evidence and testimony in three ways (i) the adequacy 
investigative steps by the Prosecutor-General's investigative team demonstrated through 
                                                
145 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 127. 
146 Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi (n 38), 87. 
147 Ibid, 88-99. 
148 Ibid, 106-157. 
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witnesses interviews, documentary evidence, and requests to external sources for specific 
information; (ii) that multiple lines of investigation were followed in order to ascertain 
relevant facts in determining the alleged criminal responsibility of Al Senussi; and (iii) that 
witnesses interviews included opportunities to identify potential exculpatory nature, to 
comment on other witness information or documentary evidence, and to clarify their own 
interviews, while victims were requested to provide supporting documentary evidence of the 
alleged harm suffered.149 However, the PTC concluded that where such thresholds are met, 
the Chambers are required to consider whether ‘there are relevant factual circumstances that 
would negate any such ability.’150 
 
To date, the admissibility challenges have provided a framework through which four factual 
circumstances have been identified and analysed by the Pre-Trial Chambers: methods of 
gathering testimony and coherence with national legal framework; adequacy of investigative 
measures; security and control over territory; and witness protection. 
 
6.2. Methods of Gathering Testimony  
The legality of the methods of gathering testimony was challenged by the OPCD during the 
Gaddafi Admissibility Challenge procedure. They claimed that the taking of witness 
testimony had violated the Libyan criminal code, which provides the Prosecutor with the sole 
authority to submit and proceed with criminal actions,151 by incorporating testimonies into 
the case file that were gathered by voluntary committees or local council members who were 
outside of the authority of the Prosecutor.152 This they claimed raised fair-trial concerns and 
demonstrated that Libya lacked the ability to gather testimony. The Government responded 
by rejecting the argument and sought to clarify that all witness testimonies that were included 
in the investigative case file were prepared in accordance to the criminal code and were taken 
by members of the office of the Prosecutor General.153 In summarising the submissions of the 
parties, the PTC accepted Libya’s response, accepting that the interviews, summaries and 
                                                
149Ibid, 217. 
150 Ibid,  297. 
151 Article 1, Libyan Criminal Code. 
152 Libyan Government’s consolidated reply to the response of the Prosecution, OPCD and OPCV to its further 
submission on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Reply: Gaddafi Admissibility) 
(n 82) 75–86. 
153 Ibid, 80. 
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statements that will be included in the national proceedings were prepared in accordance to 
the Criminal Code and were not conducted or prepared by committees of volunteers, thuwar, 
or local council members.154 
 
6.3. Security and Control over Territory and Judiciary 
In Gaddafi the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) submitted that the overall lack 
of territorial security and control in Libya had created problems in the physical exercise of 
obtaining the necessary evidence and testimony, providing protection and security for victims 
and witnesses, as well as maintaining trained and qualified staff, including judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers, who were prepared to work on such high-risk cases under the 
security conditions. Using reports by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative155 
they sought to draw a picture of the general absence of the reach and authority of the 
government security apparatus, where fights amongst rival brigades would often escalate into 
lengthy and deadly conflicts and strain the ability of the national security forces to restrain 
further outbreaks of violence and restore order. Turning to the availability of the justice 
system, OPCV referred to the UN Special Representative’s general assertion that ‘the 
majority of courts in the country are not fully operational owing to the lack of adequate 
security at court premises and the continued absence from work of judges and administrative 
staff.’156 While the PTC recognised the very real and considerable challenges that Libya 
faced as a post-conflict transitioning government, they nonetheless found that the specific 
requirements of inability should be determined according to the specific case at hand, where 
such general breakdowns and challenges would be considered as contextual information in 
regard of the condition of the judicial system, but could not sufficiently demonstrate the 
inability of the specific judicial and prosecutorial units to conduct the investigation into the 
actions of Gaddafi. 
 
                                                
154 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 194. 
155 Ian Martin, also head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). OPCV at 33-42, cites the following 
statements: UN NEWS CENTRE, "Libya facing challenging transition, but authorities striving to succeed ;  
United Nations Webcasts, Ian Martin Reporting to the UN Security council 10 May 2012, available at: 
http://www.unmultimed ia.org/tv/webcast/2012/05/security- council-meeting-the-situation-in-libya-english-
5.html. 
156 Observations on behalf of victims on the Government of Libya’s Application pursuant to Article 19 of the 
Rome Statute (n 30) 44. Citing Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 
U.N. Doc. SHOW1717,11 November 2011, 27. 
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6.4. Adequate Witness Protection 
The ability to obtain necessary witnesses and testimony is largely dependent on the 
availability, effectiveness and neutrality of adequate protection programmes: in the absence 
of a witness protection programme that demonstrates each of these features, the likelihood of 
witnesses refusing to testify increases hugely. Within the parameters of Article 17(3) the 
absence of necessary witness testimony can significantly reduce the ability of the national 
judicial system and, as occurred in the case of Gaddafi, lead to declarations of admissibility. 
While witness protection programmes are typically grounded in the fundamental rights of 
individuals, in this case witnesses, they are also intimately connected to the rights of the 
defence, as evidenced in the transfer decisions of the ICTR (see section 5.4.1 below) and to 
the availability of necessary evidence to ensure an effective trial. Despite the almost obvious 
importance of witness protection programmes as part of the Article 17(3) evaluation, very 
few publicists considered its importance, not least those pursuing ultra-compliance with the 
ICC Statute, or the upward harmonisation of national laws and practices with international 
standards. This should no longer be the case: as the two Libya cases ably demonstrate (see 
5.4.2 below) witness protection will form a central consideration in assessing the ability of 
States to obtain evidence and testimony. 
 
Obtaining Witness Testimony and Fair Trial Protections: the ICTR Transfer Decisions 
The link between the ability to obtain witness testimony and fair trial protections was 
repeatedly assessed by the ICTR Transfer Panel between 2007 and 2011, where witnesses 
refused to participate in domestic trials due to fears of reprisals or arrest. The ICTR Transfer 
Panels were required to assess Rwanda’s’ fair trial procedures in order to determine if cases 
could be transferred back to the domestic criminal justice system. The Transfer Panels found 
that various deficiencies in its Witness Protection measures prevented the ability to obtain 
defence witnesses testimony, thereby violating the fair trial rights of the accused. 
 
In Uwinkindi, the defence submitted affidavits from nine of their nationally based witnesses 
who declared that they would not testify before any national court for fear of harassment, 
threats, imprisonment or of being killed, linking their perception of threat to inadequate and 
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un-trusted protection schemes.157 ICTR-appointed defence teams pointed to Article 58 of the 
domestic criminal procedural code, which barred suspects from providing witness testimony, 
claiming that it would reduce their ability to obtain testimony from collaborator witnesses, 
thereby, reducing their ability to mount a suitable defence.158 International witnesses in 
Hategekimana and Kayishema refused to travel to Rwanda for the same fears of intimidation 
or arrest, not least as the travel arrangements of all witnesses were made by the Genocide 
Fugitive Tracking Office, a part of the Office of the Attorney General with the mandate to 
track all genocide fugitives.159 Furthermore, while a Witness Protection Unit had been 
established, it too formed part of the AG Office, creating an expectation of prejudice against 
defence witnesses, especially as reports of abuse or intimidation committed by the Unit were 
to be reported to police. 160 The Munyakazi Transfer Panel heard amici briefs that contested 
the capacity of the unit to adequately protect witnesses, with a clear perception among 
Rwandan witnesses that authorities regularly breached protective measures with the effect 
that their willingness to testify in transferred cases did not exist.161   
 
The government responded by offering to provide video-link facilities so that international 
witnesses could testify from their current location, with international funding readily 
provided. They eventually separated the WPU from the office of the attorney general and 
attached it to the office of the registrar, and created a special immunity from article 58 of the 
criminal procedural code for all witnesses of transfer cases.  
 
The Transfer Panels swiftly accepted the special immunities offered to the ICTR transfer 
cases, which complemented other special provisions set out on the Transfer Law.162 They 
considered that the defence witnesses’ fear of using the WPU constituted a threat to the fair 
                                                
157 Prosecutor v Jean Uwinkindi, Decision on Prosecutor’s request for the Referral of the Case of Jean 
Uwinkwindi ICTR Transfer Panel ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, 28 June 2011 70–72. 
158 Ibid, 37. 
159 Prosecutor v Ildephonse Hategekimana, Decision on Prosecutor’s request for the Referral of the Case of 
Ildephonse Hategekimana ICTR Transfer Panel ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, 09 June 2008 40; Prosecutor v Fulgence 
Kayishema, Decision on Prosecutor’s request for the Referral of the Case of Fulgence Kayishema 27–31. 
160 Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Decision on Prosecutor’s request for the Referral of the Case of Jean 
Uwinkwindi (n 157) 118–119; Prosecutor v. Fulgence Kayishema, Decision on Prosecutor’s request for the 
Referral of the Case of Fulgence Kayishema (n 159). 
161 Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on Prosecutor’s request for the Referral of the Case of Yussuf 
Munyakazi, ICTR Transfer Panel ICTR-97-36-R11bis, 28 May 2008 at para 85 and 87. 
162 which included barring the death penalty as well as life imprisonment in solitary confinement as potential 
sentences for the transfer accused. 
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trial of the accused. 163  Turning to the use of video-link testimony as a solution for 
international witnesses who could not be compelled to testify in situ through mutual legal 
assistance programmes, the Transfer Panels were unambiguous. They declared that ‘the use 
of video-link testimony cannot be considered as a substitution for whole scale testimony’ in 
the manner proposed by the Government of Rwanda. Even its exceptional use, they 
continued, cannot be equated with the presence of the witness in the Courtroom, as it is 
widely accepted that the ability to determine the credibility of the witness is significantly 
challenged.164 For these reasons, it would not be satisfactory to use of video link in anything 
other than exceptional circumstances. The reliance of either party on a significant proportion 
of its witness testimony through video-link, would, they concluded, violate the principle of 
equality of arms and thereby fail to provide the accused with a fair trial.165 
 
While the transfer decisions clearly reveal the limitations of Rwanda’s witness protection 
programme to obtain witness testimony for these ICTR cases, 166 does it demonstrate an 
inability to do so? In each of the transfer decisions, the defence counsel of the ICTR, rather 
than the Attorney Generals’ Office or the National Bar Association, had identified defence 
witnesses and secured their pre-trial testimony, rather than their national counterparts. The 
Rwandan Bar Association had provided repeated assurances of its willingness, ability and 
previous experience in representing others accused of participating in the genocide and the 
Witness Protection Unit provided figures of the number of witnesses that it had provided 
protection to, showing that core services associated with witness participation existed in 
general. However, in the particular cases under consideration, the witnesses, whether 
nationally or internationally based, overwhelmingly declined to provide their testimony to the 
                                                
163 Prosecutor v Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11 bi ICTR Appeals Chamber ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, 30 October 2008 87. 
164 Prosecutor v Protais Zigiranyrazo, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal ICTR Appeals Chamber ICTR-2001-
73-AR73, 30 October 2006 19; The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic et al (‘Celebići’), Decision on the Motion to 
Allow Witnesses K, L and M to Give Their Testimony by Means of Video-Link Conference [2005] ICTY Trial 
Chamber IT-95-9, 28 May 1997 18. 
165 Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11 bi (n 163) 79–81. 
166 They also indicate some of the negotiation that can occur in decisions over the allocation of jurisdiction, 
where legislative amendments to adjust the penalties of the accused, as well as providing additional protections 
for witnesses etc were considered sufficient to satisfy the ICTR’s requirements. It may be foreseeable that 
similar sorts of specialized guarantees are provided for ICC admissibility cases, thereby creating the same tiered 
national justice system that has troubled some commentators in the ICTR/Rwanda cases. 
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national justice system, effectively rendering the State unable to obtain witness testimony for 
the accused persons.167  
 
The ICTR transfer cases illustrate some of the tensions inherent in adjudicating over the 
ability of a national criminal justice system to carry out proceedings, in particular of the 
multiplicity of norms that can be referred to in order to determine ability. The unavailability 
of witness protection can clearly jeopordise the ability to obtain testimony as well as to 
provide a fair trial and is an indicator towards the overall functioning of the justice system. 
 
 
Adequacy of National Witness Protection Programmes 
Returning to the ICC and its tentative framework for assessing the ability requirements, the 
provision of an adequate witness protection programme in law and fact has been accepted as 
an important feature in determining admissibility. Within the two Libya cases, the adequacy 
of the legal framework for protecting witnesses and its availability in fact were questioned 
and examined. 
 
Under Libyan Law, witness protection measures are available during the investigative phase, 
including non-disclosure of investigative materials, in-camera witness testimony, witness 
anonymity and police protection: these measures can be continued at trial, upon the discretion 
of the trial judge as part of their powers ‘to receive evidence in whatever form he or she 
deems appropriate.’ 168 During the Gaddafi proceedings, both the OPCV and OPCD 
challenged the adequacy of Libya’s legal framework for witness protection: for its failure to 
provide special witness protection for victims and the lack of continuity of protective 
measures in the transition from the pre-trial phase, where measures are compulsory, to the 
trial phase where they become discretionary upon the decision of the trial judge.169 The 
OPCD claimed that the Witness Protection Program failed to provide defence orientated 
measures, and that the possibility of withholding the identity of prosecution witnesses the 
                                                
167 Similarly, following the NATO invasion of Kosovo, large groups of people were unwilling to testify before 
the national courts. See Florenz, The Rule of law in Kosovo: prospects and problems’ Criminal Law Forum, 
2000, volume 11, page 130. 
168 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 63) 65. 
169 According to Article 59 of the Criminal Procedural Code. Ibid, 95. 
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defence would be a violation of defence rights and would nonetheless fail to protect all 
witnesses or prevent leaking of sensitive information from the judicial authorities.170  
 
Equally, the PTC requested Libya to provide further information on whether it will 
implement protective measures for witnesses who agree to testify, if it has the capacity to do 
so, what steps had been taken already to achieve this and whether the security situation 
inhibits this.171 Libya’s one paragraph response to these issues was generally deemed 
insufficient by the PTC, although it accepted that the discretionary power of the Trial 
Chamber Judges existed in law: 
‘further to its submission that trial judges have discretionary powers to order 
protective measures, Libya has presented no evidence about specific protection 
programmes that may exist under domestic law. It is unclear, for instance, whether 
the domestic law provides for the immunity of statements made by witnesses at trial. 
In addition, it is unclear whether witnesses for the suspect may effectively benefit 
from such programmes. As such, the Libyan Government has failed to substantiate its 
assertions that it envisages the implementation of protective measures for witnesses 
who agree to testify in the case against Mr Gaddafi. Therefore, and in light of the 
circumstances, the Chamber is not persuaded by the assertion that the Libyan 
authorities currently have the capacity to ensure protective measures.’172 
 
Absence of Specific Measures: Fear of Collective Punishment and Control Over Witnesses 
Within Detention Facilities 
 
In Gaddafi, the Defence argued that the unrest, the on-going control of local areas by militias 
and brigades and the general lack of security all impacted on the ability to obtain witness 
testimony. Notably, the existence of a collective punishment campaign against those 
considered an associate of Gaddafi, as well as the public arrest of Gaddafi's defence counsel 
from OPCD and the seizure of confidential defence materials had deterred witnesses from 
testifying in defence of Gaddafi, with some evidence of irregularities in proceedings against 
                                                
170 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 173. 
171 Ibid, 42. 
172 Ibid, 211. 
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other Gaddafi era officials. 173 
 
In declaring Libya unable to obtain testimony in Gaddafi, the Chamber expressed its concern 
at the lack of capacity to obtain the necessary testimony, evidenced through ‘the inability of 
judicial and governmental authorities to ascertain control and provide adequate witness 
protection.’ It went on to note that the UNSMIL reports of torture and mistreatment of 
conflict-related detainees including senior former regime174 which has a direct impact on the 
ability to obtain witness testimony, including defence testimony, as it will deter prospective 
witnesses from coming forward and will exclude testimony from those who have been 
tortured or even killed. To substantiate the loss of control over detention facilities, and its 
impact on obtaining witness testimony, the PTC recalled Libya’s Admissibility Challenge, 
where it envisaged that it would take two witness statements for Gaddafi's, which in the 13 
month duration of the admissibility challenge had not been possible for the Libyan 
investigators to do as the two individuals remained in detention facilities which were outside 
the control of the Libyan Government.175 
 
The PTC confirmed this approach in Al-Senussi, considering that: 
‘in the context of a potentially precarious security situation across the country, 
witnesses may be afraid of coming forward or may be eliminated, ultimately causing 
prejudice to the domestic proceedings. The security situation of witnesses is therefore 
relevant to the Chamber's conclusion on whether Libya is unable genuinely to carry 
out the proceedings against Mr Al-Senussi.’176 
Absence of Witness Protection Programme is Insufficient by Itself  
Finally, while the PTC have accepted that the failure to provide adequate provision and 
availability of witness protection in the case at hand can render the State unable to obtain 
testimony, it has also accepted that, of itself, the absence of adequate witness protection may 
not be sufficient to render a case admissible. 
 
In Al-Senussi, the PTC returned to the issue of whether Libya had enacted a specific 
                                                
173 Ibid, 171. 
174 Ibid, 209. 
175 Ibid, 210. 
176 Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi (n 38), 283. 
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protection programme under domestic law that would be capable of protecting those 
witnesses necessary for the case, and found that the concern continued, as Libya had failed to 
provide ‘new submissions […] to demonstrate the existence and effective functioning of a 
witness protection programme in the country.’177 In reviewing the absence of a specific 
witness protection program within the context of the security situation, the Prosecutor urged 
the PTC to:  
‘resist engaging in speculative assessments as to the outcome of possible future events 
at the national level; and on the other, remain vigilant to obvious obstacles, 
established on the basis of concrete evidence that establish a foreseeable risk that 
national proceedings cannot in fact be carried out.’178  
 
The Chamber decided to consider the issue of an ongoing absence of an effective witness 
protection programme in light of two relevant factors, which it identified as (i) whether 
credible information exists which indicates the intentional exposure of witnesses to security 
threats;179 (ii) whether the absence of an effective protection programmes for witnesses 
combined with the fact that certain detention facilities are yet to be transferred under the 
authority of the Ministry of Justice created untenable security challenges, 180  before 
concluding that there was ‘no indication that collection of evidence and testimony has ceased 
or will cease because of unaddressed security concerns for witnesses in the case against Mr 
Al-Senussi.’181 Despite the acknowledged security challenges, the Chambers reconginsed that 
the domestic proceedings had not been prejudiced by them, which the Chambers felt had 
been demonstrated though ‘progressive and concrete investigative steps’ which had enabled 
the judicial proceedings to reach the accusation stage.182 
 
While the ICC jurisprudence has largely addressed the ability to obtain testimony through 
issues of security and witness protection measures, it has also considered the ability and 
capacity to gather evidence, including the identification and whereabouts of persons, the 
location of items and the preservation of evidence.  
                                                
177 Ibid, 287. 
178Prosecution Additional Observations to ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya relating to 
Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’ ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-
355/Red, 14 June 2013, 24. 
179 Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi (n 38), 288. 
180 Ibid, 297. 
181 Ibid, 298. 
182 Ibid, 299. 
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7. Otherwise Unable to Carry Out its Proceedings. 
The third and final test of inability is a catch-all clause that requires States to be able to carry 
out proceedings in the case concerned, in addition to the two requirements expressly included 
in article 17(3). This provides the Court with considerable leeway in interpreting national 
proceedings and the ability of the national justice system to pursue them. It also shares many 
features with the two preceding requirements: Stigen suggests that it could include the 
inability to interrogate the alleged perpetrators, or to examine and analyse evidence properly, 
both factors that overlap with, or extend the ability to obtain accused persons testimony or 
evidence.183 Rather than consider indicative factors of ‘otherwise unavailable’ Benzing 
considers that the criteria is ‘the subordinate concept of the other two, and at the same time 
serves as a generic term capturing all other possible situations.’184 The criterion has also 
enabled the Court to consider certain due process rights as well as other features of criminal 
justice that may not fit directly into a strict definition of the two preceding criteria: for 
example, early arguments submitted to the PTC sought to argue that the ability to obtain the 
suspect should cease to be applicable following the capture and detention of the individual, or 
that the ability to obtain testimony or evidence should exclude procedural flaws. The third 
criterion has provided a route through which these dimensions can be considered, which the 
Chambers have used wisely. However generic it may appear, the general requirement of the 
status of the national judicial system serves to reinforce the need for such unavailability to be 
clearly located within the general condition of total or substantial collapse or unavailable, 
while the second element of the requirement restricts its application to the case at hand. 
 
The approach of the PTC has been to use this third criterion to more fully explore due process 
rights of the defence, notably the fulfilment of the right to legal representation, real-time 
assessments, general conditions of security (see section 6.4.3) and the assertion of the 
authority of judicial powers, in how they affect the fulfilment of the specific requirements as 
well as the general condition of the national judicial system. 
 
 
                                                
183 Stigen (n 11) Chapter 9, section 2.7. 
184 Benzing (n 27) 616. 
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7.1. Due Process Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons: the Right to Legal 
Representation 
The due process rights of the accused figured heavily in the two Libya cases, as has been 
seen throughout this chapter: while the PTC often reflected on this as part of the ability to 
obtain the accused, these factors figured more prominently in its assessment of the national 
judicial system to otherwise conduct its proceedings, on the basis of its ability to adhere to its 
national legal framework.185 
 
In Gaddafi, the challenges of securing legal representation for members of a former regime 
were adjudicated: while provided for under Article 106 of the Libyan Criminal Procedure 
Code, the accused had not exercised his right to appoint counsel, and the State was unable to 
secure legal representation. The Defence cautioned that the factual circumstances for defence 
lawyers in Libya raised ‘significant practical impediments’ due to the general security 
situation and the documented risks faced by lawyers who act for the former regime.’186 The 
Government provided details of its attempts to secure independent legal representation for 
Gaddafi, including consultation with the Libyan Law Society, the Popular Lawyer's Office in 
Libya as well as the Bar Associations of Tunisia and Egypt, in order to obtain suitably 
qualified and experienced counsel.187 The inability to secure legal representation for Gaddafi 
had frustrated the ability for the national case to proceed, as the national legal framework 
requires that the accused have legal representation following the transition from the 
accusatory phase to the trial phase. 188  With this in mind, and the absence of any 
substantiation of how the State would overcome this impediment, the Pre-Trial Chambers 
found Libya otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.189 
 
In Al-Senussi, the impact of general conditions of security across Libya, such as attacks on 
ministries and governmental entities, as well as collective punishments against those who 
provided representation of former regime officials, on the ability to ensure adequate legal 
                                                
185 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 212- 214 and Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 38) 206. 
186 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 212 
187 Ibid, 213 
188 articles 31 and 33 of  Libya’s 2011 Constitutional Declaration prohibits trial from being conducted where the 
accused does not have legal representation. In contrast Articl 106 of the Crimnal Procedural Code allows 
interrogations to continue in the absence of legal representation, until legal representation has been appointed: 
after that moment, interrogations must occur with the legal representation present. Ibid, 214. 
189 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 31), 212-215 
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representation was widely discussed.190 The Chamber again emphasised that the ‘alleged 
violations of the accused's procedural rights are not per se grounds for a finding of 
unwillingness or inability under article 17 of the Statute’191 and that the allegations of the 
modalities of unlawful rendition in the transfer of Al-Senussi from Mauritania to Libya ‘do 
not demonstrate, or otherwise indicate, the existence of one of the scenarios envisaged under 
article 17(2) or (3) of the Statute.’192 
 
7.2. Real-time Assessments 
The same challenge of securing legal representation was faced in Al-Senussi, although the 
judicial activities remained within the investigatory phase. The Prosecutor argued that the 
‘real-time’ assessment of admissibility should allow the case to remain within the national 
jurisdiction, arguing that the Chamber ‘cannot base its decision on the admissibility of the 
case now on possible future facts’ but that it must be satisfied ‘that there is no impediment or 
defect that would render the future appointment of counsel impossible’ in order that Libya 
could be found otherwise able to carry out its proceedings.193 The Defence Counsel cautioned 
that the right to legal representation during the investigation phase of the case is provided 
under national law, and that the review of the case by the Accusation Chamber, including the 
appointment of legal representation is ‘one of the key roles’ of the Accusation Chamber.194 
 
In reviewing the facts of the submissions, the PTC considered that Libya had ‘provided 
persuasive information’ that the investigation into Al-Senussi was being conducted in a 
manner that was consistent with the intent to bring Mr Al-Senussi to justice and that 
following the transfer of the case to the Accusation Chamber the Court found that the 
evidence and submissions demonstrated that Al-Senussi's right to legal representation had 
primarily been prejudiced by the security situation of the country an not through any 
malicious intent. 195  The Chambers found this fact relevant to its Article 17(3) 
determinations196 before concluding that ‘the problem of legal representation, while not 
                                                
190 Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi (n 38), 228-240 
191 Ibid, 235. 
192 Ibid, 236. 
193 Ibid, 194. 
194 Ibid, 206. 
195 Ibid, 292. 
196 Ibid, 304. 
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compelling at the present time, holds the potential to become a fatal obstacle to the progress 
of the case.’ However, as the PTC had frequently held that ‘the admissibility of a case must 
be determined in light of the circumstances existing at the time of the admissibility 
proceedings’ it chose to determine whether the current circumstances, notably the security 
situation, provided ‘a concrete impediment to the future appointment of counsel’197 before 
concluding that it didn’t, in the present circumstances, but may well in the future, thereby 
determining to remain observant of the progress of the domestic proceedings through the 
OTP. 
 
7.3. Assertion of the Authority of Judicial Powers  
The final issue to form part of the assessment of the ability to carry out proceeding in the 
Libya cases, concerned the ability of the authorities to exert its judicial powers. Intricately 
linked to the general security conditions, the PTC addressed the alleged abduction or arrest of 
a prosecutor that the OPCD alleged was the Deputy prosecutor in Al-Senussi’s case198 and 
the subsequent attempts to secure the release of the Prosecutor, first by the Minister of Justice 
and then by the Attorney General. The OPCD claimed that the prosecutor was abducted, 
while Libya maintained that he was arrested as part of a general disturbance, along with the 
Investment Undersecretary and a congressman. The Chamber considered that, on the basis of 
information in its possession, it was unable to determine the circumstances of the 
Prosecutor’s ‘abduction’ or arrest’, nor whether there was any link with his involvement in 
the proceedings against Mr Al-Senussi.199 The Chamber went on to analyse the potential 
impact of such targeted threats or violence against judicial authorities, adopting the view that 
such occurrences do not necessarily entail ‘collapse’ or ‘unavailability’ of the Libyan judicial 
system within the meaning of article 17(3) but that ‘the existence of serious security concerns 
in Libya is an issue relevant to the final determination on Libya's ability to conduct its 
proceedings against Mr Al-Senussi.’200 
 
                                                
197 Ibid, 307. 
198 Ibid, 274; Defence Response to the ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 
of the ICC Statute’ (Defence Observations: Gaddafi Admissibility) (n 109) 97. 
199 Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi (n 38) 275. 
200 Ibid, 275. 
The International Criminal Court and Positive Complementarity: the Impact of the ICC’s Admissibility Law and 
Practice on Domestic Jurisdictions. 
230  EUI PhD Thesis
    
In summary, the first decisions of the Court on the ability of national judicial systems to 
pursue investigations and prosecutions of cases under the scrutiny of its Prosecutor have 
helped to dispel some of the early criticisms of it, either as a mechanism to further stigmatise 
countries emerging from civil war or other disasters201 or as a tool of rich mans’ justice, 
where ability measures would work to protect rich, developed countries while further 
penalizing those conflict and poverty-racked countries that lacked the sophisticated 
infrastructures of their wealthier counterparts. 202  The reception of and adherence to 
international human rights norms is often caught in this paradigm, with less-developed States 
struggling to accommodate the sheer scale of legal and behavioural reform required to come 
anywhere close to fulfilling these norms in their criminal justice practice. While the Court has 
remained sensitive to these realities, its mandate is not to compensate for the developmental 
ills of the world but to determine whether a particular States’ performance leaves it willing 
and able to adjudicate over the case or investigation under consideration.  
 
 
                                                
201 M. H. Arsanjani, Reflections of the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanisms of the International Ceiinal Court, 
in H. von Hebbel et al (eds.) ‘Reflections on the International Criminal Court,’ 1999, at page 70. 
202 See Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach, in von Hebbel, 
page 131. 
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Chapter 7 
Defining the Goldilocks Zone: The Impact of ICC Admissibility Law 
and Practice on Domestic Jurisdiction 	  
 
This Chapter concludes the thesis by pulling together each of the arguments laid out in the 
introduction and examined in Chapters 1 to 5, in order to conclude the parameters of national 
criminal justice practices that are coherent to the ICC and its Statute and therefore 
inadmissible before it. In doing so, it is helpful to return to the astronomers Goldilocks Zone, 
that zone or threshold where the conditions exist to enable life to occur, to establish its 
international criminal justice equivalent, where the conditions of national criminal justice 
laws, procedures and practices enable complementarity-proof criminal justice to occur. 
 
In doing so, this Chapter reaffirms those features or dimensions of the various models of 
complementarity that are applicable to the ICC Statute, concluding that the models over-
emphasised the procedural and substantive law requirements of Article 17 subparagraphs (2) 
and (3) and overlooked the importance of Article 17(1) in shaping the complementarity 
contours between criminal justice activities of the ICC and States. To remedy this error, the 
conclusion then extrapolates the established and emerging tests of admissibility, which can 
serve as guidelines to national criminal justice actors. It would be a fools-errand to conclude 
this thesis without confronting the emergent tensions between those national criminal justice 
practices that satisfy the ICC’s complementarity system and the rules and principles that have 
been established by international human rights mechanisms. 
 
Having provided full disclosure of the international criminal justice Goldilocks Zone, this 
conclusion turns to the consequences of such a reality, upon the concept of positive 
complementarity and the role that the ICC should assume in establishing a firm and stable 
basis for the development of national capacity to adjudicate core international crimes. It finds 
that, as an intergovernmental organisation, the ICC has powers to engage in limited capacity 
building activities, but that in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Court as well as to 
reinforce legal certainty and equality of its functioning, such actions should remain coherent 
to the rules and tests established by the ICC through its judicial activities. Subject to a clear 
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division of labour, the thesis considers that such activities can be conducted in partnership 
with relevant and suitably qualified organisations.  
 
Finally, this chapter incorporates the relevant findings of the latest Admissibility Appeal 
Judgment, in the case of Gaddafi, into each section of the Chapter, along with the separate 
opinion of Judge Song and the dissenting opinion of Judge Usacka.1 
 
1. The Procedural and Substantive Content of the Rome Statute has Little Effect on 
Admissibility-Proof National Criminal Justice 
 
This first key-finding of this thesis is that very few of the multitude of published 
complementarity models are strictly applicable to the complementarity system established 
within Article 17 of the Rome Statute. The introduction defined complementarity models as 
accounts of the legal and factual requirements that States must meet in order to retain 
jurisdiction of cases amounting to core international crimes that are within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC: it equally refers to the legal and factual requirements that the ICC is expected to 
impose on those States that enter into its jurisdiction.2 These models have largely focused on 
the extent to which States should implement or ‘mirror’ the provisions of the Rome Statute 
into their national legal framework of criminal justice for core international crimes, covering 
procedural dimensions of due process, fair trial standards and general principles of criminal 
law, as well as substantive dimensions of crimes and liabilities and even sentencing 
provisions. Influential trends have also emerged, critiquing the somewhat blind reverence to 
the Rome Statute, to challenge the applicability of the Rome Statute’s operational parts to 
States in their national criminal justice practices and to refine the interpretation of the 
procedural and substantive legal requirements of national justice systems according to textual 
                                                
1 Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled 
‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’ (Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal 
Judgment) [2014] ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/11-01/11 OA4, 21 May 2014. Separate opinion of Judge 
Sang-Hyun Song, Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 
2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’ (Gaddafi Admissibility 
Appeal Judgment: Separate opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song) [2014] ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/11-01/11 
OA4, 21 May 2014; Dissenting opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the 
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’ (Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka) 
[2014] ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/11-01/11 OA4, 21 May 2014. 
2 See Chapter 1, Section 1.1 
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analysis of the provisions of Article 17. Largely in favour of legal pluralism, they have 
argued that the Rome Statute imposes scant due process protections to defendants, that States 
need only to apply whatever legislation that they have in place at the time that they open an 
investigation and that national sentencing structures can serve as a guide to admissibility, 
referred to either as ‘polymorphic repression’ or ‘sentencing theory.’  
 
The practice of the ICC has qualified significant claims of each of these models, despite its 
limited determinations of the two admissibility tests of willingness and ability. Most notably, 
to the detriment of the mirror-thesis proponents, the Pre-Trial Chambers have asserted that 
they will determine the ability of a State to carry out criminal proceedings on the basis of the 
relevant national system and procedures, thereby evaluating the ability of the State to 
function according to whatever national substantive and procedural laws that are applicable 
to the case at hand,3 rather than by internationally recognised human rights, or by the 
Statute’s operational text. This poses a partial blow to those aiming for national legal reforms 
to raise or bring States criminal justice systems into line with the ICC Statute or international 
human rights treaties. It is not however, complete victory for Mégret’s notion of ‘whatever 
law is in place at the time’ as the existence of legal bars to prosecution or to the pursuit of the 
case at hand may still render the case admissible to the ICC, either on grounds of the 
unavailability of the system, or more likely, on the basis that the State is no longer able to 
actively pursue the case.   
 
However, as the literature review had identified two major trends of advocacy, one engaging 
with the criminal procedural requirements of States law and practice, and the other engaging 
with its substantive framework, the conclusion will return to this format to draw these threads 
together. Within the procedural domain, two opposing models of complementarity focused on 
due process protections, rather than on evidentiary requirements: those in favour of vertical 
harmonisation or mirroring, such as Ellis, O’Donaghue and Rigney, as well as several NGOs 
have argued that the complementarity system of the ICC gives preference to States that are 
fully compliant with the principles of due process recognised by international law, or as 
defined by the Rome Statute.4 On the other side of the spectrum, Heller, Mégret and Carnero-
Rojo have argued that the ICC Statute actually imposes scant due process requirements on 
                                                
3 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) 
[2013] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11, 31 May 2013 [100]. 
4 Introduction, Section 3 
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States national practices, and that such protections generally exist only in circumstances 
where the abuse of due process protections makes it more difficult to convict the accused 
person or defendant. Despite what I refer to as the hypnotic attraction of the mirror thesis, 
this thesis has shown that the text of the Statute as well as the broader sources of applicable 
law 5  do not support a blanket application of the mirror thesis, while equally, the 
jurisprudence of the ICC has not fully vindicated the restrictive interpretation of Heller.  
 
1.1. Fair-Trial Considerations Must Be Relevant to Admissibility Criteria 
Instead, having followed the Statute’s rules of interpretation, the thesis has reinforced the 
core findings of Kevin Jon Heller,6 that the formulation and location of the phrase ‘principles 
of due process recognised by international law’ within Article 17(2) restricts its applicability 
to the specific admissibility test of unwillingness and the three specific criteria.7 Building on 
Heller’s argument, this thesis incorporated the Pre-Trial admissibility decisions of Gaddafi 
and Al-Senussi which engaged with the scope of due process protections afforded to suspects 
undergoing admissibility challenges, 8 and compared the admissibility restrictions imposed on 
international courts with jurisdiction over fair-trial violations, such as the requirement of the 
exhaustion of domestic remedy.9 Turning to the scope of Article 21(3) to super-impose due 
process principles into the entirety of the admissibility criteria,10 it similarly found it 
unconvincing that the ‘human rights consistency test’ could apply in order to empower the 
ICC to seize jurisdiction solely on the grounds that a State had violated due process rights of 
the accused to the detriment of the individual, in the absence of a ‘provision, rule or principle 
that, under Article 21(a) to (c) of the Statute, could be applicable to the issue at hand.’11 This 
has been articulated by the Chambers in two ways: first, the Appeals Chamber has found that 
                                                
5 See Chapter 1 
6 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255. 
7 Chapter 4, Section 1.1 
8 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) (n 3); 
Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) 
[2013] Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, 11 October 2013. 
9 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 Article 35(1); 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1966 Article 41(1)(c); American Convention of Human 
Rights 1969 Article 41(1)(a); African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 Article 50. 
10 See Chapter 1 
11 Chapter 4, section 1.3, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,  Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing (Witness-
Proofing Decision: Lubanga) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06-679, 08 November 2006. 
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alleged prejudices and violations against a suspect or accused person must be relevant to the 
criteria of Article 17 in order to be applicable,12 and second, the Pre-Trial Chambers have 
elaborated upon this, accepting that fair trial ‘irregularities’ may be taken into account where 
they ‘may constitute relevant indicators of one or more of the scenarios described in Article 
17(2) or (3) of the Statute.’13 
 
Through analysis of the use of sources as well as the willingness of the Chambers to 
introduce the due process concerns of the different parties into its decisions, this thesis has 
shown that the Court will invite or accept into its record, a broad base of materials and facts 
that are grounded in due process rules and principles, which it will then analyse according to 
the indicators and criteria of admissibility. In part, this can be attributed to the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, where Rule 51 invited States to provide information that shows that 
its courts meet internationally recognised human rights for this eponymous fair trial right, 
without including any of the other specific criteria on willingness or inability. Despite the 
priority given to the independence and impartiality of national judicial systems, the Pre-Trial 
Chambers have incorporated many of the submissions of the parties that allege violations or 
irregularities of due process, both in general where there may be no explicit connection to the 
case at hand, as well as in the direct circumstances of the case at hand. This can be visualised 
as a pyramid, where the broad sweep of materials alleging fair trial irregularities and possible 
violations form its base and where, through a somewhat strict interpretation of Article 17(2) 
and (3) the materials are narrowed down to a layer of contextual information which can be 
further refined until only those case-specific facts or allegations remain, until the tip of the 
pyramid emerges with clear attributions of facts to the specific circumstances of the case at 
hand.14 
 
The thesis elaborated two further obstacles to the mirroring of internationally recognised due 
process into the text of Article 17(2) and (3). The first obstacle has arisen in the threshold 
requirement of Article 17(1) which requires States be genuinely willing and able to pursue 
criminal justice in the situation or case at hand, rather than willing and able to fairly pursue 
                                                
12Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 
2009 on the Admissibility of the Case” (Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Katanga) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-
01/04- 01/07-1497 OA8, 25 September 2009, [113]. 
13 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 
8). 
14 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 3) [242] 
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criminal justice.15 The second barrier occurs pursuant to the qualifying clauses of Article 
17(2)(b) and (c) which require that the undue delay or the loss of independence be 
inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to justice,16 which has been understood as 
imposing a punitive, sentence-focused our outcome driven interpretation of the meaning of 
justice. In seeking to address the first obstacle, the thesis found that, despite the pre-eminence 
of international principles and rules that require the process of criminal justice to be fair, 
rather than solely outcome-driven, the Court has found it more favourable to follow 
arguments that States perform genuinely rather than fairly in exercising jurisdiction over ICC 
crimes. Turning to the second obstacle, the purposive requirement of Article 17(2)(b) and (c) 
demands that once an unjustified delay or a loss of independence or impartiality is 
determined, it must be found, in the circumstances, to be inconsistent with the intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice.17 While the ICC has yet to authoritatively examine either 
criteria, it is plausible to contend that this feature of intent could be applied to further restrict 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, due to the difficulty that the OTP, as well as victims counsel may face 
to obtain sufficient facts and evidence to establish intent in this regard: efforts to do so, 
particularly by those who favour the prevalence of State sovereignty, should be tempered by 
the accepted role of the ICC to reduce impunity. 
 
Turning to the applicability of international human rights laws, rules or principles within 
Article 17(3) and the specific criteria of inability – obtaining the accused,18 obtaining 
evidence and testimony 19  and otherwise unavailable 20 – this thesis has noted several 
qualifications from the emerging practice of the Court, in the cases of Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi. The first is that while the construction of the common requirement of ability, as 
either the total or substantial collapse of the national judicial system or its otherwise 
unavailability, shares recognisable features with fair trial requirements such as effective 
remedy and the provision of adequate resources, the PTC’s early analysis has not drawn on 
these concepts.21 Instead, it has taken the existing national legal system and its procedures as 
its epicentre and framework upon which it will analyse the requirements of the ability 
                                                
15 Chapter 2 and 4.  
16 Section 5, Chapter 4 
17 Section 3.1; 3.1.4; 4, Chapter 4 
18 Section 5, Chapter 5 
19 Section 6, Chapter 5 
20 Section 7, Chapter 5 
21 Chapter 5, Section 3.1.2 
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criteria. This means that the ability of the national judicial system will be assessed by its own 
legal framework rather than according to external, international laws, including allegations of 
fair trial violations or irregularities. An example of this practice emerged in the Gaddafi and 
Al-Senussi Admissibility Decisions, where the PTC considered whether the national laws 
may function as procedural bars to the domestic trials against both men from proceeding, on 
the basis of a national fair trial protection that prevents an investigation from proceeding to 
trial where the accused is unable to secure legal representation. In its analysis, the PTC 
eventually concluded that, where such an outcome was reached, it would be more accurate to 
conclude that the case had become inactive and therefore that the case was admissible under 
Article 17(1), rather than that the State was unable to proceed and was therefore admissible 
under Article 17(3). Equally, the early practices of the PTC has shown that while it is 
concerned with the process in which the accused is obtained, or the provenance of the 
evidence, it has assessed such processes according to national law and has prioritised 
determinations of the sufficient control over the accused and the detention facilities as well as 
the probative value of the evidence obtained.  
 
One exception, which was not adequately foreseen by the academic community, but which 
was demonstrated in this thesis, is the importance that the PTC have placed on the 
requirement for adequate and specific witness protection measures, in order to ensure that 
both parties can obtain the necessary testimony.22 Ironically, in Gaddafi, the PTC considered 
that UNSMIL reports of torture and mistreatment of conflict-related detainees, including 
senior former officials had a direct bearing on the ability to obtain witness testimony, on the 
grounds that it was deterring defence witnesses from coming forward, and would exclude the 
ability to obtain testimony from those who had been tortured or killed from entering the 
investigation or trial docket. Defined as an inability to obtain control over and provide 
adequate witness protection, the PTC found this sufficient to significantly reduce the capacity 
of the Libyan authorities to obtain necessary testimony. In Al-Senussi however, it considered 
the precarious security situation of witnesses to be relevant to its conclusions on ability but 
that by itself, it was insufficient to render the State as unable. 
 
These factors have driven the discomforting conclusion that internationally recognised due 
process principles do not trump the somewhat conservative status of the statutory provisions 
                                                
22 Chapter 5, Section 6.4 
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on the willingness and ability of States to exercise jurisdiction, but that any such violation 
must be found applicable to the specific features of the case or situation under the ICC’s 
scrutiny.  
 
1.2. The Legal Characterisation of Conduct is Not Determinative of Admissibility 
Similar albeit qualified conclusions must also be reached in addressing the complementarity 
proposals that advocate for the reform of States substantive criminal laws to reflect or mirror 
the crimes of the ICC Statute. An overwhelming majority of publicists have considered it to 
be an imperative of State action to capture, define and apply international crime 
nomenclature in their national laws: this has consistently been wrapped up in the language of 
complementarity, with hints or veiled threats of the loss of jurisdiction to the ICC where the 
national law books remain without the ICC’s full list of crimes, liabilities and general 
principles. There are certainly compelling reasons why criminal justice systems may want to 
increase the list of prohibited acts, and it is certainly foreseeable that admissibility could be 
found where the law books are woefully silent on conduct proscribed by the ICC Statute, or 
that provide procedural bars, but there are also persuasive reasons to make only light touches 
of adjustment.  
 
The thesis has reiterated the obvious features if the ICC Statute as well as its differences from 
its international court brethren. Unlike other international treaties with which the ICC Statute 
shares many substantive features, the Statute does not oblige States to adopt its substantive or 
operational parts, a status it imposes only on cooperation and judicial assistance: nor does it 
refer to the legal characterisation of crimes in the admissibility criteria, referring instead to 
the conduct of the suspects or accused persons. Whereas the Court has been prudent in its 
assessment of national fair trial practices during admissibility, it has been forthright in its 
declarations of applicable substantive law. In addition to its declaration that admissibility 
should be determined according to the national legal framework and practice, it has 
steadfastly rejected any interpretation that the Statute imposes or requires States to adopt and 
apply the Rome Statute crimes to those it has identified as bearing individual criminal 
responsibility.23  Developed as part of the admissibility test to determine if States are 
investigating the same ‘cases’ or ‘incidents’ as the ICC in the disputed ‘same person same 
                                                
23 Chapter 2, section 6.4 
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conduct’ test24 the PTC developed its reasoning on the legal characterisation of conduct to 
affirm that the application of international crime labels is ‘not determinative of an 
admissibility challenge’25 whereby ‘assessment of domestic proceedings should focus on the 
alleged conduct and not its legal characterisation.’26  
 
This is at odds with the message driven by authors such as Bekou, who argues that States 
need to incorporate the core ICC crimes in order to investigate and prosecute within the 
complementarity regime.27 It is contrasts sharply with the breadth of Model Laws, popularly 
issued by intergovernmental organisations and research institutes in the euphoria of the 
adoption and entry into force of the Rome Statute, revived in 2011 by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat in a high-profile cooperation agreement with the ICC to provide technical 
assistance to Commonwealth States that had not implemented the substantive parts of the 
Statute, as well as the parts on cooperation. While I critique this use of the ICC’s powers in 
this instance in Section 4.6, and its contradiction with the judicial powers of the ICC, it is 
worth noting that the insistence on the mirroring of ICC crimes continues to be an elite 
priority.  
 
I would like to argue forcefully against such a blanket adoption of substantive law, 
particularly in low-resourced, transitional or post-conflict States, but this would be a separate 
thesis topic. Instead I will restrict my critique to some observations of such ‘vertical 
levitation’ where such arguments attempt to cajole States into significant legal reforms 
without providing adequate attention to the resources that such reforms require in order to 
become operational, in national judicial environments that are starkly different to the Hague. 
This is largely restricted to States that may come under the jurisdiction of the ICC, with 
conflicts or widespread and systematic violations that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Claims that it is easier or more thorough to import the ICC crimes to national law are often 
                                                
24 See Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka [2014] ICC Appeals 
Chamber ICC-01/11-01/11 OA4, 21 May 2014 (n 1) [47–58]. 
25 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 3) [24] 
26 Ibid [85] 
27 Olympia Bekou, ‘In the Hands of the State: Implementing Legislation and Complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn 
and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to 
Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); ‘Crimes at Crossroads Incorporating International Crimes at the 
National Level’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 677; Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou and 
Annika Jones, ‘Complementarity After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools’ (2010) 2 
Göttingen Journal of International Law 791; Olympia Bekou and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Realising the Potential of the 
International Criminal Court: The African Experience’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 499. 
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subjective and overly centralised, favouring ICC lawyers rather than criminal prosecutors in 
the midst of a conflict. Notwithstanding the complications that such legal reforms can impose 
on non-retroactivity, when they are adopted mid-way or post conflict, as for example 
occurred in Bosnia and Uganda, or was mooted in Kenya, the legislative process as well as 
the adoption and implementation of new or unfamiliar laws can cause delays and errors when 
they are implemented to deal with immediate cases.28 They require adaptations in the work 
processes of criminal investigators, prosecutors, judges, defence counsel and clerks, from 
fact—finding, evidence-gathering and evaluation, to the construction of cases that can prove 
the existence of each of the elements of crimes and liabilities, and it requires significant 
education and outreach to ensure that a minimum public awareness exists about the new legal 
technicalities, and they nearly always require far more investment and aid than is ever 
planned or considered.  
 
Several of these resource challenges were explored at length in the admissibility challenges in 
the cases of Gaddafi and Al Senussi, where the PTC acknowledged the substantial challenges 
faced by Libya, as a transitional State in the aftermath of a bloody conflict that followed 
decades of institutional violence, to secure detention facilities, to gather evidence and 
testimony, to prepare and pursue investigations, under teams of prosecutors and judges with 
sufficient independence and impartiality but also knowledge of criminal law and procedure. 
Within this environment, promises that the customary international law status of the ICC’s 
crimes could over-ride domestic law and ensure the best type of justice appear to become 
ludicrous. 
 
Arguably, many of these challenges may become minimised where legislation is adopted as a 
preventative measure and is done so with careful consideration of the national legal 
environment, as the law can become embedded into the legal community. However, such 
laws can also remain a Pandora’s box, where the full force of its power becomes apparent 
once it is opened for implementation. Until there is more empirical research on the effects of 
such legal reforms on the pursuit of criminal justice for ICC crimes, these critiques and 
                                                
28 The case-load in Uganda is an example whereby substantial legal reform on substance (including an ICC Act 
to implement crimes against humanity, genocide to supplement the Geneva Conventions Act of 1963, as well as 
Amnesty laws) overlooked the need for adequate procedural laws and rules. This led to the first case before the 
International Crimes Division of the High Court against Thomas Kwoyelo, being suspended upon appeal that 
the accused was eligible for amnesty. 
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defences remain somewhat hollow, based in part on (well-informed) anecdotal observation 
and intuition, which is ultimately an unsatisfying outcome. 
1.3. Complementarity Models Overlooked the Importance of Article 17(1) 
The third notable feature of the Court’s admissibility practice, which is absent from the 
models of complementarity, is its obvious adherence to the sequence of Article 17.29 Its 
established practice has been to move sequentially through Article 17, where with the 
exception of the two Libya cases, all preceding admissibility challenges or proprio motu 
evaluations by the Court have been rendered on the basis of the status of national proceedings 
or their similitude to the subject matter of the ICC’s investigation of case. Regulated by the 
provisions of Article 17(1), the Court’s practice has led to a far greater emphasis being placed 
on the development of tests that determine the status of national proceedings and their 
similitude to the ICC’s proceedings. This was largely unforeseen by those engaging in debate 
on the merits of national legal reform: this thesis sought to avoid this pitfall, by following the 
sequence of Article 17, through which it has been possible to clearly demonstrate the 
significance afforded to Article 17(1) in the early practice of the ICC.  
 
2. Emerging Tests and Indicators of ‘Admissibility-Proof’ Practice 
This thesis has shown that the ICC will determine admissibility on the basis of existing 
national laws and practices, which will require greater comparative analysis between the legal 
requirements of a diverse array of national laws and practices and the ICC Statute. But this 
will occur only once the ICC is satisfied that the State’s case/s overlap with those being 
pursued by the Office of the Prosecutor: the jurisprudence of ICC has consistently 
emphasised the importance of 17(1) and indeed most admissibility challenges or proprio 
motu reviews have not passed this phase of assessment, meaning that the tests and principles 
are far more developed here than in willingness and ability. Until States are better informed 
of the complementarity system and the approach of the ICC, the application of Article 17(1) 
tests of activity, timeliness, case selection and similitude between national and ICC efforts 
are more likely to dominate the complementarity system. 
 
                                                
29 See Chapter 2, section 3.1; 5.1; Chapter 3  
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Through analysis of the admissibility jurisprudence of the Court, this thesis has gone beyond 
clarification of the types of complementarity models that will be applicable before the ICC, to 
establish its emergent tests, which can serve as guidance to national criminal justice actors. 
They deviate from the established discourse on complementarity: whereas the Court has 
established quite strict tests on the similitude between national cases and their ICC 
counterparts as governed by Article 17(1), it has demonstrated significant latitude and 
deference to the qualities of national criminal justice that are exerted over such cases, by 
accepting that the willingness and ability of national judicial systems to exercise their duties 
in the specific cases under review will be assessed according to national criminal laws and 
practice. 
2.1. Temporal Features of Admissibility Challenges 
Explored in Chapter 2 and 5, the temporal features of complementarity have been quite 
controversial. The least contentious component emerged in the proprio-motu review of the 
admissibility of the cases against the six indicted Lords Resistance Army leaders in the 
Ugandan situation, following national efforts to establish national infrastructure to adjudicate 
the criminal conduct of certain levels of perpetrators. In this review, the PTC decided that 
admissibility should be considered in real-time, that is, that the process of reviewing 
admissibility must occur based on the available facts of the time, not on prospective plans, 
policies or laws. In Al Senussi this was applied to the assessment of ability, where Libyan 
criminal procedural law imposes a procedural bar on cases proceeding to trial where the 
accused does not have legal representation. While the PTC accepted that this could place an 
impediment on the ability of Libya to proceed, where it would become inactive and 
subsequently the case would become admissible to the ICC, it was not yet the reality, and that 
the Chamber cannot base its decision on the basis of possible future facts.30 
 
Similarly, in the Uganda admissibility decision, the PTC also considered that admissibility 
should be an on-going process of the pre-trial phase, subject to the evolution of the relevant 
factual scenarios.31 This facet of review, following the evolution of the factual scenario was 
developed in the Gaddafi Admissibility Decision and the Appeal Judgment, where the 
                                                
30 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 
8) [194]. 
31 Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute (Kony Admissibility Decision) 
[2009] ICC Pre Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/04-01/05-379, 10 March 2009 [27–28]. 
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majority left the door ajar for a renewed admissibility appeal, where the factual 
circumstances upon which the appeal was rejected have changed sufficiently. 
 
The Appeals Chamber judgment in Gaddafi also identified ancillary factors of timing, where 
the Chambers warned Libya of its responsibility to ensure that the timing of its admissibility 
challenges be balanced between the statutory requirement to do so at the earliest possible 
moment, with the need to refrain from acting prematurely, before it has gathered sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the Court that it is active as well as willing and able,32 arguing that: 
‘In this regard, admissibility proceedings should not be used as a mechanism or 
process through which a State may gradually inform the Court, over time and as its 
investigation progresses, as to the steps it is taking to investigate a case.’33  
 
A second temporal factor was also introduced into the judicial record of the Court in the 
Gaddafi Appeal Judgement, where the majority noted that the timeliness of admissibility 
proceedings requires balancing between the due process that should be afforded to the 
appealing party to provide evidence substantiating its challenge, with the suspensive effect 
that the admissibility challenge has on the ICC’s own investigation, noting that ultimately, 
the objective of the ICC to reduce impunity must mean that such procedures are not unduly 
lengthy.34 
 
Equally, in the fraught admissibility challenge in the situation of Kenya, the use of the 
admissibility proceedings, as well as other statutory provisions, such as the Article 16 
deferral mechanism and Article 93(10) requests for assistance, appear to be a rather more 
pernicious attempt to delay the development of the ICC’s own proceedings and shield the 
named persons from criminal accountability, rather than being reflective of the willingness 
and ability of the State to ensure that the national judicial system had the necessary 
mechanisms to investigate the two ICC cases. 
 
                                                
32 Appeals Chamber, ‘Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment’.(n 1) [164]  
33 Ibid, [165] 
34 Ibid, [169-178] 
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2.2. Evidence and Sources for Admissibility Challenges 
The sources, qualities and probative value of admissibility evidence has also been explored in 
the early practice of the ICC, although it remains far from being settled or refined, while the 
sources and probity of evidence that the Prosecutor may rely on during preliminary 
examination has also come under scrutiny. Both affect national criminal justice mechanisms 
but for slightly different reasons: at the outset of the ICC’s preliminary examinations, the 
Prosecutor has relied heavily on open source, public domain documents, primarily drawn 
from UN agencies and international NGOs.35 This means that, while the procedural rules 
ensure that States are informed of the preliminary inquiry, the first level of identification of 
conduct and possible suspects and groups may largely be derived from the findings of 
external agencies and bodies, which may well follow thematic objectives and strategies that 
are different to the ICC. While the deficiencies of this approach can be ironed out during 
investigation, where the threshold of proof rises from a ‘reasonable basis’ to what is 
emerging as a ‘sufficiency’ threshold36 the heavy reliance on documentation and fact-finding 
by external bodies, rather than by ICC Investigators, subjects the ICC to a breadth of 
differing investigative standards, methods and objectives that must then be corrected at the 
point in which the examinations proceeds to investigation. 
 
The Court has recognised that the purpose of evidence within admissibility challenges 
remains distinct from the other judicial steps that the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers undertake, 
as a process that requires the ICC to examine whether the evidence shows that domestic 
authorities are taking ‘concrete and progressive steps to investigate or prosecute the same 
case that is before the ICC’37 to a ‘sufficient degree of specificity and probative value’38 
which is distinct burden of proof to the other procedures that occur at the pre-trial stage, such 
as the issuing of warrants of arrest, or the confirmation of charges. This may include 
directions, orders, decisions, internal reports, updates, notifications or case file submissions 
that arise from the national investigation and which demonstrates ‘concrete and progressive 
                                                
35 See Chapter 2, Section 4.2 
36 See Chapter 2, Section 4.3 
37 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 3) [54] 
38 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka,  Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’ (Dissenting 
Opinion, Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Ruto, Kosgey, Sang) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 
August 2011.[61]  
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steps’ in its domestic investigation of the ‘case’ under scrutiny by the ICC. However, its 
procedure to allow and assess such submissions of evidence was heavily contested by Libya 
in the Gaddafi case,39 where the approach taken by the PTC was criticised in the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Ušacka in the Appeal judgment. In her analysis of the evidentiary standards 
of admissibility, Judge Ušacka considered the impact of the different admissibility 
participants on the use of evidence and burden of proof, where she disagreed with the PTC’s 
decision to impose the burden of proof on Libya, as the admissibility appellant, to 
substantiate that the ICC’s case was inadmissible. She considered that each participant 
(Office of the Prosecutor, State, Defence, Victims Counsel) may possess materials and 
information that is potentially relevant and that they should be required by the OTC to share 
this with the Court in order to give effect to complementarity. She further argued that the sui 
generis nature of the admissibility proceedings require that evidence and materials be taken at 
face value in their expression of the States intent to investigate the case, rather than undergo 
evaluation to determine any level of their probative value (the PTC has chosen ‘sufficiency’ 
as its marker).40 
 
The Pre-Trial Chambers had rejected significant proportions of the batches of evidence 
submitted by Libya, for lacking probative value or for failing to provide credible information 
that investigate steps were being undertaken and that they were coherent with the subject 
matter of the ICC’s case and the admissibility requirements of willingness and ability. The 
Court has also been critical of the use of evidence summaries rather than the actual evidence 
and its record, where in Al-Senussi, it considered the quality of the summaries to be 
‘fragmented and de-contextualised,’ providing a scant level of detail that taken together 
failed to ‘give an intelligible overview of the factual allegations.’41 In assessing the PTC’s 
analysis of the same or similar witness summaries in Gaddafi, the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the PTC’s approach to assess the contents of the summaries, rather than their 
authenticity and that they were correct to raise concerns over the question of the accuracy of 
the summaries to the original testimonies.42 
                                                
39 The Government of Libya’s Appeal against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case 
against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’ (Admissibility Appeal: Gaddafi), ICC-01/11-01/11-350, 07 June 2013 [120–
140]. 
40Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka (n 24) [60–63]. 
41 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al Senussi (Admissibility Decision: Al-Senussi) (n 
8) [154]. 
42 Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment (n 1) [126]. 
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In accepting this approach, the majority view of the appeals chamber is more persuasive than 
the dissenting opinion, but one feature of the PTC that warrants criticism is, in my view, their 
omission to respond to Libya’s request to visit the investigative team in Tripoli in order to 
have access to the complete case file. While the offer undoubtedly came at an advanced stage 
of the admissibility challenge, and could have reduced the expeditiousness of the challenge,43 
such rigidity and formalism would appear to be inconsistent with the PTC’s acceptance of the 
post conflict transitional reality that the government and state criminal justice facilities 
operated under, as well as its acknowledgment of the ‘rapid strides’ taken towards 
establishing sufficient and necessary criminal justice infrastructure and resources to 
adjudicate this and other cases. This serves to further distance the ICC from its national 
judicial colleagues and has done little to dissipate allegations of a Court of diplomats and 
international criminal justice dilettantes, rather than a confident and professional international 
criminal court versed in the judicial exigencies of its situation States. 
 
However, despite the dissenting opinion of Judge Ušacka, the Court continues to find that 
evidence submitted to substantiate admissibility challenges must be specific to the case at 
hand, and that factual indicators may be relevant to more than one of the admissibility 
criteria, where for example, evidence of insufficient steps in an investigation could be 
factually relevant for both inability (to obtain evidence for example) as well as unwillingness 
(through shielding). 
2.3. Core Dimensions of Admissibility Challenges: the case or incident, the suspect 
and the conduct 
The thesis also chartered the development of the ICC’s efforts to define the subject matter of 
the admissibility challenge, in clarification of the ambiguous referencing to the ‘the case,’ 
‘the person’ and ‘conduct’ in the three scenarios of Article 17(1) where national judicial 
activity would render ICC pursuit of adjudication to be inadmissible.44 The early decisions 
quickly confirmed that the national criminal justice system must be actively engaged in order 
for the remaining admissibility criteria to be considered, but contrary to the expectations or 
                                                
43 The Appeals Chamber considered that the Court must be cognizant of the need for expeditious proceedings, 
without undue delay, and accepted that the PTC had taken sufficient account of the rapidly evolving 
circumstances in Libya. See Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment (n 1) [169-178].  
44 See Chapter 2, Section 5 
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hopes of many mirror-theorists, the ICC rightly limited the scope of its inquiry into the 
judicial activity of the State which concerns the subject matter of the ICC’s own inquiries. 
This has been defined as an investigation of the ICC, where admissibility is challenged before 
the investigation has defined clear suspects and conduct, and a case of the ICC, subsequent to 
the issuance of a warrant of arrest or other measure which define the parameters of a potential 
criminal crime. These parameters consist of the suspect and the conduct that forms the object 
of reference. Whereas the inclusion of the suspect has been uncontested,45 the scope of the 
‘conduct’ has proven contentious and divisive on the degree of similitude that is required 
between the conduct established by the ICC and that of the State, and the extent to which the 
State must substantiate this, which has been defined as existing between ‘discreet aspects’ of 
the national case and its ‘actual contours.’ The Court’s exclusive reliance on conduct as the 
determinative element of the subject matter of the case has also been challenged.46  
 
Litigation over the extent of the overlap of attributed conduct between the ICC’s case and the 
national one has generated a series of dicta that may inform national criminal justice actors. 
The first dicta declared that States must demonstrate that they are investigating the ‘same 
person and same conduct’ of the case before the ICC.47 An attempt to contest this was 
subsequently made in Katanga, on the basis that the national investigation overlapped with 
the ICC’s charges on one count, but this was rejected on the basis that the national 
investigation had ceased to be active. In Gaddafi, the State contested that the ‘same conduct’ 
test should in fact require ‘substantially the same conduct’ which could consist of an overlap 
of incidents and underlying facts.48 The PTC responded by requiring a similitude between the 
underlying conduct of the States investigation with the ICC’s, defined in case at hand within 
the warrant of arrest and decision, but that the same conduct should not mean ‘exactly the 
same acts.’49 The Appeals Chamber developed this by asserting that the extent of overlap or 
‘sameness’ will depend on the facts of the specific case, where identical underlying incidents 
would lead to inadmissibility, and where no underlying incidents would amount to a totally 
                                                
45 See Chapter 2, Section 5.5 
46 Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment: Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka (n 24). [47-58] 
47 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Warrant of Arrest, (Warrant of Arrest Decision: Lubanga) [2006] ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06, 
10 February 2006 5 [31]. 
48 Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi (Libya’s Further Submissions: Gaddafi Admissibility) Government of Libya ICC-01/11-01/11-
285-Red2, 23 January 2013 [27]. 
49 Gaddafi Admissibility Decision (n 3) [83] 
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different case and would therefore be admissible. In an effort to provide guidance on the 
expansive grey zone between these two extremes, the Chambers considered that the degree of 
overlap should be substantial in order that the case be inadmissible. One exception to this was 
foreseen, where a small overlap may exist, but where the overlapping or substantially similar 
conduct of the national case would form the crux of the ICC’s case.50   
 
2.4. ICC Case Selection Reduces the Quantity of National Cases 
The final essential and perhaps overlooked clarification concerning the complementarity of 
cases between the ICC and national jurisdictions is that of case selection by the ICC, 
constructed largely through the concept of gravity, and implemented as an additional 
safeguard to filter out peripheral cases from the courtrooms of the ICC.51 This thesis explored 
the contours and contradictions of the ICC’s case selection criteria, through its policies, 
preliminary examination reports and jurisprudence to conclude that a minimal level of 
predictability existed in the application of selection criteria by the Office of the Prosecutor, 
and that the criteria themselves provided some certainty to States to define the level of 
threshold of cases that could be considered by the ICC as the most serious.  
 
By following such a process, it argued that the practice of case selection by the ICC can 
inform the exercise of national criminal justice in post-atrocity countries, including national 
case selection strategies,52 the adoption of alternative or other justice measures53 as well as 
the allocation of resources to criminal accountability. It finds that States can reasonably 
establish accountability policies that differentiate between different types of accountability 
mechanisms and remain outside of the judicial contours of the ICC, by prioritising those 
cases that satisfy the ICC’s selection criteria for criminal prosecution, and adopting 
                                                
50 Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Judgment (n 1) [71-73] 
51 See Chapter 3. 
52 Two routes appear to have emerged: (1) deferral to ICC selection (with some type of forum sharing): Uganda, 
DRC, CAR, Cote d’Ivore, supposedly Guinea; (2) Challenge to ICC selection/forum-preservation: Libya, 
Kenya; while a third could be suggested where the ICC selection criteria be used as a framework to prevent ICC 
intervention (a version of model 2) which seems to be occurring in Colombia and Guinea.  
53 As addressed elsewhere, States will remain in compliance with the Rome Statute if the cases that fall below 
the ICC’s selection threshold are addressed through other accountability measures.  See Ambos – Alternatives 
Carsten Stahn, ‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines 
for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 3 J Int Criminal Justice 695; Gregory S Gordon, ‘Complementarity 
and Alternative Forms of Justice: A New Test for ICC Admissibility’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El 
Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge 
University Press 2011); FICHL, ‘Abbreviated Criminal Procedures for Core International Crimes Cases’. 
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whichever alternative mechanisms best suited its national reconciliation or transitional 
requirements for those cases or suspects outside this threshold.   
 
This thesis has thus far demonstrated the essential qualities and quantities that national 
criminal justice must meet in order to satisfy the complementarity system of the ICC. This 
zone of national criminal justice performance is significantly lower than the expectations and 
aspirations of many publicists and advocates, and it creates tensions with as well as 
contradictions to several obligations and standards of international human rights treaties, 
which are directly relevant to the positive dimensions of the complementarity system. 
 
3. Tensions and Contradictions with International Human Rights Treaties and Treaty 
Bodies 
The similarity between the operational parts of the Rome Statute and other international 
treaties with the status of external sources of applicable law under article 21(1)(b)54 has been 
widely accepted and even posited as justification or rationalisation for many of the mirror-
thesis proponents. The gist of their argument has been that if the ICC Statute reiterates the 
obligations that States may otherwise have, then the States should be reminded and cajoled 
into fulfilling them. This is undoubtedly a noble and prudent enterprise, but an attempt to 
squeeze the two together under the guise of the requirements of complementarity is 
inaccurate. International treaties are not wet cement that can be combined or mixed together 
to fill or reinforce gaps in the wall of international obligations. Nor is the ICC a cuckoo child 
of the other international treaties, to be given the obligations and duties of other treaties as if 
its own, to enforce and impose. Metaphors aside, the ICC Statute does not live up to the 
extremely high, human rights and accountability expectations that surrounded it from its 
negotiation and signature until its entry into force.  
 
The thesis has reiterated that the role of the admissibility procedure and of complementarity 
more broadly, is to allocate jurisdiction between the ICC as an international criminal tribunal 
and relevant national counterparts, and that similar to other international treaties, it can 
impose procedural bars that may limit its functions. In some areas however, this thesis has 
shown that the ICC will impose lower requirements of States than international human rights 
                                                
54 See Chapter 1 
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bodies and that it may even stand silent where jus cogens rights are being violated. One such 
example of lowered practices can be seen in the length of the ICC’s own investigations, 
prosecutions and trials, as well as its interpretation of justified delays. While international 
human rights jurisprudence has steadfastly avoided numerical gradation of justified to 
unjustified delay, the practice of the ICC itself, and the frequent assertions by the Prosecutor 
that States should not be held to a higher standard than the Court when it comes to the length 
of proceedings55 may serve to expand the threshold of justified delay.  
 
Perhaps the most significant or challenging tension between the ICC’s complementarity 
system and international human rights treaties concerns the limited applicability of fair trial 
protections to the admissibility procedure. While Rob Cryer, Haken Friman and Darryl 
Robinson are technically correct to distinguish the subject matter of the ICC from a human 
rights court and to assert that these bodies and not the ICC should deal with fair trial 
violations, it is resoundingly distasteful to the principles upon which the ICC is founded. 
Instead of remaining silent, or waiting until a clear violation of the international fair trial 
rights of an ICC suspect or accused person who is undergoing an admissibility challenge 
occurs, such as their torture or death while in custody, this thesis considers that the adoption 
of interim measures could serve to mitigate such possibilities. 
 
Equally, the practice of case selection by the ICC and the legitimate effect that this may have 
on national criminal justice policies will need to be balanced against the right to effective 
remedy and equality before the law, as it manifests in the different treaty bodies to which the 
State may be held accountable and can be guided by established and emerging norms of 
transitional justice. Within the ICC system of complementarity, these issues are being 
comprehensively assessed and advocated in Colombia, while aspects of selection and 
prioritisation have informed criminal justice policies in DRC and Uganda.56  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the adoption of substantive and procedural laws and the 
consequential allocation of resources to ensure their effectiveness that are not connected to 
                                                
55 Prosecutor v Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Prosecution response to Application on behalf 
of the Government of Libya  pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Prosecution Response: Gaddafi 
Admissibility Challenge) ICC Office of the Prosecutor ICC-01/011-01/11, 05 June 2012. 
56 Similar challenges have also been faced by countries that have been subjected to the scrutiny of other 
contemporary international criminal tribunals, including in Bosnia and Rwanda. 
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complementarity, is unnecessary and inconsistent to the requirements of the ICC Statute. The 
early practice of the Court has shown that it is prepared to function within a plural legal order 
and that it does not require States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction as a form of mimicry 
of the ICC, but largely according to the national laws and practices in place at the time. This 
shifts the emphasis away from a heavily centralised or harmonised complementarity system 
based on the ICC’s own legal framework towards a more pluralistic system of 
complementarity. This means less emphasis on harmonising the national legal framework 
with the crimes and liabilities of the Statute and more emphasis on the selection of cases as 
well as the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction. As a concept of the ICC, and one that is 
so heavily indebted to its unique form of jurisdiction, Positive Complementarity should 
remain coherent to this zone of admissibility-proof practice. 
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